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PROVISIONING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.

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MILITARY TRANSPORT.

**MOBILIZATION AND EMBARKATION OF AN ARMY
CORPS.**

**ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE
LINES OF COMMUNICATION.**

INFORMATION IN WAR.

MILITARY EXPEDITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS.

PROVISIONING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.

BY

COLONEL GEORGE ARMAND FURSE, C.B.

(LATE OF THE BLACK WATCH).

“We have said it, and we repeat it: man is the first instrument in war, and those who occupy themselves in strengthening and nourishing him work like the rest in the defence of their country.”—LEON KIRN.



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THESE STUDIES ARE DEDICATED
TO
MY MUCH-RESPECTED FRIEND
GENERAL SIR JOHN McLEOD, G.C.B.,
IN AFFECTIONATE REMEMBRANCE
OF
THE YEARS HE WAS MY COLONEL.

PREFACE.

A STUDY of this subject should have been undertaken by one of the officers whose special business is to look after the provisioning of the troops, for the doctrine can only be expounded in a masterly manner by an individual who has had long and varied experience in this branch of the art of war. In the absence of this experience, I have fallen back on history, and have searched in the narratives of some of the past campaigns for the principles and rules which should guide the subsistence service of armies in the field.

The good of our army in the hour of action seemed to demand that some one should attempt to combat the want of interest felt for this subject. I trust I have not been too presumptuous, and that some officers may be induced to follow my studies.

G. A. FURSE.

FRENHAM VALE,
FARNHAM,

1st December, 1898.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
I. PROVISIONING ARMIES IN THE FIELD	1
II. GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS	22
III. LOUVOIS	
IV. FREDERICK THE GREAT	45
V. BONAPARTE'S CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY AND IN EGYPT, 1796-1800	58
VI. WELLINGTON AND MASSENA	75
VII. SUCHET AND DAVOUT	95
VIII. NAPOLEON'S ADVANCE ON MOSCOW	118
IX. FRENCH RETREAT FROM MOSCOW, 1812	139
X. THE CRIMEAN WAR AND THE INDIAN MUTINY ...	161
XI. THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1861-1865	186
XII. SUBSISTENCE OF THE GERMAN ARMIES IN THE WAR OF 1870-1871	215
XIII. CAMPAIGNS OF ABYSSINIA, ASHANTEE, AND THE NILE	231
XIV. VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF PROVISIONING	259
XV. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RATIONS	289
INDEX	301

PROVISIONING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.

CHAPTER I.

PROVISIONING ARMIES IN THE FIELD.

IN his desire to render his pages brilliant and alluring with descriptions of marches and battles, with exciting details of the national efforts, with the artifices of political personages and sequence of events, the historian, generally speaking, does not enter into particulars on matters which refer to the maintenance of an army in the field. Many interesting details which are so important to the military student are thus left unrecorded.

These pages leave to the historian's pen to depict the more attractive part of the great drama of war, and confine themselves to showing the efforts which must be made to provide armies on active service with regular and adequate nourishment. And here let the reader bear well in mind that, to be complete, the education of the officer must comprise a knowledge of the arts of governing and maintaining an army in every possible situation.

In all wars great battles are few and far between ; for one day's fighting there certainly will be twenty days of marching and reposing ; but whether the troops fight, march, or rest, they and their animals have to be fed. The food will also have to be in strict keeping with the temperature, with the toil endured, and with the state of over-excitement engendered by current events. It is not a question of calculating the smallest ration that a man can exist on ; he must be fed adequately in view to his achieving the maximum of exertion and being able to withstand the greatest amount of fatigue. //

Lecturing on the supply of an army in the field, the late Colonel Robert Home said, "That portion of the art of war that keeps the greatest number of bayonets in the ranks is surely not to be despised." Nevertheless, it is seldom that sufficient account is taken of the influence this subject has on the events of a campaign. No general can, however, hope to conquer unless he can insure the subsistence of his troops at all times during the operations. Although wars are full of hardships, the combatants must be preserved in health, strength, and courage, for the energy of the troops is the most important factor in battle, and on energy or food-supply will often depend the result of an engagement, which may in the end decide the fate of a campaign.

The leading principle in war is to be strongest at any given place. What largely conduces to promote this desirable superiority is feeding the troops, and feeding them regularly, for their action will be sadly impaired whenever their spirits and strength have been undermined by hunger and thirst. At the present day people are very fastidious with regard to the care of the soldier; an old conception has been revived which holds that the side which feeds its combatants adequately has twenty per cent. more chance than the other.

Another reason for attending incessantly to the subsistence of the troops is that if proper care is not observed on that point, the number of men for battle will greatly diminish. It is an old axiom that an army is strong, not in proportion to the number on its muster rolls, but in proportion to the number of men that can be put into line on the battle-field. Badly fed troops are prone to succumb to all manner of diseases, and are very liable to those epidemics which are always rife whenever there is an accumulation of men in considerable masses in a limited space.

If we take the question of supplies, and look at it from its various points of view, we shall have no doubt in admitting that it affects the condition of an army and its mobility more than the weather or the state of the roads.

The majority of military works treat on the destruction of man, whereas economy of human life in war is the aim of these pages: a diminution of sickness and mortality by a better appreciation of the necessity for looking after the soldier is our purpose. The sick and wounded, with their care and transport, constitute one of the embarrassments of a campaign, and no effort should be spared to make it as light as possible.

When either men or animals are called to do any work, the food must be proportionate to the labour. When this is not attended to, the health must suffer, and "health," as Napoleon said, "was indispensable in war, and nothing could replace its loss." *Mens sana in corpore sano* was a maxim of the Romans; courage and contempt for danger require a strong mind in a robust body, and without vigorous health no troops can achieve great things. Unfortunately, as man does not appreciate the value of wealth until he is ruined, so he does not estimate the worth of health until he falls sick.*

War must be carried out with vigour, and continuity in military operations is impossible without good food-supply. Macchiavelli, in his "Art of War," a book which was published in 1520, gives the following amongst other maxims:

"Whoever has not taken proper care to furnish himself with a store of provisions and ammunition bids fair to be vanquished without delivering a stroke."

"Men, arms, money and provisions are the sinews of war."

Without being certain of its means of subsistence, an army can undertake no important enterprise. Vauban, one of the greatest men France ever produced, held that the art of war was nothing without the art of provisioning: *L'art de la guerre n'est rien sans l'art de subsister*.

There is no denying that an immense amount of misery and distress would have been avoided in the past had this vital subject received all the attention it deserved. Death by starvation and wasting away, the devastation of many rich and smiling countries, the ruin and despair of many homes, pillage, arson, murder and the most wicked outrages and excesses to which man can descend, would not have been recorded had armies been adequately provided with the necessities of life. The first condition of human nature is to live, and by hook or by crook man will provide himself with the means to do so. As a French writer puts it: "Alas! when one is hungry one would eat the devil, if it were possible to find him." †

Loyalty itself and the best disposition of the troops have given way under necessity. To quote a single instance amongst many,

* When General Gordon was in the Sudan in 1874, he wrote: "There is now but one thing I value in the world. Its honours, they are false; its knickknacks, they are perishable and useless: whilst I live I value God's blessing, health, and you have that, as far as this world goes, you are rich."

† Georges Bertin, "La Campagne de 1814," p. 30.

in 1848, at the time of the revolution in Paris, the soldiers lacked food and money to buy it with; they accepted the provisions which were offered to them by the populace, and then cast their lot with the insurgents. Thus were confirmed the words of Maréchal de Saülx-Tavannes, "Honour and attachment will overcome the lack of pay, but never the want of bread."

The private reaps little beyond bare honour and glory; his lot on service is not an enviable one. Surely it is the duty of the officers, who derive more tangible and lasting advantages, to strive to their utmost to alleviate, as far as it lies in their power, the hardships to which soldiers are exposed whilst in a state of war.

Armies in our days act briskly and are of large dimensions—two conditions which increase the difficulty of feeding them. The maintenance of an army in the field is now considered a very complicated problem by the general staffs of all armies, by reason of the enormous number of combatants which European powers can bring into the field. It cannot be accomplished without a sound system and a body of active, intelligent, zealous, and highly educated administrative officers. No doubt, the vision of the cost and of the tremendous loss of human life makes statesmen very anxious to avoid any complications which may lead to a war, but is it not possible that their forbearance is also stimulated by the well-known difficulty of feeding and maintaining enormous masses of men in the field?

The large proportions of the armies are themselves a danger. There is a striking illustration of this in the seventeenth century. On the 11th of November, 1673, John Sobieski, at the head of twelve thousand men, had surprised a hundred thousand Turks commanded by the renowned Grand Vizier, Ahmed Kiuprili, and encamped at Choczim on the Dniester. In the following year the Turks were again in the field with an army of more than two hundred thousand men, soldiers of proved courage, led by experienced generals, and provided with a formidable train of artillery.

Sobieski had never more than forty thousand men, but he trusted that by wisdom and prudence he could make up the difference. He showed himself now a consummate commander, for he disregarded all the taunts of friends and enemies alike, and would not hazard the loss of the small force at his disposal. He rightly judged that in his adversary's difficulties lay his principal chance of success; no sneering charges of backwardness,

and even of cowardice, were able to make him depart from his cautious strategy.

At last, in a war waged in a region utterly bare of supplies, the huge proportions of the Turkish host proved their own destruction. Unsmitten though they were by the sword, the Turks withered under the blighting breath of famine and pestilence. Their ranks decreased daily, and there was no possibility of repairing the waste. Their horses perished so fast that a large portion of their cavalry was dismounted, and fully half of their guns had to be abandoned. A large number of their best officers likewise succumbed to the effects of want and disease. Their leaders were still obstinate, but, when to all these disasters were added the terrible northern frosts, they were reluctantly compelled to give way and to lead back to the banks of the Danube the shattered remains of their once splendid host.

A few months back our nation rejoiced over the attainment of the sixtieth year of the reign of our beloved sovereign, Queen Victoria. Mixed with the feeling of devotion to Her Majesty there was an obvious pride and rejoicing on the development of the British Empire during those prosperous years. The Empire has been raised by the efforts of the British people, and it behoves us to keep it as it has been handed over to us, if not to add to its lustre. To do so we may have to contend with many enemies, and it is right, when the hour of battle comes, when the sharp note of the war-trumpet vibrates throughout every quarter of the Empire, that we should be encouraged by the thought that we step into the field to try issue with our adversaries on equal terms.

In the life of all great nations there has been a period of decadence, when, having lost their power and prestige, they have been beset by their enemies. Whatever is human is subject to decay. Large empires have been raised, and have after a time crumbled to pieces; and is there any reason why Great Britain should be an exception to the general rule, and should never experience a dangerous crisis?

"Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay."

A nation which becomes so absorbed in money-making pursuits as to neglect to take all those steps which are necessary to secure immunity from attack, ceases to impose respect, and soon comes to be looked upon as easy prey. It is only by making costly sacrifices that a nation can earn peace.

No one really desires war, for its risks are too evident; nevertheless, there are now more than three millions of men under arms in Europe—a sure indication that the sword is not likely to be soon transformed into a ploughshare. Never yet in the history of the world has there been another epoch known in which so much energy, inventive genius and money have been devoted to bellicose ends.

In the matter of provisioning troops in war, Great Britain did badly at the beginning in the Peninsula, and did badly in the Crimea. Her commissariat arrangements in her last European wars left much to be desired. For all that, in the first, Wellington was singularly favoured by the dissensions between the French Marshals, whilst in the second the troops were absolutely stationary and only a few miles from their sea base. Granted that the British Army in many respects is better now and more ready for war than it was in 1854, still there are reasons for doubting if it is quite up to the mark in this province. If the proportion of books and pamphlets issued dealing with the subject of the subsistence of armies in war is any guide, our progress in this matter is, to all appearance, not equal to that of other military nations. The commissariat arrangements in our small campaigns are generally satisfactory, but it is not to skirmishes with savages or mean opponents, in which we are quite certain of being able to beat them with the organization and weapons we have, that we refer; we have in view operations on a much larger scale, when we shall have to measure our strength with an equal enemy. A struggle for existence, a war such as would be the defence of India or of Canada,* in which the troops to be employed would be far more numerous than what our officers are accustomed to provide for.

That we have not these troops is no reason why we should neglect to devote our attention to the subject; for the matter of that, neither had the United States an army in 1861. When such a vital point as the maintenance of the Union was, however, threatened, what sacrifices were not made to raise, equip, and supply a large army?

It has been our ill fortune to contend with enemies ever so much inferior to us in many points, above all in that of army

* For a war in Canada, the United States, from their huge population, might raise a very large force, out of all proportion to the small force the few millions of the Dominion could bring into the field.

administration. It is well, nevertheless, to reflect that this disparity would not exist in a serious war, and that the nations we should then have to contend against have paid special attention to the provisioning of their armies when in a state of hostility. The subject has been diligently studied, and all their measures have been carefully laid down.

It is not difficult to foresee that the constant harping in the foreign press on the finesse and greed of Great Britain, the constant parading of her crooked and selfish ways, can have but one result, attack. This hatred, so perseveringly fostered, must sooner or later lead to serious consequences. The great strength our navy has lately attained must make it more than ever evident that Great Britain holds the sceptre of the sea. An attack by sea offering no prospect of success, what can be more natural than that our enemies—and of these our increasing prosperity has gained us many—should seek to direct their attacks on some vulnerable point inland?

A popular writer calls Great Britain “a privileged conqueror who has the sea for its standing army;” but who is to encounter the enemy on those far inland regions which the ships cannot reach? In our defence we must be prepared to attack by sea and by land on the principle, *Bellum geramus ut pacem habeamus*,* and our land forces must be, not only sufficient to complete the victories of our navy, but able to act by themselves.

History shows how it is in keeping with the true principles of war to undertake a sharp offensive in one point of the theatre of war as a defensive measure to another. From a similar reasoning every nation has a right to anticipate an adversary when it sees itself seriously menaced. If successful, it will thus ward off any injury that might have been contemplated. By forestalling an attack from some other nation, and carrying the war into the adversary's country, we rob him of the initiative, and deprive him of the means for carrying his offensive designs into execution.

In forestalling the enemy, fleets can make little impression beyond the coast, unless they are accompanied by a considerable number of troops for the purpose of being landed to attack him. Until a landing-party can come up with the enemy at close quarters and decide the contest, it will be an artillery duel

* Cicero said that “war should be so engaged in that nothing but peace should appear to be aimed at.”

between the ships and the forts.* In the War of Secession the Federals resorted to mixed naval and military expeditions, landing their troops at the most opportune moment in the most telling localities. This way of approaching the enemy's coast immobilized large Confederate garrisons in Wilmington, Charleston, Mobile, and Savannah, and considerably weakened the Southern forces.† The Confederates were short of men, and needed all they could get to repair the waste in their armies in the field; nevertheless they could not reduce the strength of these garrisons, for they had to be prepared to oppose the landing troops which formed the complement of the enemy's squadrons.

Human nature is so constituted that it is necessary to repeat the same thing over and over again to draw serious attention to it: *Aures habent et non audient*. Victory generally sides with the army which has big battalions. Nelson's words to the Cabinet in 1805, "Only numbers can annihilate," apply to the army just as much as to the navy. It is only with superior forces that the enemy's power can be destroyed. The essence of Continental systems lies in the immense number of men that they can put into the field. It seems impossible to believe that our soldiers will ever be brought face to face with a conscript army in anything like equal numbers. These great numbers are only possible with a conscription; and though we may pride ourselves as to quality, it is quantity armed with the deadly weapons of our days that tells.

Voluntary enlistment will supply a definite number of soldiers, but nothing beyond that, and we appear to have already passed the possible limit. Our own Commander-in-Chief has told us, in a discussion at the Royal United Service Institution, November 17, 1897, that for the last ten years the average number of recruits joining the army has been 32,000 yearly.‡ Of this number about

* Of this there is a very recent example in the attack on Manila, in which Admiral Dewey, after having destroyed the Spanish fleet, was unable to occupy the city of Manila for lack of men.

† During the War of Secession, if any able-bodied man in the Southern States was seen about, every individual wondered what right he had to be there, and was keen to know the reason why he was not serving with the army. Such a patriotic spirit is better than any system of conscription.

‡ The total number of recruits raised for the regular army in 1896 was 28,532; in 1897, 35,015. In the latter year Parliament authorized an increase of 3136 non-commissioned officers and men. In 1894, according to the report furnished by the Director of the Army Medical Department, 36,911 men were finally approved for the service. Of this number 1448 were under 17 years of age; 353 from 17 to 18; 15,612 from 18 to 19; consequently 17,413 recruits, or nearly one half of the whole amount, were below the age fixed in countries which have a conscription.

29 per cent. were what are commonly called in the army "specials," that is, men below the standard, which is rather low for our infantry. This is not a great number of recruits for a population of about forty millions, and does not equal the number of persons who annually emigrate from these islands.

It is very unfortunate that we have not a soul-stirring national song like the Marseillaise, or the *Wacht am Rhein*, for there can be no doubt that songs of that description act on the imagination, and are very great incentives to recruiting. When Loys sang the Marseillaise at the Theatre Français, there was an enlisting office for volunteers under the arcade, and he sung with such spirit that he has been credited with having given a hundred thousand soldiers to his country.

The insufficiency of our army, in comparison with those of other powers, with the extent of our territory,* and with our responsibilities, has been dinned into the ears of the British people for many years, and most of the electors are convinced of the fact. The question, nevertheless, vital as it is, is not considered sufficiently, and its solution is put off from day to day. Experience, however, has repeatedly demonstrated that what is put off is seldom done, and when undertaken in the long run it costs very dear.

Much has been said on the readiness of two army corps to embark complete to the merest detail at the shortest notice,† showing a state of preparation which had never been attained before. This may be true enough, but the armed strength of Europe now numbers some thirteen millions, and two army corps are, in our opinion, insufficient to carry the war into the enemy's country. An army like ours, so small in point of numbers, cannot be a pledge of peace with honour, as it does not inspire sufficient respect, nor, in case of war, can it have any certainty of being crowned with victory.

The last thing one should desire is to be accounted as a prophet of evil, but the day will surely come when our country will be attacked, and when we shall have to take the field with a numerous army. Therefore, even if we do not keep up this large army in the normal times, it would do us no harm to set about and consider the best way in which the rank and file for it

* Our territory comprises 11,250,000 square miles of the habitable globe; the population amounts to 365,000,000.

† Lord Wolseley's speech at the North London Rifle Club, January 20, 1898.

might be obtained.* Not to be taken unawares, we should at the same time study the steps necessary to be taken for its adequate provision when in the field.

The administrative arrangements, in a campaign of the magnitude we imagine, will have to be placed in the hands of a very competent and experienced officer, assisted by a well-instructed and trained body of subordinates. In former times probity was considered the indispensable virtue of all military administrators.† The moral standard is now ever so much higher; but can an officer be accounted as strictly honest who does not take sufficient pains to make himself a thorough master of his branch of the service? Unquestionably the formation of such a desirable chief, and of such a competent set of officers, is impossible without close application on the part of the whole body to the subject in the leisure of peace. There lies the weak point, for it is no secret that a profound study of the art of war, in all that principally relates to the administration of an army in the field, is unattractive and distasteful to the mass of our officers. The subject is dry and unpopular; when its principles are discussed or explained, they receive trifling attention.

Examinations for promotion, the subject increasing in importance with the rank of the examinee, would do much to foster this study. What would do more still would be special promotion for officers who give undoubted proof of superior attainments, either by mastering certain subjects, or by taking the lead in the education of their comrades. Nothing acts on the young and ambitious so well as prompt recognition. What kills zeal is long service in the lower grades, long weary years of dreary routine, and subordination to incompetent chiefs. The dreams of distinguishing one's self by triumphs in the chosen career evoke a healthy ambition, which is desirable, and which should be much encouraged.

The generality of people are inclined to believe that the tendency to study and to reflect comes with age, that work

* In any case lads brought up in our state-aided schools should be drilled, and should be taught to bear arms as part of the education of every citizen.

† One has only to read Macaulay's "History of England," Chapter XIV., to see how corrupt the administration was during the reign of William III. Here is an instance relating to Schomberg's operations in Ireland. "The means of transporting baggage and artillery were almost entirely wanting. An ample number of horses had been purchased in England with the public money, and had been sent to the banks of the Dee. But Shales had let them out for harvest work to the farmers of Cheshire, had pocketed the hire, and had left the troops in Ulster to get on as best they might."

becomes a good comrade when an individual has had enough of the pleasures and pastimes of youth. Is it so, or is it not often that one begins to doubt having done enough, and to fear that one will be found wanting at a period when responsibilities will increase?

After all, has everything been done to encourage the study of the art of war in our army? Have sufficient incentives been given, or have the diligent and the lazy been treated much alike as long as they attended to the little that was strictly required of them? There is a feeling that energy or young blood is required in the superior officers, but this will be more or less the result of chance, so long as there is no prospect of more speedy advancement than that yielded by strict regimental seniority.* This need for young blood applies to other officers besides the senior. After the cavalry, the commissariat must have officers in the prime of life, for such only can sustain the privations and unceasing toil connected with the provisioning of an army in the field.

As Vial says, war is the triumph of force skilfully prepared and organized. No greater calamity can befall an army than a want of preparation. It is that which paves the way to painful surprises. Preparations cost money, and it is this outlay that scares the official mind, whose chief tendency is to keep down the expenses. Money may do much in the long run—for the side which has the means will be able to hold out the longest—but it can never make up for the dishonour of defeat or loss of prestige.

The thorough efficiency of an army can only be secured by working without intermission. The system of itself should be a perpetual reminder, and the army must at all periods be kept up to the mark and be in every respect *fit to take the field*.† This endless and laborious drudgery, often without an opportunity of testing the value of the work done, appears very discouraging, still it is in the nature of things, and, possibly, more so in the army and the navy than in other professions. Our attention must never be permitted to relax, for once it is allowed to do so negligence and abuses creep in and soon undermine the very best

* Advancement for service in the field is not within every one's reach; all officers alike are not so fortunate as to see active service.

† What an immensity of matters that short expression *fit to take the field* covers! In a few words it means that nothing has been neglected to bring the army to as near perfection as possible. It requires great confidence for a minister to assure his country on this point.

organization. When the effects of this decaying are detected the mischief is done, and done almost beyond repair.

Let the reader recall to mind the words of Frederick the Great in his general principles of war: "For whoever is destined for the business of war, peace should be the time of meditation, and war the period in which he carries his studies into effect." That monarch, however, held that the greatest portion of an army is composed of indolent people. As this is too true, some one to goad them is needed, lest they should forget the salutary lessons of history.

The maintenance of an army in the field, in all that concerns the regular provision and distribution of food, forage, and fuel, is an important subject not only for the commissariat or supply officer, but quite as much so for the chief commander of an army, for his generals, and for the mass of staff officers. The successful issue of a campaign often depends upon the general's knowledge of the most minute details. How to provision his troops should be his constant solicitude; the subject should constitute one of his principal daily cares.* In a lesser degree alone the other officers are bound to exercise a constant vigilance on the alimentation of the troops. Marlborough very often urged upon the authorities the great necessity for his being provided with money, so that his soldiers might receive what was due to them on account of pay, and that provisions for his troops might be purchased and paid for.

Most officers are familiar with the quotation of Coligny, that he who is ambitious to raise the edifice of an army should take the stomach for its base, inasmuch as an army cannot undertake anything unless its subsistence is a point absolutely beyond question. Frederick the Great, who strongly endorsed this

* Lieutenant-Colonel Lemonnier-Delafosse describes how shocked he was by something he witnessed in Spain. "On the eve of the battle of Salamanca (1812) Marshal Marmont dismounted close to the third division, which was formed up in column and at rest. It was noon; his retinue followed him. Twenty servants, not more or less, in deep mourning, discarding the long gaiters worn according to English fashion, stepped forward donned in silk hose, short trowsers, and livery with ribbon aiguillettes.

"Thirty fat horses or mules were relieved of their canteens, which were disposed in the form of a rectangle. Out came a service of damasked linen of the most dazzling whiteness, which, spread on the tilled ground, was covered by a set of delf in vermillion containing cold dishes, game, poultry, pies, etc., alongside of which were bottles of French wines, bordeaux, bourgogne. There lunched the Marshal and all his staff before a body of troops which for the fortnight it had been in the field barely had bread, and which to concoct a soup gathered by marauding everything in the shape of grain that could be found!"

maxim, added, "Hunger will overcome the greatest courage, sap the most rigorous discipline, and cause the collapse of the most able conceptions."

The truth of his words having been demonstrated by many campaigns, we should look on the provisioning of a host in the field as a most necessary study for all the officers of an army. In war it is the military chiefs who are accountable in this particular matter, and their responsibility is distinctly marked by the authority which is vested in them to sanction—subject to their personal discretion—all the measures and expenditure which tend to this end.

It is to be regretted that in the study of the art of war the provisioning of armies in the field does not hold a more prominent place, for the greatest tactical skill is of little avail if the troops cannot be adequately fed at any time during the course of the operations. In fighting it is a matter of skill against skill, of endurance opposed to endurance; the palm falls to the leader who can hold out longest. It is often purely a matter of nerve: the general who is least affected by the extent of his losses, influenced by the probable consequences of a defeat, or who will not admit that he is beaten, remains master of the field. Some commanders consider it necessary to withdraw their forces as soon as they perceive that, according to the rules of war, they have been beaten. Others—those who win battles—do not trouble their heads much about the rules of war; they stand their ground, they go on fighting until victory declares itself in their favour. In a contest, however, against the difficulties of supply a general pits himself against great and, at times, scarcely calculable forces. Of what good will the inspiration of genius be to him should he have neglected to cultivate the habit of giving personal attention to that multitude of administrative details connected with the provisioning of his soldiers? Like Turenne, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon, he may have the faculty of detecting the weak point of his adversary, but his brilliant victories will be sterile if they cannot be quickly followed up for want of food. Vauchelle rightly held that military administration was a science, and familiarity with any science cannot be obtained without much study, or paying assiduous attention to all its details for a period of many years.

From the moment they join, our officers are taught how to uphold discipline, how to handle their weapons, and how to direct

the efforts of their men. Their education is of an entirely offensive nature: the combat, the stirring episodes of the battle-field, are what the ambitious young officer looks forward to; it is in the struggle on the ghastly and blood-stained battle-fields that their imagination principally dwells. How little do they trouble themselves about acquiring an insight into those measures which conduce to bring armies face to face, and enable them to engage in a trial of strength!

With the establishment of standing armies arose the necessity of feeding them from Government resources. The haphazard way of making war support war had to give way to a methodical system, and the feeding of the soldiers became one of the principal cares of the general who commanded them.

One of Napoleon's fundamental principles was that the troops should concentrate with the object of fighting, and should spread out to pursue and to subsist. This is more than ever true now, when the contending armies are of such immense proportions, for, some hundreds of thousands of men gathered together in a narrow zone, drawing much of their daily subsistence from the locality they occupy, would, like a flight of locusts, shortly clear it of everything to be had in the way of food. Unfortunately, there are no rules by which we can determine the exact moment when the fractions of an army must unite to fight; and herein lies the difficulty of Napoleon's principle. It was his genius alone which was able to hit off the decisive moment.

In his "*Précis de l'art de la guerre*" Jomini gives it as his opinion that the art of provisioning a numerous army, above all in an enemy's country, is one of the most difficult. Schellendorf and other writers seem to think that the problem of how to feed an army in the field is one that has not yet been solved, and one that is never likely to be solved. When writers of such great ability and knowledge have failed to find a method, it is quite certain that we shall not succeed any better; it is, therefore, in this matter, more than in any other, that there is an absolute necessity for taking to heart the lessons of the past. With these should be coupled some acquaintance with the habits and peculiarities of the different nations and of their military system, a knowledge which experience has shown to be of the greatest possible value.

Knowledge exerts a considerable influence in war, and a great share of every success must be ascribed to it. To know exactly

what to do and the best way to do it, one must be familiar with the many favourable and unfavourable circumstances which are likely to occur in most campaigns. One should know how similar difficulties have been overcome by the best captains, for the deeds of great men are eternal lessons for such as follow the same career. This is how the illustrious general and historian Thucydides regarded historical facts. In the preface of his "Lacedemonian War," he wrote: "This work is a legacy for posterity, and not a work of art to delight the ear just for an instant."

There can be no question that an intelligent officer, who has stored his mind with the numerous precedents found in the narratives of past campaigns, will seldom be entirely at a loss to find a way out of any ordinary difficulty, and will possibly even be able to extricate himself dexterously from an extraordinary one. He will not come across exactly the same circumstances, but instances which have sufficient resemblance.

Difficulties need not be sought; they will present themselves unsolicited in every enterprise, in a variety of forms and shapes, never welcome yet always intrusive, and sure to appear when least expected. Very few officers, if any, are exempt from having learnt this by experience, and yet how seldom are we prepared for difficulties, and how amazed are we when they do present themselves! Only the man of expedients, the result of experience or learning, finds a ready way out of them.

When the army takes the field we must entirely discard the system of provisioning pursued at home in normal times. Unfortunately, it is a system which does not afford instruction in any way commensurate with the difficulties experienced even in the most favourable wars. Real ability in provisioning an army in war consists in getting the means to accord with the needs, and it is that which is not always so easy to accomplish.

To promote the regular subsistence of an army, there must be, in the *first* place, a commissariat corps—a corps composed of able, active, and devoted officers, possessing great knowledge of provision questions, and the courage of facing responsibilities.* *Secondly*, wise measures must be taken to feed the troops with the provisions they carry on their person, with those that form an integral part of the various corps, and with those found in

* Commissariat officers should not only have a thorough knowledge of our own system, but also of the system followed in the opposing army. Such a knowledge would often come in very useful.

the zone of operations. *Thirdly*, there must be a good system for the collection of provisions in the rear of the combatants, and ample facilities to push them forward by means of provision trains or columns, special convoys, and by turning to account the most favourable railways and waterways. *Fourthly*, the communications of the army must be very jealously guarded. There must be a system which will secure a regular, methodical, and certain way of meeting the soldiers' wants under all possible circumstances.

To form some conception of the difficulties which attend the provisioning of a large army in the field, we may look at what occurs in a large city. Let us take a city of 100,000 or 150,000 souls, and examine how the subsistence of the inhabitants is secured. This number of people to feed creates a want, and to meet it a very large number of individuals make it their sole business to procure the quantity and assortment of provisions required. Then every dwelling has one or more persons whose care it is to obtain what the lodgers need in the way of food. The purchasing of the necessary articles, in handy markets or shops, and their preparation into food is the object of the latter, who bring their powers fresh to the work, and not exhausted by a long and fatiguing march.

An important point is the demand; the necessity for certain articles of consumption, their description, quality and quantity at different seasons of the year, has in course of time become to be established. As the nutriment partaken by the mass of the people is subject to very little alteration, the average amount of each article consumed during the year becomes well known. The farmers in the neighbourhood raise farm produce for the city, their provender flows steadily into it, and there finds a ready market.

What cannot be grown in the neighbourhood in sufficient quantity, what can be procured elsewhere at a cheaper price, or is the produce of other countries, is imported by large caterers, whose profits depend on delivering the articles without delay. There are purveyors who look after these matters in gross, and there are tradesmen who look after them in detail; there are markets in which the raw article, grain, cattle, fish, poultry, vegetables, fruit, and forage are sold; there are shops to which regular customers repair to make their necessary purchases.

The provision of food in such a city is regulated by a well-

defined system and an exact division of labour. The consumers are always there, and the food is partaken shortly after it has been purchased in a fresh state. Most of it is bought, cooked, and consumed the same day. Except on a point of economy and as a reserve, there is no absolute need for the consumption of preserved provisions or salted meat and fish. Hams, bacon, sausages, dry cod, herrings, etc., are largely used, but are not indispensable; they only form a healthy variety in the ordinary meals.

All this entails a considerable amount of transport, gives employment to a large number of people, and causes a vast amount of clerical labour, correspondence, keeping of accounts, etc.

The fuel for cooking, either coal or wood, is brought into the town, and is generally delivered at the door of each house. If wood alone is used it is well seasoned and burns readily.

An army may be compared to a city on the point of the number of mouths to feed, but otherwise the conditions are very different; the main one being that troops in the field are in a constant state of motion, requiring every day alterations in the arrangements by which articles of food are brought within their reach. Furthermore, to secure its object an army must be ever active, and the most essential quality of a commander is enterprise; war is too costly to be carried out in a lingering way: the sooner the operations can be brought to a successful issue the better.

An army may be operating in a most fertile and productive country, still it may be subject to privations and want should the communications be bad and the transport insufficient.

To furnish troops in the field regularly with food and munitions of war requires the collection and organization of a large number of transport animals and vehicles. Nothing relating to the matter of transport should ever be neglected; much will depend on the nature of the country in which the operations take place, and the description of animal in general use for the conveyance of produce and merchandise. Frederick the Great insisted on having horses for draught, and not bullocks; Wellington used largely of bullocks and mules; and the Northerners in the War of Secession ended by having nothing but teams of mules.

In our petty wars it is not the adversary which is so much to be dreaded; the real enemy is the supply and transport. Take up the narratives of any of our military undertakings, and you

will not fail to find some remark concerning *the inadequacy of the transport*. It is a trouble which crops up in some way or other.

The two following passages occur in "The Story of the Malakand Field Force," a narrative of our last war on the Indian frontier: * "Transport—the life and soul of an army—is an even more vital factor here than in less undeveloped countries. The mobility of a brigade depends entirely on its pack animals. On the 14th many mules were killed.† On the 16th the field hospitals were filled with wounded. It now became impossible for the camp to move because the wounded could not be carried. It was impossible to leave them behind, because, deducting an adequate guard, the rest of the brigade would have been too few for fighting. The 2nd Brigade was therefore a fixture. . . ."

"People talk lightly of moving columns hither and thither, as if they were mobile groups of men, who had only to march about the country and fight the enemy wherever found; very few understand, however, that an army is a ponderous mass which drags painfully after it a long chain of advanced depôts, stages, rest-camps, and communications, by which it is securely fastened to a stationary base.‡ In these valleys, where wheeled traffic is impossible, the difficulties and cost of moving supplies are enormous; and as none, or very few, are to be obtained within the country, the consideration is paramount. Mule transport is for many reasons superior to camel transport. The mule moves faster and can traverse more difficult ground. He is also more hardy and keeps in better condition. . . ."

Our peace manœuvres are not free from transport difficulties. We have to work with hired transport, with drivers who are *strange to military discipline*, who do not understand immediate and silent compliance with orders received, who have not the slightest knowledge of the routine of camp life, who do not know how to picket their horses or park their waggons in military fashion. What must it be in war, when to all this is added a strange language; when the drivers must be ordered through an interpreter, or addressed with a very weak and imperfect colloquial knowledge of their vernacular? §

* "The Story of the Malakand Field Force," by Winston L. Spencer Churchill, pp. 235 and 284.

† The casualties in horses and mules in the night attack of Markhanai amounted to 98.

‡ In the operations of the Malakand Field Force in Bajaur, of three brigades, the first on the Panjkora river had not sufficient transport to move.

§ We conceive it to be a great mistake to make the transport neutral in the

The history of most of our wars and military expeditions shows that transport in the British Army has not ordinarily been accorded the importance it really deserves—a consequence which was enhanced by the fact that our provisioning was generally done from the rear. We have always personally inculcated great attention being paid to this highly important branch of an army. The money difficulty is at the bottom of all questions of transport, but this must be overcome. Transport does run away with much money; this is true enough, nevertheless the cost is amply repaid by the creditable manner in which the operations are conducted.

A great hindrance is that little transport is required in peace time, whilst an immense quantity of it is needed in war. Having in the latter case to be put immediately at work, and worked without a rest, there is no time to train and discipline it.

The main difficulty with the transport is ordinarily the want of sufficient time to organize it. In the march of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, in the summer of 1880, and in the late advance on Khartum, the transport at starting was in a state of efficiency which is not generally seen. There had been in both instances enough time to pick the animals with great care, to see to their equipment, and to infuse in the whole mass a certain degree of regularity.

During the course of a campaign transport means are the life of the supply service. The absolute necessity for an adequate and nimble transport has become greater than it was heretofore, now that the proportions of modern armies are much greater, and that the prevalent idea is that a commander should strive to carry out a campaign of rapid movements, which may lead him far ahead or on either flank of the running railway lines of the theatre of war. The greater the mass of men moving, the slower will be their progress; the difficulty of provisioning will also increase. To carry out a brisk war the staff will labour to reduce the *Barda** of the army, but there is a point in this beyond which it is impossible to go. The soldier who performs long marches and undergoes serious fatigues, the horses and transport animals which are kept steadily at work for many hours, demand to be fed, and fed on some system. The soldier makes no allowance for the difficulties of the commissariat; regular feeding alone will

yearly manœuvres, for by doing so the Generals are released from some of their principal cares and difficulties.

* This is a term used by Arab camel-drivers to denote the load of their animals; it is often applied to all that is baggage.

enable him to keep up his bodily strength and submit to a rigorous discipline. All officers should recollect that every ounce of food forwarded to the front advances the object of the campaign, and that for this purpose there is as much need to call in aid the transport of the country (bad as it may appear) as to draw largely on the food-supply contained in the theatre of war.*

This transport should be worked back as well as forward, so as not to keep a mass of vehicles and animals unemployed, which would cause a waste of resources and of money.

If we only consider in what a geometrical proportion the transport increases for every day that an army gets further away from a given depôt or source of supply, we shall realize the imperative necessity there is for drawing as much transport as possible from the country in the close neighbourhood of the troops.

With regard to the principles which should guide the action of the commissariat officers in war we shall turn to history, and, having selected a few amongst the many cases which have occurred, will endeavour in the following chapters to exhibit the results. Our object in doing so is to draw some deductions which carry the impress of experience, and which may serve to form the foundations of an efficient system.

Much has been written on what concerned the Greeks and the Romans, and that by classic writers; their books give our youths a groundwork in ancient history, and their memory will retain many instructing precedents—remarkable cases which occurred in those times. As armies in their organization, education, and armament, in their habits of marching, fighting, camping, etc., have altered greatly since those days, there is as much, if not more, instruction to be gained by undertaking an analyzing study of the histories of more recent times. The Roman soldiers—whose military enterprises were much akin to ours—were well looked after in the matter of provisioning, nevertheless the general conditions are too different now from what they were in the eras of the Roman Republic and Empire.

On the point of subsistence the ancients have not left us much to go upon. History does not record any operation of the Romans which was entirely stopped by difficulties of provisioning.

* Clausewitz ("On War," Book V., chap. xiv.) calls the military transport train "that incubus which is always destroying its own work."

This may have been due to the fact that the Roman soldier was trained to withstand hunger and thirst. For centuries after, the way in which troops were fed could hardly be called a system, and it was not till the sixteenth century that the need for meeting the necessities of the soldier in a methodical manner began to be seriously considered. It was then that the principle was first enunciated that it was an obligation for the State to assume charge of the provisioning service both in quarters and in the field.

6058.

CHAPTER II.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

ANTIQUITY gave us three conquerors of singular ability and renown—Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar; in later ages we have had three more great commanders and masters of the art of war—Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick II., and Napoleon.

The 'Thirty Years' War had already dragged on twelve years when Gustavus Adolphus determined to cast in his lot with the Protestants of Germany. From that moment the struggle entered into its third phase.

The war originated in a desire of the Catholic princes of Germany to prevent the growth of Protestantism, but it was also waged with an ambitious intent, viz. a longing on the part of the German Emperor to make his rule a real in place of a nominal one.

Gustavus Adolphus transformed poor ignorant Swedish peasants into invincible soldiers. He commanded an army which he had raised superior to any other in Europe, and he well earned the title of "father of the modern art of war." He showed that fear of God is not incompatible with the calling of the soldier, and that a man may be strictly religious but not a whit an inferior warrior for all that.

He set the example of humanity in war, and proved to his successors that it is consistent with brilliant and lasting exploits. Not only did he introduce important changes in the tactical formation of his forces, in the constitution of special corps of engineers and miners, in uniformity of clothing, armament, and equipment, but he did much in many other respects to improve the organization, discipline, and efficiency of his army. Some of his changes were real novelties, but in the main he revived and adapted old principles, and brought them to harmonize with the altered conditions of warfare.

When the king boldly entered the lists to come to the rescue of his brothers in the Faith, the Protestant cause was on the wane. Ferdinand was everywhere successful, and his generals, Wallenstein and Tilly, had overrun the whole of Germany, save only a few towns. Gustavus could not have taken the field at a more inauspicious moment; the people who entreated him to come over were both disunited and cowed; Germany was overcome, she had no power to fight for her religion or independence, her liberties were at the mercy of Austria. The Catholic princes, however, were discontented; the promulgation of the Restitution Edict, which enacted that all Protestants should restore to the Catholics any ecclesiastical property which had been secularized since the Peace of Passau, in 1552, and the ruthless way in which it was carried into effect had seriously offended the people; the Protestants were exasperated, Ferdinand's electors had lost confidence in him, and the barbarous character the war had assumed had horrified Europe.

The anomaly was seen at that period of a prince of the Church of Rome, Cardinal Richelieu, using all his influence with Sweden to induce her to embrace the cause of the Protestants and of providing means for carrying on the war for the destruction of Austria.* It was after the king had proved his worth that France, alarmed by the Swedish victories, became an uncertain ally, and Richelieu showed no hurry in fulfilling the engagements he had made. (Success is always a great factor, and, as the war went on, even Pope Urban inclined towards Gustavus Adolphus, for he refused to countenance the Emperor Ferdinand, holding that the war was not waged in support of Catholicism, but in favour of Hapsburg aggrandizement.

In 1630 Gustavus Adolphus harangued the Estates in the following words: "The Hapsburgs are threatening Sweden, and must be met instantly, staunchly. It is a question of defending the land of our sires. The times are bad, the danger is great. Let us not look at the unusual sacrifices and load we must all unite to bear. It is a fight for parents, for wife and child, for house and hearth, for country and religion."

His purpose in taking part in the war in Germany is fully

* A five years' treaty was signed on January 23, 1631, between Louis XIII. and Gustavus II. Amongst other terms, the latter bound himself to keep 30,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry in Germany, in return for which the French king was to pay him 300,000 livres for the past year's expenses, and an annual subvention of a million livres for the rest.

explained by the words he used after crossing the Lech: "I take God and my conscience to witness, as well as all the tribulation I am undergoing and shall undergo, that I have left my kingdom and all I deem of value, solely for the security of the fatherland, to put an end to the fearful religious tyranny which exists, to replace in their rights and freedom the evangelical princes and estates of Germany, and to win for us all a permanent peace.")

Now that Germany had succumbed, danger unquestionably threatened Sweden. Gustavus Adolphus discussed at Upsala the nature of the operations, and it was decided that an offensive war in Germany would cost Sweden less than the defence of her own soil, whilst it would save the people all the atrocity of a war waged as it had hitherto been, on the mainland.

We are bound to admire the pluck of Gustavus Adolphus, and to see with what small resources at his back he was able to command a fairly numerous army in Germany. The Emperor at that time was credited with having 160,000 veteran troops in the field, though in reality Wallenstein and Tilly never had much more than 100,000 men. The Swedish leader could not bring over more than one-seventh of that number, 13,000, from his country, but he had other forces in Finland, Livonia, and Prussia to reinforce them with, and, besides, he relied on the aid of the Protestant princes and free towns in Germany. In this he was mistaken, for, valuing their own interests more than their religion, they hung back, and waited to see the result of his perilous undertaking. The very men who most ardently besought him to espouse their cause were those who afforded him the least aid.

Persuaded that the war upon which he was entering was just and inevitable, the king called upon his people to submit to the necessary sacrifices. The war increased the old taxes and created new ones, interrupted foreign trade, and drained Sweden of the youth and strength of the kingdom; nevertheless his subjects, in every class, made the sacrifices required of them with exemplary patience and self-denial.

In 1630 Sweden had a population of one and a half million souls, and an income of twelve million rix dollars (£1,800,000). All the males between the ages of sixteen and sixty were summoned to appear before the civil authorities. All individuals who worked for wages, and such as were not householders, were first taken for the army. The rest drew lots, and every tenth

man between the age of eighteen and thirty years was enrolled. Certain exceptions were made; a man having no son was exempted, and one son only was taken from a family; armourers, manufacturers of weapons, and miners employed in the nitre and sulphur mines were also excused. Besides this levy in Sweden, soldiers were raised abroad, and enlisted in England, Scotland, the Netherlands, Brandenburg, and in Poland. The annual cost of the army employed in Germany—40,000 men—was computed at 1,800,000 rix dollars, or 45 rix dollars per man.

In the early months of 1630 the king had raised an army of 76,000 men, of which more than one half were Swedes; other 3000 Swedes were serving in the fleet.* He attached great value to the control of the Baltic Sea, and, having his kingdom on the north side of the Baltic, a fleet was as necessary to him as an army.

No attempt is made in this chapter to give a detailed account of the military operations of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany. The conspicuous part he played in the Thirty Years' War being a matter of history, we shall simply recall his deeds as we briefly expound his method and the changes which he introduced in the organization of his forces.

Adverse winds had kept the Swedish flotilla in port for three weeks, and it was on the 4th of July, 1630, that it approached the island of Rügen, which lies near the mouth of the Peene river. Thirty men-of-war convoyed 200 transports; these held on board 92 companies of foot, 116 troops of horse, and 80 guns of various calibres. The crews of the men-of-war and transports formed an aggregate of 6000 men. The disembarkation was carried out at Usedom. On putting foot on shore the king knelt and offered a short prayer; he then laid hold of a spade and began with his own hands the intrenchment intended to cover the landing. It took two days to land his army; the companies were set at work in succession, and soon the intrenchments of Peenemünde were completed. After this he forced the aged Duke of Pomerania to make an alliance with him, and made himself master of the southern Baltic coast.

This was one of the two special cases in which Gustavus Adolphus ran short of provisions for his army. His troops had consumed in the delay which occurred before starting, and on the passage, all the provisions issued to them; others had been

* At the end of 1631 the king had nearly 150,000 men in garrison and in the field.

ordered to be collected in Stralsund, but were not forthcoming. This matter had been intrusted to John Skythe, clerk of the Supreme Court, and once the king's special tutor, who for this want of enterprise and neglect was very severely reprimanded. Gustavus Adolphus was much disturbed, and sent pressing orders to Oxenstiern, who was then in Prussia, to hurry forward supplies. At the same time he sent him six men-of-war and thirty-six other ships to be employed in conveying them over.

Though his country was anything but wealthy, his troops were regularly paid in accordance with a fixed scale. He firmly secured his connection with the base he had so carefully established on the southern shore of the Baltic and with Sweden. No one kept a more careful watch over his line of communications, his provisions, his munitions. His soldiers were well cared for, and fed mostly from magazines, for depôts had been established by the king in convenient localities, and kept filled with eatables drawn from Sweden or raised from the produce of the country passed over. A regular staff of commissaries accompanied the army, and furnished provisions in bulk to the various corps and regiments. His troops were quartered in cities or towns, or, if encamped, were sheltered by huts or tents. He paid considerable attention to the reduction of his baggage-train.

Discipline, even under the greatest privations and temptations, acts as a powerful restraint. Nevertheless, after the promulgation of his articles of war, the king found by experience how difficult it was to maintain strict discipline in a starving army.

The countries through which Wallenstein led his troops were invariably turned into a desert. Friends and foes alike suffered from the depredations of his troops. As Hozier remarks, "Never had a country been handed over by its nominal master to armies so barbarous and rapacious." Devastation, arson, rapine and murders followed in the wake of the imperialists. It was not merely his arrogance, but the unchecked license of his troops, which made Wallenstein distasteful to the Catholics, and made the Congress of Ratisbon end in constraining the emperor to appoint Tilly supreme commander of his forces.

What damaging effect the constant state of war and arbitrary appropriation of the produce of the country must have had on agriculture is demonstrated from the fact that the condition of things were such that a man could earn his livelihood as a soldier with greater safety from the perils of war than as a farmer.

Contrary to the custom pursued by his adversaries of pillaging and clearing the countries they crossed, Gustavus used them frugally; he tolerated no marauding or plundering, and in so doing earned the friendship and good will of the population. The discipline of his army was the marvel of its day, and *esprit de corps* ran very high. Sir James Spence, reporting on the Swedish Army, wrote: "The carriage of his army makes him beloved by the enemy themselves." Signal services were rewarded by special promotion, awards of money, and pensions; but, by his command, ordinary promotion went strictly by seniority. Like the rest, the highest in the land had to begin at the foot of the military ladder, so that they in their turn might learn to obey.

Gustavus Adolphus saw everything with his own eyes; every branch of the service received his special attention; his activity was unceasing. Speed was the leading principle of his tactics; he trained his army to manœuvre rapidly and skilfully, and it was the mobility of his forces which often made him victorious. His dispositions were so taken that he was able to concentrate as quickly as the enemy. His habit was to secure every step he took. As he advanced through a country he held the crossing over all important rivers, strengthening the towns at these points, and covering the passage with suitable bridge-heads. The king left behind him no important fortress or city without observing, blockading, or besieging it. He did not neglect a prudent military occupation of the country, and echeloned adequate detachments all along his line of operations. He accumulated supplies where he had a certainty of being able to keep them.

Gustavus Adolphus was in advance of his era, and his imitators failed to understand his method; they tried to reduce it to a set of theoretical rules which were to govern every case. He consulted his marshals and sought their opinion at councils of war, but these councils were never productive of procrastination, but always followed by vigorous action.

To make war nourish war was incompatible with his ideas; he regularly paid for what he demanded from the districts he traversed, and the contributions were levied with a prudent and reasonable system. Discipline was strict, and an order forbade billeted soldiers to demand more than bed, the right to cook at the common fire, salt, and vinegar to correct the noxious quality of the water of the plains. In the spring of 1631 his troops suffered much from want of provisions and forage, and were

nearly driven to mutiny. It was then that the king had for the first time to punish depredations.

When, in November, 1630, Wallenstein was deposed, and retired to his Bohemian castles, 70,000 men of the imperial forces were disbanded. A considerable proportion of them enlisted under Gustavus's banner. There can be no better proof of the excellence of his system than what he was able to do with these troops. Every one knows how difficult it is for soldiers who have once enjoyed a loose rein to be curbed and brought to submit to a strict rule; but, notwithstanding the license and lax discipline to which these men had been accustomed, he speedily brought them into subjection, and turned them into good soldiers.

Tilly had hitherto been unconquered; he commanded a splendid-looking set of veterans, men who had followed him for years, and who were much attached to him. In his report on the capture of Magdeburg, which Gustavus Adolphus—partly owing to want of provisions, but more on account of the vacillating policy of the Electors of Brandenburg and of Saxony—was unable to prevent, and in which unheard-of atrocities were committed, the Austrian commander wrote: "Since the capture of Troy, and the destruction of Jerusalem, a victory such as this has never been seen." Many years after, in the Peninsula, our own soldiers disgraced themselves by deplorable excesses after capturing a city. The barbarous tenets of the old school had cropped up again, that the sack of a city was a right to which the soldiers had a claim. A captured city lay then exposed to all the excesses and all the crimes of which men excited by the dangers they have incurred are capable. The captors are roused by their worst passions; wine and the lust of blood—the most terrible of all intoxications—brutalizes their nature. The ashes of Magdeburg and the gore of 40,000 victims seem to have called for punishment, and from that moment fortune deserted the conqueror. Tilly had won thirty-six battles, and up to then had been reckoned the best general of his time; a superior antagonist was now before him. Gustavus Adolphus completely routed him at Breitenfeld on the 17th of September, 1631, and again defeated him on the Lech on the 15th of April, 1632. This was the grim old soldier's last battle-field; a cannon-ball shattered his thigh, and he succumbed to his wound a fortnight later.

After Tilly's death, the emperor, who was in a sore plight, and who was not capable of commanding his armies, was driven

to turn again to Wallenstein, the only really able soldier who could compete with the Swedish monarch. He had to accept the most humiliating terms, and promised to keep Wallenstein well supplied with provisions, materials, and money. This promise, for want of means, he was never in a position to fulfil, and the imperial troops lived entirely on plunder.

Soon the Swedish forces were moving to the assistance of the Elector of Saxony; Wallenstein followed them, and in the end of June, 1632, reached the neighbourhood of Nürnberg, where Gustavus Adolphus awaited him. The city was so friendly to him that the king resolved to protect it, whilst, at the same time, trying to lure his opponent from Saxony. The city contained a large amount of provisions and war materials, and he ordered the population to bring within its walls all the food that could be collected in the neighbourhood.

These measures only availed for a while, for, as there were in Nürnberg 120,000 souls to feed, the provisions soon ran short. The Swedish troops, who were encamped outside, and who had at first been well furnished with supplies, committed some excesses when the price of food rose, but these the king repressed with a strong hand.

Wallenstein, who had 60,000 men, established a large camp four miles from the city, and made it excessively strong. In this camp he waited till famine would drive his opponent from Nürnberg. Though he was vastly superior in numbers, he would not fight, and, having recognized that the king's position was exceptionally strong, he was satisfied with blockading it, imagining that his adversary's resources were more limited than they actually were. Gustavus, in full belief that his small force could well hold its own, stuck to the city, and there awaited to be joined by reinforcements.

In this attitude the two armies remained for weeks, trying to overcome each other by starvation, and they were both soon in a pitiable condition. The king had miscalculated the arrival of his reinforcements, and soon hunger appeared in Nürnberg, and then in the Swedish camp. Wallenstein's Croats were not much better off, though better accustomed to live from hand to mouth. Wallenstein remained inert, and neglected to take steps for preventing reinforcements reaching the king. By the end of August, Gustavus's army of 20,000 men had more than doubled, through the arrival of reinforcements: Oxenstiern brought 13,000

men; the Landgrave, 4000; the Duke William, 6000; and the Saxons, 5000. He then desired a general engagement, but Wallenstein kept within his lines. Possibly the latter had no confidence in his troops, which were not only insubordinate, but not prepared for battle, by reason of want of sufficient nourishment.

6058.

An addition of 28,000 men increased the king's difficulties. Both armies were about starving. Of food little remained, of forage there was none, and the whole vicinity had been eaten up. Seeing the absolute impossibility of holding any longer to Nürnberg, he took his army out of camp on the 31st of August and sought for battle, but without success. The Swedish artillerymen bombarded the imperial camp. On the night of the 1st and 2nd of September he captured Fürth, crossed the Rednitz, and encamped close to the enemy. On the 3rd, the Alte Veste, a ruined castle on a hill 250 feet above the river, which was strongly fortified and surrounded by palisades and ditches, was attacked. For twelve hours there was desperate fighting. The assault failed, and the loss on the Swedish side was heavy.

Though starving, the two armies remained facing each other for two more weeks. The king at last perceived that he had nothing to gain by staying any longer at Nürnberg. On the 17th of September he sent a formal challenge to Wallenstein to come out to battle the following day, and he drew up his army before the imperial camp; but his opponent disdained the challenge, and would not be taunted into action. Gustavus determined thereupon to quit the field; Nürnberg had been well furnished with men, and the Swedish army marched unchallenged past Wallenstein's intrenchments, and took the direction of Würzburg.

After that Gustavus marched back to Swabia. Wallenstein was steadily marching on Saxony, and took Leipsic. To hold the city and to prevent a union between the Swedes and the Saxons he advanced on Lützen, where, on the 16th of November, the famous battle was fought. This ended in favour of the Swedes, but the loss of their king was far more disastrous than a defeat would have been.

The work Gustavus Adolphus did in Germany, and which established his fame as a great commander, only extended over a period of two years and a half. It was on a vast scale. Tilly and Wallenstein not only found in him a rival, but a master. The king had a method in all his undertakings, and a far-seeing,

well-thought-out plan is apparent in every one of his campaigns. He carried out war in a more systematic and connected manner than it had been the custom hitherto. His operations, large and small, were directed with a master hand; he knew when it was meet to act with boldness, when to be prudent. His rule and discipline were strict, but his subjects were justly proud of their sovereign, and his soldiers were attached to him with a devotion which hardly has a parallel in history. The constant attention that a chief bestows on the needs of his troops is never unproductive; the soldier is fully aware of it, and repays it by his devotion and gallantry.

What Gustavus Adolphus conceived he had the ability to perform. Notwithstanding all his difficulties, and the half-hearted help he received from his allies, his achievements were great. His talent, his rare ability as a commander were especially apparent after his fall, when his system, for want of a master mind, collapsed. Neither Oxenstiern nor any of his generals were equal to the task of carrying it out. Bernard of Saxe-Weimar and Horn were completely defeated at Nordlingen by Gallas and Piccolomini in 1634. A year later the Elector of Saxony made his peace with the Emperor at Prague, and Baner was repeatedly forced back to Pomerania by the larger armies of the Emperor and his allies.

War is a punishment inflicted by Almighty God, a scourge which will ravage countries to the end of the world. Gustavus Adolphus nevertheless showed us how it lies in man's power to mitigate its evils, and how the unruly propensities of the soldiers can be kept under subjection.

CHAPTER III.

LOUVOIS.

IN meditating on the subject of how best to provision armies in the field, the mind naturally reverts to Louvois, the renowned war minister of Louis XIV. François Michel, second son of Le Tellier, was born in Paris on the 18th of January, 1641, three years after the birth of his future sovereign.

From an early age he was initiated by his father into public affairs. To fit him thoroughly for his career, Le Tellier kept him constantly by his side, himself directing him in all the details of military administration, not omitting at the same time to instruct him in all the secrets and intrigues of the Court. In this manner his father strove to render him fit to succeed him in the direction of his department. By watching closely his first essays, he was at hand to correct any false impressions, the natural consequence, evidently, of inexperience in one so young.

Much of what Gustavus Adolphus had done to improve the efficiency of his army Louvois did, later on, to better those of Louis XIV. It was in the month of December, 1655, twenty-three years after the Lion of the North had fallen in the ever-memorable field of Lützen, that the elder Le Tellier obtained for his son, then only fifteen years old, the survivorship of his office of Secretary at War.

The great efforts and industry of Colbert, who had deservedly risen into the king's favour, and who had rapidly succeeded in gaining the confidence of his country, stirred Louvois's emulation, and set him to discover some field in which he likewise might become pre-eminent. Having detected in the king a longing for martial distinction, he employed every artifice to increase it; he skilfully roused his warlike ambition, and flattered him to such an extent as to persuade him that he was a greater captain than

any of his generals. He urged him to visit the experimental camps established by Turenne, and to examine with his own eyes the condition and situation of his troops. In this manner he brought about a revival of the king's long-suppressed passion for military glory.

The wonderful talents of Colbert restored prosperity to the ruined finances of the country, and provided the means for war. Louvois applied these means in raising and sending to the field armies more thoroughly equipped and disciplined than any other of that age. His desire for power was insatiable, and he was willing to involve the whole world in the horrors of war that he might be indispensable to the king. In this he succeeded, and for some time he was, after the king himself, reputed the most powerful man in France.

Louvois was lavish of the blood and treasure of France, and a great contrast to Colbert's pacific aims. His extensive knowledge, talent, and strength of will fitted him as an able minister to an ambitious sovereign. On the death of Colbert in 1683 he was made superintendent of edifices, of arts and manufactures in France, and his influence became still greater. He was cruel to the Protestants, had a considerable share in the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and has been reproached for having been the instigator of two devastations of the Palatinate, when that beautifully cultivated country was wasted by fire and sword in 1674, and again in 1689.

On the 19th of March, 1662, he married an heiress, Anne de Souvré, only daughter of Charles de Souvré, Marquis of Courtenvaux, and shortly before his marriage Louis XIV., as a wedding gift, authorized him to affix his signature to documents as Secretary of State. From that moment dates his political existence. After 1666 Louvois had all the management of the ministry of war; Le Tellier, his father, gradually withdrew from office, and quitted it entirely in 1668, after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Louvois repaid the confidence the king accorded him by a display of surprising vigilance, restless activity, and application. The vast breadth of his intellect was able to grapple with a multitude of matters, all of which he supervised personally. His great talents shone out conspicuously in the affairs of war, principally in those which had reference to the supply of the troops. His organization did much to lessen the prerogatives and dignity

of the nobility. As the proportion of the aristocratic arm, the cavalry, decreased, that of the infantry rose, and the peasantry began to muster largely in the Army of France.

The value of the pike and lance had been lowered, and a better knowledge of firearms, with the introduction of the flint-lock, made the weight of war fall on the infantry.

The King of France must be reckoned a fortunate monarch, for he had three highly gifted servants—De Lionne, who procured him allies; Colbert, who looked after the finances; and Louvois, who administered his armies. When, in the latter years of his reign, he ceased to have the support of the talent and strength of will of his ministers, and insisted on governing by himself, his fortune changed.

Louvois worked incessantly; his labours comprised thirty years of contest and unrelenting efforts. His great strength lay in his will; he was rough to excess, so much so that some French writers have called him brutal. Macaulay describes him as “a man distinguished by zeal for what he thought the public interests, by capacity, and by knowledge of all that related to the administration of war, but of a savage and obdurate nature.” Saint-Simon, however, interprets the hardness as “ferocity of character which was nothing more than the energy of a powerful will, a right feeling, a healthy judgment, a clear appreciation of everything useful and possible.” He was spoilt to such an extent that with difficulty could he be chided by his royal master. On one occasion, it is related, that the king, irritated by his minister’s obstinacy, reproved him within hearing of some of the courtiers and attendants. Louvois was much put out, and conceived that a war was necessary to efface the reproval by making his services indispensable to the king; nor was he long in finding an opportunity for appeasing his offended dignity.

Louvois had only a small set of leading principles, but very precise and very simple, like the fundamental axioms of mathematicians. He possessed a singular aptitude, an ingenious fecundity, and an infallible method of applying them to the solution of every problem.

Though the French Army enjoyed the reputation of being the best in Europe, Louvois had been able to fathom all the vices and defects of its organization. All the administrative services, none excepted, required prompt reform. In 1662 he found the army in need of radical changes, which alone could put it beyond any

possibility of comparison with others. He laboured hard at his self-imposed task of correcting abuses and restoring efficiency. He introduced into the army promotion by seniority, a system of inspections, wise and just measures which recognized merit before simple accident of birth. Valuable services to the State, and not ancestry, were henceforth regarded as honourable.

Martinet was selected to superintend the discipline in the infantry, and his name has ever since been applied as a title to every strict disciplinarian. He began with the *regiment du roi*, in which the king took much interest, and which was intended to serve as a model for the rest of the French infantry. Martinet, nevertheless, was not simply, as he has been called, the father of rigidity in drill and discipline; he was an intelligent and brave officer. In 1660 he introduced the bayonet in the French Army, a great step in advance, by means of which the musketeer was equipped for both distant and hand-to-hand fighting. He was killed at Doesbourg.

Before Louvois assumed the reins of office, the salary of the soldiers was neither fixed nor paid regularly. It varied at times in the different armies, between one regiment and the other, and often even between the companies of the same regiment. Louvois laid down a proper scale of pay, and made the payments regular. The foot soldier received five sous a day, the horseman was entitled to fifteen, the dragoon to eleven. When, during the course of a campaign, the Crown provided bread and forage, the commissaries were bound to recover, through the captains of companies, a sou from the pay of each foot soldier, eight from that of the cavalry, and five from that of the dragoon. Better fed, better kept than heretofore, the soldier was more fit to face the hardships of war; still Louvois did not neglect the sanitary side, and brought about many useful reforms in the hospitals.

The infantry soldiers hitherto had not always remained in the same companies, for, whenever any unpopular change of garrison or disagreeable duty threatened, they had no scruple to change their captains. Louvois put a stop to this practice, which militated against good discipline, inasmuch as the soldiers were unknown to their officers and to their new comrades.

As far back as 1621 Gustavus Adolphus had ordered that the soldiers of the line were, as far as possible, to be clad alike, and Louis XIV. had introduced uniforms for his guards in 1665. After

the treaty of peace of Nimeguen uniformity of dress was by degrees extended throughout the army.

It was during Louvois's administration that the artillery took its place in the French forces.* Before that date the officers of the artillery and engineers were kept distinct from the army, and held no military rank, whilst the gunners were enlisted for the war, and discharged when peace was concluded. In 1668 six companies of gunners were raised, with a special regiment of fusiliers to act as guard for the artillery. This regiment had a company of sappers and one of military artificers. A hundred years later, after the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, the Royal Corps of Artillery was the forty-seventh regiment of the line; there was no distinction made yet in the French Army between artillery or engineer officers, or between field or fortress artillery. Each regiment (there were seven of them) had twenty companies, two of sappers, four of bombardiers, and fourteen of gunners.

During the reign of Louis XIV. France did not keep up a permanent transport or military train. In case of war transport as required was hired or impressed by the war commissaries, and had no military organization. Everything hitherto had been done under contract; in this manner were furnished the teams, convoys, and transport of all kinds, and even the men. At the close of the former century contractors furnished the horses, carriages, and drivers required for the service of the artillery or for the transport of munitions and provisions.

It was given to Louvois to solve to a certain extent the intricate problem of feeding the troops. Vauban relates how in the old war, when the French were in the enemy's country, they were for three whole weeks without bread. The soldier, naturally, lived on plunder. He had his days of plenty and his days of penury, the latter always more numerous than the former, but after marauding, after abundance or want, came a serious lowering of discipline. Louvois, who raised large armies, wanted them disciplined, and to this end his first efforts were directed to ensure to the soldiers first of all their daily bread. "When it is necessary to take into account fifty thousand extra mouths sojourning in the same spot for five or six weeks," he used to say, "it is in the preparations for keeping them alive that I am troubled."

Louvois had a special aptitude with regard to all that related

* The infantry was formed into battalions in 1635. In 1667 Louis XIV. instituted the rank of brigadier-general.

to the preparations for war in conformity with the object to be attained, the theatre selected for the military operations, and the enemy to be encountered. Munitions of war, provisions, forage, materials of every description, means of transport—in short, everything was foreseen by him in the exact proportion necessary. The preparations for a siege had a special attraction for him, because through Vauban's teaching he had acquired considerable knowledge of engineering skill.*

It was Richelieu to whom the credit of creating the *Intendance* is due. That body was suppressed by the Fronde and re-established by Mazarin. Louvois placed it on a sounder basis; nevertheless in his time there was a certain amount of confusion with regard to the exact nature of its duties.

The practice of supplying armies entirely by the plunder of the countries invaded was dying out, but no general system for insuring the means of subsistence to large bodies of troops in an enemy's country had been formulated. Gustavus Adolphus fed his troops partly from magazines and partly by means of sutlers and traders who were permitted to follow the army. Louvois created general magazines of provisions, a thing which in itself did not really demand a great effort of genius, but which, nevertheless, required a great measure of method, exactness, and continuity.

Magazines had, indeed, been formed as occasions required by the armies which needed them, but now all along the frontiers vast storehouses were established, and furnished with sufficient resources for extending their action in every direction, by thrusting out branches into the country about to be invaded. Whatever siege the king wished to undertake, whatever operations the army was intended to carry out, supplies of every description were ready to follow the combatants, thrown forward like feeders from the magazines in the rear; and if the troops were compelled to retire they were sure of finding increasing resources as they fell back.

The magazines doubled the strategical power of the French armies; by giving them more freedom of movement, they

* De Saint-Simon pays a just tribute to the fine qualities of Vauban. He writes in his memoirs: "Never man more mild, more compassionate, more obliging, but respectful without the least tinge of politeness, and the most miserly caretaker of human life, with a bravery which saddled everything on himself and gave all to others. It is inconceivable how, with so much uprightness and sincerity, incapable to lend himself to anything false or bad, he should have been able to gain to the extent he did the friendship and confidence of Louvois and of the king."

augmented the rapidity, the breadth, and the period of their operations. The foreign cavalry, having no magazines, was compelled to wait until the crops were so far advanced towards maturity as to permit of their being cut and used in a green state, whereas the French cavalry, having abundant forage in a dry state, at whatever season of the year, was in a condition to march and to act.

The armies of Louis XIV. were always ready to take the field at least one month sooner than those of his opponents. This system of provisioning, so simple in appearance, was so difficult in the execution that the enemies of France, interested as they were to copy her military institutions, hesitated for a long time to pursue it, and never succeeded as well as she did.

By the rules laid down, and by the stipulations which Louvois had made with the purveyors of provisions, all the fortresses had to be kept fully stocked for six months. In the most important along the frontier were established special magazines for the sole purpose of meeting the needs of active armies. Wheresoever the troops marched their provisions followed. Louvois would not permit of their being without bread for a single day.

Louvois also conceived the idea of imitating the use made of *tasajo*, *pemican*, and *carne secca* in other countries, and of contriving from these compounds a reserve ration. In a treatise on military hygiene, which Colombier published in the year 1775, it is stated, on the authority of Monsieur de Feuquières, that, with the object of supplying the troops with desiccated meat, Louvois ordered the construction of large copper ovens, each one capable of holding the meat of eight oxen. These ovens were intended to dry the flesh by replacing the heat of the sun's rays in tropical climates. The meat dried by this process was found to be well adapted for use. One pound of fresh meat yielded one ounce of dried stuff, and one ounce of this boiled with water is stated by Colombier—though we very much doubt it—to have sufficed to nourish eight men.

The minister had drawn around him a small number of specialists, all men of the first order, on whose character and ability he could place entire reliance. Foremost were two able officials, Saint-Povenge, who looked after all that related to administrative matters, and Chambray, who attended to military details; also two great commissaries of stores, Jacquier and Berthelot. Ably aided by these men, he had the certainty of

seeing his combinations succeed and his orders executed with secrecy and punctuality.

For the epoch the innovation introduced by Louvois answered admirably, because the wars of Louis XIV. were almost all campaigns of sieges, conducted at a very short distance from the frontier, and backed by powerful armies. Under different conditions, for wars in the field, for which the king showed little inclination, the system of magazines, always subject to many dangers, would have presented insuperable difficulties.

For the campaign in Holland, in 1672, the preparations were on an unusually large scale, and the French army was provided with a siege train and a transport train, which was an innovation in the art of war. Louvois had raised men in England, Italy, and Switzerland, he had besides resorted to a most extraordinary and daring measure in the interest of his country, with the object of guarding against depleting France of munitions of war.

To this effect he determined nothing less than to purchase a large quantity of powder and lead from the Dutch, from the very people with whom the French were soon to go to war. The mercantile spirit and greed of gain of the Dutch deadened their patriotism, and made the transaction easy. Sadoc, a Jewish banker of Amsterdam, agreed to engage in this novel speculation. Under pretext of collecting munitions either for Spanish Flanders or for certain towns in Germany, like Mayence and Frankfort, he purchased enormous quantities of powder, saltpetre, lead, bullets and tinder, which he took care to have rapidly sent over the border into the electorate of Cologne. Sadoc had soon relieved the Dutch of 400,000 pounds of powder, 160 milliers of saltpetre, 12 milliers of sulphur, 200 of lead, and 200 of tinder-match.

"A great French army passed the Rhine. Fortress after fortress opened its gates. Three of the seven provinces of the federation were occupied by the invaders. The fires of the hostile camp were seen from the top of the Stadthouse of Amsterdam." *

During the first campaign, which had put the French in possession of many towns in the Netherlands, Louvois had constantly accompanied the army. With inexhaustible activity he had directed the administration; he examined everything with his own eyes, and applied himself to master every detail of the service.

Once, when arrangements were in progress for operations in

* Macaulay's "History of England," chap. ii. p. 106.

Flanders, Louvois started for that country with Chamlay. A voyage of his along the frontier was always looked upon as a great event. The generals, officers of all ranks, the intendants, the commissaries, the engineers, the contractors, the caterers, all attended this terrible visitor with considerable trepidation. On the other side of the frontier the emotion was not any the less; the couriers increased, the governors watched day and night, expecting every moment to behold the approach of the cavalry which had been sent to invest their city. Louvois inspected the fortifications, the magazines, the troops, examined everything with a vigorous and minute scrutiny. He busied himself with the subsistence and education of the army.

Notwithstanding all the well-intended energy displayed by Louvois, there are ample proofs that he rendered himself obnoxious to many officers of the army, and that he did not even refrain from opposing and thwarting Turenne. The minister carried matters with a high hand, and, though in 1667 he had acted under Turenne's orders, later on, when cognizant of his strength, he did not keep within his proper rôle of administrator, but interfered with the generals, hampering these adepts with his views and injunctions. As it ordinarily occurs, Turenne at last lost patience, his temper got the better of him, and he rebuked the young and self-satisfied minister with the scorn he rightly deserved.

With his father's help, Louvois undertook to undermine the influence of Turenne. He worked so as to give him a rival, and persuaded the king that to carry his great projects into execution he needed two generals. He schemed with such consummate ability that Louis took Condé back into favour. During the last four years of his life Turenne had to contend against the king, Condé, and Louvois, and there was a bitter correspondence carried out by the Marshal with the latter.

Able administrator as Louvois was, he did not understand the larger operations of war. His fixed object was to seize, on reaching the enemy's country, all the adversary's strongholds. This entailed parcelling the army into small detachments to undertake the various sieges, in which many lives were lost and little lasting effect was accomplished.

Louis committed the serious error of placing greater trust in his minister who flattered him than on the honest advice of such experienced leaders as Turenne and Condé. These two wished

the king to destroy some forty-five or fifty Dutch fortresses which the French army had captured, and to retain only five as store-houses and points of support on the line of communications, which would have allowed the bulk of the army to be kept together ready for any operations in the field. Louvois, who contended that France had ample troops for furnishing the garrisons and keeping the field, gave the opposite advice, and by adopting it the king weakened his army and lost the favourable opportunity for marching into Amsterdam. Louvois also dissented from Colbert and Turenne, who were disposed to accept the terms of peace offered by the Dutch, and prevailed on the king to impose excessive conditions on the Republic. The consequence was that Holland, at the suggestion of the Prince of Orange, was submerged by the opening of the dykes, and remained in that condition for two years. The peasants suffered greatly, the whole country being turned into a vast lake; the cattle were drowned, and fresh water was obtained with the greatest difficulty. In the meanwhile the Dutch were diligently occupied in reorganizing their army.

With marvellous imprudence the minister had allowed the Dutch to ransom 30,000 prisoners for the paltry sum of two crowns per head. He had in this manner, for a ridiculous price, handed back to the Prince of Orange a whole army.

The following year nothing could repair the fault committed in fractioning the troops amongst so many fortresses. The talents and efforts of Turenne, Condé, and Vauban were of no avail.

Louvois attached great consequence to depriving the adversary of means of subsistence by ordering the devastation of whole districts, and devised many operations with the intent of cutting off the enemy's supplies. It was his opinion that the surest manner for augmenting the specie in France was to go and seek for funds on the other side of the frontier in the guise of contributions. In France there was a reserve fund for military expenses; this *extraordinaire des guerres*, as it was called, comprised at the time of Louvois's death a funded sum of fifteen millions in the hands of Mons. de Turménie, and a funded sum of three millions in the keeping of Mons. de la Touanne. These eighteen millions were the fruit of economies and of contributions levied in Holland. With such a reserve there could be no embarrassment in having of a sudden to meet any extraordinary war expenses.

In 1675 Louvois raised a large sum by means of a tax he imposed upon all individuals belonging to the *ban* and the *arrière ban* who refused to serve in person. By means of this impost he was able in the early part of May of that year to put in the field on the northern frontier an army of 70,000 men.

Like Frederick the Great, he had no relish for wars conducted too far from the borders of the country. The Prussian king attributed their ill success to the many difficulties encountered in providing supplies at a considerable distance from the frontier, and in furnishing, at the right time, fresh soldiers, remounts, clothing, and munitions of war.

In the year 1675 the Spanish fleet had gone down before the French, and the town of Messina had recognized Louis XIV. as its sovereign. Three years later we find Louvois communicating to the Intendant d'Oppède the orders issued by the king for insuring the subsistence of the troops and population of that city. The city was to receive large supplies of grain by the efforts of Mons. de Seignelay, the army by those of its munitionnaire-general, Berthelot. Colbert was to arrange with two firms which were willing to purchase and carry grain to Sicily. Louvois proposed to send to Messina blankets, sheets, mattresses, and palliasses, as straw was almost as dear there as wool in France. An order had been issued to the intendant of Provence to allow to depart free of export duty, and to have conveyed by the king's ships, salted meats, pulse, and wine. Arrangements had, besides, been made with a dealer in Paris to purchase 200,000 pounds of salted beef in Ireland, to be despatched direct to Messina. All these great preparations, all the ostentatious armaments, over which such a fuss was made, were nothing but a feint, for Louvois, who had always been opposed to this expedition, had resolved on bringing about the evacuation of Messina. He wanted to be rid of far-away wars and to concentrate the French forces. Some authors will have it that the abandonment of Sicily was rendered necessary by the license of the French soldiery.

On the 22nd of October, 1685, the declaration of Louis XIV. that he had resolved on revocating the Edict of Nantes, established by Henry IV. in 1598, was solemnly made known in all the parliaments. Louvois, who was neither a fanatic nor a *dévo*t, had a great voice in the matter. Chamblay states, "The design of this great minister was not merely to despoil the Huguenots

of the possession of their places of safety; he had also formed that of extirpating Calvinism entirely out of France, for he conceived that a multiplicity of religions in the same state was only too likely to foment civil wars, and thus to place the country at the mercy of aliens."

In 1689, he prevailed on Louis XIV. to order the devastation of one of the fairest regions of Europe. The following were the reasons assigned by Macaulay for this cruel deed done in the depth of winter: "If the cities of the Palatinate could not be retained they might be destroyed. If the soil of the Palatinate was not to furnish supplies to the French, it might be so wasted that it would at least furnish no supplies to the Germans." The historian adds: "Fifteen years had elapsed since Turenne had ravaged part of that fine country. But the ravages committed by Turenne, though they have left a deep stain on his glory, were mere sport in comparison with the horrors of this second devastation."* In Marshal Villars' memoirs we read that some of the best soldiers murmured at the work they were put to.

The services Louvois rendered to Louis XIV. were very great, and the king has been depicted as lavish in his expressions of regret for his sudden demise. Nevertheless, the Duke of Saint-Simon states, on the authority of Chamillart, that when the minister died he was in such disfavour that he would the following day have been arrested and sent to the Bastille. The king appears to have said something of the sort to Chamillart, for the raising of the siege of Coni had irritated him greatly against his indefatigable servant.

It is also Saint-Simon who relates that, after the death of Louvois, an officer came from Saint Germain, sent by the King of England (James II.), and tendered his royal master's condolences on his loss. To which Louis replied in a very unconcerned manner, "Present my compliments and thanks to the King and Queen of England, sir, and assure them that my affairs and theirs will progress every bit as well as they did heretofore."

Setting his politics aside, Louvois must be always admired as an administrator of the first rank. He has left behind him two

* Marlborough devastated Bavaria as a means of detaching the Elector from his alliance with France. This was done with ferocity; three hundred towns or villages were burnt, it being undertaken as a retaliation for Turenne's devastation of the Palatinate. Hosack ("The Law of Nations," pp. 287, 288) states that Marlborough expressed regret in having to order the wasting of the country in the neighbourhood of Munich.

great monuments, one the Dépôt de la Guerre, which he instituted, the other the magnificent retreat for old soldiers, the Hôtel des Invalides,* which was established and endowed by Louis XIV. principally at his recommendation. Though Hosack represents him as a savage and ruthless man, the king never had a more devoted, more ardent, more foreseeing and more useful co-operator than Louvois; his death was a dreary loss for France, and was much felt by the king in the unfortunate war at the close of his reign.

France gave the law to the rest of Europe in all matters military until the rise of the power of Prussia under the leadership of Frederick the Great. The Monarchy had an army which crossed bayonets with ours in many memorable battle-fields, and bore its colours with honour in every quarter of the globe. There could be no higher recognition of its worth than that which Napoleon bestowed on it in the following words: "It was neither the conscripts nor the volunteers who saved the Republic in 1793; it was the 150,000 old soldiers of the Monarchy, who, after the emigration of their officers and the dissolution of their regiments, were drafted into the Republican armies."

* In 1789 the Hôtel des Invalides had a revenue of £68,000, but its property was alienated during the time of the first Republic, when the institution was maintained out of the public revenue.

CHAPTER IV.

FREDERICK THE GREAT.

FREDERICK II. was one of the greatest monarchs of modern times. He raised his little State to the rank of a great power, and for a long period was the arbiter of peace and war in Europe. He was endowed, above everything else, with a genius for war, and in all his career showed himself the most intrepid of soldiers and the most tenacious of statesmen. Not satisfied with performing great deeds, he left his conceptions to posterity, and his principles and maxims contain a synopsis of what should rule the conduct of military operations.

Frederick the Great excelled more as a tactician than as a strategist, and most of his victories he owed to his elaborately trained troops and to their excellent power of manœuvring. He had real insight and skill in the field; he was sharp in detecting the vulnerable points of his adversary, and in striking at them till success was attained. Even more than Napoleon, the king was solicitous for the well-being of his soldiers, and, notwithstanding the bravery and discipline the Prussian Army displayed in his campaigns, diligently laboured to bring it ever nearer to perfection. Few generals have made the physical wants of their troops the subject of such careful study. He pondered unceasingly on all the wants of his soldiers, and, well satisfied with their excellence, held that with them he could undertake any enterprise, but only on one condition, viz. that the necessary provisions were forthcoming.

In his "General Principles of War" Frederick II. wrote: "An army is a multitude of men who demand to be fed every day; this food consists in good bread, wholesome meat, vegetables which are found in the neighbourhood of the camp, spirits, and, if practicable, some beer. It is not sufficient to have all these

provisions with the army in abundance, it is also necessary that everything should be at a reasonable price."

It is right to observe, with reference to the question of cost, that at that period the Prussian soldier received daily two pounds of bread and weekly two pounds of meat; everything further he had to purchase out of his pay.

Above all things, the king was particularly anxious in the matter of bread; he always took great care that the troops should not go without it. He laid down on this point that the army should always have with it ten days' supply of bread and biscuit.

It is very often said that there is nothing new under the sun. Frederick, for example, furnished each company of his army with a hand-mill for grinding corn. For this institution we must go back to the sixth century B.C., when, according to Xenophon, we find in the following passage the provision of hand-mills enjoined in the orders issued by Cyrus prior to his starting on his Lydian campaign: "And when we come into those parts of the country that are untouched, where probably we shall find corn, we ought to be provided with hand-mills . . . that we may use them in making bread. . . ." Mills likewise formed part of the baggage of each Roman legion.

Amongst Frederick's rules are to be found the two following: "It is necessary to ascertain exactly the nature of the country where the war is to be carried out, so as to regulate on this knowledge the details of the expedition it is contemplated to take in hand.—The greatest attention will be paid to the provisions which will be needed for the campaign; it will not suffice to collect them, one must calculate in advance the means that will be needed to effect their transport, because, even with the most thriving army, nothing can be executed should it fall short of food."

To meet the needs of an army he enjoins the establishment of magazines on the frontier from which the operations are intended to commence. These magazines, he observes, should be formed beforehand and in good time, so that everything may be ready when the army takes the field.

"If a river should favour you," writes the king, "provisions are conveyed thereon for several months, according to what is considered to be necessary; if there is no river a supply of flour for one or more months is carted along; with this a general dépôt is formed in some locality, which is protected by means of earth-works, palisades, or the like; a good garrison is located there,

which afterwards furnishes the daily escort for the provisions which go to the camp. We have hand-mills which we can work, and by this means eke out our provisions. There is a good way for safeguarding the convoys, it is to establish a considerable body of men between the convoy and the enemy, and to give to the former a special escort; the enemy then dreads to engage between the detachment and the escort, and in this manner is kept in respect. The posts and defiles through which the convoy must pass should be occupied in advance, to prevent the enemy turning them to account, and the vehicles should be parked every time that they issue from these kinds of places. The question of provisions is of the greatest interest. If the enemy desires to carry out a defensive war, he can only destroy you through your supplies: all his detachments have no other aim than this, and all his light troops are in the field for that purpose; this enjoins the employment of the greatest prudence and of even superfluous precautions, to safeguard your convoys, because if you are vanquished by want you are more thoroughly so than if you lost a battle." *

"You will take care," he wrote to Prince Henry, "that the soldier does not want either in bread or in meat, and in cases of great exertion you will have him supplied with provisions free of cost." In fact, the king showed a restless energy in every detail which related to the subsistence of his troops, making his operations depend on his resources in victuals. In this he differed from Napoleon, who in several of his campaigns took very little heed of the requirements of his soldiers.

As a rule, the main difficulty in feeding an army in the field does not lie so much in the collection of provisions and other articles, as in placing them within reach of the troops who have to consume them. To insure the soldiers being fed with regularity, Louvois, the celebrated minister, who was the principal instrument of the French conquests in the reign of Louis XIV., instituted, as we have seen, rolling magazines. His system was more or less adopted by the other armies of Europe, and a period ensued during which wherever the troops marched their provisions followed. The system was good, but prejudicial to vigorous military operations, and it received the name of the five days' march system, because, owing to the difficulties of transport, an army could not well get further than from five to seven days

* "*Principes généraux de la Guerre*," tom. xxviii. pp. 107, 108.

beyond its magazines. Frederick campaigned with this system, but he introduced some slight improvements in it, which allowed him to go two or three more marches from his magazines.

It was one of his sayings that a general who did not surround himself with sufficient provisions, were he even superior to Cæsar in talent, would not be a hero for any length of time.

In those days not only was the fall of a magazine or the capture of a convoy an embarrassing event in the course of a campaign, but the system generally followed entailed the employment of an enormous transport. As this cost much money, it naturally imposed a limit to the number of combatants that could be placed in the field. It was to reduce the proportions of the land transport that Frederick the Great inculcated the necessity of turning to account all rivers and other waterways in the transport of provisions and forage.

He had a hoarded treasure for war purposes, the amount of which is not exactly known. This treasure wherewith to meet the first expenditure in case of war is a regular institution, which continues in our own time, and enables the German Army to commence a campaign without fresh supplies being granted by Parliament. It is rarely in war that there is a sufficiency of money; the king sought to nurse his war funds—which were none too plentiful—by making use of a rigid economy, and thus to be in a position to continue the war for a longer period. He also fixed the price of provisions at 25 per cent. below their ordinary value.

Armies in those days were supplied by huge trains of waggons, and the art of making war feed itself was not a recognized part of the military system. At that period the principal armies of Europe were organized very differently from those of our own times, and their general characteristic was extreme slowness of motion and heaviness of manœuvre.

With regard to the subsistence of an army, Frederick divided the subject into two parts. In one he considered the most suitable localities for the establishment of magazines, in the other the measures required for rendering them mobile.

The question of transport should never be disassociated from the difficulties of provisioning an army on active service; indeed, we have no hesitation in saying that it is the most perplexing of all. If the system of rolling magazines, with the costly transport which was their complement, was found faulty in

the old days, what would it be now when the number of troops in the field is so much larger than it was in the eighteenth century?

Baron von der Goltz writes: "When two powers of the first order come to put their armies in movement, one might imagine assisting at an emigration of nations. Each one of them puts in the field a million of men, 300,000 horses, and one might well believe that the whole of a little kingdom prepares to hurl its population on the neighbouring territory. To set going and to maintain such masses of men would be absolutely impossible without the new means of transport which we can now dispose of. . . . At Solferino, 160,000 Austrians have fought against 150,000 French and Italians. At Gravelotte-Saint-Privat, 200,000 Germans were opposed to 130,000 French. At Königgrätz, 221,000 Prussians were seen in presence of 219,000 Austrians and Saxons. There is nothing, however, to prevent in the future an army of 300,000 or 400,000 combatants being seen collected on a battle-field, or from ten to fifteen army corps united under one single command, in presence of an enemy of equal force." *

Frederick's solicitude in the matter of transport is revealed in the following passage, in which he attests the necessity for a body of expert drivers, and of close superintendence on the part of the General Commanding: "Besides the vehicles which cart five days' bread-supply in rear of the regiments, the commissariat has its special waggons, and all this transport taken together can draw a month's provisions for the army. Nevertheless, when it is possible, it is advisable to avail one's self of rivers; these alone can insure abundance for the army. The waggons must be drawn by horses; we have used bullocks, and have found ourselves badly served. The drivers appointed to these carriages, as also to those of the artillery, should bestow the greatest care on them, and the general should keep them well under his supervision, because the loss of animals curtails the number of waggons, and therefore the amount of provisions. Moreover, when the horses are not well fed they cannot stand fatigue, and in trying marches you will lose your horses, your waggons, and your flour. These losses when repeated become of great consequence; they undermine the grand schemes of the war. Consequently it behoves the general to pay particular attention to certain details which to him are of vital importance."

* Von der Goltz, "Das Volk in Waffen."

A cumbersome train of baggage and provisions following the combatants is a serious hindrance. The object of an army is to fight; to do this it should have perfect freedom of movement in every direction. But this freedom of movement can only be obtained when all the roads in the neighbourhood of the contending forces are clear of impediments, such as would be were the combatants entirely left by themselves. They have, however, to take with them many vehicles containing articles of primary necessity—ammunition, provisions, and hospitals, considered indispensable to keep the troops in proper fighting condition. These vehicles occupy a considerable length of road on the line of march, whilst in their progress they must strictly conform to the march of the troops, from whom they withdraw large detachments for escorts. When they are parked in camp, the want of nimbleness of the mass engenders considerable uneasiness, and the waggons and carts have to be withdrawn and sent to the rear betimes in the expectation of a battle. If this ends in victory, as the pursuit urges the combatants forward, the conveyances are left far away behind; if the result is a defeat, they become an obstruction for the retreating troops. A proper consideration of these drawbacks will show how very necessary it is to study how best to reduce the size of the trains which accompany an army.

Cyrus, who commanded large hosts, and who knew that without a sufficient quantity of food his army could neither fight nor live, enjoined, "Spare the weight of fine quilts and carpets, and make it up with necessaries." The Roman military laws ordained the elimination of everything which was not actually necessary. In their armies this was more than ever necessary, as the transport mainly consisted of pack animals.

With the magazine system all rapidity of movement was attended with inconvenience, and the arrangement possessed a very telling defect, inasmuch as the movements of the troops were often made subservient to those of the provision columns. In 1757, for example, Frederick was delayed in attacking Daun at Kolin, having to wait for baked bread coming from distant ovens. The disadvantages of the system were not so felt at the time of Louis XIV., and it answered probably well, because the campaigns were mostly of sieges, and carried on near the frontier. Frederick, however, was opposed to a war of sieges; his aim was to penetrate into the interior of the enemy's country and threaten his capital. What he desired were short and brisk wars.

Some idea of the drag the transport was may be gained from what occurred at the siege of Olmütz in 1758. Colonel C. B. Brackenbury, in his "*Frederick the Great*," writes : " The siege of Olmütz languished. The first parallel had been opened too far from the place, which was well defended. But the chief difficulty was the transport of stores over the ninety miles of mountain road, which had to be traversed between Troppau and Olmütz, through a country infested by the Austrian light troops. The first Austrian success was the throwing of a reinforcement of 1100 picked grenadiers into the besieged town on the 22nd of June. Still, it seemed that Olmütz must fall, and the last stages were only postponed till the arrival of an important convoy of 3000 waggons, which was to leave Troppau on the 26th of June, escorted by 7000 men under Colonel Mosel. So much depended on this convoy that Ziethen was sent from Olmütz with a strong force to assist in covering the march. The convoy started at the time expected, but the country waggoners straggled so that the 27th had to be made a day of rest. This was fatal. Loudon, with a force of some 12,000 men, or more, was on the watch for it from the west, and Ziskowitz, with another force from the east. Daun had manœuvred so as to deceive the king, and make him expect a battle. On the 28th the convoy began to struggle forward again, having already lost or sent back nearly a third of the waggons, which broke down from the terrible state of the roads. As the advanced guard moved slowly forward, it perceived Loudon drawn up to oppose the passage of the defile between Bautsch and Altliebe. Colonel Mosel attacked at once, and drove back Loudon with his Croats and Hungarians. The convoy reached Neudörff that night, where Mosel was overjoyed to find Ziethen, who had come so far to meet him. The state of affairs was critical. The convoy was again in a jumbled condition from bad roads and dread of the enemy. A whole day more had to be spent in restoring some sort of order, and the march began again on the 30th. Ziethen and Mosel knew only too well that in front of them was the worst defile at Domstädtl. All precautions were taken, but when the head of the column, with some 120 waggons, was fairly in the defile, it came under fire of artillery. Horses were killed, waggons disabled, and the road was soon blocked. The rest of the convoy was brought forward as quickly as possible, and packed in a mass for defence. The attack came from both flanks at once, and was at first repulsed. All soldiers

know the result which must follow. The waggoners lost heart and head, and the convoy fell into chaos. The Prussian troops fought with great bravery. General Krokow, with the advanced guard and 250 waggons, among which was the military chest, gained the bridges of the Morava, and escaped to the king. Ziethen had to fall back on Troppau. The convoy was utterly broken up and lost, in spite of the gallant conduct of the Prussian troops."

Frederick raised the siege during the night of the 1st and 2nd of July, and marched his whole force to Bohemia. He moved with an advanced guard, a main body composed of the siege parks in the centre, and a column of all arms on each flank, then a rear-guard. The Prussian army, with 4000 carriages, was but a convoy on a large scale, which was, as it were, escorted by the Austrians who were in front, on the flank, and in the rear. On the 14th of July it was safely assembled at Königgrätz.

The relative qualities of the opponents should always be taken into account. In his wars Frederick's enemies had no better system of supply, their armies were cumbersome, deficient of power of manœuvring, and led by chiefs who adhered to obsolete precedents.

Frederick did not neglect to make use of the resources of the countries crossed or occupied by his armies, but he always insisted on the necessity for doing so without ruining them. He applied himself to use them sparingly, urged more by a spirit of self-interest than by a real feeling of humanity. In keeping with the ideas of the time he appears to have considered it much safer to depend upon the rolling magazines, and to have looked upon what was to be found on the spot as serving to make up the deficiencies.

In the Seven Years' War he departed from the custom generally followed at that time of taking up winter quarters, so as to enable the troops to be more easily supplied with food.

The assistance the Prussian monarch drew from the local resources he denied to his adversary, for one of his principles was that the best tactics lay in starving the enemy. "The greatest art of a general acting on the defensive is to starve the enemy; it is a means in which, without hazarding anything, there is everything to gain; and here is how to set about: remove as best you can all that he can be deprived of by prudence and

proper measures. Hunger will conquer man more surely than the courage of his adversary ; nevertheless, as the capture of a convoy or the loss of a magazine does not end the war, and to prevail battles are needed,* to attain success it is necessary to employ one or the other of these means."†

In 1758 Frederick, after some successes and reverses in Bohemia, was compelled to re-enter Silesia, and to employ detachments to keep in countenance his adversaries in other quarters. It was part of his plan to resort to every measure which could protect the frontier of Silesia. He had all the forage and provisions in the district of Konigingratz removed, so as to make it impossible for Marshal Daun, for want of magazines, to operate from that part of the province against Silesia. What he did in that campaign he frequently did again, holding, with good reason, that the enemy could undertake nothing serious without magazines.

Horses feel the effect of low feeding much sooner than men ; their nourishment, therefore, requires at least equal care. When an army reaches a certain distance beyond the frontier it is no longer possible to feed the horses of the cavalry and artillery and the transport animals from forage drawn from magazines. The Prussian king, fully impressed with this fact, laid down as a general principle that the cavalry was to forage in the enemy's country, the green forage being gathered on the plains, the dry drawn from the villages after the harvest. He considered it necessary to indicate to his generals the system they were to pursue in procuring forage.

"In the years 1744 and 1745 we have often had escorts of 10,000 men to protect the foragers. When the ground admits of it, and the escort is strong, one sets out to forage in two columns. An advanced guard of cavalry and infantry opens the march ; a body of cavalry and infantry follows ; then the foragers, who should all be armed ; then the horses of the artillery, supply trains, and infantry ; lastly, the rear-guard of the escort, composed of cavalry and infantry. On the two flanks along the whole length of the column are thrown out platoons of cavalry to protect the flanks, and to undertake what patrolling may be required. Arrived on the ground where it is desired to forage, dispositions

* "*Les Batailles décident du sort des États*" (*Pensées et règles générales pour la Guerre*," xxviii. 83).

† *Idem*, xxviii. 14.

are taken to defend it in the most practicable way ; the crops are treated as tenderly as possible, so that they may not be uselessly ruined ; a single road is taken, so as not to injure the sowings ; on the circumference is posted a light chain of cavalry, supported by three or four large reserves, and the general keeps a more numerous force in hand, so as to have what will be needed in the locality where the enemy intends to make its principal effort. The infantry is posted behind hedges, streams, round woods and villages, and a body of infantry is kept handy to meet any unforeseen event. The fields are then told off to the different corps which have to reap, and the foragers are set to work. When all has been cut and loaded, the foragers, with a slender escort, start first ; the infantry are called in ; then the cavalry and all the troops in a body form the rear-guard of the foragers.

“Dry forage is more easy to gather. The march is conducted in the same order ; afterwards detachments of cavalry are posted round the village where it is intended to forage, the infantry being stationed behind the surrounding hedges ; the barns are then distributed amongst the various corps, and each makes their trusses. Should one village be insufficient, after having cleared the first the same operation should be repeated in the nearest one in the neighbourhood ; but keep from foraging two villages at the same time, because by so doing you weaken yourself by scattering the troops, whereas you are always strong when taking one after the other. In returning, it will be the same as I have said with reference to green forage.” *

Much of what the king wrote on the subject of foraging no longer holds good. The difficulty lies in its transport, in consequence of its bulk, but now with steam presses, compressed forage, and railway transport, the conveyance of forage from the rear is not attended with quite the same difficulties.

Frederick held that the greater portion of the success of an army depends on an able performance of the subsistence service. This is what Jomini disapproves of, and what induced him to say that in the reign of Frederick II. the art of war had taken a backward step. In his time everything was made subordinate to an excessive consideration of not over-straining the powers of the commissariat. The great Swiss critic holds that the example of the great men of antiquity should have sufficed to overcome this prejudice. He pronounces himself in favour of the maxim that

* “*Principes généraux de la Guerre*,” tom. xxix. pp. 35, 36.

war should nourish war, a doctrine which made Cæsar's rapid campaigns in Gaul, Helvetia, and Italy possible. He remarks that the Cimbri, the Huns, the Franks in Gaul, the Moors in Spain, Gustavus Adolphus and his successors in Germany, marched surely without cumbersome bakery establishments or huge magazines.

The king was successful, and his system of supply, like everything else, was copied by most of the armies of Europe, and lasted till the French Revolution. Jomini states that he heard Bonaparte observe that when, in his first campaign, he found himself perplexed how to provide food for his army, he had nothing more to do but to fling himself on the enemy's rear, where he was sure to find an abundance of everything.

Tempelhoff, discussing the question of supplies, holds that in one case a general may venture to penetrate into the enemy's dominions without any, or, at least, without any very extensive preparations. The case would occur "when the adversary has formed large magazines at no great distance from the frontier, so situated that they can be captured by means of well-combined movements before he has time to remove or destroy them." It is a point of great importance to turn to self-account the providence of the enemy, and consequently to seize his magazines is always an object to bear in mind; but what prudent commander can ever calculate on their capture, seeing how easily they can be destroyed by fire?

The subsistence system of Frederick the Great met with the new one directed by Napoleon, and was shattered to pieces. At the root of the new system was a far greater appropriation of the resources of the countries invaded. There are several instances quoted in which the Prussian troops in the campaign of 1806 suffered from hunger and cold rather than deviate from the established system of supply. They adhered throughout to the system of feeding initiated by Frederick II., and refrained, even in their penury, from availing themselves of the produce which abounded round their camps. "One cause which increased the gravity of the disasters," writes Spencer Wilkinson,* "ought not to be forgotten. The idea that the defence of the country was everybody's duty did not exist. It was thought wrong for the officers in command to seize upon provisions or stores for the benefit of their men. In the retreat from Jena to Magdeburg,

* *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, No. 208, p. 611.

and from Magdeburg to Prenzlau, the troops suffered incredible privations. They passed starving through a country in which there was plenty to eat; they were not allowed to touch it, while their French pursuers had the full benefit of it. The nation might be destroyed, but private property must be respected." Before the battle of Jena forage was needed for the horses, and there was a large quantity of it stored in Jena; the sanction of the Commissary-General to purchase it, however, was required, and when his permission to do so was received, the results of the battle had already put the stores in the hands of the French.

There was a remarkable difference between the systems of Frederick and of Napoleon. The latter, wishing to march and strike quickly, could not tolerate being hampered by impedimenta, and would have liked to dispense with magazines. He was forced to live on the resources of the enemy's country, facing the risk of exhausting it, of irritating the inhabitants, and of turning them into implacable enemies. Frederick was more prudent and methodical; he did not admit of any movements of troops without magazines; he availed himself of the resources of the regions crossed by his armies, but took care not to ruin them.

If the importance accorded to provisioning and other administrative matters were pushed to excess before the Revolution, in the wars of the Republic and the Empire the soldiers suffered through the subject not receiving all the attention it deserved.

In one of his most fortunate campaigns (1805) Napoleon established no magazines;* once beyond the frontier his soldiers fed themselves by wresting from the peasants their store of provisions and cattle. The army was, however, disgraced by the mass of plunderers which followed it. At Braunau, by order of the emperor, 10,000 were arrested and scourged by their comrades. Much of this was the outcome of the continuous marches, which made it impossible for the rolling magazines to rejoin the troops in seasonable time.

Frederick the Great enjoins punishing marauding severely

* An army of 200,000 men was suddenly moved from Boulogne to the Rhine. The prefects were written to, and ordered to have all that was necessary for the troops collected in their respective departments. The divisions passed by, ten, fifteen, or twenty thousand men at the time. Everything furnished was settled for in bonds, which were afterwards redeemed at a price fixed by the French Government, and which was considered moderate.

and suppressing it with a high hand, as being the source of the greatest disorders. According to him it is that which opens the way to desertion. For want of provisions Napoleon's troops took to marauding and deserted, and on the point of discipline none of his armies could ever compare with those of Frederick the Great.

CHAPTER V.

BONAPARTE'S CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY AND IN EGYPT, 1796-1800.

THE French and the Austro-Piedmontese troops had been facing each other for some time on the Alps. The soldiers of Republican France occupied difficult positions in these mountains, and wintered there, enduring the greatest hardships.

The Directory did not take sufficient interest in the wants of the army. The state of the soldiers driven back from the frontiers of Italy was really pitiable; they were wanting in most things; to purchase tobacco and some mean food they were reduced to sell articles of their kit.

The younger Robespierre, one of the representatives of the people attached to the army of Italy, wrote thus to the Convention in 1794: "The army of Italy lives from day to day; its magazines are not furnished. The defender of liberty is there almost naked; the dilapidations, owing to the malevolence or the folly of the people intrusted with the subsistence and clothing, have been enormous. It is of the greatest necessity for you to accord it help of every description—clothes, shirts, shoes, provisions; we are in frightful want." Massena, who commanded the troops at Saorgio, gave testimony to their admirable resignation. He wrote: "Our soldiers are real mountaineers. . . . Nothing hinders them, nothing holds them together but the sacred love of liberty. They only know how to conquer and never complain; marching barefooted, often without provisions, they accuse no one."

In the Alps the main difficulty was the transport of provisions. To insure a continued issue to 36,000 men located several marches beyond their source of supply would have required from 3500 to 4500 mules, and, through want of forage, that number of animals could not be kept in working condition in those regions.

Dumerbion had gained some successes, and by the 8th of May, 1794, the army of Italy was in possession of the superior ridges of the Maritime Alps up to the first spurs of the Apennines. In the following September Dego fell into the hands of the French, and the gates of Italy were opened. All the fruits of these exertions were lost by Kellermann.

General Schérer, who had been sent to replace Kellermann, attacked the Austro-Piedmontese army, and by his victory of Loano recovered all the positions in the Maritime Alps which the latter had lost. Schérer lacked the ability to accomplish more; his soldiers were wanting in everything, they were not paid, they were not clothed, and they were badly fed. He complained to the Government that he was neglected, adding that should this continue he would be compelled to fall back on the Roya, and might, possibly, even have to recross the Var.

To such dire straits were exposed the heroes who in a few weeks were to astonish the whole of Europe by their courage and dashing *élan*, and who were soon to lay the foundations of as splendid a series of victories as the world had ever beheld.

It was while the army of Italy was in this state of penury that Bonaparte reappeared on the scene, this time as its general. After the capture of Toulon, through the good offices of Fréron * and Barras, who had been the representatives of the people with the besieging army, he had been promoted General of Brigade, and as such had rendered considerable assistance to General Dumerbion. After the fall of the Robespierres, however, he had become a suspect, and as such had been placed under arrest. He was shortly after released, and went to Paris, but having refused to go as a general of infantry to the Vendée, his name had been erased from the roll of generals. He would have remained in obscurity but for the revolution of the 13th Vendémiaire, an IV. (5th of October, 1795), which reinstated him as a general, and brought him conspicuously to the front.

Called to defend the National Convention against the sections by which it was menaced, Bonaparte scored an easy triumph over a mob more brave than disciplined, led by incapable chiefs. It was

* Bonaparte was not grateful to Fréron, who had become attached to Pauline Bonaparte, the general's second sister, whom he had met at Marseilles, and was very anxious to marry. For, when he ceased to be a member of the Convention and failed to be re-elected for the Council of the Five Hundred, Bonaparte refused to approve of the marriage. Fréron had lost his influential position, had no income, and was full of debts; he had ceased to be a *bon parti*.

the moral importance of the success which secured him the gratitude of the Government.

Schérer's remonstrations reached the Directory when Bonaparte, then commanding the army of the interior, was working diligently at its reorganization. When appealed to, he submitted a clear and promising plan of operations for the army of Italy. The Government was not conspicuous for talent, nevertheless it had the good sense to see that the officer who had conceived the scheme was the fittest person to carry it into effect. Thus it came to pass that Bonaparte, on the 23rd of February, 1796, was appointed to command the army of Italy.

How little did Barras imagine, when he bestowed on him this command as a wedding gift, to what purpose the young general was likely to put his first opportunity!

On the 26th of March Bonaparte arrived at the headquarters of his army at Nice. The French forces were at that moment echeloned on the Corniche road from Nice to Savona, and occupied the Col di Tende; Serrurier, with his division at Galessio, watched the enemy's intrenched camp at Ceva on the other side of the Apennines. The army numbered 36,000 available men, and these were half starved and only half clothed. The enemy's force amounted to about 75,000 men.

Bonaparte's initiative at Toulon had turned profitable, nothing deterred him; young as he was, he did not hold back for fear of incurring responsibilities. His stirring address, his first proclamation, showed the abject state the army had been reduced to. "Soldiers," he said, "you are badly fed and almost naked. The Government owes you a good deal, but can do nothing for you. Your patience, your courage do you honour, but these will not procure you victory nor glory. I am going to lead you to the most fertile plains in the world; there you will find great cities, rich provinces; there you will find honour, glory, and riches. Soldiers of Italy, will you be wanting in courage?"

As the French troops arrived on the heights of Monte Zemoto, and came in sight of the beautiful plains which lay spread before them, surrounded by an amphitheatre of lofty mountains, they stopped short, entranced by the sight. The first surprise over, the air was rent with their acclamations as they saluted their young and venturesome chief; an unanimous avowal that his proclamation contained more than empty words.

During his first campaign Bonaparte made his army subsist

on the resources of Piedmont and of Lombardy, and imposed on the population and on the petty Italian sovereigns requisitions and contributions often far beyond what was fair. Besides reorganizing his regiments and insuring the regular issue of pay, food, and clothing, he remitted eight millions to the Directory, one million to the army of the Rhine, and 300,000 francs to that of the Alps. Chambéry, on the frontier of France, was his starting depôt of provisions; next to it came Cherasco, sixty miles distant from Savona, situated at the confluence of the Tanaro and the Stura. Tortona was ceded to him; the place lies sixty miles east of Cherasco, and there other magazines were established. He next seized Pizzighettone on the Adda, seventy-five miles beyond Tortona, then advanced to the Mincio and took Peschiera, ninety miles from Pizzighettone. From his camp near Verona to Chambéry he held four fortresses, which contained hospitals and magazines, and only needed 4000 men for their garrison. On a line of communication with France of about three hundred miles he had places of depôt at a distance of about four marches from one another.

Bonaparte very often exaggerated the number of his troops, and tried to impose on the credulity of the enemy by demanding food for many more men than he led. This principle he upholds to the very last, and in his brilliant campaign against the Austrians and Prussians in 1814 there is a striking illustration of it in his words to the Duke of Rovigo after the victory at Vauchamps. "You must," he writes, "indeed have lost your head in Paris to allow it to be said that we were one to three, when I give out everywhere that I have 300,000 men, when the enemy believes it, and it must be repeated without ceasing. It is thus that by a stroke of the pen you destroy all the good effects of victory. You should know that it is not here any question of vain glory, and that one of the first principles of war is to exaggerate your own forces." *

In his proclamation, besides honour and glory, he had promised riches to his soldiers, and invading armies have always found riches by plundering the invaded and despoiling them of their goods. The experience of the first years of the Republic, when the soldier, having often to go without the indispensable, could not have

* At Reudnitz, a village close to Leipsic, on the night of the 14th October, 1813, he advocated before several of his marshals and generals the adoption of two ranks for infantry, with the object of giving a greater idea of his numbers.

lived had he not taken to marauding and pillaging, was not to be easily obliterated. By the immoderate contributions he exacted from the petty sovereigns of the peninsula, and by the appropriation of works of art, Bonaparte set a dangerous example to his troops.

The spirit of covetousness which Bonaparte so imprudently inspired in his original address, with the object of inciting his troops to great deeds, led to acts of spoliation and to scenes of pillage and violence. At Ceva, at Saint-Michel, at Mondovi the soldiers committed lamentable excesses. Bonaparte, writing to the Directory on this subject, declared that these excesses made one ashamed of being a man. At Lesegno, on the 22nd of April, he reprovved his army; a few days later he again censured it. Some officers were degraded and some of the soldiers shot, nevertheless even these rigorous measures were not sufficient to put a stop to the pillage. Once having yielded in the slightest way, and countenanced a relaxation of discipline in the matter of procuring food, he had to learn how very difficult it is to bring the troops again to perfect submission.

The example of disinterestedness which he personally set was not followed by many of his principal officers, and not only did the French troops lay hands on the property of the people, but a host of commissaries, contractors, jobbers, and speculators settled on the unfortunate country to share in the spoils.

The French Government set a bad precedent by the incredible eagerness it showed to appropriate to itself the riches of a friendly people. "Above all, do not spare the Milanese," wrote the Directory. "Levy contributions in cash at once, and during the first impression of fear which the approach of our armies will cause; let the eye of economy watch over their utilization." More sweeping still was the injunction contained in a subsequent despatch: "Leave nothing in Italy of what our political situation may allow us to carry away and which may be useful to us."

The result of all these depredations, of all the excesses committed by the French troops, was to turn in eight days a friendly disposed population, so eager to welcome the invaders, into bitterly hostile antagonists. On the 24th of May, a few days after a contribution of twenty millions had been imposed on Lombardy, as the French were about to resume their march to continue their operations against the Austrian army, a serious insurrection broke out at Pavia; the city, which was weakly

guarded and commanded by an officer of little spirit, fell into the hands of the insurgents, and the French lines of communication were in imminent danger of being cut.

After the military operations were over, the young conqueror made a sojourn of some length in Milan. There he devoted great attention to the reconstruction of the army administrative services. He requisitioned cloth with which to reclothe his troops, established hospitals for the sick and magazines of provisions. The organization of the commissariat as it existed did not please him, and, writing to the Directory, he complained that it was composed of civilian agents; these he wanted replaced by administrative officers and administrative corps. It was one of Bonaparte's notions that the commissaries needed even more courage and military knowledge than the combatant officers.

They certainly require a good store of moral courage. Momentous questions have often to be settled on the spot; a prompt decision is absolutely necessary. If circumstances will not admit of the regulations or special orders being complied with, these must be set aside when necessity demands it. The bold officer will incur the responsibility, though he may well know that his measures will be justified by superior authority only if followed by success.

Bonaparte was particularly severe with those agents who did not exert themselves to the fullest, and showed himself very rigorous towards those contractors who, when not closely watched, pillaged or requisitioned in the name of the army, and got themselves paid twice over for the articles they furnished. "I do not want," he said, "a contractor who ruins himself without just cause, or one, either, who gains millions without reason."

Very frequently at that period individuals, by means of acuteness, unfair practices, and a dishonest interpretation of business, realized in a very few years immense wealth out of army contracts. Bonaparte full well knew the scandal which these rapidly acquired fortunes gave rise to.

The abuse had reached such a pitch that he was compelled to issue the following decree:—

"Army of Italy. Headquarters, Brescia, 13 fructidor an IV.*

"We have conquered Italy to ameliorate the lot of its populations; we have raised contributions to insure our conquest, to

* August 30, 1796.

offer to our native country a just indemnity and to the soldiers a recompense due to their valour; but it has never been the intention of the French Government to authorize all manner of abuses, and the scandalous extortions which some agents who have followed the army have allowed themselves to commit. The law, in rendering them amenable to a court-martial, has imposed on me the obligation of becoming their accuser; but in the midst of the immense occupations which absorb all my time, it is impossible for me to discover the truth in this labyrinth of law-suits and thousands of complaints which are brought to me on such important concerns.

"In consequence, I have delegated to a Commission composed of five members the right which the law confers on me to bring the dilapidators before a court-martial.

"*1st Article.*—Brigadier-General Baraguay d'Hilliers, Adjutant-General Vignolle, Brigadier Dupuis, War-Commissary Boinod, and Delaage, officer of the engineers, are named members of this Commission.

"*2nd Article.*—All the Communes, all the citizens are bound to submit to this Commission a statement of what has been requisitioned from them, by whom, and when, and any information on such abuses as may have come to their knowledge.

"*3rd Article.*—The Commission will call on all who have requisitioned to render an account of how they have disposed of the articles demanded, and will before all decide if they had a right to requisition.

"*4th Article.*—Every individual whom the Commission will consider culpable will be, by its orders, arrested and brought before a court-martial to be tried according to law.

"The present decree will be printed in both languages, sent to the Assembly of the States of Lombardy, to be distributed and posted up in Lombardy, and the districts of Mantua, Brescia, and Verona."

No one knew better than Bonaparte how to stimulate the zeal of his soldiers. On the Alps we find him promising honour, glory, and riches; again, at the head of a French army in 1798, on the eve of embarking for Egypt, he promises that each soldier on his return from the expedition will have what is necessary to purchase six acres of land—an allurements which the soldiers did not forget, for it is stated that as, hungry, thirsty, and oppressed by

heat, they were crossing the desert on their way back to Egypt, after the failure at St. Jean d'Acre, pointing to the sands of the great desert, they told each other, "Behold, there are the six acres of land that have been allotted to you on retirement."

The Directory have often been charged with having purposely undertaken the expedition to Egypt to keep Bonaparte at a distance from France. This was not quite the case, for a colonization of that country had been proposed to Louis XIV., and the idea had again been brought forward during the reign of Louis XVI. More recently still, in 1796, Magalon, the French consul at Alexandria, had addressed a memoir to Charles Delacroix, one of the ministers, suggesting it. Shortly after the fall of Robespierre, 30 Brumaire an VI., Jourdan, the victor of Fleurus, wrote to Barras on the subject of driving the British out of India by the aid of Tippoo Saib, and, in the event of a French force being sent to the East for that purpose, solicited its command.

Miot de Melito, in his memoirs, attributes the original conception to Monge, and states that it was at Passeriano, during the negotiations of the Treaty of Campo Formio, that he suggested the enterprise to General Bonaparte. It may possibly have been so; nevertheless all the plans, projects, and political and military combinations emanated from Bonaparte. If the origin was not his own, the enterprise was quite in keeping with his dreams of founding a vast empire in the East; this fascinated him more than the hope of driving the British out of India. Whatever the general may have urged Tippoo Saib to undertake, that ruler had already lost much of his power, and was not likely to render him any direct help in transporting the Republican troops to the shores of Hindostan. True enough that Nelson believed the plan "by no means so difficult as might at first view be imagined," and that at that season of the year three weeks was a common passage down the Red Sea to the Malabar coast; but it was uncertain whether Tippoo Saib could send to Suez suitable vessels for the purpose. There is nothing to show that Bonaparte was in any way hopeful on this point.

Europe did not furnish enough glory, and Bonaparte, who had always a taste for the marvellous and gigantic, entertained at that period great and chimerical designs. He wanted—aided by a great rising of the Greek and Christian populations—to drive the Turks out of Constantinople, and hurl them back into Asia.

In point of fact, he had a horror of rest. "In Paris," he said, "if I remain a long time with nothing to do I am lost." The Directory had formed some idea of his ambition; the decision and self-sufficiency the general displayed in all matters began to disturb their minds; hence the belief that the concern of the Directory was quieted by finding employment for him beyond the seas. It was said that they found him a kingdom abroad to avoid all chances of his assuming the sovereignty at home.

During Bonaparte's sojourn in Egypt, the members of his family were very uneasy about him, and not a few of his friends considered him entirely lost. For all that, he had thrown himself heart and soul into the enterprise, and was thoroughly satisfied with the prospects it held out to him. When he travelled to inspect the preparations intended for a descent on England, he carried with him all the books, the plans, and the studies which related to the expedition to Egypt.

One of the main difficulties of the undertaking was a want of funds. The Republican treasury, no longer fed by the Italian contributions, had returned to its old state of destitution. The occupation of Rome and the invasion of Switzerland furnished the means. Some of the millions from Berne were sent direct to Toulon.

In this expedition the French Government persuaded some Jews of Algiers to enter into a contract for furnishing a large store of provisions for the army in Egypt. The amount due to the firm of Busnach and Bacri was never paid, though in 1802, when Bonaparte had become first consul, the Dey of Algiers reminded him of this debt. It appears that the latter was deeply interested in the transaction, and had himself furnished a large portion of the provisions through the agency of Messrs. Busnach and Bacri. The non-payment of this debt caused much dispute, and aroused the animosity of the dey. It was the prosecution of this claim which eventually led to an expedition being despatched by Charles X. in 1830 to subdue the regency of Algiers.

On May 19, 1796, Bonaparte set out for Egypt. A hundred and twelve warships, commanded by Admiral Brueys, and 400 transports sailed from France and from the Italian ports. The troops numbered about 36,000 men; the ships carried provisions for two months and water for one.

Profiting from the experience he had gained in his Italian

campaign, Bonaparte, on June 21, 1798, issued from on board the *Orient* a decree against pillage, and regulating the conduct to be observed in requisitioning.

In the first marches, as the men began to suffer from thirst, the glorious land of the East appeared very much like a fraud. Thiers, alluding to the general discouragement of the troops caused by the scarcity of water, states: "Bonaparte beheld his bravest—even Lannes and Murat—take their hats off, casting them on the sand, and trampling on them." Nevertheless, the districts watered by the Nile were rich; they yielded an abundance of wheat, Indian corn, rice, sugar-cane, various kinds of pulse, tobacco, and coffee. There were numerous herds of oxen and sheep, and poultry was forthcoming in very large quantities. With all these resources, and with two months' supplies which had been brought out by the fleet, it was not difficult to provision an army of 36,000 men.

During this campaign Bonaparte displayed the greatest care in all that regarded the organization, administration, and subsistence of his soldiers. Certainly at times they fell short of some indispensable articles, but it must often be so when campaigning in countries where the system of living and the articles of consumption differ materially from those of the invaders.

Thus far the soldiers were adequately fed, but when, early in February, 1799, they quitted the Delta to undertake operations in Syria, the conditions altered considerably. The country traversed was poor and unproductive, and the provisions had to be transported on pack animals. At El-Arisch there was no meat for making soup for the sick and wounded; the general ordered some of the camels to be killed, and when this source was exhausted soup was made from horseflesh, which is inferior to that of the camel.

The army was before Saint Jean d'Acre on the 20th of March, but, notwithstanding all the energy displayed by the French, the siege had to be raised. A number of pack animals, mostly camels, had now to be taken from the convoys to carry the sick and wounded, and such was the difficulty of finding adequate transport for them that most officers, and even Bonaparte, surrendered their chargers.

On quitting Jaffa, to prevent a pursuit, everything was destroyed. Junot and Kléber were ordered to burn the houses, to pillage and set fire to villages, to demolish the mills, so that

the army which purposed to pursue should find nothing beyond burning ruins. The troops, reduced by one half, and sorely tried by heat, hunger, and thirst, trudged wearily, retracing their steps to Cairo.

The Syrian campaign was the most trying the French were called upon to undertake. The heat of the climate, the impurity of the water (sometimes infested by tiny leeches), the glare of the sun on the sand of the desert, the *Khamsyn*, or south wind, and the plague, produced a discouragement which was only conquered by the perseverance of the troops and the noble example set them by their officers.

Bonaparte's unexpected departure for France, consequent on the news he received about the time of the defeat of the Turks at Aboukir,* irritated General Kléber, who was not at all eager to assume the chief command at a time when it was a case of all responsibility and no glory. Supported by Poussielgue—the controller of finances—he sent a report to the Directory accusing Bonaparte of having totally drained the country, and represented any longer stay of the French in Egypt as impossible. He wrote—

“The army is reduced by one half. . . . The waste in arms, in powder, in cast-iron and lead, offers a picture equally alarming. . . . The troops are naked, and this absence of clothing is much more unfortunate, as it is well known that in such a country as this want of clothing is one of the most active causes of dysentery and ophthalmia, which are the diseases constantly prevalent.

“In the first months after our arrival General Bonaparte exhausted all the surplus resources. He has levied as many contributions as the country could well bear. To return to-day to these measures when we are encompassed by enemies on all sides would be to pave the way to a rising on the first favourable occasion. Bonaparte has not left a coin in the chest, nor any equivalent objects. He has, on the contrary, left twelve millions of arrears; in the actual circumstances this represents more than

* Joseph Bonaparte, disturbed by the blunders made by the Directory, was anxious to communicate with his brother; all communication with the French in Egypt at that time was, however, very difficult, for the English kept a strict watch over the coast. He employed a Greek sailor, Santer Bourbaki, to take despatches to Napoleon, advising his return to France. Bourbaki was successful in his dangerous enterprise; he quitted Marseilles in a small vessel flying a neutral flag, nominally bound for Beyrout; he reached the coast of Syria, and coasting along in sight of land, so as to be able to fly to the nearest shelter in case of danger, he reached Alexandria in safety.

a year's revenue. The arrears of pay for the entire army alone amount to four millions."

In his "Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire" Thiers refutes these charges, and tries to prove that they were false under each heading. As he well remarks, Kléber at no time entertained any very friendly feelings towards Bonaparte, and that the report was sent on the supposition that he would either have been captured by the English whilst on his way back to France, or punished by the Directory for having quitted his command. Instead of all this, it was Bonaparte, as the head of the Government, who received and opened the despatch. If history has been said to resemble a romance, what should be said of the life of Bonaparte? Was there ever seen such a chain of events, each more extraordinary than the preceding, in the life of one man?

Leroy-Dupré, in his life of Baron Larrey, referring to the time when Menou commanded the army, says: "The French Army, well clothed, well equipped, well paid, enjoyed such prosperity that it remained in Egypt with contentment, and seemed to justify the old proverb, *Ibi patria, ubi bene.*"

Most writers have accepted Bonaparte's explanations; there is no doubt, however, that some of Kléber's imputations were correct.

The end of the French occupation of Egypt is well known to us, for the honourable part which the British Army took in ridding that country of the invader is a portion of our history of which the nation has every reason to be proud. The French Army of Egypt which was attacked at Aboukir and defeated in the battle of Alexandria, capitulated first at Cairo, then at Alexandria, and in compliance with the articles of the treaty, was taken back to France.

It must be said, in justice to the French Army, that when Bonaparte quitted Egypt in August, 1799, he took away with him its most brilliant officers. Menou, who succeeded the intrepid, gallant, and devoted Kléber, whom his soldiers admired and loved, had little talent, and did not pull well together with his officers.

Sir Robert Wilson states that whereas an English officer was able to travel through the country unattended by an escort, a Frenchman could never venture to pass through the same districts, even when the French Army ruled with uncontested dominion, unless guarded by a force sufficient to command his security.*

* Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson, "History of the British Expedition to Egypt," p. xi.

This confirms Nelson's statement, contained in his letter to the Governor of Bombay, sent overland after the battle of the Nile : " By land, nothing short of a regiment could pass over ground where, even before the battle, the French watering-parties from the ships had to be protected by heavy armed bodies." The boasted apostles of liberty and brotherhood had failed to gain the friendship and good will of the population.

If the conditions of the Army of Egypt were bad, worse, far worse, were those of the Army of Italy. The Directory had thoroughly neglected to look after the subsistence of the soldiers, and, to live, many of the brave men who had fought so heroically under Bonaparte in 1796-1797, were reduced to beg for food on the roads of the Apennines ; some even turned into brigands. In Liguria the troops could not maintain themselves, simply because there was an absolute dearth of provisions and forage.

After the defeat of the Turks in the battle of Aboukir, on the 25th of July, 1799, Bonaparte learnt that all the fruits of his victories in Italy were lost, and the beginning of the following year saw Massena besieged in Genoa by the Austrian general Ott. When the gallant Massena took over the command of the French army in succession to General Championnet " the troops were unpaid, almost unclad and unshod, receiving only quarter rations, and dying of starvation or epidemic sickness, the result of privations. The hospitals were full, and medicines were lacking. Bands of soldiers, even whole regiments, were every day quitting their posts, and making for the bridge over the Var. They forced their way into France, and scattered about Provence, declaring themselves ready to return to their duty if they were fed. The generals had no power against such a mass of misery ; every day their discouragement grew deeper, and they were all asking for leave, or resigning on the ground of illness." *

Not many months after his return from the east Bonaparte set himself to encompass the ruin of the Austrian Army in Italy. His plan was stupendous ; he had determined nothing less than to carry an army over the Alps, to enter Piedmont suddenly, and to sever Melas's line of communication by interposing his own army between the Austrian forces and their base.

In 1800 he had become *First Consul*, which meant that he had much more power ; he consequently could and did take greater pains in all that regarded the organization and supply of his army.

* "Memoirs of Baron de Marbot," vol. i. p. 66.

In the preparations for this bold undertaking Bonaparte displayed all his great qualities as an organizer and administrator.

Baron Lejeune, who served for twelve years on the staff of Prince Berthier, writes on the subject of this campaign: "It was the First Consul who inaugurated every plan, improvised the means for carrying it out, and by imbuing all with his own zeal made everything possible. It was General Berthier who identified himself thoroughly with the plans of his chief; divided and subdivided the work to be done, assigning to each one his particular task by fulfilling which he was to co-operate with every other member of the army; he strove to remove obstructions and provide for every contingency. His anxious solicitude, which kept him ever on the alert, his undaunted co-operation, were never relaxed until success was achieved."

Bonaparte created an army of reserve composed of three divisions, drawn from the Vendée; two of which were quartered in Brittany, at Rennes and at Nantes, and one in Paris. A fourth and some cavalry regiments were formed out of the dépôts of the army in Egypt, which the vigilance of the British cruisers had kept from reinforcing their respective corps. The artillery was raised at Auxonne, Besançon, and Briançon. This army contained many conscripts, it is true, but in the main was composed of mature soldiers, old campaigners, with officers at their head who had been formed in the general's school.

His measures had to be kept a profound secret, and to this effect he caused to be inserted in the *Moniteur* an order for the creation of an army of reserve 60,000 strong at Dijon. A few old officers were sent there, a few conscripts, and some war materials, all with the greatest ostentation. The papers were welcome to publish the details, and all the spies from the other countries in Europe flocked to Dijon. The divisions of the real army of reserve marched unnoticed on Geneva and Lausanne, as if they were nothing more than reinforcements proceeding to join the army of the Rhine. What they needed to complete their equipment in clothing, boots, horses, arms, and the like, they received on the way.

All the documents which referred to these preparations had been carefully removed from the War Office; the secret was in the keeping of very few trusty officers, and the First Consul could count on perfect discretion.

Food, forage, clothing, boots, stores, and ammunition were in

the mean time accumulated at Lausanne, at Vevey, and all along the Upper Rhone, from Villeneuve to Martigny. Thiers describes some of the preparations in the following words: "These are the dispositions taken by the First Consul with regard to the transport of the materials, and executed under the direction of Generals Marescot, Marmont, and Gassendi. Immense stores of grain, biscuit, and oats had been collected by way of the lake of Geneva at Villeneuve. General Bonaparte, knowing that with ready money it was easy to procure the assistance of the hardy mountaineers of the Alps, had sent considerable funds on the spot in the shape of cash.* Thus, but only on the last days, all the vehicles of the country, all the mules, all the peasants had been made to converge thereto at considerable cost. By these means, bread, biscuit, forage, wine and spirits had been transported from Villeneuve to Martigny, and from Martigny as far as Saint-Pierre at the foot of the mountains. A sufficient number of live cattle had been driven there. The artillery, with its carriages, had likewise been conveyed there. A company of artificers located at the foot of the mountains at Saint-Pierre was directed to dismount the pieces, to separate the gun-carriages into numbered pieces, so as to make them capable of being laden on the backs of mules. The pieces themselves, removed from the gun-carriages, were to be laid in wheeled sledges which had been purposely prepared at Auxonne. With regard to the infantry and artillery ammunition, a number of small cases had been prepared, a convenient load for mules, to convey it, like everything else, by employing the pack animals of the country. A second company of artificers, furnished with field forges, was to cross the mountains with the first division, to establish itself at the village of Saint-Remy, where the road again became practicable, to put together the carriages of the artillery and replace the guns on their gun-carriages.†

On the 6th of May, accompanied by Duroc and Bourrienne, the First Consul quitted Paris for Dijon, where he reviewed the conscripts and the depôts. The spies derided the troops that they saw collected there, and the Coalition Governments would not believe in the existence of an Army of Reserve. Silently the

* Baron Lejeune, in his "Memoirs," states how he was intrusted to take some bags of gold to the curés of Valois, with which to pay the peasants who were to help drag the artillery over the Alps, and to obtain some provisions and wine from the hospice of Saint-Bernard.

† M. A. Thiers, "Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire," Vol. I. book iv.

real army was gathering on the shores of the Lake of Geneva ; it numbered 35,000 infantry and artillery, and 5000 cavalry.

The French were to descend the Alps in four different columns—Moncey by the Saint-Gothard, Bonaparte, with the bulk of the force, by the great Saint-Bernard, Chabran by the little Saint-Bernard, and Thurreau by the Mont Cenis.

With a good deal of foresight, Bonaparte had won to himself the monks of the Saint-Bernard, and had got them to collect a certain quantity of provisions for his troops ; nevertheless, each soldier, besides his arms and kit, carried rations for eight days.

The operation of crossing the Alps was difficult ; it involved a march of several days, without any possibility of finding resources on the way. From Villeneuve to Ivrea the distance was forty-five leagues, six of which lay over the rocks and glaciers of the grand chain of the Alps.

The army commenced its march on the 13th of May ; it quitted the peaceful village of Saint-Pierre on the 17th, and emerged from the passes by the fort of Bard on the 23rd. After a week of great toil and danger it was in Italy. Ivrea was captured the following day. At Milan, Bonaparte was joined by Moncey with the 10,000 men he had brought over the Saint-Gothard.

The First Consul now set to to organize a system of administration by means of which his army could be regularly provided. He likewise secured the various passes leading into Switzerland. A garrison was left in fort Bard and one at Ivrea, which town was fortified. The communications by the Simplon and the Saint-Gothard valleys were guarded by parties posted at Arona and Bellinzona.

Massena, starved out, capitulated at Genoa on the 5th of June, after a most honourable defence, one of the finest exploits of that eventful year. But the triumph of the Austrians did not last long, for on the 14th of the same month their army was signally defeated on the battle-field of Marengo.

As the results of the great victory gained on the 14th of June in the neighbourhood of Marengo, Piedmont and Lombardy, with all their fortresses, were restored to France.

Though this campaign contributed to place the imperial crown on the brow of Napoleon, many superior officers of the army ascribed the victory of Marengo to Kellerman, the son of

the conqueror of Valmy. Kellerman, at the head of 400 sabres, fell on the flank of the Austrians, captured four guns and six stand of colours and made General Zach (the chief of the Austrian staff) with 2000 men prisoners. This brilliant success gave the impulse to the whole French army for a general advance.

On the same day, and almost at the same hour when the dagger of the fanatic Soliman-el-Hhleby struck Kléber in the heart, the brilliant Desaix fell at the battle of Marengo, in a charge which decided the fortunes of the day. Fortune, which is a fickle goddess, and never so capricious as on the field of battle, often hands over to the cruel Atropos men when just on the threshold of a brilliant and memorable career. In Kléber and Desaix France lost two of her most distinguished and promising champions. Both had won the love of their soldiers to a wonderful degree.

In the Marengo campaign the French army was fed in great part from the magazines captured from the enemy. Melas had established a reserve magazine at Pavia, a place admirably adapted as an intermediate Austrian base between the Mincio and Alessandria. This was captured by Lannes, who found there 200 pieces of ordnance. Few provisions were drawn from France, not much beyond what the troops carried with them. When bread was scarce the soldiers lived on boiled Indian corn flour, which forms the standard article of diet of the Lombard peasants.

CHAPTER VI.

WELLINGTON AND MASSENA—CAMPAIGNS OF 1809 AND 1810 IN THE PENINSULA.

WHEN, on the 1st of August, 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley commenced putting his troops ashore at the mouth of the Mondego, Portugal was occupied by the French under Junot.* The march of that marshal from Salamanca, and his entry into the capital of Portugal, illustrate the risks incurred when every other consideration is injudiciously sacrificed to that of speed.

In military operations rapidity is certainly an element of success, nevertheless there is a certain limit which it becomes dangerous to outstrip. Junot's invasion of Portugal, and more so the rapid marches of the French to reach Moscow in 1812, show to what sufferings the troops may be exposed, and how military discipline may come to be undermined by neglecting to pay adequate attention to the wants of the soldiers.

In September, 1807, an army of 25,000 men had been collected at Bayonne for the invasion of Portugal.† The expeditionary force was composed of young soldiers who had not reached the age required for military service; these feeble recruits, hardly able to carry their knapsacks and arms, were evidently incapable of

* In 1807 Junot was military governor of Paris, and had fallen into disgrace. On his return to the capital after the peace of Tilsit, the emperor called him to account for several indiscretions which had given rise to much scandal. It was as a punishment for this that he was sent to command the expedition to Portugal.

† In 1800, at the instigation of England, Portugal had declared war on Spain, and Bonaparte sent a small army of 15,000 men to aid the Spaniards. The command of this small contingent was given to General Leclerc. That officer, proud of being selected commander-in-chief, imagined that he equalled his brilliant brother-in-law in genius. Being about the same height and spareness, he tried to resemble him, copied his manners and his gestures, and went as far as to wear a hat and grey overcoat such as Bonaparte usually wore. He was not beloved by his troops; they ridiculed his masquerade, and gave him the name of "Bonaparte the Fair" (see "*Mémoires de Général Thiebault*," tom. iii. p. 269; "*Mémoires de Constant*," tom. i. p. 187).

enduring long marches. Napoleon calculated that Junot could cover the distance between Bayonne and Lisbon in thirty-five days. Marching over bad and mountainous roads, destitute of provisions, and without resources of any kind, the marshal reached Salamanca in twenty-five days, but not without leaving a very large number of stragglers on the way. Everything was in readiness to put the troops into cantonments, when pressing orders came from Napoleon to proceed without delay, and anticipate the British troops in the capital of Portugal. The Emperor wrote: "I will not have Junot's march delayed a single day under pretence of want of provisions; this excuse is only good for those who will do nothing. Twenty thousand men can live anywhere, even in the desert."

Stimulated and harassed by these peremptory commands, Junot pursued his march on Lisbon, with no other desire but to reach that city on the exact day fixed by the emperor. He left Salamanca on the 12th of November, 1807, his army marching by brigades at intervals of a day's distance from each other. The route followed was by Ciudad Rodrigo, the Puerto de Perales and Moraleja; the country was difficult, the weather was against them, it rained in torrents, and the streams were all swollen. The troops were ordered to get over the space of 150 miles between Salamanca and Alcantara in five days. This would have been a hard task enough for old soldiers, but the young recruits of which the army was composed, destitute of food, and wearied by night marches on muddy roads or over mountains, thoroughly broke down. Junot had no money, no transport, barely sufficient ammunition for one general action; to save his soldiers from dying of hunger he plundered everything as he marched along, and abandoned on the roads—to be stabbed by the inhabitants—the soldiers that fell exhausted by fatigue and privations.

General Foy gives some idea of the progress of the French army. "The French," he writes, "were not expected in Portugal; no preparations had been made to receive them, either as friends or as enemies. . . . Yet, all at once, behold them entering Portugal, with no provisions, no means of transport, and pushing on without stop through a country in which a prudent traveller never quits the place where he has slept without providing subsistence for the day.

"Accordingly, no distribution of provisions was made. Castello Branco, the only place on the road which could have furnished

bread, meat, and wine, was taken unawares, and was, in a manner, stunned by the irruption of foreign troops. Notwithstanding several examples of severity, which the commander-in-chief exercised on offending French and Spaniards, less as a punishment for unavoidable faults than to prevent the recurrence of disorder at a time when it would not be so excusable, the plundering which took place hindered the inhabitants from applying to the use of the army the scanty resources which they might have been able to collect together under ordinary circumstances. Pressed by want, the soldiers betook themselves to the commons, and ate the honey from the hives which were scattered about in those situations. Some discovered and devoured the frugal hoard of maize, olives, and chestnuts which the poor peasant had put by to feed his family during the winter; others lived on the acorns, *bellotas*, with which the cattle are fattened in the Peninsula.* Woe to the humble cottage that fell in the way of these famished marauders! The terrified families immediately took to flight. Many soldiers of the infantry were killed by the peasants, who were driven to despair. The cavalry lost a still greater number of horses; even the strongest were unshod, meagre, and worn out. From the first day after the passing of the Erjas the artillery fell to the rear, notwithstanding that twelve oxen or horses were harnessed to each field-piece, and though, in scaling the mountains, they were rather carried than drawn up by the artillerymen and the soldiers assigned for the service of the park.†

On the 30th of November Junot entered Lisbon; he was accompanied by from 1500 to 2000 emaciated men, who looked more like spectres than soldiers. Their clothes were in rags; shoes they had none, their feet were bleeding, their arms were soiled and rusty. This mob marched without artillery, without baggage, in the greatest disorder.

Notwithstanding the deplorable plight his troops were in, Junot acted with singular enterprise, fully resolved not to give the Portuguese time to learn the disorder of his march and the scanty number of his followers. What Napoleon desired above all was the capture of the Portuguese fleet, but this the French

* The acorn was an article of food with the Gauls, and continued to be eaten, at least in times of famine, to a much later period. Francis I. received a report from René du Bellay, Bishop of Mans, informing him that such was the fearful poverty of his diocese that in many places the inhabitants were reduced to subsist on acorn bread.

† "History of the War in the Peninsula under Napoleon," by General Foy, vol. ii. pp. 34, 35.

marshal was unable to effect.* He hastened to Belem, ordered the Prince Regent's cannoneers to fire on a few vessels of the royal fleet which were tardy and were endeavouring to join the convoy, and compelled them to put back into port. He then distributed his infantry amongst the works on both sides of the Tagus, and returned to Lisbon with the officers of his staff, having no other escort than thirty Portuguese horsemen whom he had met on his way, and pressed to attend on him as he passed through the streets of the capital.

Napoleon was not fortunate in his choice of a leader; Junot was bold and ambitious, but not a prudent commander. If his cruel neglect of his soldiers and his rashness went unpunished, this happened through the greatest good luck. Lisbon held a garrison of from 12,000 to 15,000 men; the people, however, were so disgusted by the cowardice of the Court, that they took no steps to overpower the handful of soldiers with which the French marshal approached the city. Indirectly this distressing march had baneful effects, for, in Napier's words, "the privations endured induced a violence, giving birth to that hatred so remarkable between the French and Portuguese."

The gallant quartermaster-sergeant of the battalion of the Côte d'Or may have been able to dispense with sand in the trenches before Toulon to dry his despatch with, but, as a general, he learnt to his cost that an army on the march cannot do without proper arrangements for the supply of provisions and forage. Had it been a case of a sudden war after a long period of peace, like the Crimean War, some extenuation might have been pleaded, but none could be allowed for Junot, for he had during the last fourteen years taken part in many campaigns, and, closely connected as he had been with Bonaparte, he should have picked up from that intercourse many invaluable habits and ways of thought.

In the Peninsula the supplies were a source of infinite trouble to the French and to the English. That the French, who were detested as invaders, should have experienced great difficulties on this score, and should have required strong detachments first to collect the food and then to bring it up, is intelligible enough; but that the more humane British in some instances should have fared as badly appears uncommonly strange. This is partly accounted for by the fact that the authorities were careless, and

* Napoleon was impatient to seize upon the spoils of this unfortunate and defenceless little nation. He reproached Junot for his leniency, and ordered him to confiscate, to imprison, to exile, and to levy contributions.

the people were not to be depended upon for fulfilling their contracts. Both displayed a strong feeling of malevolence.

On the 27th of June, 1809, Sir Arthur Wellesley had entered Spain, and by the end of July had conducted the Talavera campaign to a successful issue. When he set out from Portugal he did not know the real character of the Spanish rulers and generals, and placed a certain amount of credence in the reports floating about as to the low state of the French forces.

His main difficulty lay in procuring provisions for his army, as Portugal could not furnish what was needed, and though there was an abundance of food in Spain, it was unevenly distributed, and difficult to get at. "Previous to entering Spain," writes Napier, "Sir Arthur had ascertained that the valleys of the Alagon and Arago—those between Bejar and Ciudad Rodrigo—were capable of nourishing his army, and he had sent commissaries there to purchase mules and arrange with the alcades for the supply of the troops; he had obtained also warm assurances from the supreme junta that every needful article should be forthcoming, and their intendant-general, Lonzano de Torres, was at the British headquarters with full powers. Relying upon these preparations, he crossed the frontier with scanty means of transport, and without magazines." *

But the Spanish assurances went for nothing. On arrival at Plasencia he did not find the promised help, and the authorities refused to give assistance of any kind. Naturally, Sir Arthur became seriously disturbed for the subsistence of his army, and in his irritation wrote to Mr. Frere and to O'Donoghue, who was the chief of Cuesta's staff, and pointed out the distress of his troops, declaring it to be his intention not to proceed beyond the Alberche unless their wants were immediately satisfied.

Proceeding on this subject, Napier writes: "Before he quitted Plasencia he had completed contracts with the alcades of the Vera de Plasencia for 250,000 rations of forage and provisions, which, added to his previous collections, would have furnished supplies for ten or twelve days—a sufficient time to beat Victor and gain a fresh country. These rations had not been delivered, and his representations on the subject were by Cuesta and the junta disregarded; wherefore he gave both notice for the second time that he would not move beyond the Alberche unless his wants were immediately supplied. This was unheeded; no

* Napier, "Peninsular War," Book VIII. chap. i.

means of transport had been provided for him, his troops were on half allowance, absolute famine approached, and when he demanded food he was answered with false excuses and false statements.”* As his advance into Spain, however, had been made without orders from his Government, Sir Arthur was compelled to continue moving forward, particularly as the course pursued by Cuesta appeared likely to involve that headstrong chief in trouble.

After the combat on the morning of the 28th of July, Napier writes: “While the French generals were engaged in council, the men on both sides took some rest, and the English wounded were carried to the rear, but the soldiers were suffering from hunger; the regular service of provisions had ceased for several days, and a few ounces of wheat in the grain formed the whole subsistence of men who had fought, and who were yet to fight, so hardly.” In narrating the last episode of the battle, he states: “The British, exhausted by toil and want of food, and reduced to less than fourteen thousand sabres and bayonets, could not pursue.”†

“Sir Arthur’s troops had suffered so much that the 29th and 30th were passed in establishing hospitals, and in fruitless efforts to procure food and assistance to save his wounded from perishing. Both Cuesta and the people of Talavera had ample means, yet would neither give food to the living nor assist to bury the dead; the corn secreted in Talavera would have supported the army for a month, but not a measure could be obtained for the starving soldiers. . . . This conduct was never effaced from the soldiers’ recollection; Badajos and San Sebastian suffered long after for the churlish behaviour of the Talavera people.”‡

Notwithstanding his demands for food, and his threats to stay the progress of the British forces, Sir Arthur saw “his soldiers weakened by hunger, his sick perishing from want of necessary succours, his commissaries without means of transport.” Napier, after premising that no man of any nation can with less than two pounds of solid food of some kind daily do his work well for any length of time, shows what provisions the troops received in those days. “Half a pound of wheat in the grain, and twice a week a few ounces of flour, with a quarter of a pound of goat’s flesh, formed the sole subsistence of men and officers; and this scanty

* Napier, “Peninsular War,” Book VIII. chap. i.

† Idem, Book VIII. chap. ii.

‡ Idem, Book VIII. chap. iii.

supply was procured with much labour, for the goats were to be caught on the hills and killed by the troops.* Forage was very scarce, for we are told further on, "Fifteen hundred horses had perished from want, exclusive of those lost in battle."†

The Spaniards had a singular way of showing gratitude to their allies, for the cavalry "intercepted the provisions and forage destined for the English army, and fired upon the foragers, as if they had been enemies." In their flight from Talavera the Spaniards plundered the baggage of the British army.

Sir Arthur's conduct in not abandoning the Spaniards, notwithstanding their heartless treatment of his troops, threatened as they were by the enemy, was noble, but he could well write, "We are here worse off than in a hostile country. Never was an army so ill-used; the Spaniards have made all sorts of promises; we had absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army."‡

Though the British general was undismayed by difficulties, and generally rose superior to them, after conduct such as this he became convinced that Spain was not the place for a British army. He consequently retired into Portugal, and distributed his troops between Badajos, Elvas, Campo Major, and other places on both banks of the Guadiana.

It is in the following words that he explains this withdrawal: "I have no motive for withdrawing the British army from Spain, whether of political or military nature, excepting that which I have stated to you in conversation—namely, a desire to relieve it from the privations of food, which it has suffered since the 22nd of last month—privations which have reduced its strength, have destroyed the health of the soldiers, and have rendered the army comparatively inefficient."

The apathy of the Spaniards was such that at a later period we find him writing: "What folly it would be to risk anything further for the deliverance of Spain, whilst the inhabitants, for whom we have done ten times as much as they deserved, hold themselves aloof in the midst of the storm!"

Wellington, writing to Lord Wellesley, expressed himself strongly on the necessity of a system of supply. He wrote: "A starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and spirit. They plunder, even in the presence of

* Napier, "Peninsular War," Book VIII. chap. iv.

† Idem, Book VIII. chap. v.

‡ Idem, Book VIII. chap. v.

their officers. The officers are discontented, and are almost as bad as the men."

It is well known what attention he paid to questions of food and transport during the Peninsular War. He could well boast that "many could lead troops; he could feed them." Valuing the signal importance of the duties assigned to the commissariat, he had taken care to master all their details. So much occupied was Wellington with matters relating to provisions and forage, that he used to say that, besides being a general, he prided himself in being a first-rate commissariat officer.

In 1810 Napoleon determined to attempt a third invasion of Portugal, and, much worried by the disputes of his lieutenants, he selected Massena—who was of higher rank than the other marshals, and a stranger to their quarrels—to command the army.

Massena carried to the Peninsula the reputation of a great name—so much so, in fact, that Wellington was always very careful not to make any mistake in presence of such a celebrated antagonist. According to his own statement he regarded Massena as the most accomplished and scientific general to whom he was ever opposed. Napoleon's estimate of his marshal's ability had increased since the success gained on the battle-field of Wagram, but, however able and fortunate he may have been in action, *l'enfant chéri de la victoire* did not rank very high for administrative skill. Indeed, he was so careless in matters of administration that he was disliked by the troops.*

The war in the Peninsula first put a limit to Napoleon's prosperity. His glory and good fortune found there an obstacle which all the blood and bravery of his troops had no power to break through or surmount.

This was the third invasion of Portugal, for that kingdom had already twice before been invaded by the French, once under Junot, who, beaten in the battles of Rorica and Vimiera, capitulated in August, 1808. The next invasion followed after the battle of Coruña, when Soult penetrated as far as Oporto, from which city he was driven out by Sir Arthur Wellesley, on the 12th of May, 1809, retreating upon Amarante.

The difficulties Marshal Massena experienced in getting

* Massena was very extortionate, so much so that the emperor called him a robber. It is said that he offered the marshal a million of francs if he would abstain from peculation.

provisions, and which ultimately were the principal cause of his relinquishing the enterprise, were immense, and to understand this thoroughly it is necessary to look at the system followed by the British and French armies respectively.

The provisioning of the two armies was subject to very different conditions. The British, having the command of the sea, and being in possession of the harbours, had immense base magazines, which were replenished by their ships. These magazines, in their turn, supplied the convoys of the various columns. The operations of the British forces were slow, for, like Frederick the Great, they often made the movements of their troops subordinate to those of their convoys.

The situation of the French and English differed very considerably, not so much from the fact that the latter came as allies, as because they possessed a fleet by means of which they received from England all the assistance which a powerful and wealthy Government could give. The provisions coming by water surpassed in value the land convoys, which are so slow, so difficult, and so insufficient. The British general, nevertheless, had not merely to look after the subsistence of his army; he had, besides, to secure the food needed by the mass of inhabitants who, on the approach of the French, had quitted their homes. "Corn at any price was sought for in Ireland, America, and Egypt; and one thousand tons of Government shipping were lent to merchants to fetch grain from Algiers." All this could not have been done without absolute freedom at sea; for all that the sufferings of the refugees were so great that it has been said that in the winter of 1810 forty thousand persons died of privation within the British lines.

"At a distance from the sea, that nurse of British armies," writes Napier, "the means of transport necessarily regulated the extent of the supply; and as wheel-carriage was scarce and bad in Portugal, and the roads generally forbade its use, the only resource was water-carriage to a certain distance, and afterwards beasts of burden." *

The system which obtained at the end of the past century was still in vogue. Individuals, taken from mercantile houses, were appointed to discharge the onerous duties of the commissariat without previous training and without any definite regulations for their guidance. On the 8th of August, 1808, Sir

* Napier, "*Peninsular War*," Book XI. chap. iii.

Arthur Wellesley complained to Lord Castlereagh of the incapability of the commissariat department. Commissary-General Sir John Bisset calls it the *presumed inefficiency* of the British commissariat. It is quite natural that Sir John should take up the defence of his own department; however, his very words will show how, under the existing conditions, a better state of efficiency was quite hopeless. This is what he writes on the subject: "Now, at the period of Sir John Moore's first entry into Spain, when such a cry existed against the inefficiency of the British commissariat, it must be recollected that arrangements had not yet been made in respect of the discipline of the department, and the appointments to it, with a view to furnish a set of officers trained in some measure to the duties to be required of them; such training could not be the work of a day; also that prior to this, many gentlemen got commissions in the higher ranks of the commissariat who had not passed through the lower gradations, or acquired any practice which a regular probation would have produced. The numbers, too, were defective. . . . Still the clerks, when so sanctioned, had to be sought for, and sent out with their duties to learn; and they are not quite so easily learnt as is generally supposed; whilst for their errors or irregularities the country pays heavily." *

Wellington attached the greatest importance to the land transport. He had, first, the *regimental mule transport*—pack animals which followed the troops through the difficult country they had to traverse in the Peninsula. Secondly, there was the *departmental transport*, represented by the artillery engineer and commissariat trains; the two first chiefly manned by the corps of artillery drivers, and the latter by the *personnel* of the royal waggon train. Lastly came the *general transport*, composed of a vast number of hired carriages and pack animals, for the conveyance of ordnance and commissariat stores and miscellaneous equipment; also boats on the Tagus and Douro, worked by seamen. His provision columns were admirably organized, and the roads were occupied by mules and carts carrying provisions to the various centres of operation.

"In the latter part of 1810," writes Napier, "magazines of consumption were established at Viseu, Celorico, Condeixa, Leiria, Thomar, and Almeida. From those points 400 miserable

* "Memoranda and Observations regarding the Duties of the Commissariat on Field Service Abroad," by Com.-Gen. Sir John Bisset, K.C.H.

bullock-carts and about 12,000 hired mules, organized in brigades of 60 each, conveyed the necessary warlike stores and provisions to the troops; when additional succour could be obtained it was eagerly seized, but this was the ordinary amount of transport, and all the magazines in advance of Lisbon were so limited and arranged as to be easily carried off or destroyed in retreating before the enemy could seize them."

An order of the Portuguese Government threatened with capital punishment every citizen who, on the approach of the French, did not quit his dwelling. In his flight each individual was enjoined to destroy all available means of subsistence. Not a sack of corn, not a cask of wine, not a bundle of forage, not an ox, not a sheep, were to be left to the invader. Provisions, forage, cattle, goods, all that could not be carried away, was to be consigned to the flames. The mills and the ovens were to be destroyed, the boats removed, the bridges broken down, the fields laid waste. Wellington did not recommend the wasting of a friendly country without a sore heart, but the measure was the only one that would make Massena fall back from Lisbon. The British commander understood that in a defensive war the enemy's army can be overcome by making his subsistence extremely difficult.

As the French advanced they found deserted and burnt villages, and had to send detachments in every direction to gather what provisions and forage were to be had. It was in obtaining bread that difficulty was principally experienced, and this was a serious matter, for the French soldier is a great bread eater. In reality very little in the way of food was procured in this way; some pigs—whose unwholesome flesh had bad effects on the health of the troops—some Indian corn flour, some vegetables, and some potatoes. Wine was plentiful, but it was impossible to prevent the soldiers making an immoderate use of it. There was a repetition of the revolting scenes which were witnessed when in Sir John Moore's retreat on Coruña the British troops invaded the immense wine-vaults of Bembire.

Nor was the effort to procure provisions without danger, for the commissaries or their agents, obliged to proceed to some distance from the columns to gather what was needed, were often surprised, set upon by the peasants, and killed.

The British had money to pay their troops with, and to pay cash for provisions obtained by means of requisition, consequently

they generally were able to find in the towns and large villages what they principally needed. In any case they seldom experienced any serious difficulty in procuring at a very high rate whatever they urgently required. No money, on the other hand, was remitted from France to the invaders, who, taking into account the hostility of the population, often deemed it impolitic to levy contributions.

The British troops penetrated into Portugal and Spain without being burdensome to the inhabitants; they distributed money largely on their way, provisions, means of transport, everything, in fact, was paid for.

In 1810 Massena was beginning to be advanced in age; his character, once so firm, had become in a high degree irresolute. Already experiencing some difficulty in feeding his troops, he was disinclined to invade at such a late season of the year. Napoleon, however, urged him not to delay any further. Though in September, 1810, the marshal exercised nominal command over 110,000 men, the troops under his immediate orders did not number more than 63,000 combatants—55,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry. The remainder formed the reserve, and occupied places on the lines of communication; those from Burgos to Almeida were strengthened by the fortresses of Astorga, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida.

The marshal moved along the north side of the Tagus; his three corps, the II., VI., and VIII., commanded by Reynier, Ney, and Junot, with two divisions of cavalry under Montbrun, were to concentrate on the 16th of September with the intention of marching down the Mondego, so as to reach Coimbra before Wellington could gather in his detachments.

In the campaigns in the Peninsula it was the bread ration which generally failed; * this arose from want of grain and means for grinding it. Before setting out Massena issued fourteen days' bread to the troops, which lasted them till they occupied Coimbra, on the 1st of October.

Portugal has no good high-roads, and the narrow rocky paths which stand for roads do not lend themselves for the passage of army trains; the resources for maintaining an army are also insufficient. Massena, ill-advised by some Portuguese

* One of the most telling arguments used by Ney to urge a return to Spain was the difficulty experienced in getting bread in Portugal. In this he was right, and though the soldiers received plenty of meat and wine, for six months they had little or no bread.

gentlemen in his camp, instead of marching direct on Coimbra by Sampayo and Ponte de Murcelha, inclined to his right into the mountainous regions of Viseu, where the roads are the worst in Portugal. The neighbourhood of Viseu produces no corn or vegetables, nothing but fruit; the city was found entirely deserted, yet, with an army which was not well furnished with provisions, Massena lingered in such undesirable quarters, without any apparent reason, for six days. As the French found out in their retreat from Portugal, the valley between the Mondego and the Esterella is exceedingly fertile, and it was a great mistake to abandon it.

The French entered Viseu on the 21st, but on that very day the whole of the allied army was united; the various commanders acted quickly and concentrated, and thus the projected surprise of Coimbra was baffled.

As the country between the Mondego, the Tagus, and the forts at Torres Vedras still contained provisions sufficient to keep the French during the ensuing winter, Wellington found himself in a serious dilemma; he had two alternatives, either to fight the invaders on the Mondego, or to step back, wasting the country by force as he retreated. It appeared preferable to fight, though he could only oppose 50,000 troops, half of them untried, to the 65,000 veterans of the marshal. Wellington was also influenced by the despondency of the British Parliament, which appeared resolved to give up the contest in the Peninsula. He took post on the Sierra de Busaco, where he was attacked by Massena on the 27th of September; the natural strength of the position and the errors committed by the French leaders helped him to gain a brilliant victory.* The French had three generals—Graindorge, Merle, and Simon—and four thousand men killed, and double that number wounded.

Massena might have turned the left of the allies, whose front was far too much extended, but he neglected to reconnoitre the ground carefully, and obstinately refused to believe that it was possible to turn the ridges of the Alcoba. He delivered a front attack, his troops came into action without connection or the support of artillery, and no reserve was brought forward.

Baron de Marbot narrates how General Frivion, Ligniville,

* The *Moniteur* of November 23, which announced the arrival of General Foy in Paris, gave a glowing account of the state of affairs in Portugal all contrary to the facts.

and himself urged the marshal to countermand the attack, and to search for a road which would turn the heights; how he and Ligniville found a sick old monk who knew of a good road adapted for the purpose, but that Major Pelet (the marshal's senior aide-de-camp and adviser) induced Massena to adhere to the orders he had issued. After the battle the baron states that the French were so despondent that Ney and Reynier proposed to the marshal to abandon Portugal and to take the army back into Spain. The brave old soldier disdained to accept such timid counsel, and taking a road which led from Mortagoa over the Caramula ridge to Boialva, turned the British left and headed for Coimbra. This compelled Wellington to retire.

The imprudence of neglecting to establish a safe line of communications was soon punished, and in a most cruel manner. After a battle the victorious troops, elated by their success, think little of their fallen comrades, and march with a light heart to new adventures. Baron de Marbot, referring to Massena's march to Boialva, writes: "In order to conceal from the English the movement of such of our troops as were at the foot of the Alcoba, they did not march until night, and then in dead silence. But information was soon given by the despairing cries of the French wounded, whom we were under the sad necessity of abandoning. A great number of horses, and all the beasts of burden, were employed to carry the men whom there was any hope of curing; but those who had lost their legs, or were otherwise severely wounded, were left lying on the dry heath, and, as the poor fellows expected to have their throats cut by the peasants as soon as the armies were out of the way, their despair was terrible.

"The fertility of the country (about Boialva) gave hopes that the army might find abundant subsistence there. A shout of joy went up from our ranks, and the soldiers very soon forgot the fatigues and dangers of the previous days, perhaps also the unhappy comrades whom they had left dying before Busaco." *

Massena did not follow the British forces with vigour, and wasted three days at Coimbra, which allowed them to get well away. His improvidence was conspicuous; according to Napier, "he permitted such waste that resources were dissipated in a few days which would have supplied his troops for two months under good arrangements." †

* "Memoirs of Baron de Marbot," vol. ii. pp. 119, 120.

† Napier, "Peninsular War," Book X. chap. vii.

It was after the battle of Talavera that Wellington, persuaded that a defensive contest would in the next campaign devolve on the small body of veteran British and newly raised Portuguese troops under his command, sought for some position covering Lisbon which could neither be forced nor turned, and which would afford a point of concentration for the whole forces of Portugal. In January, 1809, accompanied by his quartermaster-general and his chief engineer, he had reconnoitred the country in front of Lisbon, and issued orders for an accurate survey of it, so as to be able to decide on the most eligible line of defence. The famous lines of Torres Vedras had been constructed with such secrecy that few in the British army even knew of their existence and nature; the idea prevailed at the time that the army would re-embark, and that the entrenchments thrown up round Lisbon were being constructed simply with the object of protecting the embarkation.

The lines consisted of three distinct series of defences.* The first, designed as an advanced work, was twenty-nine miles long, from Alhandra on the Tagus to the sea about the mouth of the Zizandre river; the second, the most formidable, on ground varying from six to ten miles in rear of the first, was twenty-four miles long, from Quintella on the Tagus to about the mouth of the St. Lourença on the sea; the third, a place of primary importance, was a place of refuge, an intrenched camp intended to cover the embarkation of the troops in case of disaster. Napier tells us that the aim and scope of all these works were to bar the roads to Lisbon and strengthen the favourable fighting positions between them. The whole lines comprised 50 miles of fortification, with 150 forts defended by 600 guns. For meeting a case of defeat, 24,000 tons of shipping were constantly kept in the Tagus to receive on board the British forces, and measures had been taken to procure more for the reception of the Portuguese troops and citizens.

Massena was not only ill-acquainted with the military features of Portugal, but was also absolutely ignorant of the existence of the defences of Torres Vedras. Though he had Portuguese officers on his staff, he only heard of the works five days before he came in sight of them, at Alemquer, a market town at the foot of the

* At the moment that the lines were occupied, £100,000 had been expended on them. The work was continued, and before the conclusion of the war about double that amount had been laid out on them.

Cintra hills. The fact is, that, however skilful in gaining money for his own ends from public sources, the marshal was parsimonious in expending it for the service of his country.* His lieutenants were not better informed; and, what appears more strange still, is that the emperor, who held that *avec de l'argent on parvient à tout savoir*, and who had agents and spies in every capital of Europe, should have received no tidings of a series of works which it took many months and 7000 work-people (men, women, and children) to construct. And this when Wellington was vehemently opposed by the local authorities, by the ministers, and by the nobility, and when the enemy constantly drew the most certain information of the strength and situation of the army from the indiscreet English newspapers.

The defeat at Busaco had sowed ill-will between Massena and his lieutenants, and at a most critical moment the latter showed him no loyalty. Ney and Reynier opposed the plan of an attack of the lines, and when Massena insisted that his orders for the attack were to be obeyed, Ney declared that he would not carry them out.†

This was no novel experience. King Joseph had no military capacity,‡ and complete anarchy reigned amongst his marshals and commanders, who refused to aid one another. In some self-confidence ranked higher than real military ability; others had got tired of war, and showed decaying energy. There was no obedience; the most peremptory orders from the emperor were unable to secure any co-operation. The Marshals of the Empire were determined to recognize no right of seniority among themselves, and none relished serving under one of his colleagues. This state of insubordination, in this instance, compelled Massena to move away from the enemy's lines, and the French army took up a position behind Santarem and Rio Mayor. But there was also another and an important reason for this backward move; the army was short of provisions, and it was necessary to establish it in a corn-growing district. For four months the two armies

* This was not the only instance. Referring to the campaign of 1813, Baron Lejeune states that the avarice of those in command of the French forces led to the appropriation of the funds provided by Napoleon for obtaining information about the enemy.

† The only fighting took place at Sobral, where Clausel's troops attempted unsuccessfully to dislodge the 71st Regiment.

‡ Alluding to his brother's abandonment of Paris in 1814, Napoleon said, "*Joseph m'a perdu l'Espagne et il me perd la France. . . . Ce cochon de Joseph qui s'imagina être en état de conduire une armée aussi bien que moi.*"

faced each other, separated only by the Rio Mayor. Here, however, it becomes necessary to show the difference in the conditions of the contending forces. The food supplies for the British were brought by the Tagus from Lisbon, and distributed regularly without difficulty. The French, who occupied a contracted space and had no stores, were in a sad predicament; however, they adopted a system of raids, and sent out armed detachments, composed of at least a third of every regiment, in search of provisions.* These detachments returned to camp driving thousands of donkeys laden with eatables of all kinds, and immense herds of sheep, pigs, and goats; the provisions thus seized being proportionately divided on their arrival.

De la Grave, aide-de-camp of Marshal Junot, gives the following details of the system pursued: "Towards the commencement of 1811, the French army prolonging its stay in front of the lines of Torres Vedras, the want of provisions in its ranks kept augmenting from day to day. The cavalry and the VI. army corps found yet a few resources in rear of their cantonments, on the side of Leiria and of Thomar; but the other part of the army, located nearer to the Tagus, had exhausted everything for a great distance around. The neighbourhood of Alcobaça and of Porto-de-Mos had enabled the II. and VIII. corps to live for some time; but when these regions did not yield anything more it became necessary to forage much further away. The detachments advanced at first up to the Lis, overrunning all the territory situated between this river and the sea up to about Leiria. They pushed later on up to the Soura, and soon after they crossed that river and ventured so far as to carry away wine and cattle under the guns of the enemy, who were then lining the right bank of the Mondego. The soldiers undertook this service with incredible activity, intelligence, and boldness; and what was always astonishing was, that English parties never dared to step forward to disturb these small enterprises. Feeble detachments spread as far as forty leagues in the rear of the army, and never experienced a serious mischance.

"Every regiment had its means of transport, which consisted of a certain number of donkeys and mules; but their number did not suffice when it was necessary to plunge so far back to find provisions and forage. It followed, then, that a maraude, as these

* The same plan was pursued during the second Punic war. It is related that half or two-thirds of the Carthaginian army was constantly obliged to be absent on foraging duty.

expeditions were called, after a run of twenty days, did not procure enough to feed the regiment during eight. To remedy this inconvenience, it was decided to establish small intermediate depôts on the banks of the Lis, the Soura, and the Mondego, and there deposit what could be collected in the countries still further away. Every corps took care to keep for this service a small number of men, under the orders of an active and intelligent officer. This officer was the furnisher-in-chief of provisions for his regiment. Each part of his small squad had different functions. Some were constantly occupied in ransacking the valleys, the mountains, the steepest localities, the islands in the middle of rivers with the object of discovering all that had been hidden by the inhabitants, and bringing it to the depôt. There were others told off to pen up the cattle, to grind, to bake bread and biscuit, and to turn wine into spirits, because wine was too difficult to transport. Besides these, there were some who only went and came from the depôt to the regiment, and from the regiment to the depôt, to convey the different provisions. The roads were continually covered with numerous convoys, and always under weak escorts. Our soldiers were so accustomed to discharge this service with safety and with a certain confidence, that had the enemy pushed small bodies towards these localities he would necessarily have occasioned us some losses. It would have been easy for him to do so had he issued from Peniche, or from any other point on the coast up to Figueiras. But on this side, as in front of Lisbon, there were certain limits beyond which he never ventured to step."

The weather was inclement ; the roads had become torrents, and the difficulty of getting provisions, and above all forage, was much increased. The diaries of these operations are full of supply difficulties. After taking post on Rio Mayor, Massena began to get alarmed lest the provisions on the right bank of the Tagus might get exhausted ; he therefore resolved to tap a new country by sending a portion of his army across the river to raid in the fertile province of Alemtejo.

Napier alludes to General Pamplona's intrigues in Lisbon, and writes : " Agents, under pretext of selling sugar at Thomar and Torres Novas, passed by the road of Caldas, and through the mountains of Pedragoa ; and it was suspected this treason extended to the provisioning of the enemy on so large a scale as to be one of the resources which enabled Massena so long to brave the difficulties of his position.

“Certain it is that herds of cattle were often placed in his way under circumstances raising doubts if it could be done without design.” *

Some allusion to the mandate issued by the Portuguese Government for the devastation of the country on the approach of the French has already been made, but the order was not obeyed. Napier writes on this point: “But it was his (the patriarch) and his coadjutors’ criminal conduct that really nourished the war, for there were ample means to have carried off in time ten times the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. Massena could not then have remained a week before the lines, and his retreat would have been attended with famine and disaster if the measures previously agreed to by the regency had been duly executed. The country about Thomar, Torres Novas, Collegao, and Santarem was absolutely untouched: the inhabitants remained, the mills were little injured and quickly repaired; and Wellington had the deep mortification to find his grand project frustrated by the very persons from whom he had a right to expect the most zealous support. There seemed nothing to prevent the Prince of Esling holding his positions until an overwhelming force should arrive from Spain. ‘It is heart-breaking,’ exclaimed the British general—‘it is heart-breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly’” † As Napier very justly remarks, “The Portuguese Government was a direr enemy to the English general than Massena.”

But as the nearest districts became exhausted there was no help for the French but to extend their raids, and push them further and further back. The Government did wrong to abandon Massena’s army in a country so bare of resources as Portugal, and could plead no excuse, for the nakedness of the land had been fully revealed in Junot’s march from Salamanca to Lisbon.

It is a rash proceeding to count exclusively on the local resources of the theatre of war. By neglecting to supplement these resources by reserves judiciously located on the line of operations, one lays one’s self open to serious misreckonings. It is prudent always to have some system of reserves, either in stationary or rolling magazines, and to attend to their formation betimes.

Another error was not to have secured the communications

* Napier, “*Peninsular War*,” Book XI. chap. x.

† *Idem*, Book XI. chap. ix.

by means of troops echeloned between the army of Portugal and the Spanish frontier. How unsafe the communications were at that time can be judged by the fact that, on the 2nd of November, when Massena sent General Foy from Villafranca to report his position to the emperor, three battalions were given to him as an escort, and that for three months the French had no news from France or from Spain.

Wellington has been accused of having missed several promising opportunities for attacking the French, but, as a disaster would have relieved the enemy's difficulties, he did not wish to risk anything. All his plans were based on lapse of time, and he looked forward to the moment when absolute want of provisions would compel his adversary to fall back. An attack, nevertheless, offered every prospect of success, for the French army was weakened by the large detachments occupied in gathering provisions, who were consequently unavailable for battle.

In the beginning of February, 1811, Drouet declared to Massena that he could no longer live in the neighbourhood of Leiria, and that he was going back to Spain. Ney and Reynier pressed the marshal to do likewise, urging that the country was completely ruined. Massena, whose strength of will alone had made him hold out in Portugal much longer than any other commander would have done, at last yielded, with the intention, however, of returning to Portugal as soon as reinforcements arrived.

The retreat began on the 6th of March, and on the 1st of April the French crossed the frontier, and were again on Spanish territory. The army numbered 45,000 men; 10,000 sick and wounded men had been removed to Ciudad Rodrigo and to Salamanca, and 10,000 men had been killed, had died of illness, or had been taken prisoners.

We are frequently reminded that the Spanish version of the contest in the Peninsula varies very much from ours. It is so; nevertheless Englishmen pride themselves in speaking truth, and the statements contained in Wellington's despatches and in Napier's history of the war in the Peninsula are difficult to refute.

CHAPTER VII.

SUCHET AND DAVOUT.

MEN have different ways of arriving at the same end, and in this chapter homage will be done to two leaders who, though differing essentially in character, possessed alike administrative talent of no mean order.

His numerous campaigns offered Napoleon many opportunities to select the most able officers of his army for placing in high commands. Large, however, as the number of his marshals and generals was, and trained as they had been by a thorough master of the art of war, there were few who made themselves a lasting reputation for administrative ability of a high standard. The most prominent of all were Soult, Saint-Cyr, Suchet, and Davout.

Fortunate results generally follow when a general couples administrative ability with his fighting qualities. In other French armies in the Peninsula the regiments were wanting in everything, and discipline was undermined; but it was not so in Aragon, for Marshal Suchet had devoted great attention to the organization of his army and likewise of his territory. From this it followed that when the other armies had to contend against very serious difficulties, the condition of his men was relatively good. His men were adequately fed and disciplined; thanks to his forethought, he had efficient troops, his regiments numbered fewer deserters and marauders, and the population felt protected against disorders.

Louis-Gabriel Suchet, Marshal of France and Duke of Albufera, was born on the 2nd of March, 1770, and died on the 3rd of January, 1826, when he had scarcely attained his fifty-sixth year. His advancement was rapid; he was a colonel at twenty-six years of age, chief of the staff at twenty-seven, and lieutenant-

general at twenty-nine. After having displayed rare intelligence and brilliant valour in Bonaparte's first campaign in Italy, in 1800, with a force not one-sixth that of the Austrians, he kept Melas in check and prevented the invasion of the south of France. As the Austrians were retreating to Piedmont he pursued General Elnitz, and captured six standards, thirty-three pieces of cannon, and nearly 15,000 prisoners. He then marched on Acqui, and Melas, threatened in his rear, had to detail a corps of troops in that direction. At Austerlitz, at Saalfeld, at Jena, and at Pultusk his valour and skill were conspicuous.

In his memoirs O'Meara dwells on a conversation he had with the illustrious captive: "I then asked Napoleon which of the French generals was in his opinion the most skilful? 'I should find it difficult,' he replied, 'to decide; but I am inclined to name Suchet. Massena was formerly the most skilful, but we may now consider him as no longer in existence. Suchet, Clausel, and Gérard are, I think, the best French generals.'"

Suchet has bequeathed us a fine example to follow. He was ordered to carry out very difficult and unpopular measures in a country where the population was bitterly hostile and had conceived a mortal hatred of the invaders. By his prudence, by the moderation which characterized his measures, and the firmness he showed in carrying them into effect, he quelled the insurrectionary spirit of the inhabitants, and allayed almost at once the animosity of a patriotic and high-spirited people bent on defending the freedom of their fatherland. Peace constantly followed in the train of victory, and no insurrection ever compelled the general to retrace his steps. Most of this was due to the soundness of his understanding, to his conciliatory disposition, to his habits of business, to his military skill and bravery. What is most remarkable is that by his wise administration he, an alien and a conqueror, gained the gratitude and esteem of a proud and resentful people.

The marshal, whose military talent was of the highest order, never lost sight of the principal object of a general-in-chief, viz. that of leading his soldiers to battle; nevertheless, his first solicitude was to insure them the requisite means of subsistence—a task often attended with serious difficulties—and to provide for their wants. He enjoined the strictest observance to discipline, and by maintaining order in his army easily brought the inhabitants to a sense of justice.

When Marshal Lannes departed for the campaign in Germany, which was to be his last, he recommended Suchet to the emperor as the most worthy to hold the chief command in Aragon. On the 19th of May, 1809, Suchet assumed command of the III. corps. His attention at first was directed to rally the troops, to revive their drooping spirits, and infuse into them a proper discipline. He subsequently led them against the enemy, whom they succeeded in defeating and expelling from the province of Aragon.

At this time the French Government ceased to send funds for paying the troops and meeting their general requirements in the field. On the 9th of February, 1810, General Suchet received from the chief of the staff the following communication :—

“GENERAL SUCHET,

“The emperor desires me to make known to you his intention that you should employ the revenues of the country, and even impose extraordinary contributions, if necessary, with a view to provide for the pay and subsistence of your *corps d’armée*, it being no longer in the power of France to defray these expenses. France is impoverished by the removal of the enormous sum of money which the public treasury is constantly sending to Spain ; the country which you occupy, and which is possessed of abundant resources, must henceforth supply the wants of your troops.”

The emperor called upon the general to derive from the local resources all the advantages that might fairly be expected from them, and, above all, to prevent their becoming, in the smallest degree, available to the insurgents.

The beautiful and fertile province of Aragon, which before the French invasion was a very rich one, and exported yearly large quantities of wheat, wine, oil, silk, wool, and hemp, had been sadly impoverished. For nearly two years requisitions had been levied by several national and foreign armies ; agriculture was impaired ; a great number of vines and olive trees had been destroyed ; the enormous consumption of sheep—the only species of cattle which offers a means of subsistence in that country—had nearly exhausted the breed. The capital, Saragossa, had made a desperate resistance under Palafox, and had been carried by the French after a siege which lasted eight months (from the 27th of July, 1808, to the 21st of February, 1809), one of the most heroic defences recorded

in the history of modern warfare, rivalling the ancient fame of the Spaniards for obstinate valour in the defence of walled cities.

The battle of Belchite had terminated the regular warfare in Aragon, but there were other enemies to guard against; some bands of guerrillas from beyond the frontiers of Aragon, which, once defeated, were able to find a secure asylum in Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa.

Referring to Suchet at this period, Napier writes: "Then, leaving Habert's division on the Cinca, he returned, in June, to Saragossa, and, being sensible that arms alone cannot render conquest permanent, projected a system of civil administration calculated to support his troops, yet with some security to property for the people who should remain tranquil." *

For this purpose he drew around him the few men of talent who still remained in the province, and upon whose uprightness of conduct he could place reliance. Being directed to carry out vigorous measures, he sought the assistance of a band of worthy men, who, by their enlightened views and just appreciation of the situation of the country, patriotically accepted the honourable mission of interposing moderation and justice in the intercourse between the inhabitants and the soldiery, and watched over the interests of their fellow countrymen with a perseverance which never relaxed in the pursuit of that object.

Suchet's task was anything but an easy one, owing, if nothing else, to the poor state of the finances. To what point the province had fallen can be gathered from the following passage in the marshal's memoirs: "The financial condition of the province was still more deplorable; as money was considered the sinew of war, the Spanish Government had not neglected measures that were calculated to remove it from general circulation. The late intendant of the province had carried away to Seville three million francs, the proceeds of patriotic donations and contributions collected previously to the siege of Saragossa. The wealthiest families had emigrated, and removed all the ready money they could obtain. A million reals, and 3000 marks of plate, derived from the suppressed convents, had just been transmitted to Count Cabarrus, the minister of finances at Madrid. The royal treasury of Spain was indebted to the extent of 500,000 reals for expenses, and did not possess a single real wherewith to face its engagements. All taxable objects were

* Napier, "Peninsular War," Book IX. chap. i.

fast disappearing ; the local administrations were partly dissolved ; several sources of public wealth were dried up ; and the annual pay of the army alone required eight million francs, for which we had to call upon a country which, in its most prosperous days, never paid more than four millions to the Spanish Government." *

Though the French could grapple with the enemy, and hold their wonted superiority in a fair battle-field, yet, in the end, the tedious and petty warfare carried out by the guerrillas, when the invaders happened to be weak in numbers or posted on disadvantageous ground, often led to unfavourable and mortifying results.

In the Peninsula, though they were surrounded by an irritated and revengeful population, they were left to their fate, and enjoined to look to such resources as the country might afford. It is greatly to the credit of Marshal Suchet that, notwithstanding the many difficulties in his path, he succeeded in pacifying an oppressed and exasperated population ; and that, besides providing for the pay and subsistence of his army, and carrying out several sieges, he was in a position to lodge a sum little short of eight million francs in the public treasury at Madrid.

Owing to his pacific measures, the population of the province resumed their occupations, commercial industry revived and extended, and even manufactures were established in Saragossa. The inhabitants had not enjoyed much liberty under the national Government, and when they found that they were not disturbed in their habits or in their opinions, they submitted to the foreign occupation and resumed their ordinary pursuits.

On the 29th of May the Chief of the Staff communicated to Suchet the emperor's order to take immediate measures for getting possession of Tortosa. "Aragon was now the field for General Suchet's army. The civil authorities of this province had been instructed beforehand to make provision for facilitating the distant operations that were in contemplation ; their physical resources, however, would have been insufficient had they not been backed by the good-will of the people, which it was found necessary to conciliate. Brute force is, indeed, limited in its application, and is of little avail ; and therefore, whenever it is practicable, persuasion should be made to take its place. The species of anarchy, partly military and partly civil, which

* Marshal Suchet's "Memoirs of the War in Spain," vol. i. pp. 297, 298.

harassed Catalonia and Valencia, joined to a pretty marked spirit of rivalry that exists in Spain between the different provinces, rendered the Aragonese by degrees more and more inclined to submit to, and even to confide in, General Suchet. In order to bring about this most desirable end, he designedly moderated the use of his authority by committing it to the hands of Spaniards, to men whom he knew to be most capable of exercising it with intelligence and with equity. He supported and encouraged their zeal by his friendship, and brought to notice their useful services both at Madrid and at Paris. Under these circumstances he was able to reckon, when he removed to a distance from Aragon, upon all the resources which he had been careful to husband there. He succeeded not only in forming magazines, but, what was far more difficult, in organizing means of transport. Alcañiz and Caspe, as well as Mequinenza, became the stations for most important depôts, whence wheat, flour, oats, and biscuits were regularly conveyed to the troops by convoys of mules with Spanish conductors, or by the bat horses attached to the army. Saragossa, and all the rest of Aragon, poured in upon those points the provisions necessary for the supply of our men.”*

Suchet was to have been joined by Macdonald before undertaking the siege, but he had to wait for five months, at the end of which the VII. corps still kept aloof. Napier describes the general's situation in the following words: “Suchet was perplexed. The provisions he had with so much pains collected from the most distant parts of Aragon were rapidly wasting, forage was becoming scarce, and as the plain of Urgel was given over to the VII. corps, the latter had become a burthen to him instead of an aid. He had since the beginning of the year supplied his army entirely from the resources of Aragon without help from France, and had in six months used up 120,000 sheep and 1200 bullocks.† Anxious about the future consumption, he called the notables and heads of the clergy in Aragon to his headquarters, and with their advice reorganized his internal administration. He removed many absurd restrictions upon industry and trade, placed the municipal power and police entirely with the natives, and thus obtained greater supplies with less discontent. And he was well served and obeyed, both

* Marshal Suchet, “Memoirs of the War in Spain,” vol. i. p. 188.

† These latter had been procured from Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon.

in matters of administration and police by the Aragonese whose feelings he was careful to soothe, showing himself in all things a shrewd governor and an able commander." *

* * * * *

"After the fall of Tortosa, the general had been so diligent that, when the siege of Taragona was confided to him,† his magazines at Lerida and Mora were full,‡ and his battering-train formed at Tortosa, to which place his tools, platforms, and other materials, fabricated at Saragossa, were also conveyed. Fifteen hundred draft horses, with artillerymen and engineers, and ten battalions of infantry, were collected, and from thence shot and shell were continually forwarded to San Felipe de Balaguer. This was a fine application of Cæsar's maxim—that war should maintain itself; for all the money, the guns, provisions, and materials collected for this siege were fruits of former victories; nothing was derived from France but the men." §

Suchet had 40,000 men of all arms—French, Poles, and Italians—under his command. Half of this force only was available for the siege of Tortona, the rest was needed to hold and overawe the provinces.

The general was strongly opposed to the ruinous system of contracts, for, as he himself states, the whole of the sums destined to pay the troops would have proved inadequate to satisfy the cupidity of the contractors. However, to guard against the danger of being surprised by a scarcity of meat in the midst of his siege operations, as his resources were nearly exhausted, yielding to the urgent representations of the authorities of Aragon, he was compelled to give way to necessity, and sanction a contract for the supply of cattle. Napier writes on this point: "To avoid using up the sheep and cattle of Aragon, which would have alienated the people and annihilated his own future supply by destroying the breeding flocks, Suchet contracted his meat in France, and so entirely had he pacified Aragon that none of the contractors failed, though their herds and flocks passed through that province, and were paid for by Aragonese contributions." ||

"The cattle were ordered to be distributed alive between the various regiments. Owing to this arrangement the heads of corps

* Napier, "Peninsular War," Book XIII. chap. iv.

† On March 19, 1811.

‡ Twenty-five thousand quintals of wheat were collected at Lerida and Mora.

§ Napier, "Peninsular War," Book XIII. chap. iv.

|| Idem.

were charged with the duty of superintending the proper distributions to their soldiers, and enjoined to be always provided with meat for two days' consumption. The consequence was that, the cattle being thus divided amongst the troops, they could subsist with less difficulty; the animals, being more adequately watched, never occasioned any delays in our movements, and on reaching his bivouac the soldier was not obliged to quit his quarters or to go out marauding in quest of food." *

Every measure was taken for the security of the communications during the siege; after the investment of Taragona an entrenched post was formed at Momblanch, and garrisoned by 400 men of the 1st Light Infantry and of the 14th of the Line; this detachment was to secure the communications between Taragona and Lerida, and to prevent the partisans disturbing the line between Mora and Reus. The entrenched convent La Virgen de la Sierra was attacked by 2000 Spaniards, who were driven back. General Frere, with four battalions and 200 horse, came to the rescue, and showed the garrison that an eye was kept on them.

Taragona fell on the 28th of June, after an obstinate defence. During the siege Suchet reaped the benefit of his conciliating policy, for he writes: "During the progress of this operation Aragon continued to furnish supplies to the army. We have known some of the peasantry of Teruel to have travelled to the town of Mora, a distance of fifty leagues, in order to bring their quota of provisions."

The communications with France had been greatly improved, for Suchet organized fortified posts from Canfranc by Jaca to Saragossa, and arranged so that the despatches for the army of Aragon should be sent by Pau and Oléron. A speedy and safe channel of communication with France was thus obtained. The communications established by way of Jaca also facilitated the movement of the cattle contracted for in France.

The arrangements for looking after the wounded at the siege of Taragona, for providing hospitals, attendants, and materials for dressing wounds, seconded by the zeal and intelligence of Rampon, the physician-in-chief, were unequalled in any of the French armies in the Peninsula.

Valencia's public prosperity had, during the war of invasion, been crippled as in Aragon, and for the same reasons. Suchet,

* Marshal Suchet, "Memoirs of the War in Spain," vol. i. p. 329.

therefore, strove to subdue the intense hatred of the population. He granted an amnesty to all who had borne arms against the French, opened the magazines of the army to the country people whose farms had suffered from the events of the war, abolished the war taxes imposed by the Spanish Government, "and to give the people guarantees against arbitrary exactions, the commander-in-chief issued an ordinance, and caused it to be posted in every parish, informing persons liable to contribution that the Intendant of the army alone was authorized to impose taxes and requisitions, agreeably to orders; that these charges should not be demanded till they had been legally assessed by the *contadorerie* of the province; and lastly, that they might, and indeed ought to, refuse compliance with such as were not contemplated in this measure." *

The experience of the two preceding years in Aragon was not wasted. The marshal repeated what he had done in that province, and placed prudent and upright men, and such as were deeply impressed with the true interests of their country, at the head of the municipal administration.

The result of his wise measures was that scarcely a year after his entry into Valencia an extraordinary contribution of two hundred millions of reals had been paid either in cash to the public chest or in supplies delivered on account of that tax at the military magazines. Later on the marshal reviews the financial results of his administration in the following words: "Eighteen months had scarcely elapsed since the conquest of the kingdom of Valencia. During this time thirty-seven millions of francs (close upon £1,500,000 sterling), the produce of the ordinary contributions and war-taxes, had been paid into the chest of the army. The amount of the disbursement was, for pay, etc., 16,851,920 frs.; for *matériel*, 6,186,304 frs.; for the public and local administration, pensions to ecclesiastics, military men who had retired from the service, and widows, and relief afforded, 2,143,864 frs.; for charges for the administration of the treasury of the army, 87,671 frs.; for bullion sent to France and payments made according to ministerial ordinances, 753,263 frs.; sums sent to Madrid to the King of Spain, out of the produce of the extraordinary war contributions, 7,000,000 frs.; lastly, for articles furnished to the different fortresses retained by the army, 1,470,727 frs. All these disbursements amounted to 34,496,749 frs.

* Marshal Suchet, "Memoirs of the War in Spain," vol. ii. p. 288.

"During the same interval the receipts in Aragon amounted to eight millions of francs, and in Catalonia to seven. In those provinces disbursements for pay and *matériel* had been made as in Valencia; relief and pensions had been granted and work given to the indigent class; and all the expenses for objects of general and local utility had been regulated for the benefit and to the satisfaction of the inhabitants; and that without disposing of any part of the wealth of the church, without selling the smallest portion of the possessions of the clergy or those of the opulent proprietors whom the war had driven from their homes."*

Suchet always took great pains to secure the subsistence and the pay of the troops, and there can be no doubt that there is no better way to maintain discipline and reduce the horrors of war than feeding the troops well and with regularity; this will prevent their having the least excuse for pillaging. For their small purchases they must have ready money, and it is difficult to assert authority over troops when obligations in the matter of pay are not satisfied.

The French armies of invasion in the Peninsula were badly supplied with funds, and had not such a painstaking administrator as Suchet at their head. In the second invasion of Portugal Soult had found himself in a serious predicament. The army chest was no longer filled by contributions from France, and as, for fear of a revolt, it was not considered prudent to levy contributions, the pay of the soldier remained unliquidated. To fill the money chest the marshal was compelled to have resort to a loan from the officers; one regiment alone lent 80,000 francs. At Oporto he essayed to sell the merchandise and the wine captured on the enemy's ships, but no purchasers came forward.

A French author,† referring to Soult's and Ney's armies, states: "Whereas to recover their wasted strength, these troops would have needed nourishing food, they barely received one-fourth or one-eighth of the bread and biscuit ration, three or four ounces of meat, and a very small allowance of spirits. Salt entirely failed, and, through want of this seasoning, which nothing can replace, it became impossible to cook the most indispensable food.

"The greatest difficulty was also experienced in repairing the clothes and the boots. Nearly driven to march barefooted, the

* Marshal Suchet, "Memoirs of the War in Spain," vol. ii. p. 300.

† "Souvenirs d'un Militaire des Armées françaises de Portugal."

greater portion of the soldiers contrived to cover their worn-out boots with pieces of hide taken from the animals which were slaughtered, thus manufacturing for themselves a kind of sandal.

"This expedient was of little avail; when the heat began to make itself felt, the leather brought into use without being tanned shrunk and blistered the soldiers, who were speedily compelled to cast it off their feet.

"Some hundred pairs of shoes, which had been brought up from Coruña, were distributed amongst the several corps; as these came from Government magazines, they did not last beyond two or three marches.

"There was no money for meeting these absolutely necessary expenses; it was positively impossible to impose contributions in the country. In such a predicament, Marshal Soult had again recourse to the troops; he opened a fresh loan, which yielded a sum of 125,000 francs."

Suchet recognized the necessity for occupying the towns whence the enemy derived his chief resources, and the sea-ports which provided him with arms and ammunition, for widening the passes and repairing the roads in order that the artillery and cavalry should be free to proceed in any desired direction. His success in procuring resources from a country the inhabitants of which were determined to resist a foreign yoke was due to his administrative capacity, his fairness, moderation, and rigid impartiality. In the course of six years the marshal undertook the sieges of Lerida, Mequinenza, Tortosa, Taragona, Mont-Serrat, Oropesa, Saguntum, Valencia, and Peniscola. These operations, to be carried to a successful termination, not only entailed a large loss of men, but considerably augmented the difficulties of provisioning the troops.

The III. corps, like many others, suffered from the Russian campaign, which was the beginning of the decadence of the French forces in the Peninsula. In January, 1812, by an order from Paris, all the Poles who were serving with the eagles in Spain were called away. Suchet lost the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regiments of the Vistula, which, with detachments of the 4th and the squadron of Lancers, formed a division of 6000 veterans. Next year General Severoli's Italian troops were recalled for service beyond the Alps, and, as the German troops were suddenly ordered to be disarmed, the infantry regiment of Nassau and the Westphalian Light Horse were lost to him. In all, his command

was deprived of 2000 Italians, 2400 Germans, and 2000 gendarmes; to these must be added 800 picked soldiers, who were directed to return to France to be incorporated into the Imperial Guard.

During his operations the marshal captured 94 standards, 1415 pieces of artillery, and 82,101 prisoners, but of his laurels none were brighter than the affection his soldiers felt for him, and the gratitude with which he was regarded by the inhabitants of Spain for his considerate conduct towards the vanquished. Suchet combined in his person prudence and courage, and it was this happy combination of qualities which gained him such a bright reputation.

Another brilliant commander, Louis Nicholas Davout, was born in France in 1770. Davout was not, like many of the marshals and generals of the Empire, without distinguished ancestors, for he came of an ancient family of Bourgogne. Unlike Marshal Suchet who commenced his military career as a private of the cavalry of the Lyons National Guard, he was brought up for the profession of arms, and was educated first at the military school of Auxerre, and later at the similar institution in Paris. At the opening of the French Revolution he was serving as an officer in the cavalry regiment of Royal-Champagne.

It has been related how Suchet contrived to win the confidence of an irate and passionate population, and succeeded in getting it to aid his plans. Davout, though endowed with great courage, self-reliance and a remarkable talent for the organization and maintenance of troops in the field, was not gifted with the same conciliatory manners. He has been accused of being wanting in the *suaviter in modo*, and has been depicted by tradition as an inflexible military chief, silent, stoical, laconic, and obstinate. A most notable trait in his character was the implicit confidence he had in his faculties of command. Early in his career, at a period of great commotion and disorder, he discovered that discipline was an essential condition of war, and he remained ever faithful to that great principle. He wrote, "*Bravoure et discipline, telles sont les bases de la morale du soldat.*" He had full knowledge of his worth, but detested to proclaim himself. It is very much in favour of his character that he was the friend of Marceau and Desaix, two of the most brilliant soldiers of the revolutionary period.

Some writers have called in question Davout's harsh and despotic manner, and possibly with a good deal of truth, for there

were many officers in the army who were very jealous of him. His letters to Madame la Maréchale,* published by his daughter, Mme. la Marquise de Blocqueville, show him in a different character, though evidently his own wife admitted that his zeal for the service of his emperor and his country may have occasionally carried him too far.

General Berthezène gives an instance to show how nobly Davout could repair an injustice. "During the occupation of Silesia by our troops in 1808, Colonel Dupellier of the 106th of the Line, having been obliged to make a forced march, exacted some refreshments for his regiment in a small village which had not been assigned to him as a station for a halt. Marshal Davout, from the manner in which the thing had been represented to him, believed the colonel had been guilty of an exaction: he reproved him publicly, and forbade him to justify himself. Nevertheless, after further inquiry into the circumstances, it came to be recognized that this officer was innocent, and was consequently a victim to the marshal's prepossessions. Then Davout did not disdain to avow his error, and to make reparation in a most thorough manner; he obtained, though in time of peace, the colonel's promotion, and retained him in his own army corps."

An instance may be quoted which appears to refute this general charge of over-severity. General César de Laville, Davout's Chief of the Staff, in replying to a complaint made by General Wegesach, writes: "His Excellency has ordered particulars to be gathered on the occurrence which forms the subject of your letter—that is, the burning of some houses in Schönberg, as His Excellency does not tolerate in war anything beyond the necessary evils."†

The extremely rigorous orders concerning the way the city of Hamburg was to be treated were sent by Berthier. Extracts from these instructions were furnished by Davout to the Government of Louis XVIII. to refute the charges made against him; in any case, it is well authenticated that he did not carry his orders out to the letter. In spite of the severity of his administration in Germany, the Prince of Eckmühl is respected

* Davout was already engaged to be married, but his engagement was broken off, and, in compliance with the desires of the First Consul, he married Mlle. Aimée Leclerc, sister of General Leclerc, who had espoused Pauline Bonaparte.

† One of the marshal's principles was, *Faire à l'ennemi tout le mal nécessaire, mais ne lui faire que celui-là.*

in France, as having been sensible, generous, and patriotic. However, it is with the superior qualities of the soldier that we have to concern ourselves. Alas! man is very imperfect, and the life of many a distinguished leader of men does not bear looking into minutely, for it reveals the same failings and vices to which our frail humanity is prone. It is rarely that one meets with a Bayard, a warrior *sans peur et sans reproche*.

His studious habits gained for Davout, after he joined his regiment, a reputation for being a dreamer. He did not promise great things then, and by his comrades was considered more of a book-worm than a practical officer; nevertheless, his studies formed his character and mind, and made him what he proved himself to be at Auerstädt, at Eylau, and at Eckmühl.

Davout's principal feat was the battle of Auerstädt, in which (notwithstanding Bernadotte's refusal to co-operate with him), at the head of three divisions and three regiments of light horse, in all numbering 16,000 men, he defeated Brunswick's army of 54,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. Inspired as the men were by the presence of their king, the Prussians fought well, but they sustained a crushing defeat, losing many colours and 115 guns. Sir Edward Hamley holds that this battle was "more glorious to the victor than any other fought independently by a marshal of the Empire." Napoleon tried to detract from the importance of Davout's victory by treating it as a simple episode of the battle of Jena—a mean action unworthy of a conqueror who had scored many brilliant victories.

On the 14th of October, 1806, both the French and Prussian armies were divided into two parts, and fought two distinct battles. The orders issued on the 13th at 10 p.m. directed the Marshal to march on Apolda, so as to fall on the rear of the Prussian army, then about Jena. Berthier added, "Should Marshal Bernadotte (Prince of Pontecorvo) be with you, you may march together, but the Emperor hopes that he will be in the position which has been indicated to him at Dornburg."

On the night of the 13th and 14th Bernadotte had arrived at Naumburg. Davout gave him a copy of the orders he had received from head-quarters, requesting to be told what he intended to do. The prince replied that he would start for Camburg. General de Trobiand, Davout's aide-de-camp, was sent to him to dissuade him from his intentional inaction, but the prince remained obstinate. "In spite of the urgent requests of

his generals," writes Marbot, "he let his three divisions remain wholly inactive, refusing to support Davout, who, a league away, at Auerstädt, was withstanding the Prussian army under the king in person, and ultimately beat them."

It was after Napoleon had returned to Jena, to sleep there, whilst the flattering words of Lannes, who hailed him as Emperor of the West, were still ringing in his ears, that he received the first intimation of the battle fought by Davout.

This victory caused umbrage to Napoleon; he could in no way claim to have participated in the battle of Auerstädt, which was the outcome of the Marshal's initiative, and, to his mortification, the principal part of the Prussian army was beaten by Davout, and not by him. This battle eclipsed his, for the victory of Jena was the less important of the two, and nothing so decisive in its results as the victory of Auerstädt.

This was well understood by the conquered party, and not soon forgotten, as the following story will show. In 1867 William I., King of Prussia, afterwards Emperor of Germany, paid a visit to Paris. One afternoon, guided by one of the French marshals, he went over the Salle des Maréchaux at the Tuileries, and, as he came before each bust, inquired the name of the warrior represented. When he came to the one of Davout he asked what title he bore. "He was Prince of Eckmühl," was the cautious reply. The king remained silent for a moment, then, to the surprise of his guide, said bluntly, "He was likewise Duke of Auerstädt, and Prussia well knows it."

Apparently the official despatch was so couched as to deceive even such a discerning individual as Talleyrand. In the following letter which he sent to Madame la Maréchale Davout with the official account of the battle, he evidently confuses the two battles into one.

"MADAM,

"I hasten to bring to your notice an account which I have just received from head-quarters of the victory of Jena. Marshal Davout has come out of it with a fine branch of laurel, which you, madam, can add to his previous collection."

Napoleon need not have been so provoked; the credit of the campaign was his. That one of his lieutenants should have had a larger share in its crowning event was one of the fortuitous

chances of war. However he may have felt at the time, the emperor recognized the following year the brave part taken by Davout on the memorable 14th of October by creating him Duc d'Auerstädt. The battle really was fought round the village of Hasenhausen, but received its name from Auerstädt, where the King of Prussia had his head-quarters.

Davout worshipped Napoleon, his genius, his inimitable ability. He recognized in him the only man fit to guide the destinies of France, and vowed to serve him with constancy, fidelity, and disinterestedness. Writing to Madame la Maréchale after the battle of the 14th of October, he concludes, "I have had the good fortune to fulfil the intentions of the emperor, and to acquire some claim to his esteem and good will." Auerstädt dissipated a part of the illusion, and from that time there was a tacit distrust between the two; it only broke out openly in the tragic events of the disastrous expedition to Russia, at a time when the marshal's health and vigour were impaired, while the brilliant qualities of his imperial master were dulled by disappointment and disease.*

Ségur's allusion to Napoleon's ill health in 1812 has been impugned, but there is the testimony of Baron Lejeune, who, being on the staff of Prince Berthier at the battle of Borodino, had plenty of leisure for observing the renowned leader. He writes in his memoirs, "I was surprised that the emperor had shown so little of the eager activity which had before so often ensured success. . . . We all agreed in wondering what had become of the eager, active commander of Marengo, Austerlitz, and elsewhere. We none of us knew that Napoleon was ill and suffering, quite unable to take a personal part in the great drama unfolded before his eyes, the sole aim of which was to add to his glory. . . . We were all anything but satisfied with the way in which our leader had behaved, and passed very severe strictures on his conduct."

With the ability and vigour the Marshal displayed at Auerstädt, at Eylau, at Eckmühl and at Wagram, he coupled other equally eminent qualities. In 1812 he commanded the 1st Corps in the Russian campaign, during which his forethought and his measures for the provisioning of his soldiers were singularly conspicuous. There can be no question that had the

* Napoleon suffered at the time from dysuria, or retention of urine, but his policy carefully concealed the nature of his ailments.

same pains been taken by the commanders of the other corps, the enormous casualties in the advance and the disasters of the retreat would never have attained such proportions.

In the Russian campaign Davout displayed extraordinary zeal. He put his heart into the work, and devoted all his energies to the success of the enterprise, possibly in the hope of being able to seize some fresh opportunity of distinguishing himself which might drive the emperor to admit his superiority over the rest of the marshals.

That Davout was in favour of the expedition there can be no doubt. In a letter to his wife from Wiazma he writes, "This campaign will not have been the least extraordinary amongst those of the emperor, or the least useful for our children; this will place them out of reach of invasion from northern hordes." Again he writes, "It was high time to undertake this campaign; the preparations of the Russians were formidable, and would have become even more so." When the Russians stole away, and every day denied to the emperor the battle which he was looking forward to, Davout wrote, "So much the better! The campaign will be almost entirely performed by the legs: it will be nothing more than a long military march." The marshal at no time considered the success of the campaign an impossibility, but he seems to have deemed necessary for this other chiefs, other measures, and for the emperor a better state of health.

Marshal Davout, Prince of Eckmühl, had administered the affairs of the districts of Poland occupied by the French troops with consummate tact and ability. Had the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland been decreed, he was believed to be a strong candidate for the crown. He was quite accustomed to hear himself spoken of as the future king. It was the fear of giving offence to Austria and to Prussia by disposing of the provinces of Posen and of Gallicia that kept Napoleon from complying with the ardent wishes of the Poles.

Davout, who was a first-class military administrator and organizer, neglected nothing in order to enable his corps to keep the field without being at the mercy of those accidents which loosen the bonds of discipline and lower the *morale* of the soldier. There were, nevertheless, envious men who misrepresented his efforts; their animosity reached such a point that Napoleon said that really it appeared as if it was Davout who commanded the army.

On the point of provisions on the march to Moscow, Thiers

writes: "It had been observed that the villages were less unprovided than was at first supposed, and that especially on the lateral roads, where the Russians had not had time to destroy everything, there still remained a sufficiently large quantity of provisions. With the exception of the Guard and the 1st Corps, all the others were to be fed on the resources of the country."

But there was a lack of administrative ability, organization, and discipline, and through the deficiency of these qualities—exception made of the 1st Corps—the others saw their numbers melt away. When regular issues ceased, the foreigners, and, above all, the young soldiers, deserted or lingered along the roads. Many of them used to get intoxicated on the spirits which were found in the villages bordering on the highway.

In the 1st Corps—that commanded by Davout—on the contrary, everything was regulated with the greatest forethought. The Marshal had brought all his experience to bear on the preparations for the campaign, and his residence in Poland could not have failed to indicate to him the principal difficulties with which the Emperor would have to contend. At the head of these lay the provisioning of his army, for the French were about to march through a country which was by no means the most fertile in Europe. To draw the subsistence for the troops entirely from the resources of Russia was plainly an impossibility, so Davout set about to devise some plan for making his soldiers less dependent on the pace of the convoys. In view of a long march it was very desirable not to overweigh the infantry, but by a judicious reduction of kit it became possible to make room for provisions and ammunition.

Thanks to the Marshal's fostering care, in the first period of the campaign the steadiness, the discipline, and the fine soldierly spirit which animated the 1st Corps were the general theme.

Count Philippe de Ségur, in his "*Expedition to Russia*" (Book VII. chap. i.), gives the following details of Marshal Davout's arrangements: "It was remarked now, as well as before we reached Smolensk, that the divisions of the 1st Corps continued to be the most numerous; their detachments were better disciplined, brought back more, and did less injury to the inhabitants. The men who remained with the colours lived on the contents of their knapsacks, the regular appearance of which relieved the eye, so fatigued with a disorder that was nearly universal.

“Each of these knapsacks, reduced to what was strictly necessary in point of apparel, contained two shirts, two pairs of shoes with nails, and a pair of extra soles, a pair of pantaloons, and half gaiters of cloth ; a few articles requisite for personal cleanliness, a bandage, a supply of lint, and sixty cartridges.

“In the two sides were placed four biscuits of sixteen ounces each ; under these, and at the bottom, was a long, narrow linen bag, filled with ten pounds of flour. The whole knapsack and its contents, together with the straps and the hood, rolled up and fastened at the top, weighed thirty-three pounds twelve ounces.

“Each soldier carried also a linen bag, slung in the form of a shoulder belt, containing two loaves of three pounds each. Thus with his sabre, his loaded knapsack, three flints, his turn-screw, his belt and musket, he had to carry fifty-eight pounds’ weight, and was provided with bread for four days, biscuit for four, flour for seven, and sixty rounds of ammunition.

“In rear were carriages laden with provisions for six more days ; but it was impossible to reckon with confidence on these vehicles, picked up on the spot, which would have been so convenient in any other country, with a smaller army, and in a more regular war.

“When the flour-bag was emptied, it was filled with any corn that could be found, and which was ground at the first mill, if any chanced to be met with ; if not, by the hand-mills which followed the regiments, or which we found in the villages, for the Russians are scarcely acquainted with any others. It took sixteen men twelve hours to grind in one of them the corn necessary for 130 men for one day.

“As every house in this country had an oven, little want was felt on that score ; bakers abounded, for the regiments of the 1st Corps contained men of all trades, so that articles of food and clothing were all prepared or mended by them during the march. They were colonies uniting the character of civilized and nomadic. The emperor had first conceived the idea, which the genius of the Prince of Eckmühl made his own : he had everything he wanted—time, place, and men to carry it into execution ; but these three elements of success were less at the disposal of the other chiefs. Besides, their characters being more impetuous and less methodical, they would scarcely have derived the same advantages from it ; with a less organizing genius they would

therefore have had more obstacles to surmount. The emperor had not paid sufficient attention to these differences, which were productive of baneful effects."

The historian contents himself with this description of arrangements for the bread ration; Baron Marbot gives in the following words a few more details: "In addition to their day's march they (the troops) had every evening to go and seek provisions far from their bivouacs, since the Russians, as they retired, had burnt all stores, and it was impracticable to distribute rations regularly to the French troops. Davout's corps was, however, for a long time a fortunate exception to this rule, since that marshal, who was no less great as an administrator than as a leader, had organized before the passage of the Niemen huge trains of small carts to follow his army. These carts, filled with biscuit, salted meat, and vegetables, were drawn by oxen, a certain number of which were slaughtered every evening. This, while assuring a supply of provisions, had a great effect in keeping the soldiers in the ranks."*

Draft bullocks, being seldom in proper condition, are with good reason considered unfit for slaughter. Nevertheless, on special occasions it is senseless to be very fastidious, and, as the provisions conveyed were being gradually consumed, Davout prudently turned to account the bullocks which were of no further use to him for draft.

In the paragraphs just quoted Count de Ségur observes that the men of the 1st Corps sent out to gather provisions "brought back more, and did less injury to the inhabitants." This is natural enough, for if the men before setting out have been fed they will do the work with greater order and efficiency than can be expected from men whose craving for food must be whetted by the alluring sight of abundance. It is a very difficult task for the strictest disciplinarian to keep famishing men under proper restraint. Who is to stop a mass of men, worn by fatigue, and receiving no rations, from laying forcible hands on the bread and meat which they require to keep them alive?

On the subject of the privations endured by Junot's young troops when marching on Lisbon, Napier remarks: "Young soldiers always attribute their sufferings to the ill will of the inhabitants; it is difficult to make them understand that a poor peasantry have nothing to spare. Old soldiers blame nobody, but

* "Memoirs of Baron de Marbot," vol. ii. chap. xxvii.

know how to extract subsistence, and in most cases without exciting enmity.”*

Davout drove Bagration's corps of 30,000 men back upon Bobruisk. He overtook him on the road to Mohilev, and, though at the head of not more than 12,000 men, attacked and beat him. Had it not been for the inability of the emperor's brother (King Jerome), he might have forced Bagration to surrender.

At the battle of Borodino, bearing in mind a manœuvre which had stood him in good stead at Wagram, he proposed it to Napoleon, who, however, refused to resort to it. His plan was to turn the Russian position with five divisions by moving by the woods of Outitza on to the old road to Moscow. He promised, if he was allowed to start in the night, to appear on the following morning on the Russian flank with 40,000 men to drive the enemy back on their centre, and to push them into the angle which the Kalocza made with the Moskowa. The suggestion was good, for the position occupied by the Russian army was well defended on all sides, nevertheless the emperor considered the manœuvre risky, and feared that the Russians, once they became aware of their danger, would retire without fighting. When the marshal had explained his plan to the emperor, the latter, after meditating in silence for some minutes, replied, “No! it is too great a movement; it would remove me too far from my object, and make me lose too much time.” Davout persisted from conviction; he undertook to accomplish his manœuvre before six in the morning; he protested that in another hour the greatest part of its effect would be produced. Napoleon, impatient of contradiction, sharply replied with this exclamation, “Ah! you are always for turning the enemy; it is too dangerous a manœuvre.”†

After Malo-jaroslavetz, when it came to a question as to which route it were best to follow in the retreat, the marshal was strongly in favour of and proposed the road by Medyn and Smolensk, not only because it was the shortest, but because it was the one which could furnish most resources. Unfortunately, also in this instance his advice was not followed, and the route suggested by Murat was chosen.

The marshal was a thorough soldier, and as such disdained to flee before the enemy; he was anxious to prevent a too hurried retreat having a demoralizing effect on his troops. Had the other

* Napier, “*Peninsular War*,” Book II. chap. i.

† General Louis Philippe Comte de Ségur, “*Campaign of Russia*,” vol. ii. chap. vii.

generals been guided by the same consideration, in all probability the result would have been far different. During the retreat, trusting to the spirit of order which had always been the principal cause of his success, he imposed on his troops, in spite of their cruel sufferings, a slow and methodical march; he forbade all precipitation, which, having the semblance of a defeat, might embolden the adversary. The emperor found fault with his system of marching in echelon, alleging that it had enabled Miloradovitch's advanced guard to overtake them.

Napoleon had the weakness to accuse him of having abandoned Ney; but the accusation was not just, for if blame was to attach to any one, it was to himself for not having waited at Krasnoe for his rear-guard to rejoin him. On the 17th of November the emperor was attacked by the Russian army as he was quitting Krasnoe. He might have been captured had the enemy shown more audacity, and had not Davout arrived in time.

Davout, who has been portrayed as being blunt, austere, and morose, shows none of these defects in his correspondence with his wife; he was distracted when the rigours of the season conquered his methodical genius, and he beheld his soldiers, till then held by bonds of discipline, exposed in their turn to all the horrors of famine and want. Ségur states that he was dejected, but he must have been exasperated rather than dejected; in any case he had great reason to be either, for he was vexed and dissatisfied with much that he had been unable to prevent. Such was his state of bitterness that he even entertained thoughts of suicide.*

The discipline of the 1st Corps was much admired in the advance on Moscow. At the close of the retreat, on its arrival at Thorn, the divisions of the corps were composed of the Eagles, not one of which had been lost, of the officers of the regiments, and of a small number of soldiers. All these marched in one body in the midst of a disorderly mob of disbanded soldiers. "The nearer we got to Wilna," writes Lejeune, the chief of Marshal Davout's staff, "the more intense was the cold, especially at night, and every morning those still capable of bearing arms became fewer and fewer. The 1st Corps now numbered scarcely 300 men, and the colonels and generals had to carry the colours of their regiments themselves." Most of the soldierly spirit in the 1st Corps was due to Davout's fostering care; he could do no

* This he avows in a letter written to his wife from Thorn, January 15, 1813.

more, for in a contest between nature and man it is the first which generally conquers.

One of the most painful duties imposed on Davout was to counsel Napoleon to leave Paris after Waterloo. The wily Fouché selected him for the unpleasant task, counting on his bluntness of manner, and on some coolness which had existed lately between him and his sovereign. Napoleon received him coldly, and told him that he would have expected such a proposal from any other person than from Marshal Davout. The marshal succeeded in his mission, but left the Elysée deeply mortified with his reception.

CHAPTER VIII.

NAPOLEON'S ADVANCE ON MOSCOW.

A STUDY of Napoleon's memorable campaign of 1812 in Russia can well be divided into two distinct parts, owing to the great difference in the attitude of the French army in its advance and in its retreat. An attempt will be made in this chapter to portray briefly the movements of the French up to the occupation of Moscow, leaving for the following one to review the terrible sufferings and hardships which overtook them in their retreat from that city, when cold, want, dejection, and lack of discipline gradually undermined their organization.

Napoleon's most powerful motive for a war with Russia was his wish to compel Alexander I. to comply with the treaty signed at Tilsit in 1807, for the Czar had not closed all his ports to England, as stipulated. This, the avowed point in dispute between the two monarchs, possibly hid a more important one, namely, the great warlike preparations which Russia was understood to be making.

The invasion of Russia was a serious enterprise. Caulaincourt—formerly French ambassador at St. Petersburg—had vainly endeavoured to dissuade the emperor from his purpose; Napoleon besides had been warned against it by Lieutenant-Colonel de Ponthon, whose services had been lent to the Russian army after Tilsit. That officer had taken great pains to point out to his sovereign the apathy of the Lithuanian provinces, and the little prospect of their according him any tangible support ; *

* Baron de Marbot accuses the Poles of having, with very few exceptions, remained utterly apathetic, and of not having helped the French. "But so far from coming to help the French troops, they refused them the most necessary things, and in the course of this campaign our soldiers had often to take by force the provisions which the inhabitants, and especially the nobles, concealed from us, and yet gave up on their first demand to their persecutors, the Russians."

the scarcity of provisions and forage; the almost desert regions which would have to be crossed; the impracticability of the roads for artillery after some hours' rain, and, above all, the rigour of the winter and the physical impossibility of fighting after the snow fell. Were not all these good reasons for abstaining from such a risky enterprise? Nevertheless, Napoleon was deaf to all remonstrances, and persisted in his determination to invade the Russian Empire. He had great belief in the adage, *Vouloir c'est pouvoir*.

Not only was Napoleon's * grasp of principles great, but his

* The greatest man who has lived in this century has been contemptuously called the Corsican usurper. The accident of his having been born in Corsica is cast against him, though he went through his studies in France, and through life identified himself with the fortunes of that country. How little has the place of birth to do with the question! Catharine of Russia was a German. Of the men of action in Prussia, Stein was born in the Rhenish provinces, Blücher belonged to Mecklenburg, Gneissenu came from Württemberg, and Scharnorst was a Hanoverian. Of Mazarin, who was an Italian, it was said, "If his accent was not French, his heart was" (*"Si son langage n'était pas français, son cœur l'était"*). Napoleon himself, according to the Duchess d'Abrantes, said, "*Je suis moins Corse qu'on ne le croit*" (see "*Memoirs de la Duchesse d'Abrantes*," tom. iv. p. 352).

What he did usurp is not very evident, for the throne had been overturned several years before he set it up again. It was the French nation which drove out the Bourbons and left the country without a ruler; it was mediocrity, the absence of real statesmanship and high policy, which kept it without a head after the downfall of Robespierre; it was Napoleon who created the Empire.

At the opening of the century the pretensions of the House of Bourbon could scarcely be said to exist. Most states in Europe had, either directly or indirectly, acknowledged France as a republic, and such an acknowledgment undoubtedly inferred that the pretensions of the Royal House were a thing of the past. France needed some one to guide her policy, and was glad to recognize the only individual who had the ability to do so.

In 1814 many people of different opinions desired to get rid of Napoleon, but at first there was no intention whatsoever of recalling the Bourbons; these princes were forgotten, unknown, and without prestige.

What, after all, was the Bourbon rule when the expelled family was brought back to the throne? It was marked during the reign of Louis XVIII. by tyrannical and unconstitutional measures pressed on the king by the Jesuits and nobles of the old school; and his successor Charles X. conceived the vain idea of restoring the absolutism of the old French monarchy. All this created discontent, and led to the revolution of 1830. This revolution aimed as much at the Holy Alliance and the treaty of 1815 as against the ordinances of the king, and Louis Philippe almost found a competitor in Napoleon II.

The elder branch of the Bourbons was deposed after a reign of fifteen years. Charles X. was succeeded by Louis Philippe Duke of Orleans, but as King of the French and not as King of France. The younger Bourbon line remained on the throne only eighteen years, and Louis Philippe abdicated on the 24th of February, 1848.

The *Times*, in its issue of the 22nd of June, 1815—which contains the Duke of Wellington's despatch on the victory of Waterloo—calls Napoleon "the rebel chief" and his troops "the rebel Frenchmen." These terms of abuse evidently had reference to the abdication of Fontainebleau; nevertheless it is a fact that this abdication was forced on Napoleon by the desertion of his marshals, that his relegation to an African island, to the Azores, to Madeira, or to St. Helena had been discussed during the Congress of Vienna, and that the annual stipend of five millions stipulated by the Treaty of Paris had not been paid to him, and there was every probability that it never would be.

judgment, knowledge of details, and foresight were extraordinary. He could set everything right, no matter how far away. Here is a case quoted by Napier: From Ratisbon, in 1809, on giving Soult the supreme command over the 5th and the 6th Corps, Napoleon ordered him to concentrate and act decisively against the British. "Wellesley," he wrote, "will probably advance by the Tagus against Madrid; in that case, pass the mountains, fall on his flank and rear, and crush him. Thus, even at that distance, and without other information than what his sagacity suggested, this all-knowing soldier foresaw the leading operations as soon and as certainly as those who projected them."*

The emperor could inspire the whole machinery of government. In his presence every one realized that he was before a master spirit. What were his ministers and his generals but his executive officers, who, when left to themselves, almost invariably blundered? What was so to be admired in him was not so much his grasp of the principles of the art of war, as the iron will and the endless capacity for work with which nature had endowed him.

Napoleon was an exceptional being, and would have made his mark independently of the fortunate circumstances which came to his aid. Such beings are rarely seen. He was a born leader of men; he had the magnetic attraction which makes the great commander. He could inspire the weakest, he could infuse courage in the most timid. No one like him commanded the devotion of hundreds of thousands, all ready to follow him anywhere, and to give up their lives for only a glance of approval or a simple word of praise. His campaigns were too brilliant, his battles were too masterly to be ever forgotten by posterity. His whole career had that touch of romance which never tires, which always evokes fresh interest.

The army of invasion marched from the Vistula to the Niemen, and crossed the frontier at Kowno, Grodno, Pilnoy, and Tilsit on the 24th of June. Taking General Gourgaud's estimate, the forces which crossed the Niemen amounted to 325,900 men, actually present according to the returns, with 984 pieces of cannon. Of this force 155,400 were French, the remaining 170,500 allies. The army was thoroughly well organized when it set out.

Baron de Marbot accuses Napoleon of having lowered the tone of his army by mingling foreign regiments with the French. On this point he writes: "The 1st corps, commanded

* Napier, "Peninsular War," Book VIII. chap. ii.

by Marshal Davout, reckoned on the 1st of June 67,000 men, of whom 58,000 were French, the balance consisting of Germans, Spaniards, and Poles. In the 2nd Corps, under Oudinot, with 34,000 French, there were 1600 Portuguese, 1800 Croats, and 7000 Swiss. In Ney's Corps, the 3rd, the proportion of French was even smaller, while in the 4th and 6th Corps, united under Eugène Beauharnais, the French composed less than one-half, the remainder being Croats, Bavarians, Spaniards, Dalmatians, and Italians, and of the 44,000 cavalry under Murat, 27,000 only were French. . . . The French element was mingled with foreigners who were themselves in the most heterogeneous confusion with regard to language, manners, customs, and interests; all served badly, and often paralyzed the efforts of the French troops." *

"In this terrible drama had been engaged Tartars from the confines of Asia, together with the *élite* of the troops of some hundred European nations, for from the east and from the west, from the north and from the south, men had flocked to fight with desperate courage for or against Napoleon." †

That part of Russia which lies north of a line drawn from Nijni-Novgorod, Moscow, Minsk, to Warsaw can hardly satisfy the needs of its inhabitants. Rye bread is the staple food in the country, and also of a portion of the inhabitants of the towns. Wheat does not ripen in those districts, and is cultivated only as an exception; what thrives best is flax.

Napoleon was not regardless of the fact that the principal difficulty of his undertaking lay in providing food for his army. Writing to General Lacuée, minister-director of the administration of war, he states: "In view of the war with Russia, I shall have twenty millions of rations of bread, or a fifty days' supply for an army of 400,000 men; I shall have twenty millions of rations of rice, at one ounce a day, or fifty days for 400,000 men. I shall have two millions of measures of oats, or for 50,000 horses for fifty days. I suppose I have not made any miscalculation with regard to these different figures."

Closer to the seat of war he ordered the collection of a vast amount of provisions. "From Dantzic," writes Count Philippe de Ségur, "the emperor proceeded, on the 12th of June, to Königsberg. At that place ended the inspection of his immense

* "Memoirs of Baron de Marbot," vol. ii. chap. xxi.

† "Memoirs of Baron Lejeune," vol. ii. p. 187.

magazines, and the second resting-point and pivot of his operations. Vast quantities of provisions, adequate to the immensity of the undertaking, were there accumulated. No detail had been neglected. The active and impassioned genius of Napoleon was then entirely directed towards that most important and difficult department of his expedition. In that he was profuse of exhortations, orders, and even money, of which his letters are sufficient proof. His days were occupied in dictating instructions on that subject; at night he frequently rose to repeat them again. One general received in a single day six despatches from him, all distinguished by the same solicitude."

In one these words occur: "For masses like these, if precaution is not observed, the grain of no country can suffice." In another: "It will be necessary for all the provision-waggons to be loaded with flour, bread, rice, pulse, and spirits, besides what is required for hospital service. The effect of all my movements will be to assemble 400,000 men on a single point. There will be nothing then to expect from the country, and it will be necessary to have everything within ourselves."* His provision was always admirable. In March, 1812, he orders Davout to have 50,000 out of his 66,000 quintals of grain ground into flour and packed into casks. He enjoins the marshal to be careful that the casks can be disposed without difficulty on the newly constructed vehicles.

Notwithstanding that the emperor had caused immense magazines to be established in Prussia and in Poland, especially at Thorn, Königsberg, and Dantzic, from the very commencement of the concentration the cavalry began to pillage to procure the necessary forage. Yet Napoleon had postponed the opening of the campaign on this very account, trusting that this delay would have given him the power of feeding his horses on the Russian crops, and that by lightening his transport he might more easily overtake the enemy and bring him to battle.

To feed the army the emperor had organized very powerful means of transport. He created a waggon-train on the lines of the military train he had established in 1807.† In January, 1812,

* General Louis Philippe Comte de Ségur, "Campaign of Russia," vol. i. p. 65.

† In the battle of Dresden the French artillery played the principal part. Soon after the commencement of the action rain began to fall in torrents, and Napoleon, to enable his guns to move, doubled the teams by taking horses from his waggon-trains which were lying idle in the city.

Napoleon himself reviewed the arrangements he proposed to make with regard to the military train for the supply of bread. "My idea is to have the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th and 12th battalions of the French train, a battalion belonging to the army of Italy, and a battalion of the Imperial Guard—total, eight battalions, with an equipment of 2016 vehicles; four battalions of carriages *comtoises*, equipped with 2424 vehicles; four battalions, with 1224 carriages drawn by oxen; a battalion of the bullock-train from the kingdom of Italy, with 306 carriages;—grand total, seventeen battalions, equipped with nearly 6000 carriages, transporting from 110,000 to 120,000 quintals, divided as follows: the eight battalions of the military train, thirty quintals for each vehicle; the battalions of *comtoises*, twelve quintals; and the battalions with carriages drawn by oxen, twenty quintals;—total 114,000 quintals, which will make a million of rations of bread, or for an army of 200,000 men a two months' supply."

The provision-waggon were to receive their stores from the magazines established on the Vistula. At the time of the passage of the Niemen the troops were ordered to take with them provisions to last twenty days, which, however, were not to be consumed until the troops had crossed over to the right bank.

No organization of carts and waggon, however perfect, could have fed so large a force as Napoleon employed in the Russian campaign so far from his base. Most of the measures miscarried. "Immense resources," says the Duke of F  zensac, "were rendered unfruitful by distance and the bad state of the communications; orders admirably conceived and drawn up, from want of time and necessary means, remained a dead letter." The greater portion of the vehicles did not even reach the Vistula, either on account of the bad condition of the roads, of the carriages being too heavy for the soil, of the inconsiderate length of the daily marches, of the fatigues endured by the horses and drivers, or of defective organization and want of discipline amongst the latter.

Napoleon himself has stated that during the campaign of 1812 the French army had in its rear six lines of d  p  ts and magazines.

The magazines of the first line were at Smolensk, ten days' march from Moscow.

Those of the second line were at Minsk and at Wilna, eight marches from Smolensk.

Those of the third line at Kowno, at Grodno, and at Bialistok.

Those of the fourth line at Elbing, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plock, Modlin, and Warsaw.

Those of the fifth line at Dantzig, Bromberg, and Posen.

Those of the sixth line at Stettin, Cüstrin, and Glogau.

Distance principally rendered most of these magazines unprofitable; it would not be so now, connected as these places are by railways, but it was so under the old slow conditions of transport. Moreover, even if a proper staging system had been arranged for the provisions coming up, the country on the line of advance had been so thoroughly stripped of everything that the greatest difficulty would have been experienced in feeding the horses and drivers.

"From the Oder to the Vistula," writes Ségur, "and even to the Niemen, if provisions were abundant and properly stationed, the less portable foraging supplies were deficient. Our cavalry were already forced to eat the green rye, and to strip the houses of the thatch in order to feed their horses." Sir Robert Wilson states: "The cavalry was generally in bad condition from fatigue and from want of good water and proper food." He relates how Murat one day complained to Nansouty that "the cavalry had executed a charge without the proper vigour." To which complaint Nansouty is said to have replied, "The horses have no patriotism; the soldiers fight without bread, but the horses insist on oats." *

"The army catered for itself on the march. The country being fertile, horses, waggons, cattle, and provisions of all kinds were swept off; everything was seized, even to such of the inhabitants as were necessary to lead the convoys. Some days after, at the Niemen, the embarrassment of the passage and the celerity of the first hostile marches caused the fruit of these requisitions to be abandoned with an indifference only equal to the violence with which they had been laid hold of." †

Napoleon calculated on bringing the enemy to battle, and all his efforts were directed to that end. He sacrificed every other consideration to that, and trusted that a brilliant victory would have compelled the Czar to sue for peace. What wrecked the expedition to Russia was the too great rapidity of movement,

* General Sir Robert Wilson, K.M.T., "French Invasion of Russia," p. 133.

† General Louis Philippe Comte de Ségur, "Campaign of Russia," vol. i. p. 93.

for the emperor allowed himself to be hurried on as soon as his army had crossed the frontier, in the hope of surprising the adversary. This manœuvre had answered well in 1806, and he may possibly have thought that it would again result in his favour.

On the arrival of the army on the Niemen, the convoys of provisions were found to be very backward. Through want of suitable roads, proper supervision, or endurance in the draught animals, they were several stages in the rear. The *corps d'élite* took with them enough provisions to cross the Niemen, and to last them till they reached Wilna. Napoleon entertained hopes that his convoys would rejoin at a favourable moment, and further counted on adjusting the provisioning of his army by means of deliveries made by the vast magazines of Dantzic and of Königsberg, for which purpose he intended to utilize the waters of the Prischhoff, the Pregel, the Deine, the Vilia, and the Frederick Canal.*

At this early date pillage was already resorted to by the foreign troops which formed part of his army ; the stragglers, numerous in the German and other regiments, already committed ravages in the fields. The first fatigues and the abuse of *chenapes* (spirits distilled in the country) caused the death of a certain number of conscripts of the young guard.

The storms which succeeded one another—notably those of the 24th and 30th of June, and that of the 2nd of July, which was the worst of all,—a long downpour of bitterly cold rain which lasted the whole day and night—disabled at least one-third of the horses. The waggons of those remaining alive had to be overloaded ; this over-weighted the waggons, and made the progress of the trains very slow. Being often very far behind the army, the men and horses were subject to much suffering from want of food and fodder.

Ségur relates how, after crossing the Niemen, the army lost 8000 horses, which died from the inclemency of the weather ;

* The distance by rail between Dantzic and Wilna is 286½ miles, made up as follows :—

Dantzic to Königsberg	81½ miles.
Königsberg to Insterburg	56½ "
Insterburg to Eydtkuhnen	38½ "
Eydtkuhnen to Kowno	51 "
Kowno to Wilna	59½ "
					<hr/>
Total				...	286½ "

he states that from that moment the transport service was nearly disorganized. This loss was due to a fearful storm which spread over a tract of about fifty leagues, covered the fields and roads with water, and caused a sudden lowering of the temperature. A very large quantity of vehicles remained abandoned in the sands. General Sir Robert Wilson alludes thus to this same storm: "Five days incessant deluge of rain, which had begun on the 29th, accompanied by an icy chill, had caused an epidemic amongst the horses (unable, from the state of the roads, to procure any other food than the green rye growing in the fields), which destroyed several thousands, occasioning the abandonment of a hundred pieces of cannon and five thousand ammunition waggons, and so disorganizing the columns by depriving the troops of regular commissariat supplies that numbers fell sick; and no less than 30,000 stragglers were estimated to be wandering on the road from the different points of passage, committing every deplorable excess on the peasantry." * According to Thiers, this number of Germans, Dutch, and Italians deserted between the passage of the Niemen and the occupation of Wilna. Some French conscripts imitated their bad example.

Napoleon contemplated laying hands on the enemy's magazines, but the Russians burnt everything as they retreated, and left nothing which might be of use to the invader. This, the delay in the march of the convoys, and the loss of many of them, were serious disappointments to him. Notwithstanding all his orders, plundering went on everywhere; the foreign troops especially had no scruple in devastating properties, wrecking villages, etc. The Russians in their retreat had carried away all that they could, and had requisitioned horses, cattle, carriages, and guides. On the advice of General Pfuhl, the Czar had issued instructions to the effect that the invaders were to be overcome by fatigues, distance, and hunger.

The history of Russia contained the record of another invasion, when, not quite a hundred years before (1708), Charles XII. marched into that country at the head of 43,000 men. In that instance Peter the Great, with prudent foresight, resolved not to fight the Swedish monarch, but to starve him out. As the Czar retreated, by way of Smolensk, along the great highway to Moscow, his army gained strength, that of his opponent lost it. Charles had to follow an ever-retreating army in a sparsely populated and

* General Sir Robert Wilson, K.M.T., "French Invasion of Russia," p. 29.

devastated country, and his position was every day becoming more perilous.

Count de Ségur, alluding to the inducements opened to the French who took part in the Russian campaign, writes: "To this must certainly be added the prospect of plunder; for the exacting ambition of Napoleon had often disgusted his soldiers, as the disorders of the latter tarnished his glory. A compromise was necessary: ever since 1805 it had been tacitly understood that they should bear with his ambition, and he with their plundering.

"This plunder, however, or rather this marauding system, was generally confined to provisions, which, in default of regular supplies, were exacted of the inhabitants, though often too extravagantly. The most culpable plunderers were the stragglers, who are always pretty numerous in frequent forced marches." *

This compromise to which Ségur alludes reminds us of the words of Plutarch in his description of Cæsar's campaign against Pompey, when the soldiers, unable to keep up with their enterprising leader, murmured, "Whither will this man lead us, and where will be the end of our labours? Will he harass us for ever, as if we had limbs of stone or bodies of iron? . . . Will not Cæsar learn from our wounds that we are mortal, that we have the same feelings, and are liable to the same impressions as other men?"

Troops which have to endure continuous efforts, by performing long marches in a strange climate, must not only be fed, but fed well. It has at all times been difficult, if not nearly impossible, to control troops which were suffering cruel privations.

The art of meeting the wants of the soldier, depending, like all other arts, on material processes, cannot be applied to armies which surpass a certain numerical strength, and the movements of which exceed a certain degree of rapidity.

It has been stated that Napoleon had accumulated vast quantities of provisions at Dantzic and at Königsberg. To bring these to the army he had intended to turn to account the rivers and streams which flow in that part of Russia. Supplies from these sources ascended the Pregel in large boats as far as Vehlau, and when transferred to lighter ones could proceed as far as Insterburg. Other convoys went by land from Königsberg to Labiau, then by way of the Niemen to the Vilia, as far as Kowno

* General Louis Philippe Comte de Ségur, "Campaign of Russia," vol. i. pp. 102, 103.

and Wilna. But the Vilia dried up, and this kind of transport was stopped. Napoleon then tried to organize a corps of Lithuanian chariots, and collected five hundred of them, but the sight of these rude vehicles was not encouraging. He next entered into negotiations with some Jews, who are the only merchants found in that country, and by their assistance the provisions which had remained at Kowno at last reached Wilna. However, by the time they entered that city the army had already quitted it.

In his endeavours to overtake the enemy at Wilna, he hurried the French troops along; it was impossible to wait for the provision columns, which, moreover, were for the moment totally disorganized. Many of the vehicles were drawn by oxen, and their gait was so slow that delays occurred; in the end the convoys could only provide subsistence for such reinforcements as joined the army.

An advance on Moscow in our days would be a different affair from what it was in 1812, for there is a line of railway connecting Moscow with Wilna and Königsberg. This line would facilitate the supply from the base. Certainly the retiring Russians could destroy it, but the railway corps, with materials brought up by reconstruction trains, would not experience any very great difficulty in restoring the line.

Arrived at Wilna,* the emperor halted for sixteen days to better his arrangements with regard to transport and provisions. He had a number of ovens built, caused the mills to be repaired, and ordered all the grain procurable to be carried to the mills to be ground into flour. In an order of the day issued on the 9th of July he regulated the march of the entire army and that of the several headquarters.

The emperor ordered a grand review of the troops to be held on the 10th at six o'clock in the evening. As he arrived on the ground a terrible storm broke out; many of the troops were

* Wilna lies $239\frac{1}{2}$ miles by rail beyond Warsaw, and $548\frac{3}{4}$ from Moscow. The total distance between the two latter cities is divided as follows:—

Wilna to Minsk	115 miles.
Minsk to Borissow	$43\frac{3}{4}$ „
Borissow to Orscha	77 „
Orscha to Smolensk	$69\frac{1}{2}$ „
Smolensk to Wiazma	102 „
Wiazma to Moscow	$141\frac{1}{2}$ „
					<hr/>
Total	$548\frac{3}{4}$ „

alarmed by the violence of the elements at the outset of the campaign. The ancients would have certainly recognized in this disturbance of nature a bad presage, the indication of some impending catastrophe.

When the march was resumed, according to Count de Ségur, the principal column, the centre one, found nothing on the road on which its advanced guard itself had to subsist on the scanty leavings of the Russians. In so rapid a march, from want of time, it could not diverge from its assigned direction; besides, the columns on the right and on the left consumed everything that was to be found on either side of it. In order to live better it ought to have set out at a later hour each day, halting earlier, and spreading more toward the flanks during the night; this could not be done without imprudence when the enemy was so near at hand.*

Pillaging became more and more frequent; the Lithuanians, stripped of all their property, began to heap curses on the French troops. The horses, fed on green corn, fell exhausted along the roads; we saw nothing, says the Duke of Treviso, but abandoned vehicles and broken-down waggons; according to him, all this had the appearance of a rout.

The emperor tried to delude himself on the condition of his men; he unceasingly spoke of their twenty days' supplies, consumed, if not abandoned, long ago. Lastly, he said that a victory would repair everything; yet it never came. The Russians were always steadily retreating, following the counsel of General Pfuhl.

The dwellings, the villages, the towns on the French line of advance, were delivered to the flames; the people had obeyed the orders of their rulers, and, leaving nothing but charred and smoking ruins to the invader, had retired with the Russian troops. How often history repeats itself! Vercingetorix,† the valiant chief of the hundred valleys, fighting against Cæsar for the liberty of Gaul, issued his orders, which were to be passed from mouth to mouth, and repeated from village to village, from city to city: "That for three nights at the time of the rising of the moon, the sacred star of Gaul, all the country—from Vannes to the Loire—be burnt; so that Cæsar and his army may not find

* General Louis Philippe Comte de Ségur. "Campaign of Russia."

† According to Thierry, Ver-cinn-cedo-rih (chief of a hundred valleys) was the war title of the son of Celtil. Cæsar took this to be his proper name, and he is known under no other name in history

in their passage nor men, nor shelter, nor food, nor forage, but everywhere . . . everywhere . . . cinders, famine, a desert, and death."

On the French left, Oudinot, after having beaten Wittgenstein three times, on the 30th and 31st of July and 1st of August, decided to fall back on Polotsk. This having come to Napoleon's knowledge, he sent Lejeune to demand the reason for this retreat. The marshal explained how the Russians had purposely allowed themselves to be repulsed, hoping to entice the French to follow in pursuit of them into desert districts where they would perish of famine. He, however, had declined to fall into the trap.

The inevitable dispersion of the various corps, with the object of facilitating their subsistence, necessarily kept the emperor at a distance from his soldiers. The Guard were the only troops in his immediate neighbourhood, and it was with difficulty that food or shelter could be found for them. To meet their wants several convoys of provisions, intended for other corps, were retained at the imperial head-quarters—an arbitrary measure which gave rise to much discontent. The soldiers of the less favoured corps murmured, but being far away and out of sight, their complaints could not reach the ear of the emperor. Had they done so they might not have drawn much attention, for, as Miot said of Napoleon in his *Mémoires de l'Expédition en Egypte*, there were many instances to show that he seemed neither to care nor feel for the privations which his soldiers were ready to undergo from their blind and infatuated attachment to him.

The great battle which he so eagerly desired might have come off twice, but for the incapacity and obstinacy of his lieutenants. The first occasion was at Bobruisk, when King Jerome blundered and let Bagration's corps escape; the second was at Valutina, when Junot would not stir to go to the aid of Marshal Ney. Junot might have shut the Russian army in a narrow defile, where it would have been caught between two fires and compelled to lay down its arms. Both victories would have had immense results for Napoleon, but his usual good fortune seemed to have deserted him.

It appears that Napoleon was not well pleased with the complaints made by Poniatowski of the want of pay and regular commissariat supplies; for in a letter to Berthier, dated Wilna, July 9th, he writes: "Answer the prince that you have submitted to the emperor his letter—that his Majesty is much

dissatisfied to find that he is talking of pay and *provisions* when his whole object should be to pursue the enemy.

"That his Majesty is the more surprised when he thinks that the Imperial Guards, who had come by forced marches from Paris to Wilna, are not only without *half-rations*, but *bread* altogether, and that, being fed totally on meat, they do not make any complaint.

"The emperor has seen with regret that the Poles are *such bad soldiers and have such a bad spirit* as to put forward such privations, and he trusts that he shall hear no more of it."

Napoleon, having issued orders to provide subsistence for his troops, and having accurately calculated the time when the supplies so ordered should reach their destination, always acted on the supposition that his orders could be carried out. He was deaf to all representation that the troops were starving, because he had given sufficient directions, which, had they been executed, would have made this impossible.

The Duke of Treviso vainly urged the emperor to adopt a more methodical march, on the model of those of Frederick the Great, in which the army was followed regularly by magazines. The advice was sound, but remained disregarded. The soldiers, overcome by fatigue and hunger, says General de Ségur, had not the heart to knead the flour that they found and to light the ovens. They let themselves die of starvation.

When the French entered Witebsk on the 28th of July, hardly any resources were found; the Russians had deserted the town, and only a few Jews were remaining.

Napoleon sojourned at Witebsk for seventeen days; he was compelled to stop there to grant some rest to the troops, to concentrate the various corps which had been detached in pursuit of Bagration, to organize some magazines and hospitals, and to form a plan of defence for a line of operations which was assuming such unusual length. He at one time thought of ending his campaign there, to be resumed and concluded in the following year.

During this time the Duke of Bassano, who had been left at Wilna, despatched to the army the recruits, the marauders who had been arrested on the way, and the convoys with supplies and munitions which had come from Germany and from Poland. On leaving Wilna, Napoleon had left the duke there in the capacity of Governor of Lithuania. General Hogendorf, a Dutchman who could hardly speak French, was appointed military

commander. Neither of these two, one an old diplomat, the other a man with little military knowledge, having seen nothing of war, had the experience and ability required for organizing the communications of an army.

All the officers about the emperor's person, principal amongst them Berthier, Lobau, Caulaincourt, Duroc and Daru, were strongly opposed to an advance on Smolensk and Moscow. Daru argued thus: "If provisions failed at Witebsk, what would be the case further on? The officers whom he had sent to procure them either never reappeared, or returned empty-handed. That the small quantity of flour, or the few cattle which they had succeeded in collecting, were immediately consumed by the Imperial Guard; that the other divisions of the army were heard to murmur that it exacted and absorbed everything, that it constituted, as it were, a privileged class. The hospital and provision-waggons, as well as the droves of cattle, were not able to come up. The hospitals were insufficient for the sick; provisions, room, and medicines were all wanting in them."*

Another cause of anxiety was added to the rest. Dysentery had broken out, and was extending its ravages over the whole army. At Witebsk there were 3000 soldiers lying sick of that disease.

Reckoning on the magazines at Dantzic, at Wilna, and at Minsk, Napoleon now appeared to contemplate seriously establishing his winter quarters at Witebsk. He rode over the ground around, and prescribed the formation of depôts of supplies. Thirty-six ovens, which could yield 29,000 lbs. of bread at a time, were constructed, and some field-hospitals were organized. He inspected every day the stores of provisions and the ovens; he was present at some of the issues, and frequently visited the hospitals. Conversing with his lieutenants, he conveyed the impression that the capture of Moscow was put off to the following year; then, suddenly, he took the fatal determination to continue the campaign.

It would be difficult to conjecture what influenced Napoleon to go on with the operations in this instance, but it is possible that he desired to terminate the campaign speedily, and sought to overawe his enemies both at home and abroad by the news of a brilliant victory.

* General Louis Philippe Comte de Ségur, "Campaign of Russia," vol. i. p. 192.

A writer gives it as a guide, that in no instance ought judgment to be more upon its guard than when the actions of a commander are considered during the course of a campaign. And it is so, for who can pierce the real working of his mind? who really knows what it is that influences his decisions?

The subsistence of the troops became every day more precarious. After leaving Witebsk it became necessary to give rye in soup to the soldiers, but their stomachs, accustomed to bread, could not tolerate this indigestible food. Many soldiers were attacked with dysentery and died. The experiment was next tried of giving the rye after it had been roasted, but with no better result; the disease increased, and with it the mortality.

Clausewitz observes that it is beyond doubt that to his want of regard for the subsistence of his troops Napoleon was indebted for the extraordinary melting away of his army in his advance, and for its utter ruin in the retreat.

On the 14th of August battle was given to the Russians at Krasnoe, and two days later, after a bloody fight, the French entered Smolensk. The invaders lost 6000 men killed and wounded; the town was in flames; the enemy had destroyed all the resources in food and forage, and compelled the inhabitants to fly. During the march on Smolensk the army had lived from hand to mouth; of regular distributions there were none. In the emperor's instructions one certainly finds an order to take, before setting out from Witebsk, supplies for fifteen days; but what was the good of such an order when with the army there were not provisions for twenty-four hours?

In Smolensk there was the same want of food, and soon supplies of wine, spirits, beer, and even water ran out. Not only was there a dearth of provisions and forage, but the most indispensable medical appliances were wanting. There was no linen for bandages, there was no lint, there were no splints. Paper, which was abundant in the record office, was employed in lieu of linen, parchment was utilized for splints, and tow and birch-tree cotton turned to account in dressing the wounds.

At this period the French had lost a fourth of their number and the allies one half. Many soldiers, overcome with fatigue, were unable to keep their place in the ranks; others were seen, who, being without food, plucked the ears of rye as they marched to devour the grain. The roads were strewn with the dying; the

Germans, Italians, etc., deserted in mass, and formed bands which devastated the country.

Ségur gives a description of the manner in which the troops provided for their subsistence. He writes: "At Smolensk orders had been issued, as at Witebsk, to take, at starting, provisions for several days. The emperor was aware of the difficulty of collecting them, but he reckoned upon the diligence of the officers and the troops. They had been warned—that was sufficient; they would contrive to provide themselves with necessaries. They had acquired the habit of doing so; and it was really a curious sight to observe the voluntary and continued efforts of so many men to follow a single individual to such great distances. The existence of the army was a prodigy that was daily renewed by the active, industrious, and intelligent spirit of the French and Polish troops, by their habit of surmounting all difficulties, and by their fondness for the hazards and irregularities of this dreadful game of an adventurous life.

"In the train of each regiment there were a multitude of those diminutive horses with which Poland swarms, a great number of carts of the country requiring to be incessantly replaced by fresh ones, and a drove of cattle. The baggage-waggons were driven by soldiers, for they turned their hands to every trade. They were missed in the ranks, it is true; but here the want of provisions, the necessity for transporting everything with them, excused this prodigious train: it required a second army, as it were, to carry or draw what was indispensable for the first.

"In this prompt organization, adopted while on the march, the army had accommodated itself to all the local customs and difficulties; the genius of the soldiers had admirably made the most of the scanty resources of the country. As to the officers, as the general orders always took for granted regular issues which were never made, each of them, according to the degree of his zeal, intelligence, and firmness, appropriated to himself more or less of the spoil, and converted individual pillage into regular contributions.

"For it was only by excursions on the flanks, and into an unknown country, that any provisions could be procured. Every evening, when the army halted, and the bivouacs were established, detachments, rarely furnished by divisions, sometimes by brigades, and most commonly by regiments, went in quest of necessaries, and penetrated into the country. A few *versts* from the road they

found all the villages inhabited, and were not very hostilely received; but as they could not make themselves understood, and besides wanted everything, and that instantaneously, the peasants were soon seized with panic, and fled into the woods, whence they issued again as no very mean partisans.

"The detachments, meanwhile, plentifully regaled themselves, and rejoined their corps next day, or some days afterwards, laden with all they had collected; and it frequently happened that they were plundered in their turn by their comrades belonging to the other corps whom they chanced to fall in with. Hence arose animosities, which would have infallibly led to most sanguinary conflicts, had not all been subsequently overtaken by the same misfortune, and involved in the horrors of a common disaster.

"Until the return of their detachments, the soldiers who remained with the Eagles lived on what they could find on the military road; in general it consisted of new rye, which they bruised and boiled. Owing to the number of cattle which followed them, there was less want of meat than of bread; but the length, and especially the rapidity, of the marches occasioned the loss of many of these animals: they were so suffocated by the heat and dust that when they came to water, they ran into it with such eagerness that many of them were drowned, while others drank so immoderately as to swell themselves out till they were unable to walk." *

Between the action at Valutina on the 18th of August and the 7th of September, when the battle of Borodino was fought, there was no serious engagement. Nevertheless, the rapid advance and a few days' cold rain cost the French 38,000 men and nearly 20,000 horses; the resources of the country grew scantier every day.

Baron de Marbot writes: "Our loss in horses, owing to the immense labour which Murat† had throughout the campaign imposed on the cavalry, was enormous. Mindful of his brilliant successes against the Prussians in 1806 and 1807, he thought that cavalry could do anything, and marched twelve or fifteen leagues a day, the only thing necessary being to bring the heads of his columns in contact with the enemy. But the conditions were

* General Louis Philippe Comte de Ségur, "Campaign of Russia," Book VII. chap. i.

† Murat was the *maître équiper* of the Grande Armée, and Napoleon, on account of his extravagant style of dress, used to call him *le Francien de l'armée*.

much changed by the climate, the difficulty of getting forage, the length of the campaign, and, above all, Russian tenacity. Thus when we arrived at Moscow half the cavalry had no horses, and Murat destroyed the rest in the province of Kaluga." *

If the Russians prepared a desert for their foes, the latter did not behave a bit better. Gallant as they are, French soldiers are considered the most reckless soldiers in Europe. Sir Robert Wilson writes: † "The march of the enemy from Smolensk had been accompanied with the most barbarous destruction and disorder of every kind. Even the towns which they were occupying were set on fire with recklessly mad ferocity and disregard of their own interests.

"Gjatsk and Dorogobouche suffered this fate, and Junot himself nearly perished in the flames. Nothing was respected; a demon spirit raged and revelled with exterminating fury, preparing a day of vengeance no less savage and calamitous." ‡

This savage and senseless destruction completed what the Russians had done, and left on the French line of communications the charred remains of many towns and villages which would have afforded them shelter in the retreat.

General Kutusoff waited for the emperor at Borodino on the banks of the Moskowa. Before the battle Napoleon published a brief proclamation to his army, urging the troops to behave as gallantly as they had done at Austerlitz, Friedland, Witebsk, and Smolensk—"that the most distant posterity may cite your conduct on this day, that they may say of you, 'He was in the great battle under the walls of Moscow.'"

"The army required subsistence, repose, and the prospect of an early return to their homes.

"Privations, fatigue, and disgust had enfeebled their passion for glory; and yet on the morrow, when arrayed on the field of blood, all forgot their griefs, and emulously strove to win a crown, though cypress were enwreathed with its laurel." §

Who does not pity the French soldiers who were so lavish of their blood in that severely contested battle, after all the hardships

* "Memoirs of Baron de Marbot," vol. ii. chap. xxviii.

† General Sir Robert Wilson, K.M.T., "French Invasion of Russia," p. 132.

‡ Marbot states, "When the army entered Wiazma that pretty town was in flames, and so was Gliat." At Borodino, according to Lejeune, the smoke of the villages set fire to by the Russians prevented the French staff getting a clear idea of the enemy's position.

§ General Sir Robert Wilson, K.M.T., "French Invasion of Russia," pp. 138, 139.

they had endured in their long and painful march? So confident, however, were they in the genius of the great man who commanded them, and so certain that a great victory was in store for them, which would put a period to their labours, that they all donned their best uniforms to take part in the battle. And when they fought they fought with the indomitable valour that distinguished all the soldiers of the Empire.

No less confident were the Russians, stirred by the holiness of their cause; but what added yet more to their confidence and gave them an immense moral advantage over their adversaries was the fact that they had plenty of provisions and fodder, and that neither men nor horses had suffered from famine. How great the sufferings of the French had been could be gathered after the battle, when they were seen taking from the dead the few provisions still remaining in their haversacks.

The battle of the Moskowa—called by our historians the battle of Borodino—was a most sanguinary one; the vast plain was steeped with human blood and littered with the bodies of men and horses. On every hand were arms, broken gun-carriages, shattered drums, cannon-balls and splintered shells. Ghastly piles of slain marked where the fiercest encounters had taken place. The losses on both sides were very heavy; besides 40 generals killed or wounded, the French lost 10,000 men killed, and twice that number were wounded. Their adversaries suffered more heavily still, for the casualties in the Russian army have been set down at 60,000 men. The French army lacked the most indispensable articles for their wounded; they had no blankets, they had no straw, they had no meat to turn into soup.

This battle opened the gates of Moscow to the French,* and on the 14th of September, 1812, the French flag waved over the old capital of the Russian Empire.

From Mojaïsk to Moscow the Grand Armée crossed a sandy and desert plain. For a long time it had ceased to receive any regular issues of provisions; water and forage were wanting; the men and the horses were utterly worn out through hunger, thirst, and fatigue. Soon, however, they would enter the old capital of the Russian Empire—Moscow of the gilded domes;

* On the morning of the 8th of September, Prince Eugène was endeavouring to find out something of the enemy's intentions; he advanced stealthily close up to the entrenchments of Borodino, and discovered that the weapons of the sentinels were lances, and not muskets with fixed bayonets. From this he concluded that the enemy was in retreat, the Cossacks being left in charge of the fortifications.

there they would find the rest they so much needed, abundance, and riches. It was this hope which sustained the declining forces of these intrepid warriors.

Baron Lejeune writes: "It was on September 9, at Mojaïsk, that I first saw our troops use horseflesh as food. The court of a house I occupied, and the street it was in, were alike piled up with unfortunate horses, many still breathing, though too severely wounded to be able to rise. A report I had to draw up occupied me an hour, and when I came out with it, what was my surprise to find all the horses cut to pieces and the best part of the flesh carried away by our men! I was not yet reduced to eating the tough, yellow, tasteless meat, but ere long it was to be all we were to have to save us from the torments of famine."* On the 6th of November General Jouffroy gave Lejeune a supper of horseflesh; the guest acknowledges that he quite enjoyed his meal, but principally because it was washed down by a flask of good wine.

If the French army was sadly hampered when leaving Moscow, the Russian army in the retreat from that city was in no better condition. Sir Robert Wilson thus alludes to this: "The army, indeed, since the first day's retreat from Smolensk, had been accompanied by a wandering nation. All the towns, villages, and hamlets were abandoned as the columns appeared. The old and infirm, the women and children, were placed with the movable effects, and the Dii Penates on their kabitkas or telagas (one and two horse carts, which no peasant is without), and these, not being permitted to move on the high road, which was reserved for the artillery and military equipages, formed a variety for themselves of frequently a dozen flanking columns. It was a wonderful spectacle to see the numbers, the order, the ingenuity and facility with which they wended their way through streams, and over morasses and ravines that had been thought heretofore, even by the inhabitants themselves, to be perfectly impracticable, 'not leaving a wheel (as the French bulletins admitted) to mark any disorder, hurry, or trace of their direction.'"† The same writer tells us that 180,000 souls, with 65,000 carriages, passed the barriers.

* "Memoirs of Baron Lejeune," vol. ii. p. 190.

† General Sir Robert Wilson, K.M.T., "French Expedition to Russia," p. 165.

CHAPTER IX.

FRENCH RETREAT FROM MOSCOW, 1812.

IN his principles of war and administration Frederick the Great condemns winter campaigns. He declares that they ruin the troops by the diseases they engender, and that the state of continuous action in which they are kept not only impedes their being kept up to strength and re clothed, but makes it impossible to rearrange the trains of munitions and provisions.

The king spoke of winter campaigns with aversion, as likely to ruin any army ; nevertheless, he admits that there may be circumstances which may compel a general to undertake them, and that he had often to resort to them from necessity and not from choice. Notwithstanding that all his winter campaigns were successful, he adds : " But as the fatigues are too severe, and because the human frame is not made to resist them in the long run, it becomes necessary to employ a great measure of vigour and audacity so that they may not last too long."

Frederick the Great was likewise much opposed to those wars which took armies far away from their frontiers, and considered that they were apt to terminate disastrously. In proof of this he quoted how Charles XII. saw his glory pass away in the deserts of Pultawa ; how the Emperor Charles VI. could not hold out in Spain, or the French in Bohemia.

The soundness of these principles was singularly illustrated not many years after by the disasters which befell the French in the latter part of the campaign of 1812. Notwithstanding a dragging war in Spain, Napoleon undertook another in the north of Europe, to attack a state the frontiers of which were separated by countries which owed him only compulsory allegiance. To prepare for this war he withdrew some of his best troops from

the Peninsula, and swelled his ranks with large numbers of foreign soldiers.

He also neglected to organize his line of communications by echeloning at short distance from each other small corps to secure his line of retreat in the event of a defeat. All the disposable forces were pushed on to Moscow; between that city and the Niemen there were garrisons only at Smolensk and at Wilna. Smolensk was 286 miles from Moscow, and Wilna was about 350 miles from Smolensk. There were no adequate means for sending back the sick and wounded,* and for lack of small garrisons the prisoners of war could not be removed. Of 10,000 taken by the French, not a single one ever left Russian territory. Lastly, when the troops fell back from Moscow, through want of prevision and direction, they had no reliable source of supply, for no proper measures had been taken to meet a possible retreat.

Napoleon remained in Moscow from the 15th of September to the 19th of October. The goal had been reached, and, deluded by a false hope of concluding an honourable peace, he wasted thirty-four days making no serious preparation for a withdrawal. Nothing more was done than directing the prisoners, such of the wounded as could be moved, and some of the impedimenta of the army on Smolensk. Daru was of opinion that if the emperor held Moscow he would be able to insure the supply of bread, meat, and salt for the whole winter. The greater portion of the provisions had been saved in the conflagration, and had only been partly treasured upon by the soldiers. Baron de Marbot corroborates this, for he declares in his memoirs that after Moscow was burnt † there were sufficient houses, churches, and barracks to shelter the entire army, and that, even after the fire, there were more than sufficient provisions to maintain the whole army for six months.

A careful search brought to light the existence of considerable quantities of grain, salted meat, spirits, and, above all, sugar and coffee. The city was divided into quarters, which were assigned to the various army corps. The most spacious buildings remaining

* All those injured at Borodino were for two months in the convent of Polotsk, and were there when the retreat commenced.

† Baron Lejeune states that the fire was the pre-arranged work of incendiaries. To his corps (the 1st) was assigned for quarters a suburb which had escaped the fire. Three times had he in one morning to change quarters, the house occupied being on fire. He describes the measures taken to set fire to the dwellings, and relates how he had to order his men to fire on every one who looked at all like a Russian before he could put a stop to these recurring conflagrations.

after the conflagration were turned into storehouses, in which all that was found was deposited. There was no question that bread, salted meat, and spirits for several months for the army were obtainable. Baron Larrey, who may be accepted as a very competent authority, believed that the army could have lived for six months on the provisions found in Moscow.

Sir Robert Wilson seems to have entertained a different opinion on the point of the available resources, for he states that the stores of provisions found in the cellars of the houses that had escaped injury were few, and would have afforded a very scanty support to the French. This accords with the statements of Baron Lejeune, who writes: "The men told off to supply our needs had no means of doing so but by pillage. Every day their task became more difficult and dangerous, as they had to go further and further afield. . . . These last few days were very trying. Our purveyors were no longer able to bring back anything either for the men or for the horses."

The real difficulty was with regard to fresh meat and forage, the last particularly, for without forage it was impossible to keep alive the horses of the artillery and cavalry. Daru suggested killing them, as they could not be fed, and salting their meat. His proposition, after all, was the best. He recommended turning Moscow into an intrenched camp, to lodge the troops for the winter in the cellars, and to wait until reinforcements and assistance of every kind should come from Lithuania in the spring, and enable the army to resume the offensive.

Napoleon entertained other views, and still nourished hopes of being able to conclude peace with the Czar. These were rudely destroyed by Kutusoff's sudden attack on the French outposts at Vinkowo on the 18th of October;* the evacuation of Moscow was settled. At this period it was more a question of falling back to take up winter quarters in Poland; the idea of leaving Russia and recrossing the Niemen had not matured. The emperor was much perturbed by the possibility of his retreat being taken as an acknowledgment that he considered himself beaten, from which conception his prestige would necessarily suffer.

Considering the advanced season of the year, the difficulties

* General Sebastiani was taken completely by surprise; he lost thirty pieces of cannon, all his baggage, had 5000 men killed and many others taken prisoners. Murat was nearly captured.

of the retreat had been singularly overlooked. The French army at Moscow was 646 miles from Wilna, and 705 from the Niemen at Kowno. With an average of $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles a day, this would have entailed a march of 56 days: this was the actual number of days occupied in the retreat. The great variations of temperature in Russia are terribly trying, that country being much too hot in the summer, as it is too cold in the winter. The retreat was to take place in the cold months, and it cannot have been difficult for the staff to have ascertained the nature of a Russian late autumn and winter. Any of the inhabitants, if questioned, would have described its severity,* and told that when a north wind is blowing, with a temperature of from 25 to 30 degrees of frost, the Russians generally keep indoors all day and night, in rooms heated by stoves, and if compelled to venture out, they do so only after having partaken of a substantial meal, cased in woollen garments and thick furs.

It was time, however, to do something; the French army was on the point of being severed from its base of operations, and already two convoys coming from the magazines at Smolensk had been captured. Forage was very scarce, and difficult to collect, though Napoleon had striven to encourage the people to bring it in, promising that it would be paid for on delivery. The number of Cossacks who roamed round the city of Moscow was increasing, and to procure the indispensable forage it was necessary to engage in endless skirmishes and petty combats. The peasants were stubborn, set fire to their dwellings to drive the foragers out, and instead of bringing in supplies, killed all those who, prompted by the greed of gain, had wended their way to Moscow.

The days of rest during the course of a campaign are golden opportunities for overhauling one's armour, and for putting everything into serviceable condition, so as to be in the best possible state of efficiency when the operations are resumed. The clothing, the shoeing, the reserve supplies, the regimental transport, are all points which should then receive special attention.

Valuable time, which could have been employed by the generals in re-equipping the troops, in organizing convoys, in eliminating everything superfluous, and reducing the impedimenta to the strictest necessary, was wasted. The very chiefs who had counselled a halt at Witebsk appear to have

* Lieutenant Colonel de Ponthon had pointed this out to the emperor when trying to dissuade him from undertaking the invasion of Russia.

become paralyzed. If there were some who well foresaw the difficulties of the retreat, yet they did not exert themselves to their utmost to facilitate an operation which is difficult at all times, but more so when undertaken during the rigours of winter. The troops set out on their return to the base with their clothing worn out and deficient of shoes. There were some who had picked up a few furs in the pillage of Moscow, and were, consequently, better prepared than their comrades to withstand the rigours of the climate.

The army was encumbered by a large artillery park, and a mass of vehicles of all sorts drawn by 50,000 horses. Some carriages were laden with nothing else but loot captured in the city. The impedimenta obstructed and retarded the movements of the troops, and it was very soon seen what a difficult matter it would be to find provisions for the soldiers.

"The traces of the carriages," writes Baron Lejeune, "were constantly breaking, the march was retarded whilst they were mended; there were perpetual blocks in the sand, in the marshes or in the passes, and it often took our troops twelve hours to do a distance which a single carriage could have accomplished in two." *

Napoleon ordered all the carriages not absolutely necessary for the transport of provisions to be burnt, and the horses to be handed over to the artillery, but this order was not complied with.

In this army, which had been now contending for years, which had become inured to war, the absence of all method was very remarkable. As the troops advanced on Moscow it must have struck the emperor that every step they were taking towards that city must necessarily be followed by others tending in the opposite direction, to regain their country. If the French had swept away all the provisions which the retiring Russians had not been able to carry away or destroy, the exhaustion of the country must have been complete. Nothing but an orderly establishment of magazines at short intervals following on the advance of the combatants, could have availed to feed his troops on retracing their steps at the conclusion of the campaign.

The chronicler of another memorable retreat relates how, when the Greeks discussed the best route to take in their retreat, Ariæus addressed them thus: "If we retrace our steps we shall

* "*Memoirs of Baron Lejeune*," vol. ii. p. 202.

all die of starvation, because we have no more provisions. In the last seventeen marches which we have made to reach this place we have found nothing in the country, or have otherwise consumed in passing the little that there was. Let us look, therefore, for another route, possibly longer, but on which we shall not be wanting in victuals." *

Kaluga, towards which the French army was to march on quitting Moscow, is situated in the centre of the empire, and lies on the right bank of the Oka, a navigable river which falls into the Volga at Nijni-Novgorod. It was, and is now, a city of great importance to the Russians, and the seat of an extensive corn trade. The city was already occupied by the Russian army, and could be very easily fortified.

Astonished at the resistance he met with at Malo-Jaroslavitz, and uncertain if he were strong enough to force a passage through the Russian army at Kaluga, Napoleon, after a council at which Murat, Prince Eugène, Berthier, Davout, and Bessières were present, discontinued his march in the direction of that city, and issued orders for the army to regain the road to Smolensk, a road which his troops in their advance on Moscow had denuded of almost everything.

On the road to Smolensk—at Mojaïsk, at Gjatz, at Wiazma—very little in the shape of food was found; the provisions began to diminish, and many carriages had to be destroyed for want of horses to draw them. The cold now commenced to make itself felt, and the number of sick augmented. No issues whatsoever were made, and the famished soldiers deserted; others cast away their arms, which they had no longer sufficient strength to hold. In the presence of a fate which seemed inevitable their spirit grew paralyzed and weak. Cold and debility, the necessary consequence of want of nourishment, made many soldiers quit the ranks and roam over the neighbourhood in the hope of finding there a crust of bread or some slight shelter. They found instead the lances of the restless Cossacks and the pikes of a resentful peasantry.

The unfortunate soldiers had to be content with a slice of grilled horseflesh, and a little rye flour made into gruel with snow water, or kneaded into cakes when there was fuel. For want of salt they seasoned this poor repast with powder taken from their cartridges.

* Xenophon, "Anabasis," ii. 2.

Ségur states that "Kutusoff believed that the Russian winter of itself would overthrow Napoleon . . . that it was best to leave the honour of that victory to the climate, and the work of vengeance to the Russian atmosphere." Apparently, he seems to have strictly adhered to this idea, and of his inactivity there is a striking proof in the following instance:—

On the 3rd of November there was a fight at Wiazma. Of this Ségur writes: "Miloradowitch, perceiving that his prey was escaping, now applied for reinforcements, and it was again Wilson, who was sure to be present wherever he could be most injurious to France, who hastened to summon Kutusoff. He found the old marshal unconcernedly resting himself with his army within hearing of the action. The ardent Wilson, urgent as the occasion, exhorted him in vain; he could not induce him to stir. Transported with indignation, he called him a traitor, and declared that he would instantly despatch one of his Englishmen full speed to St. Petersburg to denounce his treason to his emperor and his allies."

Tchichagoff, in his memoirs, asserts that the fatal disunion which so often prevailed amongst Napoleon's lieutenants existed quite to the same extent amongst those of Alexander.

A serious snowstorm, with an icy cold wind, belaboured the army after it had quitted Wiazma. On the 6th of November the sky assumed a leaden hue, and snow began to fall as it does in Russia, thick, heavy, and continuous. Everything was hidden from sight except the dark fir trees covered with icicles, and here and there the useless remains of some destroyed village. In silence, stiffened by the cold, discouraged and famished, the unfortunate soldiers trod the road which leads to Smolensk.

That city was the only hope of the brave; many of the officers and non-commissioned officers, trusting to find within its walls some alleviation of their sufferings, strove to keep their famished men together. But the weather was now commencing to tell in earnest, and the appetite, as is natural in cold climates, began to get keener. The number of victims was large, and every morning many frozen corpses marked the location of the bivouacs.

The old men of Russia and Poland assured Baron Larrey that they had never before experienced such a long and severe winter. The birds of those northern regions, surprised by an abnormal winter, vainly tried to gain the centre of Europe, and, stiffened by the cold, fell at the very feet of the French.

Carriages in large numbers were abandoned on all sides, for the horses were no longer in a condition to draw them. The strength of the animals was utterly gone; they were so worn and exhausted that they could not even stand.

The ubiquitous Cossacks, on their hardy *konias*, followed, like wolves or jackals, every movement of the French army, keeping on the border of the forests, and missing no opportunity for pouncing on any isolated men to strip them, or for seizing any vehicle that was abandoned on the road.

Want has the sad effect of ruining the spirit as much as the body. There was no longer amongst the enfeebled and discouraged soldiery any trace of their military virtues; the sense of duty, *esprit de corps*, honour, courage, and energy had all disappeared. Generals, officers, and soldiers were mixed, confused one with the other, wearing women's pelisses, cloaks of all sorts, most strange and hideous garments. So disfigured were they that their comrades with difficulty were able to recognize them. The greater portion had no shoes, their feet were badly protected by pieces of cloth which they had wound round them.

The irregularities in the advance had seriously undermined discipline. When the army reached Smolensk on the 13th of November, of over 100,000 men barely 37,000 remained in the ranks. Napoleon had ordered a great quantity of provisions and clothing to be collected there, but the magazines did not contain much, for they had been drained by troops on the passage. There was flour for seven days, rice and spirits for 100,000 men, but no meat. It was now that the large number of stragglers, with no officers to look after their wants, created difficulties in the issues. Napoleon had given orders to the effect that food should be issued only to authorized officers, bearers of receipts which were to be exchanged for supplies. The gates of Smolensk were closed, so that only the organized troops should be admitted to receive their provisions. This arrangement and the delays which it entailed irritated the soldiers, dying as they were of hunger and cold; all authority was set at defiance, the storehouses were broken into, the provisions were looted, and did not serve, as intended, to revictual the army corps. There was much disorder, waste, and loss of life.

When distracted by the terrible pains of hunger man's best qualities are blotted out, and nothing else is seen but the wild

beast with all its furious instincts. Neither exhortation, menaces, nor blows exercise then the least influence ; men are like a torrent let loose, whose ravages it is impossible to arrest.

A few days' halt was made at Smolensk to allow the stragglers to come up, and on the 15th of November the march was resumed for Krasnoe. Ney was left behind with the rear-guard. On the 17th the marshal, having blown up the ramparts, quitted the place, but he had not got far from it before he was attacked on both flanks, in front and in rear by the enemy. Napoleon reached Orcha on the 19th, and was seriously agitated by the uncertainty regarding Ney's fate.

The marshal had found the Russians in front of him at Krasnoe ; posted on the other side of a ravine defended by formidable artillery. The French attacked, and twice carried the batteries, but eventually were driven out by superior numbers. The condition of the rear-guard was desperate, still, it was commanded by a daring leader, who had confidence in himself and his soldiers. Ney had numerous fires kindled so as to retain the enemy in their camp, and by threats of death compelled a Russian colonel to guide the troops to the nearest point of the Dnieper. He abandoned his artillery, baggage, and wounded, and setting out under cover of darkness, reached the banks of the river after a march of four hours. The river was not thoroughly frozen, but the ice was sufficiently strong to allow of the men crossing in single file. For three days the French marched, fighting incessantly, along the winding banks of the Dnieper, and on the 20th came in sight of the town of Orcha. A strong body of the enemy's infantry occupied a wide plain which separated the marshal from the emperor, but some of the officers he had sent to Orcha for assistance reached the place, and brought the welcome news that Ney was at hand. Prince Eugène and Mortier were thereupon sent to his relief, the Russians were repulsed, and the marshal and his brave men were conducted to headquarters. Of 6000 to 7000 men, at the most 1200 rejoined the army.

The heroism displayed by Marshal Ney on this occasion, and, in fact, in every step of the retreat, will live as long as the records of Napoleon's luckless expedition to Russia. There is no more brilliant page in the history of the whole of that war. The Bourbons, in their revenge, sullied their name by bespattering the walls of Paris with the blood of the man whose daring bravery

was the glory of his country. France has produced many gallant men, but of the whole number scarcely one excelled in courage the unfortunate marshal—the hero who led Napoleon’s Imperial Guard in the final effort at Waterloo.

Treachery, when accompanied by ingratitude or greed, is a most detestable crime; but the unfortunate marshal fell victim to the fascination which Napoleon always exercised on all who approached him, and to the glorious souvenirs of his deeds. Ney appears to have been sincere when the first news of the emperor’s return from Elba reached the capital. He and his staff rode from one quarter of Paris to the other wearing a white cockade of most conspicuous size, but fresh loyalty succumbed before the memories of old days. No one could resist the pale and calm-featured man in his historical grey surtout and *chapeau*. It was an ideal figure of the glory of the country which electrified the great majority of Frenchmen and certainly all soldiers.

Many of Napoleon’s former followers were dejected, and suffered from what was called *nostalgie de son empereur*. They hoped to see him return some day. All France in 1815 welcomed him back, and so little devotion was felt for the restored Bourbons that resistance was not even thought of. Ney found his old chief received with rapture by the nation, and his own soldiers favourable to his cause.* Granted that he had rendered himself amenable to punishment, still there were other sentences besides the sentence of death which might have been inflicted.

Davout, who had no great friendly feeling for Ney, begged that he might be tried by a court-martial, so firmly did he believe that no one would have condemned such a man. In his evidence before the Court of Peers Davout stated that the Convention of the 3rd of July with the allies which he had signed, covered all the actions performed during the hundred days, consequently that Ney was under the protection of that treaty. The Duke of Wellington denied that the French king was bound by the convention—a declaration, however, which Alison refutes.

The marshal’s trial reflected little credit on the court.† Count

* The French people were never such ardent partisans of Napoleon as after he had been driven from the country. The restored Government had done much to incur unpopularity, and its stability was very precarious. In the end of 1814 all the nation was discontented, and looked back to the days of Napoleon.

† Marshal Monecy refused to be president of the court-martial before which Ney was to appear. For this he was confined in the fortress of Ham, and deprived of all his employments.

de Bourmont, whose evidence went a considerable way in bringing about Ney's condemnation and execution, had twice been a deserter. On the 31st of March, 1814, he had declared for the Bourbons, and at the Restoration had received from the king the command of a military division. When Napoleon returned from Elba he went over to him, and was appointed to the command of a division of the army of the Moselle, but on the eve of the battle of Ligny he again deserted and went to join Louis XVIII. at Ghent.*

The Bourbon Government had no respect for gallant deeds. A brave soldier *in uniform* crossed the British camp and got into Almeida with instructions for General Brénier. For this daring exploit Napoleon conferred on him the cross of the legion of honour and a special pension of 600 francs. At the Restoration, Tillet, then a sergeant, had obtained an ordinary retiring pension. The special pension became a subject of discussion in the Chamber, as being a violation of the law of pluralities, but General Foy pleaded so eloquently in favour of the gallant sergeant that at last he was permitted to enjoy both pensions.

Sir Robert Wilson, in narrating the events of the retreat, states: "The most stringent order was published to incorporate all stragglers into the different corps; to punish *previalement* all who again quitted the ranks; to give up all horses to the artillery; to burn all effects except a change of linen and shoes, as well as all carriages except a certain number for the use of the emigrants from Moscow; to hold all generals and others responsible for the execution of orders which the honour of the French and the safety of the army required. . . . The order was judicious, and the execution essential; but the disorganization was too great, the number of stragglers too considerable (the non-combatants exceeding the combatants), and the marches too continuous and harassing for due attention and compliance."†

Some 300 officers whose men had disappeared proposed forming themselves into a special corps, ready to fight together on every emergency, but, owing to want of strength and discipline,

* De Bourmont was slightly wounded in the knee on the 11th of February, 1814. He quitted the battle-field, and handed over the command to Colonel Voirol of the 18th Regiment of infantry. Evidently the general was not much missed, for the troops on receiving the news of his departure filled the air with cries of *Vive le Colonel Voirol!* The heroic defence of Nogent-sur-Seine was due to the energy and example of the brave colonel.

† Sir Robert Wilson, K.M.T., "Narrative of Events during the Invasion of Russia," p. 284.

these *escadrons sacrés* fell to pieces in a few days, before they could render the slightest service.

Even worse than the want of method was the indifference and inactivity evinced by those whose business and duty it was to look after the men, to persuade them to remain in the ranks, and to spare no trouble in collecting by all possible means the little food that was to be found. Cold and want appear to have been accepted as sufficient justification for any dereliction of duty. The abject state the Grande Armée had fallen into is described by Marbot in the following words: "It was in this disorderly camp that I saw for the first time soldiers returning from Moscow; it was a heart-breaking sight. All ranks were confounded; there were no arms, no military bearing; soldiers, officers, even generals were clad in rags, and for boots had nothing but strips of leather or cloth hardly fastened together with string;—a huge rabble, in which thousands of men of different nations were jumbled, shouting in every language of the Continent of Europe, and unable to understand each other." With good reason the Baron accuses the head-quarters staff for not having made the 50,000 stragglers and soldiers separated from their regiments cross the bridges over the Beresina on the night of the 27th of November. Being anxious for the pack-horse which carried his regimental cash-box and account-books, he crossed to the right bank to look for it, and, to his surprise, found the bridges completely deserted. "Not one officer of the imperial household, not one aide-de-camp, not a single marshal, was there to warn those poor wretches, and, if necessary, to drive them to the bridges. . . . As I passed," he adds, "by the head-quarters staff and Oudinot's staff, I called attention to the empty state of the bridges, and to the ease with which the unarmed men could be brought across at a moment when the enemy was not trying to do anything. But it was all in vain; I only received evasive answers, and each man left the task of directing the operations to his colleagues."

Another officer recrossed the river to look after his equipment. Baron Larrey, the chief surgeon of the Grande Armée, having gone across the Beresina with the Imperial Guard, discovered after a time that several cases of instruments necessary for the wounded had been left on the other bank. His concern was so great that he crossed back to look for them. Arrived at the end of the bridge he fell in the midst of a delirious crowd of disbanded

soldiers, and ran the risk of being crushed to death. excellent man and devoted surgeon had gained the affection of the army. His name was no sooner bruited than he was seized and carried speedily back across the bridge, and placed in safety amongst the troops on the other side of the river. "Let us save him who has saved us," was heard on every side. In all the horror of the situation the gratitude of the soldiers overcame every other feeling, and made the life of the man who had often saved theirs most valuable to be preserved.*

There were some colonels who strove to keep the men in the ranks, and Baron de Marbot has left us some details of the several measures he took to that effect.† It was not surprising that the bearing of the 23rd Chasseurs à cheval should have elicited the emperor's approval, for a corps of over 500 sabres, well mounted and equipped, must have been a rare sight at that time. The Chasseurs, however, had belonged to the 2nd Corps, stationed for two months at Polotsk, and had not taken part in the advance on Moscow; moreover, quite lately, on the 23rd of November, they had come in for a windfall in the capture of 1500 vehicles belonging to Tchichagoff's army. These were captured by Castex's brigade, composed of the 23rd and 24th Chasseurs.

Marbot states: "The booty was immense—a hundred times more, indeed, than the brigade could carry." However, that prudent commander took advantage of his good fortune. "So I assembled my regiment, and pointed out that as they had a long retreat before them, during which it would probably be impossible for us to continue distributing rations of meat, as I had done throughout the campaign, they had better take steps chiefly to supply themselves with provisions. I added that they should also think of protecting themselves against cold; and that as overladen horses do not last long, they must not break theirs down with all sorts of things of no use in war. To sum up, I said that I should hold an inspection, and that all that was not food, shoes, or clothing would be rejected without mercy."‡

The Russian carts and carriages were well stocked, and after the two cavalry regiments had benefited by this capture, Marshal Oudinot allowed the other troops of the 2nd Corps to send

* Napoleon left a legacy of 100,000 francs to Larrey, adding, "He is the most virtuous man I have ever known."

† See "*Memoirs of Baron de Marbot*," vol. ii. chap. xxix.

‡ "*Memoirs of Baron de Marbot*," vol. ii. chap. xxx.

detachments in turn to appropriate provisions and clothing. *There was something still left to be taken on the following day by the swarms of disbanded troops on their way back from Moscow.*

Admiral Tchichagoff, with the army of Wallachia, should never have been allowed to pass by Prince Schwartzenberg, who had been posted with 30,000 Austrians in Vollandia to close the way. However, the news that the occupation of Moscow had not led to peace awoke the hatred of the Austrian and Prussian allies, whom Napoleon had imprudently placed on both wings of his army. Thus the armies of Tchichagoff and Wittgenstein both closed on the French rear.

Marbot points out another piece of carelessness in collecting all the dismounted men at Lepel, where they were to receive horses that were expected from Warsaw. The place was badly chosen, and it would have been better to have sent the men direct to Warsaw, where in the dépôt there were plenty of horses only wanting riders.

Kutusoff pursued Napoleon's forces with little vigour; had he displayed more activity and enterprise he would have prevented any of the French troops ever reaching the Beresina. In the passage of that river the French lost a large number of waggons, and the disbanding increased. There was no longer an army, and by abandoning the remnants of his forces to return to France the emperor added to the existing disorder, for he appointed a successor who was unequal to the task.

Lejeune states that the emperor, yielding to the earnest entreaties of his most faithful servants, decided to leave the army and return to France. It was a bad example, which was soon followed by Murat and many other superior officers. The only excuse was the necessity for reorganizing the French forces, which that step enabled him to do.

The small groups had ceased to exist; every individual moodily followed his way, leaning for support on the branch of a tree. What a sorrowful spectacle! The warriors who had conquered Europe had the appearance of spectres, and dragged their emaciated bodies in mute despondency through these immense snow-covered plains.

Woe to him who allowed sleep to overcome him, even for a few moments; he never woke again. Woe to those who made a false step and slipped, for they had not the strength to get up,

and if they implored for help no one paid the least attention to them. The most selfish egotism crushed all kindly feeling in almost every breast. The men were reduced to the level of brutes, without the power of feeling compassion. Such alone as had an exceptional constitution survived. The only way to keep alive was to march, for the heat engendered by motion prolonged vital resistance. Those who were drawn on carts and other vehicles got benumbed and died. Those who rode arrived at the bivouacs quite rigid, and in essaying to warm up their frozen limbs at the fire contracted gangrene. It was a wise precaution to march always on foot, and to keep at a judicious distance from the bivouac fires. Fighting had nearly ceased, for if on the side of the French the arms had been abandoned, on the other the enemy lacked the strength to give battle.

Many of the French during the retreat were drowned in the dark by falling into the village wells, the openings of which are level with the ground. Others, overcome with misery, committed suicide.

Some relief might have been obtained at Wilna, where the commissariat had collected provisions, clothing, shoes, spirits, etc., and where the magazines contained forty days' supply of flour and thirty-six of meat for 100,000 men; but there was no longer any vestige of discipline. Any methodical distribution was impossible, the officers being no longer obeyed. As soon as the city was reached, on the 9th of December, the crowd rushed in, every individual's paramount concern being to satisfy his own personal wants. Here was a sad proof again of Lafontaine's words, *Ventre affamé n'a pas d'oreilles*. Something might have been done with a more orderly mass, but no one took the trouble to prescribe how the issues were to be regulated. The Duke of Bassano and General Hogendorf, the military commander, had retired to the Niemen, and Murat's staff neglected to take the initiative.

As the army was retiring the Duke of Bassano would have done much better service by organizing a succession of dépôts on the line of communications, with provision columns and convoys. Fixed magazines in the city were a mistake, and the result showed it. On the night of the 10th the city had to be evacuated in a hurry, for the Russians were attacking it, and all the provisions, materials, sick, and wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. On the hill of Ponari, four kilometres from the town,

the treasure-waggons, containing ten millions in gold, were captured by the Cossacks. Napoleon had given directions to have the money in the chest sent to Dantzic, but the order evidently had come too late. The position of the French was not improved.

There is the testimony of Baron de Marbot, an officer who gained a just reputation from looking after the wants of his men; his words show what might have been done had every one's faculties of mind and body not been paralyzed by the cold.* He refutes Count de Ségur's statement that hunger drove some of the retreating French to eat human flesh. "The road was so lined with dead horses," he says, "that no one needed to think of cannibalism. Further, it would be a great mistake to suppose that provisions were altogether lacking in the district. They only ran short in the places actually on the road, since the neighbourhood of these had been drained when the army was on its way to Moscow; but it had swept by like a torrent without spreading laterally, and the harvest had since been gathered, so that the country had in some measure recovered, and, by going a league or two to one side a fair amount could be found. It is true that only detachments still in good order could make these expeditions without being picked up by the swarms of Cossacks who prowled around us. I made arrangements, therefore, with several colonels to organize armed forays. These returned always not only with bread and some head of cattle, but bringing sledges laden with salt meat, flour, and oats, obtained in the villages which the peasants had not deserted, showing that if the Duke of Bassano and General Hogendorf, who had been entrusted with the management of Lithuania, had done their duty while they were at Wilna, they might with ease have established large stores. But they attended only to provisioning the town, and took no thought of the troops." †

The retreat continued, and Count de Ségur gives a heart-rending picture of the miserable state to which the soldiers were reduced. "Like savages, the strongest stripped the weakest; they rushed at the dying, and often did not wait for their last breath. When a horse fell you might have fancied yourself in presence of a starving pack of hounds; they surrounded it, they

* On the night of the 9th of December Baron Larrey's thermometer registered 28 degrees Réaumur of frost.

† "Memoirs of Baron de Marbot," vol. ii. chap. xxxii.

tore it to pieces, which they disputed amongst themselves like devouring dogs!"

"Chacun pour soi, c'est la loi de nature." *

The intense cold affected in a special manner the troops which had hitherto been in quarters. The 12th Division was sent from Wilna to Ochmiana to meet the Old Guard. Of 12,000 men who composed it only 350 survived the march. The sudden change from hot barracks to a bitterly cold bivouac caused the death of this great number of men.

On the 13th of December Kowno, the starting-point of the campaign and last Russian town, was reached. The French then took the direction of Gumbinen. Twenty thousand unfortunate soldiers, covered with rags, of which 2000 or 3000 still retained their arms, was all that remained of the invading army. According to Baron Larrey, 3000 of the best soldiers of the Guard, belonging to the infantry and cavalry, almost all from the southern provinces of France, were the only troops who had really resisted the cruel hardships of the retreat; they still retained their arms, their horses, and their warlike bearing. The Dukes of Lantzic and of Istria were at their head; the princes Joachim and Eugène marched with them.

The undaunted Ney had commanded the rear-guard to the last, and words cannot be found for bestowing sufficient praise on the heroism he displayed throughout. Neither the deadly winter climate of Russia, the great proportion of the pursuing forces, the utter dejection of his soldiers, could subdue the spirit of this rare warrior, whose courage ever rose beyond the obstacles he had to surmount. Well did he deserve the proud distinction that Napoleon bestowed on him of the bravest of the brave—

"SIT TIBI TERRA LEVIS." †

The Russians, apparently satisfied with having swept the enemy from the national territory, halted on the Niemen. The promise given by the Czar to Mons. de Narbonne, "I shall not attack, but I shall not lay down the arms as long as there will remain a foreign soldier in Russia," had been kept.

At Gumbinen the retreating troops were joined by some of the Neapolitan guards, with some artillery and cavalry. The

* Bérard, the writer of the "Cancans."

† This pious wish was uttered at the funeral of the Latins; it was to the effect that earth might press lightly on the person buried.

stragglers gathered round this nucleus. Food began to be issued with regularity, and the soldiers found comfortable shelter against the cold, which was still intense.

The style of the bulletins announcing the retreat of the Grande Armée from Moscow was anything but reassuring, and created alarm.* Desprez, returning from Moscow, wrote to King Joseph: "The imagination cannot conceive the reality of our reverses; in one word, the army was dead."

Thiers computes the losses of the French and allies at 300,000 men. Marbot, basing his estimate on the returns referred to already in p. 120, which, he says, had been all covered over with notes in Napoleon's own hand, assumes the total of the army to have comprised 325,900 men. Of the 155,400 French, it appears that 60,000 recrossed the Niemen, so that 95,000 only were missing; of these, 30,000, who had been taken prisoners, returned home after the peace, reducing the loss of the French to 65,000 men. Of the allies the loss was much less, for the Austrian and Prussian contingents went bodily over to the enemy, and the other allies individually deserted during the retreat. Marbot gives some particulars of the losses of his regiment, the 23rd Chasseurs, which deserve to be noticed as an example of what results can be attained when the zeal of the colonel, officers, and non-commissioned officers is exerted in enforcing discipline and in taking due care of the men in campaigning. "When the campaign opened, the 23rd Chasseurs were 1018 all told. Thirty more joined at Polotsk, bringing the total up to 1048. Out of these I had 109 killed, 77 captured, 65 maimed, and 104 missing—355 in all; so that on the return of the troopers whom I had sent to Warsaw after the campaign, the regiment, when sent on beyond the Elbe, in February, 1813, could muster 693 mounted men, who had shared in the Russian campaign. Napoleon could not believe it; he had the regiment inspected, and a special return drawn up of all men present by name, when the colonel's statement was fully confirmed."

Marbot was not the only officer who took great pains to secure the well-being of his men. Another deserving more than passing notice on this same point was Major Curély. De Brack says in his praise, "This man, so brave, so intrepid, so ingenious,

* On the anniversary of the victory of Austerlitz, at Molodetschno, Napoleon dictated the 29th Bulletin. It describes succinctly the disasters which befell his army, but it concealed their true extent.

so strong-minded, so ready, so calculating in daring enterprises, when he commanded a detachment, was, at the same time, its doctor, veterinary surgeon, saddler, shoemaker, cook, baker, farrier, till, coming face to face with the enemy, he showed himself the most remarkable man of the *Grande Armée*." What more flattering praise could the gallant general have bestowed than the words, "For me Curély was the pattern of a light cavalry man"? *

This is what Curély himself writes on the measures he took for feeding his soldiers in this campaign—

"Having quitted Bonn on the 30th of May, 1812, to join my regiment in Russia with a squadron of 220 horses, I arrived at Seskerky on the 19th of August, and there I remained till the 29th.

"I took advantage of this stay to get my squadron in the best state of efficiency. I found a mill; I had some corn ground, and some bread baked; I issued four days' supply to my squadron, and carried as much away in carts. On quitting, I left in the village, which is situated only four leagues beyond Polotsk, a quartermaster-sergeant and four chasseurs, whose horses were lame; these were the only men that I left in rear, and they were very useful to me. I left a written order with the quartermaster-sergeant to have wheat and rye ground, and to have bread baked, which I would send to pick up; and early on the morning of the 29th I left to rejoin my regiment, which was bivouacking in front of Polotsk.

"My precautions were not useless, because, on arrival, I found the regiment without bread. I began by distributing what I had brought in the carts, and informed Colonel de Lagrange, who commanded my regiment, the 20th Chasseurs, of the five men which I had left behind at Seskerky. As the army had no bread, I proposed to the colonel his sending an officer to that village to supervise the manufacture. This he did; and thus we got bread up to the 20th of September. At that date my officer and my men were sent back from Seskerky by superior order, but no bread was given us.

"On the 20th of September forage was again exhausted; it

* Curély performed some daring deeds. In the battle of Polotsk, October 17, 1812, having caught sight of the Russian general, Wittgenstein, he dashed at him with a squadron of the 20th Chasseurs and captured him. In a fight with the general's escort which followed, Curély was unhorsed, and his captive succeeded in making his escape.

became necessary to spread out. The brigade went further forward on the Polota; and to the 20th Chasseurs (which I temporarily commanded) was allotted a single castle in the Polish style, named Korleski. This house was isolated and surrounded by a palisade, so that I found myself protected from surprise on the part of the enemy. I therefore located the regiment in the enclosure, and put as many horses as possible under shelter: the rest had to bivouac. The magazine of Seskerky did no longer exist; I received no more bread from it. No more did the army administration furnish me with any. This is what I did to keep my soldiers alive—

“I sent the regiment in search of green rye in the fields and unoccupied villages that lay in front of us. Two-thirds I had threshed, and the straw went for the horses. In the house there was a hand-mill. Day and night the men relieved each other from hour to hour to grind; and some bakers I had in the regiment baked bread. As to meat, it never failed, the country being very rich in cattle. I had a forge set up in the house; and not only did I keep the shoeing always up to the mark, but I completed all the chasseurs who were without them with four spare shoes and sixty nails. Amongst my men I had some shoemakers; I bought leather, and had the boots repaired. I caused the most pressing repairs to be executed to the clothing and saddlery. We had but a pool of water for the men and the horses. I put some rye flour with water into barrels to ferment; this gave us a drink not very agreeable in flavour but very wholesome.”

Neither Marbot nor Curély participated in the advance on Moscow, for they formed part of the troops (2nd and 6th Corps) posted at Polotsk, but they deserve no less praise for what they did. With regard to these two corps there was not the excuse of rapid and continuous marches to plead as an excuse to cover the neglect in providing for them, still Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr states, “Not to let their soldiers die of starvation, the commanders of corps sent out on their part detachments to procure provisions; an inconvenience which was further aggravated because the greatest number of men went to plunder on their own account.”

Both at Smolensk and at Wilna want of discipline prevented the best utilization of the available resources; in both cases very strict injunctions had been issued to the effect that the issues were to be made to parties commanded by officers, who were to

furnish receipts in return. This measure could not be carried into effect, for the mass of the men had quitted the ranks.

In war the courage of the troops, the boldness and experience of the general are not sufficient; discipline constitutes the veritable force of an army. Discipline means always and everywhere the safety of the entire host. What made the small Swedish army of Gustavus Adolphus so powerful was a severe discipline; this was the base of its excellence. The Russians in their retreat in 1812 showed great discipline, the French and their allies in theirs an utter want of it.

God's first gift to man was order, and had the poor soldiers, miles and miles away from their base, fully realized that in discipline alone lay their only hope of safety, they would have kept together, and severely punished the feeble Russian advanced guards which tried to overtake them in the retreat. The bonds of discipline at first had been carelessly allowed to relax, and when the number of stragglers and the disorder became too great the evil was past all remedy. This is one of the most valuable lessons of the campaign. The more adverse the circumstances, the stricter must be the discipline of the army.

This campaign also showed the truth of the principles enunciated by Frederick the Great. The Russians, retiring in their own country, and occupying ground which had yet been untouched, had a considerable advantage over the French. They approached their reinforcements and fell back on well-filled magazines and convoys. This was in their favour as long as their retreat lasted, but the destruction of their towns and provisions, intended to hamper the invaders, did them considerable injury during the pursuit. Marching in cold weather ruined the French, but was likewise injurious to the more hardy Muscovites. Baron Marbot writes: "The Russian soldiers, accustomed as they are to pass the winter in houses where draughts are always excluded and stoves always lighted, are far more sensitive to cold than those of any other country; and the heavy losses which the enemy incurred from this cause explained the slackness of their pursuit."

General Sir Robert Wilson writes: "The 29th Bulletin will justify every opinion I adventured at the time, and the present state of the Russian force will afford a severe comment on the policy of those who considered that evasion of resistance would economize the Russian strength. The march has certainly not

cost less to the Russian armies than 80,000 men, and every day the effects extend with alarming violence. Few of our battalions muster more than 200 men under arms; and all the armies now moving on the Vistula cannot bring more than 70,000 effectives.

"We are taught to expect great reinforcements in the spring, equal to 200,000 men; but the whole line of march is a *pest lazaretto*—so bad that of 10,000 men who marched from Bayan, only 2500 entered Wilna a fortnight since, and the greater portion of that number has remained there in the hospitals, where 8000 bodies still remain unburied." *

Very evidently Kutusoff, by failing to appreciate to the full extent the necessity for supporting Miloradowitch at Wiazma, was responsible for much of this.

Ségur concludes, "Winter, that terrible ally of the Muscovites, had sold them his assistance dearly. Their disorder pursued our disorder. . . . The 120,000 of Kutusoff's army were then reduced to 35,000. Of Wittgenstein's 50,000 scarcely 15,000 remained." † "Fortunately, the intensity of the cold, which had just completed the discouragement of our people, had also benumbed their enemies." Habit certainly trains to endure hardships, but there is a limit beyond which nature cannot go. When that limit is reached, man will follow the natural law common to all living beings, the preservation of his existence; for this he must have food, warmth, and rest.

* Sir Robert Wilson, K.M.T., "Narrative of Events during the Invasion of Russia," pp. 398, 399.

† General Louis Philippe Comte de Ségur, "Campaign of Russia," vol. ii. pp. 335, 336.

CHAPTER X.

THE CRIMEAN WAR AND THE INDIAN MUTINY.

THE expedition to the Crimea cannot be compared in importance with the campaigns commented on in the last chapters. That expedition, nevertheless, was remarkable, inasmuch as it gave a new impetus to the study of the art of war. In the struggle before the earthworks of Sebastopol can be found the germs of improvements in weapons and appliances, such as the perfecting of small arms, the means for augmenting the range and destructive power of artillery, the adoption of armour-plates for ships, the employment of railways in war, and many other.

On the 1st of May, 1851, Her Majesty Queen Victoria opened the great exhibition in Hyde Park. This was the first essay to gather together all samples of the world's craft and industry, and there were many thoughtful persons who seriously believed that once men had met together in friendly and peaceful competition, they would never again be persuaded to meet in rivalry of a different kind.

There had sprung up in England a general decrying of arms. A party called the "Peace Party" had been formed, which denounced war in very strong terms. In the eyes of people on the Continent, England appeared to be on the decline; her ancient spirit seemed to be failing her.

For a period of forty years the country had been relatively at peace. British troops had been engaged in distant lands, in Afghanistan, in the Punjab, and at the Cape of Good Hope, but from the period of the fall of Napoleon Great Britain had remained at peace with the Continental States of Europe. Many of the new generation had grown up in the belief that wars were things of the past, and that the practice of settling international disputes by the sword was barbarous and wicked.

On the 14th of September, 1852, the great Duke of Wellington died; the embodiment of the country's last military achievements, the wise and successful general who had gained so many laurels for the British Army in India, in the Peninsula, and at Waterloo, was laid to rest. He was in his eighty-fourth year, and though his unswerving devotion to the national good had gained for him, as a counsellor, unlimited trust, he had reached an age when the mind naturally loses a great deal of its power.

The great feeling of security, the doctrines put forth by the Peace Society, had caused Great Britain to forget the old Latin maxim, *Si vis pacem, para bellum*. The costly lessons taught by the wars which had harassed Europe at the commencement of the century had been allowed to fall into oblivion, and the calling of arms was pursued by the officers more as a gentlemanly career than with any just appreciation of the real object for which nations patiently submit to the burdens of standing armies. The blunder was made, and it is not an uncommon one with us, to dispense with certain military establishments in peace, for the reason that they run away with much money, and their employment is only prospective.* Such was the unfortunate condition of things in our army when, in his irresistible craving for more territory, the Czar Nicholas I. began in 1853 to propose to Sir G. Hamilton Seymour some arrangement anent the division of the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire in Europe.

Only two years before this (December 2, 1851), Louis Napoleon had made himself master of France by a *coup d'état*, and by a vote of the people had ascended the throne as Napoleon III. Here was an opportunity for him to transfer the attention of his subjects from domestic contentions to some showy policy abroad. Kinglake puts it that the war sprung out of a dispute about a key and a silver star; the matter in dispute hinged on some obscure rights regarding the holy places, which diplomacy failed to set straight, ending in Turkey declaring war against Russia. On the 30th of November, 1853, the first tragic event of the war occurred; the Turkish fleet was at Sinope, a considerable seaport town and naval station on the southern shore of the Black Sea. There Nachimoff attacked and destroyed it.

* In 1854 we discovered to our cost what a mistake had been made in 1833 in suppressing the Royal Waggon Train, which the Duke of Wellington originated in the Peninsula for the conveyance of the sick and wounded, ammunition, regimental baggage, and everything brought within range of the enemy's fire.

In the British Cabinet there were men who disliked the idea of war; Lord Aberdeen and Mr. Gladstone had a sensitive objection to it. The former had witnessed in his youth the carnage of Leipsic, and, in his horror for war, helped to involve his country in the very evil he so much dreaded. Lord Palmerston, however, on whom the Emperor of the French brought considerable pressure, overcame the reluctance of his colleagues. France and England acquainted Russia of their firm resolution to prevent any repetition of the Sinope affair; it was intimated to her that their squadrons would enter the Black Sea with orders to request, and, if necessary, to constrain every Russian ship met in that sea to return to Sebastopol, and to repel by force any act of aggression afterwards attempted against the Ottoman territory or flag. In accordance with this threat, on the 4th of January, 1854, the fleets of England and France entered the Euxine. In the Queen's Speech (January 31, 1854) Parliament was asked to provide for an increase of the military and naval forces, and a few days later, on the 21st of February, 1854, Her Majesty declared war against Russia.

The great expectations formed in 1851 fell to the ground, and the cheerful prospect of unity and peace amongst civilized nations was banished to the realms of philanthropic imagination. The old antagonists, England and France, entered into the contest as allies, and the command of the British forces was conferred on Lord Raglan, an old pupil of the great Duke in the Peninsula and at Waterloo.

When the allies landed at Varna, in Turkey, the Russians, with an army of from 60,000 to 80,000 men, were besieging the fortified town of Silistria on the Danube. At that time the allies could not render any assistance to Mussa Pacha and his beleaguered garrison, from want of sufficient land transport; the two armies on that account were not yet in a condition to take the field. If we accept Kinglake's estimate, the British force alone to undertake a march into the interior needed 14,000 pack-horses or mules, of which number not more than about one-third had been collected.

On the 23rd of June, 1854, after a siege which lasted thirty-nine days, the Russians retreated from the walls of Silistria with a large loss of men. They never appear to have been in earnest in wishing to take the place. With this retreat of the Russians within their boundaries, the main cause of dispute between the

allies and Russia came to an end; but *Nicholas* had not been punished, and after all the fuss made about the expedition the people of France and England did not relish the troops coming back having done nothing. It was then that the idea began to acquire ground in both capitals that the allies should invade the Crimea, and destroy the harbour of Sebastopol, the chief naval arsenal of Russia in the Black Sea. The plan was conceived at home, but none of the allied commanders, naval or military, were in favour of the expedition; the French, principally, considered the proposed enterprise to be rash.

The Crimea is a peninsula of 8000 to 9000 square miles, almost surrounded by water; its shores on three sides are washed by the waves of the Black Sea, and on the fourth by the Sea of Azof. The peninsula is united to the mainland by the very narrow isthmus of Perekop; Sebastopol is situated on the south-west. The southern district of the Crimea is well cultivated, and in that part are to be found many seats belonging to the Czar and to Russian noblemen. The vineyards there yield excellent grapes, and some of them produce very good wine; grain of various kinds is raised abundantly. Much attention is bestowed upon horses, oxen, and sheep. The northern part of the peninsula, however, contrasts greatly with the south; it is one vast uniform steppe, destitute of water and wood, with a soil, generally speaking, very unfit for agriculture, with numerous salt lakes and salt marshes. This much the allied commanders had been able to ascertain; it was nothing more than a general geographical description of the country, but there were many other very important points on which they were utterly ignorant.

The popular outcry for an expedition to destroy Sebastopol could not be quieted, and eventually orders were given to the French and English commanders-in-chief to take steps for transporting the troops across the Black Sea and to invade the Chersonese Peninsula.

It is necessary to observe that a very important matter in the transfer of the army across the Euxine was overlooked. In Sir Anthony Sterling's words, "Our army was shot on shore in the Crimea without baggage or transport." A certain amount of land transport had been collected by Commissary-General Filder at Varna,* but, on account of the limited number of ships

* About 4000 horses and mules, 2300 draught oxen, and 2500 carts and *arabas*, with a large multitude of drivers, had been collected in Bulgaria.

available, most of it was left in Turkey on the departure of the army. As the British staff were in complete ignorance with regard to the country about to be invaded, this was a serious fault. In Kinglake's words, "when England flew to arms against Russia, she was not only without a land transport corps, but even without adequate knowledge of the huge operations required for enabling a modern army to live and move." It would have been more in accordance with the teachings of the art of war to have left a thousand troops or so at Varna, and to have made room for a certain proportion of army transport. For this serious blunder the staff and not the commissariat was answerable, and matters would have been worse had the Russians swept away from Eupatoria and its neighbourhood all the available country carriage. As it was, 350 arabas were captured on landing. At the time there appears to have been a notion that the army would throw up intrenchments, and wait until the ships could return and bring the remainder of the baggage, horses, and mules left in Turkey.

The soldiers were disembarked without knapsacks, and had to carry on shore a few articles of kit, ammunition, and three days' provisions. They carried cold pork and biscuit, with a canteen of water. No tents were landed.

On the march from Eupatoria both armies had to rely on a floating base, and the absolute necessity for having a safe one on land was one of the principal arguments held in support of undertaking a march to seize the ground on the south side of Sebastopol. By that manœuvre, which the depressed and disorganized state of the Russian army after the defeat on the Alma made safe, the British had secured the small tideless harbour of Balaclava, and Lord Raglan was relieved of much anxiety with regard to his transport ships.

The harbour of Balaclava was so small that it could not take in all the transports; it was this which led to the loss of the *Prince*, the *Progress*, and other ships, laden with much-needed stores, in the great storm of the 14th November.

Commissary-General Filder, an officer who had acquired considerable experience in the Peninsular War, had charge of the commissariat arrangements. The verbal instructions he received from the Treasury, were to make the war cheaply. He was to procure the greater part of his provisions on the spot; but the cultivation of the plateau of Sebastopol, when the allies occupied

it in the last days of September, 1854, was very inconsiderable, and the majority of the crops in the country had been gathered. England in the end had to make up for this short-sighted policy, and it cost many millions to repair the evils of injudicious parsimony.

The collapse in a very short period of every branch of military administration cast considerable discredit on our army. How was it possible that in the brief space of a few weeks the system of clothing, of transport, of feeding, of nursing*—everything, in fact—could have broken down? A rejoinder is not difficult; the lessons of the past had been permitted to be forgotten, and Great Britain had plunged into a war without being prepared or organized for such an undertaking. The new generation of officers was inexperienced, and the real study of the art of war had been shamefully neglected.

It was the absence of all system, or of one equal to the emergency, which caused the failure of the entire machinery of army administration. The Parliamentary Committee elicited the fact that no estimates were ever made in England for what provisions and transport the army might have needed after landing in the Crimea.

Nothing or next to nothing was known of the intended country of operations; the necessary preliminary studies had been neglected. An army in movement can tap fresh resources, but not so an army which is stationary; and one thing must have been very clear—that 63,000 men would soon have consumed the resources of a not particularly productive peninsula. The strength of the British force in the first winter did not exceed 25,000 men, and with the sea communication open—for the Russian fleet afloat was shut up in the harbour of Sebastopol—and with steam transports available, it is inconceivable how advantage was not taken of the resources of the markets of Trebizond, Constantinople, and Smyrna. It could not have been a difficult task, with the influence of our consuls, to keep our small army thoroughly well supplied from the products of Bulgaria and Turkey in Asia. The error committed by the administration of the army at home was in not having detailed officers or other agents to feed the base from the resources found in its vicinity.

* There was no hospital corps, and a number of men were taken out of the ranks to be employed as hospital orderlies and to accompany the sick going from Balaklava to Scutari. This aided in lowering the effective strength of the regiments.

England was disgraced by the utter collapse of her army organization. The staff had no special training, and little knowledge of the art of war. The regimental officers were even more ignorant. The mediocrity shown by the medical and commissariat, their want of provision, the lack of courage of their chiefs to assume responsibilities, cast serious discredit on the departments.* Of land-transport there was next to none. For a force numbering 33,452 of all ranks landed in the enemy's country there were only 75 mules and a few carts. The soldiers were miserably weakened by sickness and overwork; they were often half fed; their clothing was inadequate for their protection; their boots were out of repair. Fuel was difficult to procure, and it was often impossible for the men to cook their food.† This, moreover, was not of the best kind, for the subsistence officers had under-estimated the importance of issuing soft bread, fresh meat, and some description of vegetables. Was it a wonder that the men sickened and died, that from a too free issue of salt provisions scurvy broke out, that some regiments could barely muster a couple of dozen men thoroughly fit for duty? In the month of February, 1855, the British force had 14,000 men fit for duty, 10,000 sick absent, and 5000 sick present.‡

The real enemy was the want of transport to carry up food and munitions to the front. The commissariat had for this purpose a few mule-carts and pack animals and some 200 of the arabas captured at Eupatoria; to these must be added the regimental bât horses, which were taken from the regiments to assist the commissariat. As a large portion of the transport was employed in carrying materials and ammunition to the front, the want of mules prevented the troops sometimes getting the whole of their rations up, although there were abundant stores at Balacava. It has been said that had there been more transport animals there was no forage to feed them with; but this want of forage was nothing more than the rest, want of proper provision. Chopped straw and barley, being the ordinary forage

* The coffee berry, issued in a green state to troops who had no utensils for roasting it and grinding it, and who were short of fire-wood, showed an incredible amount of ignorance or want of thought.

† Vines were plucked up, root and branch, for fuel.

‡ "Scutari and its Hospitals," by the Honourable and Reverend Sydney Godolphin Osborne, reveals a very sad state of inefficiency, and ignorance of the necessities of war.

used all over Turkey, were to be purchased in any quantity. The commissariat demanded a shipment of English hay, and to this the Treasury objected, as being far more costly than chopped straw. Much time was lost by the Treasury, and the hay only reached Balaclava in the beginning of February.

Between the 12th December, 1854, and the 17th January, 1855, the cavalry division lost no less than 426 horses. Lord Lucan accounted for this loss by the fact of the horses having been employed on transport duties. Really they were badly fed; most of them died of starvation, combined, no doubt, with the severity of the weather, fatigue, and exposure. During the first six months the army was in the Crimea 2329 transport horses and mules were landed. Of these 200 were destroyed; 689 died of sickness due to exposure, fatigue and want of sufficient forage.

The distance from Balaclava to the front was not more than from seven to eight miles. But even here no one thought for some weeks of constructing a good metalled road to connect the divisional camps with the base. Representations had been made to the quartermaster-general on the wretched condition of the road, but men to repair it could not be spared from the siege works. A few Turkish soldiers employed on it, under the direction of our engineer officers, accomplished next to nothing.

A railway was commenced, but the expenso and labour of making it would have been better employed in constructing a good road for wheel transport. A good macadamized road for such a short distance would have been more valuable and sooner opened for traffic; such a road, in addition to the railway, had eventually to be made. To construct the railroad were needed about 500 navvies and many horses. As it was, only when March had begun the line became available; it was then used as a tramway, the waggons being drawn by horses as far as Kadikoi.

The soldiers, who, besides duties in the trenches, had to undertake all sorts of fatigues, were wonderfully cheery all along; they submitted to all these hardships and deprivation of rest with great fortitude. They were often marched to Kadikoi, the temporary terminus of the railway, to bring up thirty-two pound shot to the artillery park. Seldom, however, are the devotion of the officers or the courage and patient endurance of the soldiers of any good unless the auxiliary elements of success are perfect.

The idea that the walls of Sebastopol were to fall like those of *Jericho* at the sound of the trumpets of the allies showed incredible

ignorance on the part of the public at home. The military authorities made no provision for a reverse, or in case of bad fortune. It was apparently forgotten that even with the most prosperous issue the levelling of the fortifications and the destruction of the docks of Sebastopol must have taken some time, and that the troops could not come away at once and leave this part of the work undone.

Through carelessness the mortality was great, and but for the courage of Sir W. H. Russell in telling the people of England the real state of affairs, it would have been greater. The patriotic anger his letters aroused mended matters, but not too soon.

In this war less than 5000 officers and soldiers fell from injuries inflicted by the hand of the enemy; upwards of 19,000 sunk under disease and privations. Of the latter a large portion might with sound arrangements have been spared to their country.

Unlike the French army, in the British there was no officer charged with the organization and direction of all the administrative branches. Their independent action and the unreasonable jealousy of each other, exposed all the evils sure to arise from a want of unity of direction. For six weeks lime juice, at that time so necessary, remained unissued, because neither the medical or the commissariat officers could make up their mind to ask the commander of the army to decide if it were to be regarded as a medical comfort or as an article of commissariat issue. It was not until twenty-four years later that in the British Army the whole of the administrative services were united in war under the direction of a General of Communications.

For 334 days a siege lingered which, with a little more boldness, might have been rendered quite unnecessary. The greatest blunder which can be committed in all enterprises, whether public or private, is to let the opportunity slip by. The town at first might have been taken by assault; time instead was given to the Russians to strengthen and arm the unfinished defences of Sebastopol. Todleben writes on this point, "The allies, after having by the end of September, 1854, effected their passage over the Chersonese Peninsula, could not make up their mind to deliver an assault on the feeble fortifications left almost without defence on the south side of Sebastopol, without having first prepared the way to the success of their attack by a formidable cannonade and bombardment."

Soon it was a question as to which of the two sides ought to

have been called the besieged. The Russians certainly not only had an ample force to hold the works, but also an army in the field, which attacked the positions of the allies on three different occasions. And whilst the latter held a few square miles of country in the south-western corner of the peninsula, the Russians were masters of all the rest, with uninterrupted communication with the southern provinces of their empire. Sebastopol was defended by an unlimited supply of munitions of war from within, and the arrival of constant reinforcements from without. A garrison superior to the besieging force defended the works, for the garrison and the army in the field were one.

General Bosquet summed up the situation in these words: "This is not a siege, neither is Sebastopol a fortress; the enemy's position, from their right, at the mouth of Sebastopol harbour, to their left, stretching away towards Balaclava, is one entrenched camp. Behind them is a large, powerful, military nation, with all its supplies, which they can pour into Sebastopol at pleasure."

As the invasion had come on the Russians in the guise of a surprise, no adequate preparations had been made for the coming of their army. The forwarding of provisions on roads broken up by repeated floods was a Herculean difficulty, and generated confusion in their administrative departments. The soldiers experienced untold hardships; these and the rigorous winter sent a large number of men to their graves and to the hospitals. As the number of sick and wounded augmented, their sick transport was inadequate to remove them from the beleaguered city.

It will never be accurately known what a price Russia had to pay for bringing such numerous forces to the Crimea. The Russians themselves cannot say how many thousands of men, drawn from the most remote corners of their immense empire, from the shores of the Baltic and of the White Sea, from the sources of the Volga or the slopes of the Ural, left their bones bleaching on the road to Cherson or Perekop. The long marches in the winter, on bad roads, killed thousands and thousands of them. In the closing months of 1855 Russia was at the end of her resources. The feeding of the Russian troops gathered round Sebastopol, before the days of railways, was not an easy matter, but there was no war correspondent in their camp to dilate on the hardships of the sons of the Czar. We will confine ourselves to one item of the administrative difficulties, the bread. Russia had close at hand an enormous supply of grain, both in the districts bordering

on the Black Sea and on the Sea of Azof, but there were no mills for grinding it. The commissariat, therefore, was compelled to have flour brought from a distance, even from the centre of Russia.

In Parliament Mr. Roebuck gave notice that he would move that a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the condition of the British army before Sebastopol, and on the conduct of those departments of the Government whose duty it had been to minister to the wants of the army. On this motion the Ministry were defeated by a majority of 157 votes.

After the first winter matters mended considerably, and above all with regard to transport; a very efficient land transport corps was organized by Colonel McMurdo for any possible operations beyond Sebastopol.* The writer spent most of the second winter in the Crimea, having joined the head-quarters of his regiment at Kamara in December, 1855. The troops were then lodged in comfortable wooden huts with the luxury of a stove; the men were clothed in fur-lined coats, with long boots as a protection from the sticky mud; the rations were good and plentiful. The health of the troops was excellent, and their appearance most vigorous; possibly no finer infantry could be found than what Sir William Codrington could muster in his parades on the plateau before Sebastopol in the spring of 1856. The artillery was equally fine, and well mounted; the cavalry had been removed from the peninsula.

The results of well clothing, well feeding, well warming the British troops, lodged in solid huts, with the floor raised above the ground, were appreciated when the French troops, which had not the same comforts, began to be attacked by typhus. The *Intendance* was then at fault, and with the experience of the previous winter, allowed the troops to suffer severely. Nevertheless, the admirable arrangements of the *Intendance* during the Crimean War were the subject of much praise for many years afterwards.

When we endeavour to trace what advantage the British people reaped from the invasion of the Crimea, it appears that, putting entirely aside the loss of prestige, the country paid forty-one millions of money, and lost 24,000 men in this war to no purpose. The main object of the invasion of the Crimea, on which the people at home, in June 1854 laid such stress,

* The Royal Warrant decreeing the formation of the Land Transport Corps appeared on the 24th of January, 1855.

was to deprive Russia of the means of aggression. In keeping with this, one of the most important articles of the treaty of peace declared the Black Sea neutralized; its waters and its ports were declared opened to the mercantile marine of every nation, and formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war of either of the powers possessing its coasts or of any other power; the Sultan of Turkey and the Emperor of Russia engaged to establish or maintain no military or maritime arsenal on the shores of that sea. In 1870, when France had been seriously defeated by Prussia, Russia declared that she would no longer submit to be bound by that article of the treaty.

Bismarck, with diplomatic slyness, suggested a conference of the representatives of those powers which had signed the treaty. The Conference met in London, and agreed upon abrogating the clause for the neutralization of the Black Sea. The people of England, who were so loud in calling for the expedition to the Crimea in 1854, took very little notice of the whole thing, and the farce was allowed to be played out.

The Crimean War was the last in which we saw the enlistment of a Foreign Legion. Some thousands of Swiss, Germans, and Italians were enlisted for the war, but the struggle ended before any of these had set foot in the Crimea. How Englishmen are not ashamed to hire foreigners to fight their battles has always been a puzzle to us. Though it is difficult to account for this want of patriotic spirit, still we may express a hope that when Great Britain next has the misfortune to be involved in a struggle with another nation she may find sufficient combatants amongst her forty million inhabitants. Even a small percentage on so many millions will yield a numerous army.

The history of that dreary first winter in the Crimea must be told and retold lest we should forget. The people who remember the outcry that was made on the shortcomings of 1854-55 are getting fewer every day; the war is now of old date, it is a thing of over forty-two years ago. Other events have cast the expedition to the Crimea into oblivion, and few personally recollect what it was exactly that brought the country into discredit.

In times of profound peace certain matters of military organization and administration demand to be attentively studied. If these are neglected the result will be national dishonour, if nothing worse. At the time of the Crimean War Prussia occupied a lower position in Europe than she had ever before held

during her existence as a kingdom. Europe in general did not then hold the Prussian Army as of very much account; nevertheless, eleven years after, Prussia surprised Europe by the rapidity with which she crushed Austria, and in a war of seven weeks asserted her position as the first military power in the world. To what are we to attribute this but to the attention which Prussian officers paid to all particulars connected with their army? They made a thorough study of their profession, taking full advantage of the experience gained by other powers, with the happiest of results. Thus it came to pass that, when the blast of the war-trumpet sounded throughout the realm of the Brandenburgs in 1866, the Prussian staff and the generality of Prussian officers had a very fair knowledge of what was to be done.

It is continually stated that German officers have so few resources that, not to be idle, they are driven to make a deep study of their profession. We doubt if this is the exact truth, and we expect that a careful inquiry would disclose the fact that they have a knack of finding time both for their professional studies and for relaxation. Most of our officers love only such occupations as develop strength and physical activity; but is it proper to exercise every member of the body but the brain? Oh that we had in us the rare gift of persuasion, and could see our officers following the old maxim, *Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci*! But studying at present meets with little encouragement. There is no gainsaying that an officer who wields a good bat at cricket, who is a good oarsman, who is foremost at tennis, at football, at golf, and so on, is a greater hero in the sight of his comrades than one who has by application acquired a deep knowledge of his profession. We do not decri field sports, games, and all manner of manly exercises—indeed, we have always been foremost in commending their value—but where we think the fault lies is in their being made the primary object of many of our officers' daily occupation.

Matters have changed since the Crimean campaign, which gave a fresh impulse to the art of war, nevertheless there is still much room for improvement. It is in the first years of an officer's life where the blot lies; the very starting-point of his career is the time when habits of industry should be inculcated by the men of ripe experience, for it is then that it is easy for the young mind to learn, and to retain what has been learnt.

A year had scarcely passed since the British troops were

withdrawn from the Crimean Peninsula when the great Sepoy Revolt shook to its foundations the whole fabric of British rule in Hindostan. Though the greater portion of the Bengal troops departed from their allegiance, still the word "mutiny" is ill applied to a rising of the native races against British power. Religious fanaticism and national hatred had a greater share in the rising than the question of greased cartridges. By malicious inventions and falsehoods the agitators made the most of the cartridge question, trying to gain over the sepoys on the plea that the Government wickedly meditated to destroy their caste; but it really was the annexation of Oudh, of Sattara, and of Jansi which had disturbed the native mind and created alarm throughout the land. A conspiracy for the subversion of British rule in India had been afoot some time before 1857, only in that year the conditions appeared more favourable. The reduction of the British force in India brought about by the Russian and Persian wars, and the prevalent impression amongst the native rulers of India that the power of England was on the wane, seemed to indicate that the propitious time for a revolt had arrived. In the early part of 1856 a handsome-looking Mahommedan was to be seen moving amongst the British camps in the Crimea; this was Azimoolah Khan,* an emissary of Seereek Dhoondoo Punth, generally known as Nana Sahib of Bithoor. His mission to England, to have the Nana legally recognized as the adopted son of Bajee Rao, Peishwa of Poonah, had failed, and he doubtless reported to his master many rumours then afloat in Constantinople and the Crimea anent the decay of Great Britain's strength.

In February, 1857, the native troops in the three presidencies numbered together about 300,000 men; of Europeans there were 38,306 men, of whom, however, about 4000 had been withdrawn to take part in the expedition sent to Persia. In Bengal there were 21,000 white troops. When Lord Canning took the reins of government, everything promised a reign of peace and prosperity; but soon the mutterings of the yet distant storm were heard: treasonable placards and mutinous demonstrations gave warning of the existence of widespread disaffection. Discontent was prevalent. The Mahommedans were dreaming of their past glories, of the sway of their powerful emperors; the Mahrattas

* I remember his visiting the mess of my regiment at Kamara; he wore a green choga embroidered with gold, and his deportment was full of Oriental dignity.

were mourning over the defeats they had suffered from Lake and Wellesley; the leaders of the Brahminical class were grieving over their fading power, over their curtailed privileges. Hatred, intrigue, and fanaticism reigned all over the land. The Mahommedans fanned the smouldering embers; the Nana of Bhitoor was to stir up the Hindoo population. The natives began to believe that the moment to strike was propitious, and that our numbers were insignificant.

What better season could be found for a revolt? The European troops were few, and scattered widely through the three presidencies; there were no railways, and no ready means of communication. The hot season, the most trying and deadly for European constitutions, was at hand; the time-expired men had sailed, the debilitated had gone to the Himalayan sanatoriums, and no fresh drafts were expected from England.

Of warnings the Company had plenty. "The circulation of the *chupatties* before the outbreak was an exact repetition of what happened before the Mahrattas invaded northern India, only in place of goat's flesh a sprig of millet had accompanied the bread. Before the Sonthal Rebellion a branch of the *sál* tree (*Shorea robusta*) had been sent from village to village." *

These indications made little impression, their significance was disregarded. No men had more faith in the loyalty of the Company's troops than the officers of the native army. The senior administrative officers treated with silent contempt their subordinates' reports, particularly if of an alarmist tenor. Sir Charles Napier had looked on a rising of the Indian nation as very likely to occur. Sir Henry Lawrence, a shrewd ruler, foresaw the mutiny and did his best to avert it, but his warnings fell on listless ears. The junior civil and military officers repeatedly gave warnings that something extraordinary was brooding, but no credit was attached to these reports.

In the last week of January, 1857, a spirit of mutiny was evinced by the native troops quartered at Barrackpore and at Dum Dum, but the matter of the greased cartridges having been explained to the troops, the Government assumed that all uneasy feelings had been removed. Shortly after the 19th Regiment of Native Infantry mutinied and was disbanded, and a sepoy of the 34th Native Infantry was tried and executed for shooting at

* Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, C.S.I., "Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi."

Lieutenant Baugh. The 63rd Native Infantry were also showing serious evidence of disaffection.

On the 10th of May the native troops broke out into open mutiny at Meerut, and on the 11th they reached Delhi, the capital of the last Great Mogul. The outbreak at Meerut was the beginning of the rebellion; the troops in most of the Bengal cantonments followed the example set them, revolted, and marched to swell the rebel army at Delhi.

The news of the outbreak reached England on the 29th of June, and arrangements were made by the Court of Directors to send reinforcements to India. So little did they understand the critical state of affairs, that they considered that two additional cavalry regiments and six additional infantry battalions would be sufficient to meet the contingency.

Fortunately, in a moment of sore trial a British plenipotentiary was on his way to China to adjust some differences between Great Britain and the rulers of that empire. He was Lord Elgin, and had with him a body of British troops—4491 officers and men—to support him. Lord Canning, aware of this, with the consent of Lord Elgin, intercepted these troops, and called them to come and help to put down the mutiny in India. About this time, also, the Persian War had come to a close, and Sir James Outram's forces returned to India, forming a second contingent of British troops available to face the crisis. More troops came from Ceylon, Mauritius, and the Cape.*

It was at Delhi that the question of British supremacy was virtually decided. In all the annals of British conquest in India there is no brighter page than that which depicts the valour and fortitude displayed by the small British and native force on the now famous ridge during those four dismal months of 1857.

* Sir Colin Campbell (afterwards Lord Clyde), who went to India as Commander-in-Chief after the death of General Anson, was an old veteran. His commission as an ensign was dated the 26th of May, 1808. On the 21st of August of that year he joined the British forces, then encamped about the village of Vimiera, and took part in that battle, being not quite sixteen years old. He was at Coruña, but his battalion was not engaged. He next went to Walcheren, then returned to the Peninsula; fought at Barossa and Vittoria; led the forlorn hope at the siege of St. Sebastian, where he was wounded; and was again wounded at the passage of the Bidassoa. He commanded the 98th Foot in the first China war, and a brigade in the Punjab War, taking part in the battles of Ramnugur, Chillianwalla and Goojrat; commanded the expedition to Kohat. On the 25th July, 1852, he resigned his command at Peshawur, owing to a difference with the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, and reverted to the command of the 98th Foot. Commanded the Highland Brigade in 1854, and contributed largely to the victory of the Alma. On the 10th of July of that year he was promoted Major-General, after a service of forty-six years and one month!

A rich country like India could easily provide the food and forage required by the small army then in the field. In a rising in which every one, Mahomedan or Hindoo alike, was against us, what must strike one as very strange is that no difficulty was experienced in provisioning the troops. We have the testimony of Lord Roberts on this point. He writes: "Throughout the campaign the commissariat department never failed; the troops were invariably well supplied, and even during the longest marches fresh bread was issued almost daily." *

What seems strange is that this praise of the Indian commissariat should appear as a passing observation in a foot-note. Whilst Lord Roberts fully describes many fights, incidents, and gallant deeds, he says very little about a matter which might have had the gravest results in the quenching of the mutiny. Had patriotism been able to overcome the innate greed of the native mind in the early part of the rebellion, such difficulties might have been placed in the way of provisioning as to have given quite a different turn to the campaign. In our army, truly, matters of administration do not evoke all the attention they deserve; here is one instance to show how they are cast in the background, as if almost unworthy of being noticed.

We ourselves joined the troops in the field after Delhi had fallen, and during the rest of the campaign of 1857-59 never wanted a ration. The provisions throughout were of good quality, in the assigned proportion, and issued with the greatest regularity. The soldier's ration is the outcome of a great many years of experience, and is universally acknowledged to be on a suitable and liberal scale.

The prompt liquidation of our obligations had inspired such confidence in the natives that no disloyalty could shake it. Moreover, the military operations were conducted with great method, and, as a general rule, there was none of that very rapid manœuvring which is often found when expert masters of the art contend against each other in European warfare.

The commissariat department in India had, as a rule, been efficiently administered, and had gained a certain amount of experience in the late wars in the Punjab. At that period, when the royal commissariat was purely an administrative department, with officers who began their career as Treasury clerks, and who in their entire service held nothing beyond a relative

* Lord Roberts, "Forty-one Years in India," vol. i. p. 281.

status in the army, the East India Company's commissariat was administered by officers withdrawn from regimental duty, but who did not, in virtue of being so employed, sever their connection with the combatant service. It should also be borne in mind that the success of the Indian commissariat, though greatly due to the talent of its officers, was singularly advanced by the influence which the British civil and political administrators had in the country.

The Indian commissariat had entered into large dealings with native contractors, and the prompt manner in which it had always settled the accounts, and the considerate and generous way in which it had dealt with its agents, had established a rooted respect for the department in the native mind. This was demonstrated by what occurred when General Havelock was advancing on Cawnpore in 1857. That portion of the establishment of bullocks for the siege train which was left at Cawnpore when Nana Sahib got possession of the station came out on the approach of the British force, joined it, and was of singular help in getting the guns up.

Sir Charles Gough and Arthur Innes in their work, "*The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*," pay a just tribute to the commissariat arrangements in the Punjab wars: "The commissariat department, though it may have worked expensively, was, however, very efficient, and supplies of all sorts were generally fully and rapidly obtained." *

In his "*Defects, Civil and Military, of the Government of India*," Sir Charles Napier, however, contends that the Indian commissariat was not always up to the mark. In the second chapter of Part II. he declares that in his days the contractor was not the soldier's friend with regard to the quality of the articles he supplied, and how, when the soldier urged any complaints, the commissariat officer always supported the contractor. Referring to the Military Board, he wrote: "What is the course of the Military Board? It accepts from native contractors tenders for supplying the Europeans at a price so low that it is not possible to execute the contract honestly, and every species of fraud and bribery is resorted to by the dexterous rascal who contracts." The Military Board was suppressed many years since; it was known to be very dilatory in its audit operations. In 1851, at the time when the Company brought charges of fraud against Lall

* Sir C. Gough and Arthur Innes, "*The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*," p. 69.

Jotee Pershad, and had him tried at Agra, the accounts of the Cabul campaign were not yet closed, this notwithstanding that the troops had left that country in 1842; neither were the accounts of the Sutlej and Punjab campaigns. That the accounts could thus lie open for years could not have been agreeable to the commissariat.

To return to the mutiny, the harvest before the outbreak of the sepoy army had been an extraordinarily good one, and for the subsistence of the forces employed in besieging Delhi there were abundant provisions to be obtained between Umballa and Meerut. The insurrection, however, occurred at an unfavourable moment, inasmuch as, for economical reasons, the East India Company had, in 1854, given up keeping a transport establishment. General Ramsay, who was commissary-general during Lord Dalhousie's administration, finding that he could fully depend upon the country for obtaining sufficient transport under contract, had advised the Government to get rid of the greater portion of the cattle establishment. The Government had thereupon ruled that it would henceforth hire transport for the occasion. Notwithstanding this change, no difficulty was ever experienced throughout the operations in gathering together a sufficiency of transport.

The happy result of Sir Henry Lawrence's foresight in the way of storing provisions is shown by the following passage taken from "The Sepoy Revolt," by Lieutenant-General McLeod Innes, V.C.: "Sir Henry had stored supplies in such quantity that the cattle furnished meat up to Havelock's arrival, while the grain food fed the whole force, including Havelock's, till Sir Colin arrived and withdrew the garrison, late in November."

Captain James, the energetic commissariat officer at Lucknow, having received orders from Sir Henry Lawrence to provision the Residency, spent his time in riding about the country buying supplies of all sorts, which were stored wherever room could be found for them. At Agra, Lieutenant Chalmers, the executive commissariat officer, aided by Lalla Jotee Pershad, had stored food in sufficient quantity for the garrison and refugees from the surrounding districts.

Lalla Jotee Pershad and Mr. Lang—a learned barrister of the Supreme Court, and afterwards the editor of the *Moffuselite*—who defended him, were well-known characters we often heard of, and even came across at the period of the Mutiny. The first was a

native agent and contractor employed by the Indian commissariat department for many years. He was employed in the operations in Afghanistan with General Pollock's force, and with the armies engaged in the Gwalior, Sutlej, and Punjab campaigns. A man of greater resources, a more competent and respectable agent it would have been difficult to find. His security was always to be depended on, and in his dealings he was fair. Those who knew him held that he was respectable, intelligent, and trustworthy. Deputy-Commissary Parsons said of him: "I can confidently recommend him as one of the most eligible agents for commissariat employment, and one upon whom the utmost dependence can be placed in times of difficulty requiring capital, energy, and honesty." His exertions in the above-mentioned campaigns kept the troops from ever being put on half-rations.*

No commissariat arrangements had been made for the second Sikh War. The deputy commissary-general, Major Ramsay, wrote to Lalla Jotee Pershad to meet him at Allyghur, and there told him he must supply the army with provisions, forage, and transport. The emergency was extremely critical, for the difficulties in procuring provisions on the frontier were very considerable, and had it not been for the personal energy and influence of Jotee Pershad the army might not have been able to proceed against the enemy. His influence in the country was great, and, having command of ready money, the people in large cities were anxious to enter into dealings with him. It can well be imagined what the personal influence and energy of the man must have been, to admit of his keeping the army so admirably supplied in the enemy's country, in a country devastated by war.

In 1851 Lalla Jotee Pershad, with Chotey Lall and Shunkur

* Brigadier James Parsons, C.B., who had command of Scindia's contingent in 1858, states: "I remember, particularly, I dined with Lord Hardinge on the 9th of December, 1845; and on taking leave of his lordship, he said he wished to ask me a question, which was, if I thought the Sikhs would cross the river or not? I said, 'Certainly not; the moment they did so, they would lose their independence. He said, 'That is my opinion also.' But that very night an express arrived, reporting that the Sikhs had actually crossed. Orders were immediately sent to the commander-in-chief to advance the army, and I got permission from his lordship to join the commander-in-chief's camp immediately. I did so, and joined at Lushkurra Khan ke Serai next morning. Up to that time no order for providing supplies for the army had been given to me. I immediately sent to Jotee Pershad, and gave him *carte blanche*, and told him supplies must be procured. He said, 'Very good,' and left me, and supplied all that was required fully and efficiently; and I know not another native in India who could have carried out my orders so completely as he did. I speak this with due consideration, as I was twenty-seven years in the commissariat, and had to do with a great many natives, contractors, and others; but none possessed the means and influence to carry out my views as he, Jotee Pershad, did."

Dass, was tried, charged with fraud and with subornation of perjury. The accused were acquitted, the court remarking that there were not sufficient grounds on evidence for their commitment.

After the successful termination of these wars, the Company was ill-advised to bring to trial the man who, by all accounts, was the only one they could have employed under the emergency, and without whose influence and exertions their armies could not have been fed.

It was contrary to the rules of the commissariat department to employ a contractor without his giving a security. The security given by Jotee Pershad for the Punjab campaign was a lac of rupees, which were held pending the final adjustment of his accounts by the Military Board. In that campaign it was computed that he employed at least 200 agents.

There was every year in India, in the winter months, a large movement of troops. These, in course of relief, marched long distances. Camping and feeding troops on the line of march were consequently matters thoroughly well understood, and carried out for many consecutive days with great order and regularity. The habits of the natives lent themselves to this.

To understand what feeding a large army in India really meant we must take into account that in the old days there was no restriction whatever on the number of servants, camp followers, and their families, who moved about with the troops;—they generally amounted to from three to five times the number of the combatants*—and must also remember that by far the largest portion of the army transport was composed of pack animals. Hackeries were not often employed, for many of the roads were indifferent, and the pace of the bullocks was too slow.

The greater portion of the commissariat transport was hired, and it was really extraordinary to see how a mass of heavily laden pack animals moved from camp to camp without a hitch, and came into camp immediately after the troops. Of the transport Lord Napier of Magdala wrote that it was “managed under a kind of social organization peculiar to itself, which has existed from time immemorial, and which goes on somehow, one hardly knows how.”

The facility with which contracts were made, and honestly carried out, and the fidelity of the drivers, were great recommen-

* In the seventeenth century in Europe, the baggage-trains and the mass of non-combatants were enormous. In one of the German armies, in which the troops did not number more than 40,000 men, there were counted 140,000 camp followers.

dations in favour of the system. The contractors, from whom large numbers of cattle were hired, were generally men of considerable power in the country, and they readily assisted the commissariat in getting provisions of every kind for the troops. About seven days was sufficient to furnish a force with provisions and transport.

There is a regimental system in the Indian cavalry regiments which is peculiar, and which relieves the command of much anxiety. Beyond the pay, arms, and ammunition, each regiment provides itself with all it requires. There is a system of funds—the *chundah* fund, the *tofeer* fund, the *wordie* fund—to which the native officers, non-commissioned officers and sowars, subscribe a monthly sum out of their pay for providing remounts, equipment, and clothing. A bazaar forms part of the establishment of each regiment, and among other rules the bunyas are bound to keep grain for a given number of days, with transport ready to move it.

One of the difficulties in a mixed European and native undertaking is to feed the Indian troops, owing to the great variety of races and caste; they are particular about their food, and what one eats the other will not. As a rule, the commissariat does not supply rations to native troops; an exception is made on service in localities where individuals would find great difficulty in purchasing it. With the native troops the bazaar is the supplying agent; the native sellers make it their business to supply the troops with provisions and other necessaries. This method suits the natives and is adapted to the country, but becomes difficult to work when the troops step beyond the frontier. Its drawback lies in the fact that the native soldier often abstains from purchasing sufficient food to maintain himself healthy and strong.

At the first starting of the China War, which followed close on the Indian Mutiny, the Royal and the Indian commissariat were employed. It was soon seen how the two, following different regulations and systems, could not well work together. Though the royal commissariat was short-handed, the Indian commissariat officers were sent back to India.* In that fortunate campaign the royal commissariat did not entirely agree with the military train, and at the end of the operations the department claimed the complete control over the land transport, and such ships as were employed in commissariat services. This ultimately

* Officers were then borrowed from the line to perform commissariat duties, but from want of training were anything but efficient.

led to the appointment of Lord Strathnairn's Committee, and eventually to the creation of the Control Department. The scope was of too collective a nature to be long-lived; the supervision of so many matters assigned as a charge for one single officer entailed a labour which was almost beyond the forces of man; it also diminished the responsibility of the chief of each secondary branch. The control system demanded very able officers indeed to work it, men of more talent than ambition. The British Army is very conservative; the new department was not popular, and the officers who had served under the old system from the very first did not work together with the required cordiality. After a trial which lasted several years it was found desirable to disestablish the new department. Three distinct branches were formed out of it—the Commissariat, the Ordnance Store, and the Pay Departments.

The duties of an Indian commissariat officer educate him for that responsibility which he is frequently called upon to assume. Being varied, they make him self-reliant and acquainted with many shifts and resources. At the end of a year's probation the young officer who aspires to join the department has to undergo a final examination in the following subjects. This will show what a wide range of matter he has to become proficient in.

- (a) The care and custody of cattle and commissariat stores;
- (b) The system of procuring supplies by departmental agency or by contract;
- (c) The mode of rationing British and native troops;
- (d) Departmental rules and returns;
- (e) Drawing up estimates and average statements of the cost of victualling troops and feeding cattle;
- (f) The equipment of cattle;
- (g) The commissariat stores required for cavalry, artillery, and infantry on the march;
- (h) Cattle for food and for transport, breeding, weight, etc.;
- (i) Reading the accounts of native subordinates;
- (j) Writing orders and letters in the vernacular;
- (k) Knowledge of commissariat accounts.

The officers of the Indian commissariat have in peace that practice which comes so useful in time of war. They are bound to acquire a fair knowledge of the resources of their districts, and this habit teaches them how to turn the produce of India to profitable account for military purposes.

When we ponder over the *commissariat* arrangements which obtained in the two campaigns which form the subject of this chapter, we are struck by the great difference which existed. In one, a stationary army with the full command of the sea, within a short steaming distance of the ports of Bulgaria and Asiatic Turkey—where there were consuls to aid us with their local experience and influence—and the great emporium of Constantinople, with a few miles of transport by road, and with no hostile population to interrupt the communications, was allowed for several months to experience great want of provisions. In the other case, small armies scattered over the whole face of the Bengal territory, with operations entailing a constant state of movement, contending in a country in which all classes of the population were bitterly hostile, were, without resorting to coercion, but simply by following the old system of contract, amply supplied at all periods of the active operations.

To what can this remarkable difference be attributed? Partly to the way in which the *commissariat* was formed. The department in 1851 was under the orders of the Lords of the Treasury, who naturally knew very little about war, and whose great aim was to manage the war cheaply. According to Sir W. T. Power, a few officers, not sufficient to attend to all duties, had been collected in haste from distant quarters of the globe. Apart from the seniors, many of whom had served in the Peninsula, the junior officers had limited colonial experience with small detachments of troops, supplied almost exclusively under local contracts, without direct *commissariat* interposition.

Besides this, in the long peace which followed after Waterloo, the officers of the royal *commissariat* had sunk into mere distributors and accountants. They had lost sight of the severe toil connected with procuring provisions and provisioning an army in the field. The experienced had become rusty, and the inexperienced, having neglected to master the subject, when the difficulties cropped up had not the knowledge of the details necessary to form competent *commissariat* officers.

In India, on the other hand, the same class of officers, with a professional knowledge of the requirements of the troops combined a wide acquaintance with the local resources; and, as the troops were accustomed to make long marches, the machinery for feeding them was constantly in use. The royal *commissariat* had no proper establishment of storekeepers, clerks, issuers,

artificers, bakers, butchers, etc., whereas in India much of the subordinate work was done by smart conductors and uncovenanted *employés*; most of the clerical matter was intrusted to native writers, and the details of distribution were left to be attended to by unenlisted natives, men who had quite a talent for that description of work. In the neighbourhood of the troops, native agents were never at a loss to purchase the principal articles of food; not only were the local resources ample, but they were turned to profitable account at every step that the forces took.

Major-General Balfour, C.B., R.A., in his evidence before Lord Strathnairn's Committee (1867), stated: "I think that the commissariat in India, from the extent of their transactions, stands in a higher position than our home commissariat. I think the Indian commissariat officers perform duties of a higher and more extensive administrative character than in this country, and their influence is felt over very considerable areas."

The Indian commissariat continues to give satisfaction on service. At the conclusion of the operations of the Malakand Field Force, Major-General Sir Bindon Blood reported on the services performed by the department in the following terms: "The commissariat arrangements under Major H. Wharry, D.S.O., were most successful. The rations were always abundant, and of uniformly good quality; and I may here observe that in five previous campaigns I have never seen the supply of bread anything like so continuously good as it has been throughout the operations of the Malakand Field Force. No doubt, the excellence of the commissariat arrangements has had a great deal to do with the good state of health of the troops, which I have remarked upon."

The reader will judge if this praise was not well merited, when he takes into account the duration of the operations—nearly three months—the very difficult nature of the country, the poorness of the roads, and the fact that the line of communications led through a hostile country, or one that might at any moment have turned so.

CHAPTER XI.

THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1861-1865.

SINCE Napoleon's overthrow in 1815, no other war has attained the same proportions as the contest the North waged against the Southern States of America for the preservation of the Union. No recent war can compare with it when we take into account the duration of the struggle, the mass of combatants raised, the number of battles and engagements fought, and the size of the contending armies.

In examining broadly the measures taken for provisioning the forces of the Union, one is naturally struck by what difficulties the subsistence department must have had to contend against at first starting. A great war came on the country as a surprise; there were no preparations, and the officers can have had no personal experience whatever in the arduous task of provisioning large masses of men in the field.

The very number of troops under arms conveys somewhat of an idea of the difficulties the department had to face. On the 1st of January, 1861, the army of the United States numbered 16,367 men. On the 15th of April of that year Mr. Lincoln called on the States to furnish 75,000 volunteers to overcome "combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." In July of the same year the army had risen to 186,757 men, and it went on gradually increasing. The muster-rolls showed on—

January 1, 1862	575,917	men.
" 1863	918,191	"
" 1864	860,737	"
" 1865	959,460	"
March 31, 1865	980,086	"
May 1, 1865	1,000,516	"

In 1861, whilst the army of the Potomac, prior to the campaign in the Peninsula of Virginia, lay encamped in the vicinity of Washington, it drew provisions and forage from the depôts which had been established at Washington, Alexandria, Fort Corcoran, and Runyon. The railway line of supply may be said to have been the Baltimore and Ohio Railway. In view of the former diet of the volunteers, vegetables and fresh meat, in addition to what was laid down in the regulations, was sanctioned to be issued to the troops.

A large depôt for transport had been established at Perryville, on the left bank of the Susquehanna. A depôt of transport, and of remounts for artillery and cavalry, was at the same time established in the immediate neighbourhood of Washington.

A striking feature of the topography of the States of America is the number of navigable rivers, and it was soon seen, when the Civil War broke out, that the side which could secure possession of these streams from their sources to their mouths would be master of the country. The Union soon acquired command of the seaboard and of the rivers leading inland, and, besides employing railways as lines of supply, turned the waterways into lines of communication. These are undoubtedly the best adapted for the purpose when there are sufficient ships available, for ships are not exposed to attacks to the same extent as roads and railways. Ships, besides, carry many tons of stores in a compact form, which would otherwise occupy miles of road, and release the administration from having to pay, feed, and take care of thousands of animals, with their indispensable attendants.

In proportion to the enormous extent of country, the States in which the operations were carried on in the Civil War were scantily populated. The settlements were few and distant from each other; much of the country was clothed with forest. This peculiarity of the country not only limited the amount of the local resources, but had the effect that in battle the soldiers were less under the direction of their commander-in-chief and divisional generals. Indeed, most of the battle-fields presented very little resemblance to the battle-fields of Europe.

In Virginia—which was the great battle-ground of the war—no dependence whatever could be placed in procuring subsistence for an army from local sources. The Federal forces had to trust to the rations carried by the soldiers and by the army

trains. The amount so carried varied from ten to sixteen days' supply.

The Federals could count on the resources of a powerful and rich country, and the unlimited command of supplies from Europe. In the spring of 1862, for McClellan's Peninsular Campaign, vast quantities of stores had been accumulated in and round Fortress Monroe. The Federal fleet was intended to sail past the Confederate defences at Yorktown, and convey provisions up the York River to West Point. These were to feed the land force as it advanced on Richmond.

On the 4th of May, Johnston evacuated Yorktown, and McClellan advanced on Richmond by way of Williamsburg. On the 16th, the divisions of Franklin, Porter, and Smith moved to White House on the Pamunkey River, where a permanent dépôt was established. White House became the base of operations from which the army of the Potomac, then astride on the Chickahominy, drew its supplies. The provisions were brought up to the troops by the Richmond and York River Railway. This line from White House to the main camp measured eighteen miles. The army was well supplied with transport. According to Colonel Ingalls' report, it had, on the 1st of July, 1862, 3100 waggons, 350 ambulances, 17,000 horses, and 8000 mules. The effective strength was about 80,000 men, consequently there were forty waggons for each thousand men.

On the 26th of June McClellan, finding the enemy in his rear, and fearing lest the Federal supply dépôt at White House might be cut off, telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls to run the cars to the last moment, and to send provisions by waggon to Savage Station. If compelled to abandon White House, he was to destroy by fire what could not be carried away; fresh dépôts were to be promptly established on the James River.

White House was abandoned on the 28th, but every measure had been taken for a rapid retreat down the Pamunkey. Only a small quantity of stores had to be destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. By the 3rd of July McClellan's base was established at Harrison's landing on the James River.

The subsistence department at Washington took every possible care to send all that was needed by the troops in Virginia. McClellan reports on this point: "During the entire period that I was in command of the army of the Potomac there

was no instance within my knowledge where the troops were without rations from any fault of this (Subsistence) department."

Not later than the first year of the war the South began to feel the full effects of the blockade of its coasts. There was no salt to preserve the meat necessary for the support of the armies. Wine, tea, and coffee had become scarce and dear. Spirits were extracted from fruit, and coffee was replaced by a decoction of rye. The cultivation of cotton was to a large extent given up, and the fields were sown with Indian corn.

After McClellan's withdrawal to the James River, the Federal Administration organized the army of Virginia under General Pope, with the object of advancing from the Upper Rappahannock for the capture of Richmond. Lee sent Jackson north to attack Pope, and on the 30th of August the latter suffered a crushing defeat in the second battle of Bull Run. The alarm this caused in Washington resulted in the withdrawal of McClellan's army from Virginia. Lee then marched the rest of his forces to join Jackson; thus, early in the month of September, 1862, the two armies were again about where they had been at the beginning of the year.

Lee crossed the Potomac, took possession of Frederick City, and threatened Philadelphia and Baltimore. McClellan marched through Maryland, and covered Baltimore. This compelled Lee to turn to the north-west through the mountains. McClellan pressed hard on the rear of the Confederate army, and forced his way through the mountain passes. Lee had to face about and fight. The battle of Antietam, or of Sharpsburg, was fought on the 17th of September. The action was indecisive, for Lee retired without leaving a gun or a waggon behind, but the Confederates had to give up the invasion of the North and recross the Potomac into Virginia.

As reasons for not renewing the attack on the 18th, McClellan asserts that his troops were greatly overcome with fatigue and exhaustion from the day and night marches of the previous three days, followed by a severely contested battle; that his supply trains were in the rear, and many of his troops had suffered from hunger. But, more than anything else, that he was not inclined to fight another battle with less than an absolute assurance of success. He recognized that the national cause was in such a critical condition that it could not afford any risk of defeat.

It was Napoleon who said that the supply of shoes always

fell short in war.* Field-Marshal Sir John Burgoyne relates how, one day, he asked the Duke of Wellington which he considered the first requirement of a soldier? The duke replied, "A good pair of shoes." "And the second?" "A good pair of shoes for a change." "And the third?" "A pair of soles for repairs." The want of shoes had a considerable influence in the result of this campaign.

On the part of the Confederates, the campaign had been bare of success because Lee's army was reduced in effectives by the failure of thousands of barefooted men to march with him into Maryland. In September, 1862, the Confederate army was wanting in war materials, and badly off for transport; the animals were out of condition and worn out. The men were badly provided with clothes, and thousands were destitute of shoes. They were clad in rags, with feet either bare or only half shod; they had no tents; their food consisted of green apples and green corn. The contrast between the well-clothed and well-fed Federal troops and the ragged and poorly equipped army of the Confederacy kept the people of Maryland from giving any substantial help to the south, either in recruits or in provisions. It was a grievous disappointment, for great hopes had been built on the enthusiasm of the Marylanders for the South.

Lee was not only the most able man the war produced, but, gifted with a high sense of humanity and justice, he tried to lessen as far as possible the horrors of war. He showed an example of forbearance which some of his opponents might well have copied. Notwithstanding the stress of provisions, he forbade all depredations of private property, and ordered the quartermasters to purchase all supplies needed by the army. At Sharpsburg the Confederates were weary from long marches, and their food during the day was plucked from the apple trees that stood on the battle-field.

As the army settled down on the Potomac, Lee began to press the authorities at Richmond for supplies of shoes for his soldiers.

This year, which had already seen McClellan's Peninsular Campaign, Pope's defeat in front of Washington, and the Confederate invasion of the North, closed with Burnside's defeat at Fredericksburgh. Burnside had been placed in command of the army in lieu of McClellan, whose slowness and want of energy in

* "*Vous savez qu'on manque toujours de souliers à la guerre.*"

the campaign in Maryland was much blamed. This was the excuse, but it appears that his greatly increasing popularity caused alarm to many members of Mr. Lincoln's cabinet. They showed little regard for his demands for stores, equipment, and horses, and sent him instead repeated orders to advance.

Burnside had an army of 125,000 men, and purposed crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburgh, and then advancing on Richmond. His main depôt of supplies was at Aquia Creek on the Potomac. Lee and Jackson were before him, and had fortified the hills behind Fredericksburgh. On the 13th of December Burnside crossed the Rappahannock, and attempted to storm the hills, but he was defeated with heavy loss, and driven back to the north side of the river.*

Nearly 3000 soldiers of the Confederate army were still barefooted; many were without muskets, and, though it was winter, were still worse off with regard to blankets.

Hooker, who in his turn succeeded Burnside, tried in the following May (1863) to force his way to Richmond. He led his army across the Rappahannock, but with no better success; he was met by Lee at Chancellorsville, and driven back across the river with heavy loss. This was one of the great battles of the war. Stonewall Jackson fell severely wounded at Chancellorsville. Lee, in allusion to his general having lost his left arm, said that in Jackson he himself had lost his right. The hero of the Shenandoah Valley died of his wounds.

Fortune, however, smiled on the Federal armies in the West. The possession of the Mississippi was an object of the highest importance to the North. The three Confederate states of Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas lay to the westward of that river; if the Federals could regain command of this river from its source to its mouth these states would be entirely cut off from the rest of the Confederacy.

The war that was expected to have lasted ninety days had dragged its slow length along for over two and a half years. Many combats, large and small, had been fought, but no thoroughly lasting result had yet been obtained in any quarter. It was not surprising that the North felt discouraged. One

* Lee wanted to make a stand behind the North Anna river, where a Federal defeat so far from their water communications and their base of supply might probably have resulted in the destruction of Burnside's army. The Confederate Government, to save Virginian territory from devastation, bade him meet the enemy on the Rappahannock.

demand for troops had succeeded another, until over 1,300,000 men had been called into the service of the Union for longer or shorter periods. The expenditure the war had already cost was sufficient to discourage even a power so rich in territory and resources as the United States.

Farragut's fleet had captured New Orleans in April, 1862, and in the following June had moved up the Mississippi to attack Vicksburg. The attempt, after a month of toil, and after several plans had been tried, was given up.* In the end of March, 1863, Grant, who knew how necessary a signal victory was for the North, ordered his troops to concentrate at Milliken's Bend, with the object of laying siege to the city. His intention was to attack Vicksburg from the rear.

The Federals marched south from Milliken's Bend by way of Richmond to Perkin's Plantation, ten or twelve miles below New Carthage. The road through the flooded land was, however, in such a bad state that it was impossible to use it for conveying large stores of provisions. Vessels loaded with provisions and ammunition, convoyed by the eight gunboats of Admiral Porter's squadron, had to carry them down stream, running the gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries. On the night of the 16th of April, 1863, the first attempt was made: every transport was struck, and one sunk. The operation was repeated on the 22nd, when seven more transports, towing twelve barges loaded with forage and provisions, passed the batteries. Of the transports one was sunk, and one was burnt; six of the barges were disabled.

Grant ferried his army across the Mississippi below the city, landed the troops at Bruinsburg, and moved towards Port Gibson, a place twelve miles from Bruinsburg. There he met the enemy at two o'clock on the morning of the 1st of May; a sharp engagement ensued, fighting lasted through the day, and ended in the defeat of the Confederates.

Pemberton and Johnston did not work well together. The two had an army of 60,000 men. Pemberton held Vicksburg, Johnston was at Jackson, the capital of the state of Mississippi, fifty miles to the east of Vicksburg. Johnston wished to have no siege, but to fight the Federals in the open field; Pemberton

* It was during these first operations against Vicksburg that one of the most daring feats of the whole war was performed. Lieutenant Brown, with a crew of volunteers from the army, manned a river steamer, the *Arkansas*, which had been strengthened with iron, sallied forth from the Yazoo river, and attacked the Federal fleets under Porter and Farragut.

proceeded to strengthen the fortifications in every way, and to get ready for a siege. Grant's plan was to interpose between Johnston and Pemberton, and destroy the two in detail.

On the 3rd of May he attacked the works at Grand Gulf in reverse, and without any very heavy fighting carried that post. It was after this, to obviate being molested in the rear, that he determined, against the opinion of all his most prominent officers, to operate without a base.

In the preceding December Van Dorn had captured the depôt of supplies established at Holly Springs, and a cavalry raid led by Forrest had intercepted Grant's communications with the North. Grant then realized how next to impossible it was to maintain a long line of communications through an enemy's country, but, on the other hand, how possible it was to subsist mainly on the resources of the country itself.

He now decided to make use of the experience he had acquired, and purposed to protect his rear by keeping the Confederates so well occupied that they would have no opportunity for detached movements. This would add to his strength, for there would be no need to leave any troops to guard and keep open the communications with the Mississippi.

Despite the very great advantages which the electric telegraph confers in war, unfortunately it lends itself to the Government hampering by its directions the operations of a general in the field. Grant cut loose from his base to get rid of all interference from the cautious and distrustful Halleck, who wished that the operations should be carried out strictly in accordance with the principles of war.

On the 12th of May Grant inflicted a defeat on the Confederates at Raymond, after which he determined to capture Jackson by a bold stroke.

Grant's position, with Johnston in front of him at Jackson, and Pemberton in his rear at Vicksburg, was a dangerous one; nothing but ruin awaited him should the two Confederate leaders succeed in combining their forces. Grant, however, relied on rapidity of movement, and showed unbounded confidence in his troops. Twenty days after he had crossed the Mississippi at Bruinsburg, his army had marched 180 miles; he had gained five battles, with a loss to the enemy of 88 guns and 12,500 men; he had captured the capital of the Mississippi state, and destroyed all the enemy's depôts of supplies, with the railroad and bridges which

connected Vicksburg to Jackson.* He had kept his troops well together, and had always encountered the enemy with superior forces. On the 19th of May he was in a position to commence the investment of Vicksburg.

His movements had compelled the enemy to evacuate Haines Bluff, which he now constituted as a base of supplies. On the 21st of May the trains from that place arrived at the Union camp with rations for the troops. From this time his grip on Vicksburg could not be loosened. Halleck sent him reinforcements, and by the 14th of June his forces had increased to 71,000 men. By the 20th of that month 220 guns had been placed in position.†

Johnston threatened the rear of the Federals, but steps had been taken to cover the ground with batteries and rifle-pits. The Confederate general moved slowly, and could not combine his action with the besieged forces. Pemberton hoisted the white flag on the 3rd of July, and the surrender of the fortress was carried out the following day. Sixty thousand muskets, 172 pieces of ordnance, and 31,600 prisoners were the fruit of the siege. The fall of Vicksburg led to that of Port Hudson, which surrendered to General Banks as the news arrived that Pemberton had laid down his arms. The whole of the Mississippi River thus passed under the control of the fleets and armies of the Union; the Confederacy had been divided into two parts, each of which in future had to fight for itself, and no help could pass from one to the other. They could no longer bring grain and cattle across the river from Texas and Arkansas to feed their armies east of the Mississippi.

The War of Secession may well be divided into two distinct parts. For the first two years of the contest the Federal Government was engaged in fixing its encircling lines and winning territory piecemeal from the Confederacy. There was no finality in the actions of most generals; a victory was followed by a period of rest, and was allowed to lie fallow for want of a proper appreciation of the best advantages that could be derived from it. The Cabinet exercised a baneful control.

In the next two years the energies of the Executive were more

* Jackson was a small peaceful county town of two main streets and detached villas, inhabited by wealthy planters. The inhabitants offered no resistance, but this did not prevent the wanton destruction of the place. The Federal soldiers, drunk with rum, pillaged and burnt without being restrained by their officers.

† Mortars were constructed by boring out logs of hard wood and binding them with iron.

in keeping with the principles of war. New generals led their armies; Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Meade, all hard-and-fast fighters, who were bent on seeking and destroying the principal Confederate armies with a view to putting a speedy end to the war. Grant reasoned that all secondary successes were worthless, so long as the heart of the rebellion was not pierced. Action and continued action, according to him, was the only way of transforming raw troops into veterans.

Whilst Grant was pressing the siege of Vicksburg, the Confederates were beaten in the battle of Gettysburg. The Gettysburg campaign was brought about by the scarcity of provisions, and, above all, of forage in the Confederate army. The resources of Virginia were nearly exhausted,* and a change in the scene of operations had become necessary. Lee's design was to transfer hostilities to northern ground, and there to subsist his army; to cause the evacuation of Washington by a victory in Pennsylvania; and to force the recall of the Federal troops from the siege of Vicksburg.

To turn his adversary's flank he had to deceive the Federal general at Falmouth, and take a long route by Gordonsville and Culpepper. His supplies had to come round by Gordonsville, whilst Hooker could not only march to Warrenton or Manassas by a shorter route, but, by means of the rail to Aquia Creek and the transports on the Potomac, could move his provisions with greater facility.

The question of provisions was intimately connected with the action of both sides. In the first operations against Milroy, that commander could not hold out at Winchester till succour could arrive, simply from lack of supplies. After Gettysburg, Lee had to retire, for he could not hope to remain in Pennsylvania at so great a distance from his base of supplies.

In writing to Stuart on the 22nd of June, 1863, Lee ordered him to collect all the supplies he could for the use of his army. Ewell was directed to advance into Pennsylvania to procure provisions. It depended on his success for the rest of the army to march into the Cumberland valley. Accordingly, in June, he established his headquarters at Chambersburg; he scoured the country for many miles with the object of collecting horses,

* When the Confederates crossed the Potomac they were principally armed with rifles captured from the enemy, and carried knapsacks and accoutrements which still bore the names and numbers of Federal regiments.

forage, and provisions, paying for the same in Confederate money.

The greater portion of Lee's army was subsequently concentrated in the Cumberland valley, a rich and fruitful country, teeming with plenty. Requisitions were served on the towns, but strict orders had been issued against plundering and retaliation, which, much to their credit, the Confederate soldiers obeyed.

On the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of July was fought the battle of Gettysburg. After a tremendous fire of two hours' duration from a hundred and fifty cannon, the Confederates made their last charge. It was gallantly made and gallantly repulsed. After a struggle which lasted three hours, Lee was defeated; he had lost in the three days about 30,000 men. His army had been so badly punished by the terrible slaughter that it was never again quite equal to what it had been before. He never recovered from the serious loss he had sustained, and henceforth made no further effort to invade the North. July, 1863, in fact, was the turning-point of the war, after which the Confederacy grew steadily weaker.

Lee's Government left him vastly outnumbered on every battlefield, and though he generally gave the enemy a staggering blow, the latter quickly presented itself with recruited numbers. The flower of his army was in part destroyed at the battle of Chancellorsville, and the South was unable to send other soldiers to make good the loss. He repeatedly urged the Confederate President to reinforce his army by the troops guarding the Atlantic coast, to make him sufficiently strong to destroy the army of the Potomac, but in vain. In rebuking the southern newspapers for scorning the suggestions of peace, Lee reminded them that whilst his resources in men were constantly diminishing, those of the enemy were steadily augmenting.

Rosecrans had not stirred to co-operate with Grant in the Vicksburg campaign; he had been seriously defeated in the battle of Chickamauga on the 20th of September, in which his effective force was reduced by nearly one-third. Bragg followed him, and shut his army up in Chattanooga. Chattanooga was a most important point for both sides. The army which held it could control all East Tennessee, and could at the same time attack the mountainous region to the south of it, in northern Georgia. Though Rosecrans still retained possession of Chattanooga, the Confederates had cut him off from the Tennessee River,

which was his natural line of communications with his base. His army was so hemmed in that it could neither advance nor retire, and in this position it was gradually being reduced to starvation. "His supplies had to be hauled for many miles from Bridgeport, Alabama—the terminus of the railroad turning south from Nashville—over a road lying back from the river; and this road was constantly raided by Confederate cavalry under the enterprising General Wheeler. Over 12,000 mules had been killed in transporting supplies. The distance was sixty miles, twenty-five miles of it through unfathomable mud, and across a mountain ridge where a false step would precipitate a team over a frightful precipice. A thousand pounds was an unusual load for a waggon drawn by six starved and jaded mules." *

The situation of Rosecrans' army was desperate—there appeared no other alternative but starvation or a disorderly retreat; his men had been reduced to one-third rations, his horses were either dead, or so crippled by starvation that they were not able to draw his guns into action. Grant, who had been appointed to command the military division of Missouri, was ordered to Chattanooga, where he arrived on the 23rd of October, and soon, in General Howard's words, an army on the verge of starvation was changed into an active, healthful, well-supplied conquering force.

Bragg, who commanded the Southern forces, occupied Missionary Ridge and Look-out Mountain, limestone cliffs running a little west of south from the Chattanooga River, and nearly parallel with it, and enclosing between them the Chattanooga valley. These heights were strongly fortified and held by the Confederates. Look-out Mountain, which Rosecrans had lost when he drew back on Chattanooga, was a crest rising abruptly above the Tennessee River to the height of 2400 feet above sea-level.

Grant's operations began on the 26th and 27th of October, when Hooker's forces joined the army of the Cumberland. Sherman had left Memphis on the 2nd of October, with the army of the Tennessee, to go to Grant's aid, and, notwithstanding bad roads and swollen streams, he reached Bridgeport by the 13th of November, and by the 15th was in Chattanooga. Grant had opened the way to Bridgeport, and the troops, who had been living on almost quarter rations, within a week of his arrival were receiving full rations. They were well fed, had been re-clothed, and despondency had given place to courage and hope. The

* William Conant Church, "Ulysses S. Grant," p. 196.

moment for action had arrived. Grant could dispose of 60,000 men; his adversary had 45,000. On the 23rd of November, Thomas made a reconnaissance in force, to ascertain the truth of the report that Bragg's army was falling back. When his movement was stopped, his troops occupied a position one mile beyond that held by the enemy in the morning. On the 24th of November Sherman attacked the right of the Confederate position, and secured two high points on Missionary Ridge. Hooker secured possession of Look-out Mountain. Bragg drew his troops from Look-out Mountain with the object of concentrating on his right, against Sherman. At daylight on the 25th Sherman advanced to the attack. Thomas, after a desperate struggle, secured the summit of Missionary Ridge. His troops did so without orders, and were much surprised at their own success.

The Confederates were pursued on the night of the 26th and 27th of November up the Chickamauga as far as Ringgold in Georgia.

The importance of the victory lay more in the fact that the Confederates drew their provision of lead, nitre, and coal from eastern Tennessee; that their chief stock of corn and nine-tenths of all their bacon came from those districts.

The Unionist loss in the three days' battle is set down at 5821, that of the Confederates at 8681 men, of whom 6142 were made prisoners. The loss in some of Grant's regiments was over sixty per cent. Sheridan, in his attack on Missionary Ridge, in one hour lost twenty per cent. of his force of 6000 men.

The important battles of 1863 were followed by ten months of inaction. It was not till the beginning of the following year that the armies of the Union were again set in motion. The army of the Potomac numbered at that time about 100,000 men. Sherman had assumed the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi with another 100,000 men; Major-General Banks had 20,000 men west of the Mississippi; Major-General Butler commanded the army of the James, 23,000 strong, on the James River close to Richmond; Major-General Sigel guarded the approaches to Washington by the Shenandoah Valley.

In the month of April the three corps of the army of the Potomac were between the Rapidan River and the Upper Rappahannock. Grant determined to march direct upon Richmond; but the capture of the Confederate capital in his mind was of secondary importance. Lee, and not Richmond, was his objective; the necessary thing to do was to defeat the Confederate army in

the open field. The subsistence of his army, nevertheless, had considerable influence on the selection of the line of advance. In a letter to General Meade, he wrote: "Lee's army will be your objective point; wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. The sole point upon which I am now in doubt, is whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other, with corresponding objections; by crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond, and going north on a raid.* But if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out. We separate from Butler, so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James River." The movement by the left to operate against Lee's right flank was eventually adopted. The object Grant had in view was to fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand.

The army of Northern Virginia spent the dreary months from December, 1863, to May, 1864, on the southern bank of the Rapidan River. There it suffered much from cold and want of provisions. White, in his "Life of Robert E. Lee," writes: "The worst-clad and the worst-fed army, perhaps, ever mustered into service was the band of Confederate heroes who shivered and starved together on the banks of the Rapidan. Rude huts of pine and oaken logs, furnished inside with beds of straw, formed the habitation of both officers and men. The soldiers were clad in garments made up of patches and fluttering strings. Very few possessed comfortable shoes. Thousands were absolutely destitute of covering for head or foot. The only complete outfits were the products of hand-loom, woven by wives, mothers, and daughters, who kept brave watch, and prosecuted uncomplaining labours in the old plantation homes.

"Hunger was the most inveterate enemy of the Confederates in the Rapidan bivouac. One quarter of a pound of fat pork, with a little meal or a little flour, was the portion of food assigned daily to each man. Very frequently the pork only was dealt out, or perhaps the meal, or a bundle of crackers. . . . But

* What Grant wanted to avoid actually occurred, for, on the 13th of June, Early was sent to attack Hunter. That officer left the Shenandoah Valley open to Early's corps, and the Confederates were able to threaten the capital from the north. Never was Washington so near being captured during the war. Early was delayed just long enough for reinforcements to come in aid of the imperilled city.

the railways were dilapidated, and the rolling-stock worn out, and the meat and corn produced in the far south could not be swiftly borne to the starving men who were defending the northern threshold of the Confederacy.”* The South could provide provision for their armies in the field, for its three and a half millions of slaves made themselves useful by carrying on the agricultural labour of the country. The main difficulty the Confederacy had to contend with in subsisting its soldiers during the war lay not in the production of provisions and forage, but in their transport over decayed and worn-out railways. The Federals had destroyed many, and occupied others, and there were no great iron foundries in the South to produce the materials required for keeping the lines in proper repair.

Whilst Lee's army was debilitated by want, according to the testimony of one of his officers, Grant had the best-clothed and the best-fed army that ever took the field. Twenty thousand men had charge of the trains, 4000 waggons carried provisions and ammunition for an army of 100,000 men.

Grant held that war made in slavish observance of rules will fail. However true this is, there are certain conditions which must always be observed to secure victory. He determined to make a straight march upon Richmond, but of the various alternatives open to him for this purpose he selected the worst. He had to cross a river in face of a resolute enemy—one of the most difficult operations of war; after this he might have to give battle with a river in his rear, and in a most intricate country, so thickly covered with woods that the presence, strength, and movements of the enemy could be easily concealed, in which it was impossible to use cavalry, and all but impossible to use artillery: on ground with which Lee and his soldiers who had fought at Chancellorsville were pretty well acquainted, whilst there was no possibility of keeping his movements secret, as the inhabitants of the Wilderness sympathized with the Confederates, and gave their voluntary service as spies.

He hoped by a rapid movement to delay an encounter until his army had reached a more open country; but, had he studied the qualities of his opponent, he would have realized that this would have been the very last thing he had any reason to expect.

General Ingalls gives the following details with regard to the

* Henry Alexander White, “Robert E. Lee, and the Southern Confederacy,” p. 332.

composition of the Federal army : "The forces that composed the armies on the Rapidan were as follows: The 5th and 6th Corps, the cavalry and artillery reserve and engineer brigade constituted the army of the Potomac, under General Meade; and the 9th corps, under General Burnside; making about 125,000 effective men. There were 4300 waggons; 835 ambulances; 29,945 artillery, cavalry, ambulance and team horses; 4016 private horses; 22,528 mules; making an aggregate of 56,499 animals; 34 waggons per 1000 men."

Grant was not as fortunate this year as he had been in the last. He had before him a most alert and skilful adversary, a man of rare military ability, a better master of the art of war than he was himself. From the 5th to the 7th of May he fought the battle of the Wilderness, in which the army of the Potomac and Burnside's corps lost 17,666 in killed and wounded, the missing amounting to 2900. His object was not attained, and if we take for a criterion of success, in default of any other, the number of casualties, the advantage remained with Lee, whose loss was about one-third less. There is no denying that it was a partial failure.

Lee had foreseen his adversary's next move. Grant had set his impedimenta in motion at 3 p.m. on the 7th, so as to keep the way clear for the troops. Stuart, however, having reported the movement of the Federal waggon-train, the Confederate forces were hurried to Spottsylvania Court House. The race between Grant and Lee was a close one, but Lee succeeded in planting his army across Grant's line of advance. Another series of battles were fought here from the 8th to the 18th of May; they resulted in a loss of 16,141 killed and wounded and 2258 missing to the army of the Potomac; the Confederate loss was much smaller.*

In a lull in the operations between the 13th and the 18th of May, the Confederates rested, and appeased their hunger with provisions drawn from the captured Federal haversacks. "Real coffee boiled in new Federal tin cups, with foreign sugar, gave additional vigour to Lee's veterans."

* Whilst these battles were in progress, Grant telegraphed to Halleck: "Send to Belle Plain all the infantry you can rake and scrape." Again, on the following day, he informs the Executive at Washington that he will fight it out on this line if it take the whole summer, adding, "The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers." The strain had been too severe; repeated repulses and disproportionate losses had affected the *morale* of the Federal soldiers, and produced a loss of dash.

After leaving Hanover Junction, or since the 21st of May, the Confederates had received only two issues of rations; one issue consisted of three hard biscuits and a meagre slice of pork to each man. Two days after this issue one biscuit was apportioned to each soldier; upon this scanty allowance the Confederates had to contend in the battle of Cold Harbour.

After the battles of Spottsylvania Court House, Grant manœuvred round Lee's right flank. On the 28th of May the Confederate army stood athwart his path. He waited for reinforcements, which W. F. Smith brought up on the 30th of May; and on the 1st of June a battle was fought on the roadway between Old and New Cold Harbour. The battle was renewed the following day, but Grant, who had an opportunity to fight in open ground, declined to deliver battle against Early, upon which the latter built a strong breastwork in front of the Union right. Grant assaulted all along the line—it was six miles in length—on the morning of the 3rd of June, but the fire of the Confederates was very fierce and accurate. Within twenty minutes the leading troops of the three corps which attacked Lee's centre and left were almost destroyed, and the rest sought shelter; the assault was hopelessly repulsed. At nine o'clock Grant ordered a renewal of the attack, but no forward move was made. His generals did not relish sacrificing their men, and the men simply reopened fire from where they lay. In an hour he had lost nearly 12,000 in dead and wounded; the troops had advanced slowly and unwillingly, and sustained heavier losses than there was reason to expect.

In the middle of June, Grant, having taken into account the temper of his troops, and found the defences of Richmond on the north and east too strong to be taken by assault, determined to move his army round, cross the James River, and attack the city on the south side. He carried out this movement, following nearly the line of the Seven Days' Battle in 1862, but with very little fighting. City Point, which Butler had taken by surprise on the 5th of May, was to be the great dépôt for the Federal army.

The dépôt at White House was broken up on the 22nd of June, 1864, and Sheridan's cavalry was detailed to escort a convoy of 900 waggons to the James River. The convoy was attacked by the Confederate horsemen of Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, and driven to move further down the James. It got safely across the river on the 25th.

On the 18th of June, Meade had tried to capture Petersburg, but, as it was found impracticable to carry the enemy's lines by assault, it was decided to open regular approaches. The city was to be attacked the following month after the explosion of a mine which had been prepared under the Confederate lines. The assault which followed the explosion, however, was a most humiliating failure. Petersburg remained in the hands of the Confederates till the 2nd of April next, when it was evacuated at the same time as Richmond.

The artistic part of the art of war lies in manœuvring, by which process the enemy is coerced to abandon a favourable position or to adopt some course adverse to his interests. Very signal advantages are thus often reaped without burning a single cartridge, whilst should a battle ensue the adversary is disconcerted by having to fight under unfavourable conditions. Grant owed his success not so much to strategy as to superior numbers and resources, and to hard fighting in which even a series of victories gained by his enemy left the latter less able to resist. He had a rooted objection to all manœuvring, and in conversing with Meade he declared, "I never manœuvre." On this account he will not be handed down in history as a scientific general, nor as a master of the art of war. His direct attacks on lengthy lines of works, in face of a heavy fire from an undaunted enemy, without due preparation, often without even a careful examination of the ground, brought about a very heavy and unnecessary loss of life. His losses from the 5th of May, 1864, to the 9th April, 1865, amounted to 124,390 men; it was this heavy addition of casualties that caused him to be called by some severe critics "the butcher."

The greater resources of the North enabled the Federal Government to bring into the field larger armies and more abundant supplies, and at every point to threaten to overwhelm its antagonist by sheer weight of numbers. "Butler reports Grant as saying to him, in an interview at Fort Monroe, that the enemy should be conquered by continual attrition, and by inflicting losses in every way, and by wearing out their resources as fast as possible, and at however great cost, relying upon our own more abundant money and men to bring out a successful result. He proposed to attack at all times and under all conditions, even at the risk of losing more men than Lee, for he knew he could afford to lose more." * This fighting *at all times and under all conditions*,

* William Conant Church, "Ulysses S. Grant," p. 261.

*the terrific blows the army of the Potomac had sustained in these "assaults all along the line" had shaken the morale of the troops. "They had been ordered to attacks which the very privates in the ranks knew to be hopeless from the start, . . . and they had almost ceased to expect victory when they went into battle."**

One of his defenders, to account for the mortality, states that where he lost two men in action within a given time he lost three from other causes, forgetting that the average proportion gathered from statistics is thirty-five to forty deaths by sickness to ten caused by wounds. He argues, moreover, that Grant was more saving of his men than the other generals, inasmuch as by freely giving the life of his men he laboured to bring the war to a speedier end. Grant showed how little he valued human life when on the 7th of May he hurried to Spottsylvania, leaving behind him his dead unburied and some of his wounded to care for themselves. Later on, he would not demand an armistice to remove his wounded after the foolhardy attack on the Confederate works at Cold Harbour on the 3rd of June. Sending a flag of truce to Lee he conceived was liable to be interpreted as an admission that he had been beaten. For over two days he held back, and when he determined to act his wounded men were dead.

His march from the Rapidan had cost him 54,926 men; a short time after, with the attack on Petersburg, the casualties rose to about 65,000 men. Lee had lost between 18,000 and 20,000 men, but, whilst the Federal army was reinforced by 55,000 men, the Confederates had no prospect of refilling their diminishing ranks. In that lay Grant's advantage.

Posterity will fully endorse the justness of Fletcher's estimate. "Excepting in persistency of purpose, Grant had shown few of the qualities of a great general. In a campaign fought without strategy, and in battles without tactics, he had sacrificed, since he marched into the Wilderness, at least 60,000 men."†

In 1864 occurred Sherman's advance from Chattanooga against Dalton and Atlanta, through a country of lofty mountains and strong defensive positions. Johnston and Sherman were equally balanced as far as abilities went, both had graduated at West Point; the latter was younger than his adversary by thirteen years. Johnston proved himself the ablest of the Confederate generals after Lee. Sherman, who at the commencement of the

* General F. A. Walker, "Life of Hancock," p. 229.

† Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, "History of the American War," vol. iii. p. 246.

war was reported to be crazy or odd, at the end of it had gained the reputation of being one of the ablest generals of the Union.

Sherman's object was to drive Johnston's weaker army southwards through the mountains to the open country beyond Atlanta, and then to attack it, overthrow it, and destroy it. Johnston, on the other hand, wished to meet his opponent on equal terms. All Sherman's supplies were brought by the single line of railway behind him, which necessitated his leaving detachments as he advanced to protect the railway, for fear that the Confederate cavalry would work round his rear, tear up the rails, and starve his army. Johnston knew that every such detachment weakened the Federal forces and made them more equal to his army. He stuck to each position until Sherman's forces began to overlap his towards the rear, when he cautiously retired to a fresh position. Neither of the two leaders was minded to give his adversary the slightest chance. Pursuing his plan, Sherman drove the Confederate general back from one position to another until Johnston crossed the Chattahoochee River and took position before Atlanta.

But the Confederates were slow to understand the skill displayed by Johnston, and, just as he had begun his arrangements for fighting the Federals, Jefferson Davis, who always disliked him, removed him from his command, which was conferred on J. B. Hood. In July Hood made three furious attacks on Sherman's army, and was beaten in all three. Early in September he was compelled to abandon the city of Atlanta to the forces of the Union.

After having lost Atlanta, Hood marched his army north-west towards the very country from which Sherman had set out. He conjectured that the Federal general would follow him, and hoped to transfer the seat of the operations back to Tennessee or to the north. Sherman made a show of pursuing him till he saw him fairly started for Tennessee; he then returned to Atlanta, picking up and thoroughly destroying the railway as he came, and leaving behind him a dreary wilderness. Having foreseen the probable course that Hood would follow, Sherman had sent to Tennessee General G. H. Thomas with very nearly one-half of his army.

Sherman still had an army of over 63,000 men, mostly picked veteran troops. He had abundant provisions, and the States before him not only were the richest of the Confederacy, but had

not felt the straits of war. In the middle of November, 1864, he burnt Atlanta, cut the telegraphic communication with the North, and set out in a south-easterly direction, making for the sea.* His route lay through Milledgeville and Millen, down the peninsula between the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers to Savannah. The army quitted Atlanta on the 15th of November; it comprised four corps of infantry and one division of cavalry, with a total of 63,680 men, 14,768 horses, 19,410 mules, 2520 waggons, and 440 ambulances.

This army marched in four columns, and traversed a strip of country sixty miles wide, all of which was made desolate. The railroads were destroyed, the stations and bridges were burnt, and the army lived on the resources of the country. It started with about twenty days' provisions in its waggons, which were refilled as fast as their contents were issued. Grant's instructions were, "You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources." Alluding to this march, Sherman says: "I estimate the damage done to the state of Georgia at one hundred million dollars, at least twenty millions of which inured to our advantage, and the remainder in simply waste and destruction."

There was hardly any resistance to countenance all this damage, for the Federals only had 531 killed and wounded, with 1616 captured or missing. The object appears to have been to make it impossible for any other army to subsist in that part of the country. This will be understood by looking at the instructions for the Valley Campaign, which were first written for Hunter and afterwards made over to Sheridan. General Grant wrote: "In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed—they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that so long as an army can subsist among them recurrences of these raids must be expected."

Acting on his instructions, Sheridan completed what Hunter

* When Beauregard received the news Sherman had a start of 275 miles, and it was too evident that it was fruitless to follow him through a country devastated by the Union troops.

had begun; he laid waste the whole Shenandoah Valley, burning and destroying crops and farming implements. He turned the most fruitful district of Virginia into a complete wilderness. In his despatch he writes: "I have destroyed over 2000 barns filled with flour and wheat, have driven in front of the army over 4000 head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops no less than 3000 sheep." He reports that the valley had been swept so bare that a bird could not fly over it without carrying his rations with him. He had carried out to the letter the orders of General Grant.

Progress is an empty vaunt; the destruction carried out by the Federals in 1865 almost beats what was done by Turenne in the Palatinate in 1689, for which he has been seriously condemned by historians, with this difference, that Turenne did it to injure strangers and not men of the same blood and kin. The North entertained a bitter feeling of revenge against the South. Neither Sherman nor Sheridan breathe a word of regret for having been compelled to order such dire waste, and the terms in which the report of the thoroughness of the devastation were couched were harsh and unfeeling. It was amazing in a country which boasts of its freedom and advancement.

The third paragraph of the orders issued to the invading army on the 9th of November was worded thus: "The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather, near the route travelled, corn and forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables and corn meal, or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the waggon-trains at least ten days' provisions for the command and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants or commit any trespass; during the halt or at camp they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and drive in stock in front of their camps. To regular foraging parties must be entrusted the gathering of provisions and forage at any distance from the road travelled."

Sherman's march to the sea was a raid on a very large scale. The order to forage liberally was taken in its broadest sense. Extreme measures of military severity were sanctioned with the intent of punishing a people whose only crime it was to cherish a

cause which they honestly believed to be just. A brilliant conception, showing genius of a high order, was marred by the disgraceful scenes which accompanied the march of the troops. There was plunder, devastation, and crime, none of which were checked and punished by the officers. Milledgeville, the pleasant capital of Georgia, the seat of her Legislature, the residence of men famous in the history of their country, was plundered and destroyed. The march of the troops was accompanied by a multitude of negroes; a starving population followed Sherman, and perished from hunger and exposure, being helpless in everything which related to their means of support.

Not every one of the Federal generals intended that the war should be carried out on these lines. General McClellan, in his letter to Mr. Lincoln, July 7, 1862, wrote: "This rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known of Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment.

"In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations; all private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes."

Whilst history will always extol the pluck of the Confederates in having for four years warred against superior numbers and resources, unable to repair the waste in men and materials, with cold sympathy from Europe, and their ports strictly blockaded, it will always deplore the animosity the Federals nourished towards their opponents, and the misery they inflicted on the population under the excuse of depriving the South of means of resistance. The unjust execution of Mumford, and General Butler's atrocious order regarding the ladies of New Orleans—supported, as it was, by the press of the North—will always be stigmatized with words of reproach.

Sherman's army reached Ossabaw Sound, at the mouth of the Ogeechee River, on the 13th of December, after a march of a little less than a month. That day Fort McAllister was stormed, and

on the 21st, after a siege of eight days, Savannah was captured. In reporting its fall to the President, Sherman added that he offered it as a Christmas gift to the country.

The army was fortunate in having fine weather, and when it arrived in sight of the Atlantic, after a march of four weeks, the waggons were still loaded with provisions, and the men and animals were in much better condition than when they had set out from Atlanta. During the time that Sherman's columns were marching seaward it was not quite known in the North what had become of his army; the air was filled with predictions of coming disasters.

Sherman, who had strongly opposed Grant's action in advancing from Grand Gulf without a base, and having severed all communication with Washington, copied in this instance the example set him the previous year by the Lieutenant-General. Both chiefs were keen to be left unfettered.

Well would it have been for Sherman's reputation if General Grant's plan of bringing his army by sea from Savannah to join those of the Potomac and the James had been carried into effect. Then his soldiers would have been spared venting their hatred on the unarmed and defenceless inhabitants of South Carolina. The terrible scenes which occurred in Sherman's march to Goldsboro are a matter of history, and have stamped disgrace on the Federal army of the West. Cruel things were done, just as when man fought with the untamed passions of primitive times. The sack and burning of Columbia; the sickly scenes which accompanied that foul deed (which Sherman ungenerously and falsely attributed to General Wade Hampton); the desolating march not called forth by any determined opposition, not provoked by cruelties and licence on the other side; the firing of the negroes' cabins; the want of discipline, lust of plunder, and intoxication of the soldiers; the absence of control on the part of the officers;—fill some of the worst pages in the history of the war.

General Sherman sums up in the following words the result of his march through South Carolina: "In general terms we have traversed the country from Savannah to Goldsboro, with an average breadth of forty miles, consuming all the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meat, corn-meal, etc. The public enemy, instead of drawing supplies from that region to feed his armies, will be compelled to send provisions from other quarters to feed the inhabitants. Of course, the abandonment to us by the

enemy of the whole sea-coast from Savannah to Newberne (North Carolina), with its forts, dockyards, gunboats, etc., was a necessary incident to our occupation and destruction of the inland routes of travel and supply. But the real object of the march was to place this army in a position easy of supply, whence it could take an appropriate part in the spring and summer campaign of 1865. This was completely accomplished on March 21st, by the junction of the three armies and occupation of Goldsboro."

Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher's observations on this march are none too severe. "Thus in a few words does General Sherman recapitulate the results of a campaign which, whilst bringing renown to himself and his troops, had carried ruin, misery, and desolation to the inhabitants of the country in a degree seldom equalled in modern armies. Political hatred had been added to military licence in the dealings of the soldiery with the people of South Carolina; and Sherman, whilst careful of his own troops and personally just in his conduct even as regarded the enemy, exercised little control over the men under his command, apparently satisfied if the end proposed—viz. the complete destruction of the country as a means of supply for the forces of the Confederacy—should be attained, at whatever cost to the *morale* of his troops or to the welfare or even existence of non-combatants." *

To go back a few months, in the previous July, Early, at the head of a little more than 12,000 men,† entered the Shenandoah Valley as a diversion for the relief of Lee's army, at that time hard pressed by Grant. When the Confederate general crossed the Potomac into Maryland the devastation of the Shenandoah Valley by Hunter had aroused a bitter spirit of revenge. Early burnt Chambersburg, the inhabitants having refused to comply with an imposed contribution of 200,000 dollars in gold. Government stores were plundered, requisitions levied, houses burnt; prisoners, horses, and cattle were seized. Early issued orders for these deeds as reprisals, roused to wrath by the spectacles which had greeted his eyes on his march down the valley of the Shenandoah.

After a four years' struggle the Confederate cause was waning in enthusiasm and resources. In 1865 the South was exhausted in men and means, and began to feel the pinch of increasing

* Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, "History of the American War," vol. iii. p. 492.

† According to his statement he had 8000 infantry, 40 field-pieces, and 2000 badly mounted and equipped cavalry when he arrived before Washington.

want. Of its citizens many had lost heart. Its currency had become almost worthless. With the opening of the year a dollar in gold was worth sixty dollars in Confederate money; and with the decreased value of money a portentous rise took place in the price of all the necessities of life. The railways had been destroyed, and provisions, cattle, and horses were nearly spent.

The depreciation of the Confederate currency was an unmistakable symptom of a lack of confidence in the course of affairs. Every advance of General Grant's lines created serious alarm in Richmond, and caused fresh rigour in the enforcement of the conscription laws. The pavements were swept of every class of loiterers; the clerks of the departments, with the exemption certificate in their pockets, were carried off, whether able to do duty or not.

The Confederates were evidently tired of the war. Desertion was rife, and carried to such an extent that, had it been tried to shoot all the deserters, it was doubtful whether enough soldiers would have been available for the duty.

The winter of 1864-65 was a very severe one, and entailed great sufferings on both armies—on the Confederate especially, for the troops were on short rations and thinly clad. Sheridan's horsemen, withdrawn from the ignoble work of devastating an unresisting country, raided in the fertile districts from which Richmond and its defenders principally drew their provisions. The Southern field of supply was getting smaller by degrees, and with the destruction of the Richmond and Lynchburg Railway and of the locks on the James River Canal, great difficulty was experienced in bringing the available stores within reach of the troops.

The Federals had established their grand dépôt for operations against Petersburg and Richmond at City Point. City Point was situated about ten miles from Petersburg, where the waters of the Appomattox fall into the James River. That place was connected with Petersburg by a line of rail, and two other lines, the Norfolk Railroad and the Weldon Railroad, were available as lines of supply for the Federal armies.

City Point was supplied by a fleet of steamers going backwards and forwards from that point to the northern ports. On an average 40 steamers and tugs, 75 sailing-ships, and 100 barges were employed in the subsistence service.

A host of artificers were employed at the depôt; there were 1800 men, carpenters, blacksmiths, saddlers, packers, carmen, and labourers of all sorts. It was computed that in one year 3653 carriages and 2414 ambulance waggons were repaired, while 19,618 horses and 31,628 mules were shod.

There were different jetties for the various services; provisions, forage, clothing, camp equipment, hospital stores, horses, mules, railway plant, were all landed separately, and taken to their assigned places.

On the 9th of February, 1865, Lee assumed command over all the Confederate forces; for the Confederate Congress, in order to slight Mr. Davis, had appointed him General-in-Chief of the army. At the same time the Legislature of Virginia appointed J. E. Johnston to the command of the forces which were to stop Sherman's victorious march to the North.

The situation was one of unprecedented gloom. The previous days Lee had reported to Richmond that his troops, who had been exposed to bitter winter weather, had been without meat for three days. "If some change is not made," he said, "and the commissary department organized, I apprehend dire results. . . . You must not be surprised if calamity befalls us." Mr. Davis, it is said, endorsed this discouraging dispatch with words of anger and command easy to write. "This is too sad to be patiently considered, . . . criminal neglect and gross incapacity. . . . Let supplies be had by purchase or borrowing."

As the campaign in Virginia opened in the spring of 1865 the Federal army numbered 124,700 men of all arms; to oppose it the Confederates had only 57,000 men. Of nine railways leading on Richmond and Petersburg, only two were still in the hands of the Confederates—the Southside road, running from the State of Tennessee, and the Richmond and Danville line, coming from the confines of North Carolina. At Burkesville, sixty miles from the Confederate capital, these two lines crossed each other, and Grant, knowing that the control of these two railroads would mean the destruction of Lee's army, hastened to take steps to secure it.

Before Grant could carry out his purpose, on the night of the 25th of March, Lee attacked Fort Stedman, his object being to break the Federal communication with City Point, destroy the depôts of the enemy's army, and force Grant to withdraw the bulk of his forces, which were threatening the Confederate right

wing. The first success was not maintained; the Confederates were defeated, their opponents securing a point of vantage for operating against the Confederate line of works. Grant now appears to have given up the plan of cutting the railways for an attack of Lee's right rear. On the 31st the Confederates drove back Sheridan to Dinwiddie Court House, but at night retired to the strongly entrenched post of Five Forks. The following day Pickett was entirely defeated, and Lee's right was shattered and routed: there was no hope whatever of saving Richmond. There was nothing left for Lee to do but to break through and join Johnston. The Confederate retreat had been decided upon.

Grant, however, did not realize at first all the importance of the advantage gained; he ordered an advance against the enemy's works all along the line for the 2nd of April. The Federals fought gallantly, and carried all the works, but their losses were very heavy, and, in the actual circumstances, every drop of blood shed that day seems to have been shed in vain.

Lee quitted Richmond; his object was to effect a junction with Johnston at Danville, a short distance from Burkesville.

When he abandoned Richmond, the first rendezvous appointed was Amelia Court House, where, according to his account, Lee had ordered provisions to be sent. But when his half-starved troops arrived at that place, on the 4th of April, they found that no food had been sent there to meet them. Nearly twenty-four hours were thus lost in collecting subsistence for men and horses. The delay was fatal, and could not be retrieved. The whole pursuing force was upon him when he resumed his march on the night of the 5th of April.

This point about the provisions has been disputed. Jefferson Davis declares that "no call, by letter or requisition, from the General Commanding or from any other source, official or non-official, had been received either by the commissary-general or the assistant commissary-general; nor was any communication transmitted through the department channels to the Bureau of Subsistence for the collection of supplies at Amelia Court House." The absence of supplies, whether an order was given or not, was a severe blow to Lee, for it was a loss of precious time. Sheridan barred the road to Lynchburg, and captured four trains coming from thence with provisions for the starving Confederates. Lee endeavoured to cut his way through the cavalry, but Sheridan's action had enabled the army of the James to come

up. Before the cavalry had time to charge, the Confederate commander-in-chief offered to surrender.

After Lee had accepted the terms on which the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia would be received, he remarked that his army was in a starving condition, and asked General Grant to provide them with provisions and forage. To this the latter at once assented, asking for how many men rations would be wanted. Lee answered, "About 25,000," and orders were at once given to issue them. The number of individuals who surrendered turned out to be even larger, for the paroles signed amounted to 28,231. This is accounted for by the fact that many stragglers came up and rejoined after the surrender.

The greater resources of the North and the command of the sea brought the Civil War to an end. The system followed by Grant was to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if by nothing else, there should be nothing left for the South but submission. Four years of war had cost the Union about 8,000,000,000 dollars. The expenses in April, 1865, when the strife came to an end, were reckoned at 4,000,000 dollars a day. The Federal losses are estimated at 316,000 men; those of the Confederates are unknown, but, possibly, were not far from another 300,000 men.

CHAPTER XII.

SUBSISTENCE OF THE GERMAN ARMIES IN THE WAR OF
1870-71.

THE Franco-German War of 1870-71 is the best example we have of the new order of things. The German operations were on a large scale, carried out in a very rich country, with the aid of railways, and with untiring efforts on the part of their administrative body. The *Intendantur*, casting aside all pedantry, employed without hesitation all the known methods for feeding troops in the field, and with good results.

Count Moltke, whose knowledge of war no one will dare to deny, stated before the German Parliament that in no war in which large masses of men were employed had the troops ever been so well fed as in the Franco-German War of 1870-71. With a combination of many favourable circumstances, and the great forethought of the Staff and administrative officers, there were nevertheless accidents and embarrassments. The periods of penury were certainly of short duration, still they offer a further proof of the acknowledged difficulties which surround the efficient provisioning of troops in war. Possibly no other army ever showed such perfect discipline on the march.

The Germans put three distinct armies in the field. The first, commanded by General von Steinmetz, was composed of 75 battalions, 64 squadrons, and 45 batteries. The second, commanded by Prince Frederick Charles, consisted of 181 battalions, 156 squadrons, and 105 batteries. The third army, commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia, comprised 153 battalions, 134 squadrons, and 96 batteries.

At the commencement of the war great difficulties were experienced in feeding these large masses of men whilst effecting

their concentration on the frontier: the time permitted for preparation had been so short. The railways were fully occupied in transporting the combatants, and until that operation was completed it was impossible to forward the provision columns or to turn the railways into lines of supply. When fighting commenced the troops were not followed by supply columns, for as these had mostly been sent by march route, they had not yet overtaken their respective army corps.

Referring to this period, the German official account states: "Twenty field-ovens were at once constructed at each of the following places: Cologne, Coblenz, Bingen, Mainz, and Saarlouis, and the flour stores of the nearest peace magazines were placed at their disposal. Large bakeries for the army were set up in houses near Frankfurt-am-Main, and in Mannheim; and the bakeries established in the larger garrisons situated on railways were enlarged, and rendered capable not only of supplying the current wants of the field troops, but also of forming considerable stores of bread and reserve supplies of biscuit.

"In the corps districts the Intendantur secured a six weeks' supply of food, oats, and hay, which was forwarded to a point within the *rayon* of concentration of each corps; and a considerable part of the "fortress supplies" from Cologne and Wesel was forwarded by steamer to Bingen, and applied to the use of the field army.

"As in the first days of the transport the army corps could only forward their supply of food and forage by taking it with them in the railway waggons, or by attaching separate waggons for the purpose, the troops were ordered to relieve the Commissariat by supplying themselves within the *rayon* of their position; a special fourteen days' reserve of flour and oats was collected in the large magazines on the railways, which were kept complete by filling after each issue. A six-weeks' supply, forming a reserve, of food, oats, and hay, for seven army corps, was accumulated in Cologne, Coblenz, Bingen, and Frankfurt-am-Main, whilst Baden formed magazines for the army at Heidelberg and Meckesheim, Bavaria in Germansheim, Ludwigshafen and Neustadt, and Würtemberg in Bruchsal.

"At the end of July, when the greatest part of the troops had been moved to the front (receiving the regular ration at different feeding-stations on the road), the army corps were able to begin to move forward their supplies of food, so that at the end of this

month and the commencement of the next about fifty through provision trains were forwarded to the Rhine."

All Germany contributed towards the supply of its armies, because the corps, being organized locally, had for the main source of supply their districts, and these were connected with their corps in the field by distinct railways. Not only were the products of Germany largely depended on, but these were supplemented by purchases made abroad. In England, for example, 3,000,000 lbs. of preserved meat, and the same amount of biscuit and of compressed forage, were bought; the contract stipulated that these articles were to be delivered at Cologne.

After the battles in the first week of August, large stores of provisions and forage which the French had accumulated fell into the hands of the Germans. As they began stepping on to the enemy's territory, little assistance in the way of provisions could they get from their own reserves, consequently these provisions abandoned by the enemy were most welcome. Besides, once over the frontier the system of requisition came into play.

With regard to requisitions, it should here be noted that, though the Germans employed the system of living on the resources of the enemy's territory on most sound principles, they admit that requisitions only yielded one-third of the provisions and forage required for their armies. The other two-thirds were provided by the efforts of their Commissariat.

Experience has demonstrated that in trusting to the resources of the theatre of war for the subsistence of the troops, the invader has always a better chance of success than the defender. The latter, being bound to treat its countrymen tenderly, must stop short of threats and punishments, and cannot resort to very rigorous measures to compel the peasant to unearth the provisions he has hidden. The invader does not make any semblance of tenderness: the inhabitants are a conquered people, and as such have no claim to be treated leniently; they can be menaced in such a way as will force them sooner or later to produce some of their hidden store. It is for fear of seeing his family exposed to famine that the peasant hides his surplus provisions, and he will not part with them until he is tempted by the offer of a very remunerative price, or is constrained by very severe measures.

When the allies invaded France in 1814, the French civil and military authorities could seldom come to an understanding with regard to the way in which the needs of their army were to

be met. In seeking to protect the interests of their people and in not being able to realize the pressing wants of the troops, the civil authorities added much to the difficulties of the defenders. In 1870 certain mayors and peasants, who grudgingly and incompletely complied with the demands made in the interest of the French Army, were subsequently seen, under fear of punishment, complying but too readily with the much greater exactions imposed by the Germans.

As the railways gradually ceased to be needed for the transport of the combatants, provisions for the 1st Army were pushed forward to Fraulautern, opposite to Saarlouis. At this place, on the 8th of August, the bakeries for the troops were set up.

The General commanding the 2nd Army had devoted special attention to the utilization of all the vehicles he could dispose of for drawing forward the provisions which had been accumulated on the Rhine for the use of his troops. By these efforts magazines were established first at Saarbrück, Sarreguemines, and Saarunion; then at Forbach, Saint-Avold, and Faulquemont; lastly, on the 13th of August, at Remilly. A large mass of provisions were collected about this latter place, as a precautionary measure to meet any unforeseen events during the contemplated crossing of the Moselle.

The general eagerness to meet the needs of the troops soon paralyzed the railway lines, for there was not sufficient animal transport to clear speedily the terminal stations. On the 14th of August the principal Intendant of the army had to issue an order that no trains with provisions were to be forwarded from Germany without a formal demand coming from himself or from the Inspectors of Communications.

A considerable quantity of provisions and forage were damaged owing to the absence of suitable protection. These had to be stacked in the open, and, notwithstanding that they were covered with tarpaulins, the dampness caused by the heavy rains in August injured a considerable quantity of flour, salt, bread, and grain.

After the battles of Vionville and Gravelotte, the troops were without sufficient food; the reserve provisions had been nearly all consumed, and it was impracticable to draw supplies from the provision columns during the day. To make up for what was wanting the soldiers had to make the best of it with

coffee and wine. In fact, it was not until the 19th of August that the corps trains rejoined their respective units.

The 1st and 2nd Armies were detailed for the investment of Metz. The railway from Saarbrück was rapidly repaired and made available for traffic as far as Remilly, where a large dépôt was established. The provisions collected at Saarbrück—for it was there that the contractors had to deliver their goods—were pushed forward towards Metz, and those for the 1st Army were detained at Courcelles.

To feed the 2nd Army, a branch line was constructed between Remilly and Pont-à-Mousson. This branch line, the result of forty days' work, was thirty miles long, and was ready for traffic by the 23rd of September. The steepness of the gradients and the small radius of the curves militated against the use of large locomotives. The trains consisted of ten or twelve waggons at the most, sometimes of three or four, and only ran by day. The provisions sent from Saarlouis to Pont-à-Mousson each day was reckoned at 4000 quintals.

So great was the extent of the lines of investment that the transport of some of the army corps had to seek provisions at these terminal stations, covering a distance of about forty-five miles. As the roads had been damaged by the rains, the teams and vehicles suffered so much that the results were not in any way in keeping with the time taken or the fatigues endured.

Magazines had been formed in rear of the positions occupied by each army corps, and gradually very large resources were accumulated there, sufficient to fill all the vehicles in the event of a precipitate departure. Later on, as the investing force increased, another dépôt was formed; the one at Courcelles supplied the northern force, the other, at Novéant, the southern.

Considerable difficulties were experienced in getting drinking water; fortunately, these were overcome owing to the abundance of wine found in the neighbourhood, which was distributed regularly to the troops. The Norton tubes, which had been purchased in large number in view of this investment, yielded poor results, owing principally to the rocky nature of the country.

At the end of August the cattle-plague broke out, and began to attack the cattle in the dépôts which had been formed at Saarlouis, at Courcelles, at Ars-sur-Moselle, and at Jorry-aux-Arches. To stay its ravages, a thousand animals were ordered to be destroyed and a sanitary cordon was organized. Prompt

measures were taken to remedy the want of fresh beef; as much mutton and pork as could be procured was issued, and consignments of smoked bacon were demanded; considerable quantities of salted and smoked beef and bacon were also ordered to be purchased in the seaport towns. To give a certain quantity of beef to the troops, a field butchery was established at Mainz, whence the meat, having undergone a certain process of partial ebullition and an artificial friction with salt and pepper, was forwarded by rail to the field depôts.

When, after an investment of ten weeks, the army of Marshal Bazaine capitulated, the 1st Army had to feed 150,000 prisoners during their transport to the frontier. In this way were consumed the whole of the reserves with which the magazines had been stocked with the view to meet the case of a sudden departure.

On the 26th of August the 3rd Army commenced its change of direction to the right, to take in flank McMahon's forces, which were moving from Chalons to the relief of Metz. This caused considerable embarrassment to the provision service, as the troops had to close up and advance on a narrow front. The provision columns and cattle on the hoof were not allowed to follow immediately in rear of the combatants, and one of the provision columns, moving from Vitry-le-François towards Reims, not having received in time notice of the change of direction, was captured.

The system of requisitions and purchases did not yield a sufficient amount of provisions, and at this period the troops had to endure great privations. The army of Metz came in aid of the army of the Meuse, and from the 29th of August despatched daily one hundred vehicles loaded with provisions to Étain.

During this movement, the troops were ordered to consume their reserve rations, and to replace them by calling up from the convoy some of the best-horsed waggons.

Supplies were captured from the enemy at Besace, Carignan, Donchery, and Bazeilles, and the Prussian Guard Corps captured at Carignan, on the 31st of August, a convoy belonging to one of the French army corps, containing supplies for seven days. The convoys of the Crown Prince's army rejoined the troops on the 2nd of September, after the battle of Sedan.

When, after the surrender of the French army at Sedan, the 3rd Army and the army of the Meuse took the road to Paris, the troops were fed by the inhabitants. The method was feasible,

for, there being little fear of meeting with any serious opposition in the open field, the troops could advance on a broad front. Their provision convoys assisted when any unexpected deficiency arose. It was about this time (September 12, 1870), that an order was issued for a small number of vehicles to be requisitioned for the purpose of carrying provisions regimentally; their number was fixed at two per battalion, and one for each squadron, bearer company, or administrative unit.

All the troops were furnished with three days' regimental reserve rations, and carried in these vehicles others to last them several days. Bread was principally procured by requisition, some was also baked by the army bakers. The intendance, moreover, had established large magazines at Reims and at Chalons-sur-Marne, and turned to account the French bakeries at Mourmelon.

In the march from Corbeil to Paris, the 3rd Army had to pass through a zone in which the cattle had been removed, and all the provisions had been carried to Paris by the inhabitants in their flight. The provisions which could not be removed had been destroyed, and the smoke rising in many parts of the country showed how the work of destruction was progressing.

The subsistence for the troops employed in the investment of Paris demanded to be organized on a large scale. At that time (the latter part of September) the provisions coming from Germany could not be sent by rail beyond Nogent-l'Artaud for the 3rd Army, and Château-Thierry for the army of the Meuse. The cavalry divisions had to undertake excursions to some distance from the walls of Paris to serve requisitions. All the provisions obtained by their efforts were stored in large magazines at Versailles and Corbeil for the 3rd Army, and at Chantilly for the army of the Meuse.

The army of the Meuse, which invested Paris on the north, from the abundant yield of its requisitions was able to store for itself a sufficient reserve in the grand magazine of Chantilly. The 3rd Army was not so fortunate; the requisitions made on its account were not so productive. On that side of the city it was found more advantageous to resort to purchases than to levy requisitions.

What was most trying was the scarcity of fresh meat. All the cattle within the greatest possible circle was to be requisitioned

and sent towards Paris, but there was difficulty in finding any in the first twenty-five leagues round the city.

The article which was most abundant in the surroundings of Paris was wine, and the issue of a daily allowance to each soldier during the privations consequent on the first days of the investment was found beneficial. The potato and pulse harvest was so rich that several corps laid in a stock, which, eventually, lasted them till the end of the winter.

Threshing-machines, mills, and ovens were put into working order, and markets were established in which purchases were made for ready money. From time to time the *Moniteur Prussien*, published at Versailles, gave the tariff at which all articles were to be sold, showing the highest price allowed. The stoppage of the traffic on the roads round Paris was suspended in what concerned the movement of provisions.

The army corps had to come direct to the main magazines at Corbeil and Versailles to seek there the provisions and forage they needed. Those magazines were fed by convoys, provided by the line of communications service, which proceeded to fetch their loads from the terminal railway station of Nogent-l'Artaud, and later on of Lagny. In rear of these stations large magazines had been formed at Chalons-sur-Marne and Nancy, and these were kept stocked by means of articles obtained by requisition or purchase.

The arrangements for provisioning the 3rd Army investing Paris show what a very important rôle the transport plays in the interval which lies between the terminal railway station and the troops. The serious obstructions on the railway lines compelled a demand being made on the line of communications service to give up a large proportion of their vehicles to the artillery for the transport of the siege train. This was done to the detriment of the troops, for the various army corps, after this measure had taken effect, had to go to the terminal station of Lagny with their own transport means to receive their supplies, and the two main magazines of Corbeil and Versailles became only reserve dépôts.

Railway communication with Germany was extremely limited, and through communication on the only line which led from the frontier to the neighbourhood of Paris was thwarted by the fortress of Toul, which was still in the hands of the enemy. The transport of men to replace casualties, of stores of food, of equipment

and clothing for the army of investment could not be otherwise than slow until that fortress was captured, so, early in September, orders had been issued for its reduction. The question of bringing forward the siege park, which had been ready in Prussia since the middle of the previous month, remained to be considered. The capture of Toul in any case would not have cleared every difficulty.* The French had demolished the tunnel of Nanteuil in a most complete manner, and this prevented the railway line being used west of that place.

In examining a map of the theatre of war it will be seen that in the east, where the German armies crossed the frontier, there were two railway lines, Saarbrück-Metz and Strassburg-Frouard-Blesme, available as lines of supply for the invaders. For all traffic or movement which was directed towards the French capital, owing to a gap of forty miles between Metz and Verdun, the first line had to ascend the Moselle and join the second at the Frouard junction.

The Saarbrück-Metz Railway was employed as a line of supply, and assigned to the 1st and 2nd German Armies during the investment of Metz. The troops which invested the fortress on the west could, however, get very tardy help from this line until Pont-à-Mousson was connected with Remilly by a temporary line, which did not become available for traffic before the 23rd of September. For the service of the troops of the 2nd Army the second railway line had to be called in aid, provisions, forage, etc., being brought up the Moselle Valley Railway to Novéant.

When the 3rd Army and the army of the Meuse changed front to the right, to operate against McMahon's army, it had to cross a tract of country devoid of railways. The only lines in that district are the Verdun-Chalons and the Nancy-Frouard-Chalons, both of which run east and west. The only railway running north and south is the Reims-Mézières, which from the latter place goes to Sedan and Montmédy. This line lay too far to the west to be of any use to the Germans in their pursuit of McMahon's army; it would have laid one flank entirely unprotected and exposed to attack.

After the surrender of the French Emperor and his army at

* The German official account of the war (section 10, p. 32) gives an idea of the carriage that was calculated to move the siege train by ordinary transport. "In order to transport the siege park by the ordinary roads, about 4500 four-wheel waggons and 10,000 horses would have to be collected in the enemy's country for the 300 heavy guns, with a provisional equipment of 500 rounds per gun."

Sedan, the 3rd German Army and the army of the Meuse marched on Paris. When, in consequence of this movement, Reims was occupied, the invaders could dispose of two railway lines of supply, viz. the Reims-Soissons-Paris line and the one of Chalons-La Ferté-Paris. Nevertheless, as the most northern of the two fell again into the Nancy-Strassburg line at Chalons, the Germans had only partially the use of two lines. There was a third line further south, the Belfort-Troyes, Fontainebleau-Paris Railway, but throughout the operations the Nancy-Blesmes-Chalons-sur-Marne Railway was the one the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Armies could mainly rely on.

There remains to note the line from Paris to Le Mans; this was not restored for traffic till after the capture of Le Mans (January 12, 1871), and was of minor importance.

In the latter part of 1870 one railway fed the army besieging Paris, brought up the siege materials and daily reinforcements, and at one time even helped to feed Prince Frederick Charles's army on the Loire.

It has been said that the railways were opened for traffic only as far as Nogent and Chateau-Thierry; from those stations there was no other way of forwarding provisions and forage but by means of animal transport. To convey the goods from the temporary terminal station to the troops entailed a journey which lasted from nine to ten days. The Versailles magazine could only gather together from the Fuhr Park and Proviant Kolonne 1386 vehicles—quite an insufficient number for the work. The result of these vehicles being many days on the way was that they consumed on the journey one-half of the articles with which they had been loaded at the railway terminus.

After the capitulation of Soissons, towards the end of October, the army of the Meuse, which invested Paris on the north, found itself in possession of a railway line which really belonged to it. The destruction of a tunnel between Soissons and Villiers-Cotterets, however, necessitated the cartage of the goods between these two localities, which absorbed many vehicles and entailed much manual labour. The situation only improved at the end of November, when, after the tunnel had been repaired, the trains could proceed as far as Gonesse and Mitry. At that time the trains from the east came as far as Lagny-sur-Marne. On the 23rd of November the line was extended from Lagny to Challis; this rendered the conditions more easy. From that moment it

became possible to give the troops a full ration of meat. The troops on outpost duty, in consideration of the rigours of the temperature, received an increase in bread and meat. The reserve provisions could also be completed, and the forage ration augmented.

To appreciate fully the difficulties which the German commissariat had to surmount, we need only look at the average daily supply of the investing forces. These required each day—

148,000 3-lb. loaves of bread,
102,000 lbs. of rice,
539 oxen or 102,000 lbs. of bacon,
14,000 lbs. of salt,
900,000 lbs. of oats,
2,400,000 lbs. of hay,
28,000 quarts of spirits,

a large supply of coffee, sugar, and many thousand cigars. The provisions and forage for each army corps filled each day five railway trains, each one composed of thirty-two waggons.

The line of communications service experienced throughout the very greatest difficulties for want of a sufficiency of animal transport. With regard to the general transport drawn from the country, arrangements were made on the staging system; shelters for the men and animals were built, with cook-houses, depôts of forage, water-troughs, etc. The drivers received pay, and, in some cases, were even clothed; and all the ordinary requirements—shoeing, repairs of harness, and carriages—were attended to. Notwithstanding all this, as the work was naturally of a very heavy nature, desertions were plentiful, and soon some other arrangements had to be made. At the end of December 600 vehicles were purchased in Germany; these were to be driven by men of the Landwehr, dressed in uniform, and commanded by officers. This measure was adopted too late: 200 carriages drawn from Silesia arrived in January, 1871; the second section from Hesse, also of 200, had to contend with glanders, and was necessarily broken up; the third section, drawn from the grand-duchy of Posen, took so long in completing its organization that by the time it could be put to work the war had come to an end.

At the commencement of the war the number of carriages sanctioned for the communications service was 600 for each army corps. These vehicles were to fill the intermediate magazines

established between the terminal station and the corps of operation. This number was soon found to be insufficient, and had to be largely augmented.

The rapidity with which animal transport diminishes is a point which the staff should always bear well in mind. The German army before Metz experienced great difficulty in the matter of provisioning, principally from a want of sufficient transport. Its carriage park melted away by degrees; some part had to be allotted to the railway-construction troops, and another portion vanished, ruined by disease, the result of hard work and exposure. The communication service of the 1st Army, which at the commencement of the operations possessed 2000 vehicles, could not count on more than twenty on the 17th of October, 1870. Nearly the entire park had disappeared in about two and a half months.

Immediately after the fall of Metz, the 2nd Army was put in motion towards Orleans by way of Bar-le-Duc, Joinville, Chaumont, and Troyes, to join the forces under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin then covering the siege of Paris on the south, and making head against the army of the Loire.

The 2nd Army then comprised only three corps, the 3rd, 9th, and 10th, and the 1st cavalry division. On quitting Metz it numbered about 52,000 infantry, 7100 cavalry, and 264 guns.

The army corps were enjoined to load their provision trains and convoys by indenting on the magazines established in the neighbourhood of Metz; to replenish on the way by demands made on the magazines formed by the Governor-Generals of the occupied territory they passed through; and beyond the limits of their commands to draw on the communication magazines, which the direction of the line of communication service had been ordered to establish.

In the march from Metz to the Loire, a distance of 230 miles, which were covered in about three weeks, from the end of October to the middle of November, the 2nd Army lived easily on the local resources, and was able to take its provision columns—which were refilled three times in the course of the march—completely loaded with provisions to the north of Orleans, its new theatre of operations. The precaution had been observed to take a large supply of coin to purchase and pay ready money for all that the army could not draw from the rear. Notices were largely posted stating that the *Intendantur* intended to pay for the provisions and forage, indicating the price that would be

given for each article. The inhabitants were threatened with a rigorous enforcement of requisitions, according to the customs of war, if they refused to hand over the provisions in conformity with this tariff; and the local authorities were solicited to persuade the people in their own interest to sell supplies to the German troops. The best results were obtained from the employment of these measures.

On approaching Orleans, the greatest difficulties were experienced in feeding the troops of Von der Thann, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and Prince Frederick Charles, owing to the hostile attitude of the population. After the capture of that city matters mended a little; however, at the battle of Beaugency—which lasted three days, from the 7th to the 10th of December—the convoys, moving on roads which were cut up and little known, could not rejoin their respective troops. Wood and straw were very scarce, and in the exceptional cold of the winter of 1870-71, the soldiers in their cold bivouacs were deprived of the repose they so much needed. In the beginning of the following month, the 2nd Army moved to attack the lines of Le Mans, and an order was issued for the troops to carry provisions for seven days. After some days' fog, it began to freeze on the 9th of January; snow afterwards fell heavily, covering all the roads, and making them slippery. The movement of the convoys across the defiles of Perche became very laborious, and the troops had to economize the provisions they carried. At Le Mans and Conlie the French had collected large quantities of supplies, and, as the Germans captured these places, they were able to turn these provisions to account in feeding their troops. After the fall of Le Mans railway communication with Versailles was re-established, and from there with Germany; thus the 2nd Army could draw some of its supplies from the far-off magazines on the Rhine. There was only one small break, between Versailles and Juvisy, and in this a large waggon-train was kept steadily at work.

The first bodies of the 1st Army which quitted the neighbourhood of Metz to march northwards after the capitulation of that fortress were not able to take more than a four-days' supply of provisions with them. Most of the available resources had been expended in feeding the French prisoners and the people of Metz. The subsequent bodies left in a better condition, but, as a rule, during its march from Metz to the Oise, the 1st Army

was fed by the inhabitants, and had recourse to its provision columns only in case of necessity. Officers were sent forward to establish magazines at Laon, Rethel, Rheims, and Soissons; the provisions found in Sedan and Verdun, when these places opened their gates, were turned to profit, and some purchases were also made in the enemy's territory. Thanks to these various measures, the 1st Army was able to continue its offensive movement to the north and north-east of France, carrying sufficient provisions.

When this army afterwards undertook operations towards Amiens and Rouen, it re-established the railway lines Clermont-Amiens and Amiens-Rouen, which had been slightly damaged. Magazines were then formed by the aid of requisitions and purchases at Rosières, Amiens, and Rouen, and some supplies were even drawn from Germany. What was captured at La Fère and Peronne went to fill these magazines, and the troops appropriated a portion of a provision convoy captured from the French on the 26th of December. Owing to all these dispositions, the 1st Army did not experience any further serious difficulties with regard to provisions until the peace.

The measures taken by the German Army administration to feed the enormous masses placed in the field in the last Franco-German War cannot but excite the admiration of every military student. The proportions of their provision columns, hospital establishments, and military train were something beyond our conception. Captain Schaeffer, of the military train, states that on the 1st of August, 1870, the mobilized German army possessed—

- 82 ordinary provision columns (supply-trains.)
- 18 butchery and bakery trains.
- 18 movable remount depôts.
- 14 squadrons of escort for the train.
- 52 bearer companies.
- 197 movable field hospitals.
- 17 reserve depôts for hospitals.

The military train employed in the above services comprised—

- 140 officers, train of the line.
- 1,500 officers of the Landwehr, who had served in the cavalry or in the artillery.

45,500 soldiers of the train.

48,000 saddle or draught horses.

11,600 two or six horse carriages.*

To replace the losses in the train fifteen dépôts had been organized in Prussia.

Notwithstanding all these excellent arrangements, this army, administered on most regular and intelligent principles, always victorious, campaigning in one of the most rich and fertile countries in Europe, in a well-populated country, one in which villages abounded and the ways of communication were plentiful and well kept, was not free from want. The soldiers were at times with difficulty kept from starving.

Referring to the capture of Le Mans, the official account of the war expresses itself thus: "Owing to the continuous advance, it was difficult to bring up reserves of men and material. In these days, when winter prevailed in all its severity, when snow-drifts and ice impeded movement, part of the infantry were marching in linen trousers and ragged boots.† The officers were in no better case. For a long time past they had been deprived of their baggage, as the waggons had been unable to follow along the bad roads. But the good-will, the perseverance and the discipline of the troops, conquered all the difficulties which successively presented themselves."‡

Gambetta's newly raised armies were in a worse plight; they were famished, and with a temperature four degrees below zero were shivering in their ill-protecting garments.

After the engagements which took place for three consecutive days under Belfort, from the 15th to the 17th of January, there was felt a great scarcity of bread and oats, and but for the zeal and indefatigable energy of the leaders of convoys, the troops would have really suffered from hunger. After the battle was over, it

* This number does not include the vehicles for the trains with reserve supplies, nor those obtained on requisition.

† Mons. Fleury, in his work on the invasion in the Aisne in 1814, states that the Russians gave the municipality of the town of Chateau-Thierry a few hours to furnish 800 pairs of boots. Whilst waiting for the requisition to be complied with, they pulled off the boots of all Frenchmen who passed by. The Cossacks were professed thieves. It was said that when they could no longer plunder the enemy they resorted to robbing their officers or each other. At the battle of Friedland a Russian officer, severely wounded, was left for dead on the field and denuded of every article of clothing, even to his shirt. Later on, referring to the skill displayed by the Cossacks in stripping the dead and wounded, he said all knew what excellent *valets de chambre* they made.

‡ "The Franco-German War, 1870-71," sect. 17, p. 210.

became necessary, first of all, to give the troops a hot meal ; they had not received one for four or five days. Until the 19th of that month, it was not found possible to issue full rations to the men.

The officers who will have to look after the provisioning of our army in the field—for it is for them that these lessons are gathered—should well reflect on the paramount importance which an essentially military nation attaches to the excellence of its army, and on all the sacrifices it willingly incurs. The Germans, with all the experience of a recent war—the one of 1866—with the ameliorations which that contest had suggested, with ample means, and with a great display of forethought and energy, found in their war with France serious difficulties constantly arising. Are we ready to surmount the same difficulties, on a scale, of course, proportionate to the size of our army? That is a question which our civil and military army administrators should often ask themselves. Until they can conscientiously answer that we can, their task is not completed ; the duty they owe to their country is not fulfilled.

CHAPTER XIII.

CAMPAIGNS OF ABYSSINIA, ASHANTEE, AND THE NILE.

THE subject of provisioning troops in the field claims the attention of the general and administrative staffs of all nations. It demands our notice in a special manner on account of the destitute state of many of the countries in which British troops have to campaign.

In the expedition to Abyssinia, the food and forage had to be drawn from India; in the war in Ashantee, between Cape Coast Castle and Coomassie, there was actually nothing to be found in the way of provisions; everything had to be sent out from home.*

To feed large armies is a difficult matter, but most campaigns are carried on in fertile countries, in which there is every prospect of turning the local resources and the country's transport to account. In many of our little wars the difficulty crops up in another way; we step into a country which is naturally poor or neglected, and find nothing in the way of food or transport on which we can lay our hands.

The three campaigns furnishing the subject of this chapter have been purposely selected, not because as military undertakings they were of such magnitude as to stand out conspicuously amongst others, but because they offer good examples of the difficulties our commissariat often has to contend against.

In the ten years which passed between the great struggle for the suppression of the Indian Mutiny and the Abyssinian expedition, the British Government, in conjunction with the French, sent a force to China to curb the arrogance of the rulers of the celestial

* In 1873-74 the territory of the Gold Coast was not connected with the mother country by a telegraph line. The nearest telegraph of which the general could avail himself in making demands on the War Office was the Anglo-Brazilian, situated on the island of St. Vincent in the Cape Verd group.

empire. But in China the allies found plenty of provisions and transport.* At Tien-sin, a town which they occupied shortly after the capture of the Peiho defences, supplies of every description, including sheep and cattle, were found in abundance. In the advance on Peking, following the banks of the Peiho, every inch of the country was covered with crops of Indian corn, millet, beans, etc. The conditions are not always so favourable for us, and the difficulties often are such as to tax to the utmost the faculties of a competent commissariat officer.

It is not to be imagined from what has been stated above that in distant wars the resources of the mother country are not made to contribute. The troops for the China War, for example, were almost entirely drawn from India, nevertheless the home authorities forwarded by sea for their use—

Biscuit	540,000 lbs.
Salt beef	280,000 „
Salt pork	280,000 „
Preserved vegetables (rations of)...					280,000 „
Rum	12,750 gallons.
Porter	2,490 hogsheads.

Besides these, large consignments were sent from India, with grain and forage for three months.†

Our officers might be inclined to believe that, as our country will not possibly be called upon to put large masses of troops in the field, she will never experience the great obstacles which attend the subsistence of modern armies. As we have seen in many of our wars, these are none the less when having to feed a small number of combatants if the operations are conducted in a region which is naturally unproductive, or has been neglected or wasted. They must also increase with the length of the line of operations. Should everything have to be brought up from the rear, there must be an enormous transport train, and this requires a corresponding amount of forage. This forage must be found on the spot, and cannot be carted, but in unproductive and neglected countries it is an article which is very scarce indeed.

The origin of the expedition to Abyssinia was the unjust detention of some of Her Majesty's subjects by the Negus.

* The allies embarked in this war being completely ignorant of the characteristics and resources of the country.

† The consignments of clothing, boots, etc., were also on a large scale.

In 1862 Captain C. D. Cameron succeeded Mr. Plowden as British Consul at Massowah. Notwithstanding that he had no representative character in any part of the Abyssinian territory, he managed to give umbrage to the emperor. That potentate, fancying himself slighted by an unanswered letter he had addressed to Queen Victoria, seized all the British subjects within his reach, and amongst these were several missionaries and Consul Cameron, who had gone to Gondar in the Abyssinian country.*

Cardinal Massaja, who was a missionary in Ethiopia for thirty-five years, states that Theodore, who had become very proud of the victories he had gained, considered himself the first monarch in the world, and expected Europeans as well as the Abyssinians to bend the knee before him, and tremble in his presence. He relates how Mons. Le Jan, French consul at Massowah, and Mons. La Garde, a medical officer in the French Army, were sent on a special mission to the Court of Abyssinia. Mons. Le Jan, with great want of tact, would not comply with the ridiculous ceremonies prescribed when admitted to the presence of the Negus, and obstinately followed the custom which obtains in Europe. The Negus was much irritated by this, and ordered Mons. Le Jan to be imprisoned, but soon released him, and sent him to Massowah. About the same time happened the rupture between Theodore and the British consul. Mr. Stern, who was looking after the missionaries, was guilty of some unpardonable imprudence, which the proud emperor resented; he was consequently bound and cast into prison. Captain Cameron warmly took up his defence, and soon shared his fate.

Mr. Rassam, a native of Mosul, then assistant-resident at Aden, with Lieutenant Prideaux and Dr. Blanc, was sent on a mission to the Negus Theodore with a message from Her Majesty. The Negus added Mr. Rassam and his companions to the number of his captives. The measures of conciliation having failed, an ultimatum was despatched on the 9th of September by the minister of foreign affairs—Lord Stanley—demanding the release of the captives within three months, in default of which war would follow. Parliament voted the necessary supplies in November, 1867, but for some time before

* Consul Cameron had received a despatch ordering him to go back to Massowah and not to interfere with Abyssinian politics. The letter to the Queen was pigeon-holed, and there it remained till 1864. The British Government took little interest in the fate of their consul, but the case of the missionaries was taken up by Lord Shaftesbury and the religious public.

preparations for the expedition had already been set going. In July Lieut.-Colonel Merewether, the political resident at Aden, had been ordered to Massowah, and directed to collect information should a military expedition have to be sent to Abyssinia.

A correspondent wrote: "It is a noticeable fact that the literal truth was never told in Abyssinia. Abyssinians are clever liars, and everything which related to the country ahead was certain to be found false as we journeyed along." *

As in many of our wars, the country invaded offered nothing, or next to nothing, in the way of provisions, and being poor and exhausted, it was out of the question to impose contributions. Major Mignon, the senior commissariat officer with the advance force in Abyssinia, writes in his report of the 10th of June, 1868: "The difficulty of obtaining supplies, the difficulty of purchasing even those offered for sale, the entire absence of any trading class, the entire absence of any standard of measure, the necessity for the constant daily, nay, hourly, exercise of patience, of discretion, of tact, of forethought, are matters too well known to His Excellency to require further notice from me." The difficulty of purchasing was augmented by the peculiarity of the currency. In 1857 the Austrian Maria-Theresa dollar was the only coin which was accepted in Abyssinia, and the only small change consisted in blocks of salt brought from the Afer country.†

Magdala was situated 380 miles from the British base. The mere work of carrying provisions along such a length of road was in itself enough to keep the energies of the invading army at the utmost strain.

The ultimate success of the expedition depended on the efficiency of the transport. Lord Roberts writes: "The question as to the most suitable organization of the Land Transport Corps occupied a good deal of Sir Robert Napier's attention while the expedition was being fitted out, and caused a considerable amount of correspondence between him and the Bombay Government. The commissary-general wished to keep the corps under his own orders, and objected to its being given an entirely military organization. Sir Robert Napier preferred to establish the corps

* H. M. Stanley, "Coomassie and Magdala."

† One of the articles always to be found in Abyssinian markets is salt in rectangular blocks. In Tigré from 20 to 25 pieces go to the dollar; in the south less, until the Galla country is reached, where salt is so scarce that from three to four blocks go to the dollar.

on an independent basis, but was at first overruled by the Bombay Government. While acting in accordance with their orders, the commander-in-chief wrote: 'I believe that the success of systems depends more on the men who work them than the systems themselves; but I cannot accept without protest a decision to throw such a body of men as the drivers of 'our transport animals will be (if we get them) on an expedition in a foreign country without a very complete organization to secure order and discipline.' Eventually Sir Robert got his own way, but much valuable time had been lost, and the corps was organized on too small a scale;* the officers and non-commissioned officers were not sent to Zula in sufficient time or in sufficient numbers to take charge of the transport animals as they arrived.

"A compact, properly supervised train of 2600 mules, with serviceable, well-fitting pack-saddles, was sent from the Punjab; and from Bombay came 14,000 mules and ponies, and 5600 bullocks, but these numbers proving altogether inadequate to the needs of the expedition, they were supplemented by animals purchased in Persia, Egypt, and on the shores of the Mediterranean. The men to look after them were supplied from the same sources, but their number, even if they had been efficient, was insufficient, and they were a most unruly and unmanageable lot. They demanded double the pay for which they had enlisted, and struck work in a body because the demand was not at once complied with. They refused to take charge of the five mules each man was hired to look after, and when that number was reduced to three, they insisted that one should be used as a mount for the driver. But the worst part of the whole organization, or, rather, want of organization, was that there had been no attempt to fit the animals with pack-saddles, some of which were sent from England, some from India, and had to be adjusted to the mules after they had been landed in Abyssinia, where there was not an establishment to make the necessary alterations. The consequence was that the wretched animals became cruelly galled, and in a few weeks a large percentage were unfit for work, and had to be sent to the sick dépôt.

"Other results of having no properly arranged transport train and no supervision or discipline, were that mules were lost or

* At first it was thought that 10,000 mules, with a coolie corps 3000 strong, would suffice, but before the expedition was over it was found necessary to purchase 18,000 mules, 1500 ponies, 1800 donkeys, 12,000 camels, and 8400 bullocks.

stolen, starved for want of food, or famished for want of water. The condition of the unfortunate animals was such that, though they had been but a few weeks in the country, when they were required to proceed to Senafe, only sixty-seven miles distant, a very small proportion were able to accomplish the march; hundreds died on the way, and their carcasses, quickly decomposing in the sun, became a fruitful source of dangerous disease to the force." *

The above passage has been quoted in full, as it represents more or less the evils generally found in a hastily raised transport corps. As our wars have given us many instances of faulty or tardy organization in matters of transport, it is well to repeat the warning until it becomes thoroughly inculcated.

Intimately connected with transport is the nature of the roads. In this expedition the absence of good roads was a fruitful source of difficulty. It became necessary to convert a mere track leading from Zula—the locality selected for the base—up to the highlands, into a road fit for guns, wheeled vehicles, and heavy baggage animals. The work occupied several weeks; it was very laborious. Many huge boulders had to be cleared away, much blasting had to be done, and in one case the road had to be cut out of the solid rock.

In summing up the results of the march on Magdala and the rescue of the British prisoners, account should be taken of the fact that at the time when the expedition to Abyssinia was set going the power of King Theodore was already waning. The standard of revolt had been raised in several provinces, his army was rapidly deserting him, and only with the greatest difficulty could he obtain food for his followers.

It appears desirable at this point to give a sketch of Theodore and of his system of warfare. The Negus at this time was forty-seven years of age; as Ras Kassai, he had distinguished himself so much by courage, intelligence, activity, and tact, that he had succeeded in obtaining a wonderful influence over his fellow-soldiers. In a battle fought in February, 1855, at Debireskié, he defeated Dejjaj Oubié, and captured the Abuna Salama; the latter was compelled to crown him Emperor of Abyssinia.

Theodore—for such was the name he assumed at his coronation—had great powers of intellect, and, but for his excesses, could have raised a large and flourishing Ethiopian empire. His speech

* Lord Roberts, "Forty-one Years in India," vol. ii. pp. 34, 35.

was thrilling, and his words fascinated his followers. No one dared to set up in open opposition to him. He kept strict silence with regard to his plans, and such operations as he had conceived were veiled in mystery; 100,000 men were bound to follow him without having the least idea of what his object was. He made his warriors march at a great pace, his object being that as they took far less time on the road they could fall suddenly on the enemy. His conquests were conceived on a large scale, and he displayed a strategy up to then unknown in that country. He was conspicuous for his equanimity in battle, in perils, in victories, in defeats. The measure of his revenge on the conquered was boundless.

Beyond his conquests, Theodore attained nothing, for he took no trouble to reorganize his country, and became a scourge to the Abyssinian people. As long as he had bread and meat for the subsistence of his army, he was powerful; but when provisions began to fail, the greater part of his soldiers left him.

In the military expeditions organized for the punishment of some rebel district or for some new conquest, he did not disclose his thoughts. At night the great drum was heard, and it was proclaimed through the camp that the following morning all the warriors were to be ready to attend their emperor. Early the following morning the order of departure was given. Theodore, mounted on his horse and accompanied by his personal staff, led the way; 100,000 men followed him, no one knowing where the army was going. The pace was rapid; a march which ordinarily took six was got over in three or even in two days. Arrived suddenly where he intended to strike, he surrounded the place so that no one should escape. Having pitched his camp not far from the dwellings, the chiefs of the province or district were summoned to appear before him. As he at first simulated a friendly disposition, the people hastened to lay at his feet all they possessed, so as to satisfy his followers and soldiers as well as they could.

Having received large contributions and rich presents, he then began to ask the people to render an account of their conduct towards him. If it was a case of rebellion, the leaders were to be handed over to him, in default of whom the principal families were taken as hostages. If it was a case of having refused to pay tribute, a greater one was imposed—not taking into any account what had been already offered spontaneously.

Often the demands were so great that it was impossible for the people to comply with them. Then, as the time allowed expired, his soldiers were let loose, and laid their hands on everything—cattle, grain, merchandise, youths, slaves, everything was carried off and collected in the centre of the camp. Not satisfied with depriving the population of all it possessed, the emperor compelled the people to become carriers, and transport everything to his own province.

Five years of this barbarous government sufficed to reduce a prosperous country to abject misery. All the cattle for farming and for food carried away, all the grain and seed plundered, all the young men fit to carry arms led away, so many people killed or mutilated, so many families deprived of the assistance of their slaves, the country was soon depopulated, the fields were left untilled, and famine spread over the unfortunate territory.

In 1868 Theodore was crazed with drunkenness and despair. He slew his best friends and councillors, and condemned to death tried and trusted warriors.

To return to the British expedition, the scale of rations for the invading force—Europeans, native soldiers, and followers—on first landing at Zula was fixed as follows:— *

TO EACH EUROPEAN PER DIEM.

1 lb. biscuit or fresh bread.	4 ozs. rice.
1 lb. fresh meat.	$\frac{5}{8}$ oz. tea.
1 lb. vegetables.	$\frac{2}{3}$ oz. salt.
$2\frac{1}{2}$ ozs. sugar.	3 lbs. firewood.

TO EACH NATIVE SOLDIER.†

2 lbs. rice or flour.	$1\frac{1}{2}$ ozs. tobacco, or 3 ozs. sugar.
4 ozs. dhol.	$\frac{1}{8}$ oz. pepper.
2 ozs. ghee.	$\frac{1}{8}$ oz. turmeric.
$\frac{3}{8}$ oz. salt.	$\frac{1}{8}$ oz. chillies.

TO EACH NATIVE PUBLIC OR PRIVATE FOLLOWER.

1 lb. rice or flour.	1 oz. ghee.
4 ozs. dhol.	$\frac{2}{3}$ oz. salt.

On the 16th of January the scarcity of rice led to an alteration

* See "Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia," vol. ii. pp. 172, 180, 181.

† This was the scale adopted for the China War of 1860.

in the scale. The Europeans ceased to draw the 4 ozs. of rice, receiving money compensation for that article. The rice and flour ration of the native fighting men was reduced to 12 ozs. per man per diem, $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of mutton, or money compensation, being given in lieu. The public and private followers were allowed 10 ozs. of flour and 10 ozs. of rice per diem, and $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. of mutton or goat in lieu of the balance. Spirits were issued to fighting men only, and the forage had to be issued very sparingly.

The spirit kegs were found about the most difficult articles to transport, and towards the middle of February the daily issue of spirits had to be reduced to one dram.

On the 27th of the same month, a new scale of rations had to be laid down for the troops and followers who were to advance beyond Antalo. Issues were to be made as follows:—

European troops.		Native troops.		Followers.	
Flour	... 16 ozs.	Flour	... 14 ozs.	Flour	... 12 ozs.
Meat	... 24 „	Ghee	... 2 „	Ghee	... 2 „
Salt	... $\frac{2}{3}$ „	Salt	... $\frac{2}{3}$ „	Salt	... $\frac{2}{3}$ „
Ghee	... 2 „	Meat	... 16 „	Meat	... 16 „
Vegetables	2 „	Kokum	... $\frac{1}{2}$ „		
Tea	... $\frac{1}{2}$ „				
Sugar	... 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ „				

An alternative ration was provided for natives who could not eat meat.

Every effort was made to purchase grain and other provisions from the chiefs and from the inhabitants, but that part of Abyssinia crossed by the British force on its advance to Magdala was wretchedly poor. It produced no vegetables; milk and butter were occasionally procurable; eggs and poultry were scarce and dear; there was little grain or grass in comparison with the requirements of the force. Forage was very scarce, and it was from the effects of insufficient food and very hard work combined that the mortality in transport animals was so great.

In consequence of the failure of the native transport, which it was intended to be utilized in pushing to the front what had been collected at Antalo, the provisions began to run short. A general order was consequently issued to intimate that in the next advance all officers and soldiers were to reduce their baggage or kits, that twelve soldiers were to occupy one tent, and the officers were to double up. The orders issued at Lat

were even more stringent than those issued before leaving Antalo. No baggage was to be permitted to go to the front. A forced march, a dash was to be made for Magdala; every mule was required for conveying provisions. Unmounted officers were allowed to carry only a great-coat, blanket, and indiarubber sheet. Sugar, rum, coffee, tea, potatoes—all luxuries, in short—were to be left behind.

From Lat to Magdala no troops could have possibly been in lighter marching order; only the bare necessities of life were to go with them.

On advancing beyond Lat, fifteen days' rations according to the following scale were issued to each corps:—

Europeans.	Natives.
Biscuit or flour, 1 lb.	Flour, 1 lb.
Vegetables, 2 ozs.	Ghee (if obtainable locally), 2 ozs.
Salt, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz.	Salt, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz.
Sugar, $1\frac{1}{2}$ oz.	Vegetables (once a week), 2 ozs.
Tea, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz.	
Rum, 1 dram.	

It was laid down that these were to be carried by the transport attached to each unit, and issued under regimental arrangements; but whenever the commissariat could issue from local purchases flour, bread, ghee, etc., these were to be issued to the troops in lieu of a similar ration in regimental charge. The regimental transport animals, as they became unloaded by the consumption of the rations, were to be handed over day by day to the officers in charge of the transport, to be placed by them at the disposal of the commissariat for the carriage of articles purchased locally.

The dollar in Abyssinia, as it is everywhere, was an omnipotent aid; it caused water to flow from solid rocks. The inhabitants pulled down their houses to sell the rafters to the commissariat, so that the food they had brought for the soldiers might be cooked.

During the four weeks that the force was south of the Takazze, the troops were badly fed, and had no compressed vegetables, lime-juice, sugar, or rum. Biscuit and rice were only issued occasionally. The beef procured in the country was excessively poor, tough, and hard, and the ration had to be increased to 2 lbs. The inhabitants of the country were with difficulty persuaded to part with their sheep. Instead of bread, flour was issued and made into *chuyatties*; the flour was a mixture of wheat,

barley, and bageree. Native bread, called "gogo," was made of this flour, and was largely consumed by the troops; but it was insufficiently baked and very indigestible. The provisions were decreasing rapidly; the animals were sometimes on half rations, and very often on quarter.

The fifteen days' supply was expended early in April, and for some time after the 1st of that month the ration of the troops and followers had to be reduced to 1 lb. of meat, 8 or 10 ounces of flour, and such salt as was procurable in the country. Bowel complaint, produced by bad feeding, bad water, and exposure to rain, became prevalent amongst both the Europeans and natives of India. On the 21st of April the Principal Medical Officer felt bound to address a complaint to the Commander-in-Chief, informing His Excellency that the want of vegetables, sugar, and rum was telling on the health of the troops. The great difficulty lay in the transport of provisions; but a time came when the population eagerly came forward to take service as carriers.

There was no scarcity of food in the return. The garrisons of the stations on the line of communications during the absence of the army had collected heaps of provisions of all sorts. They had plenty of time for doing so, and the silver dollar acted in a marvellous way. All the natives possessed was offered for sale, where the supplies came from being the greatest mystery.

The march from Magdala to Antalo proved very fatal to the animals of the transport train. The road was literally strewn with their carcasses. Hundreds of mules died daily. The camels succumbed the most readily; and even the elephants, notwithstanding the great care taken of these valuable animals, suffered. At Pilago five of the latter had to be shot, because of their extreme weakness. Cavalry horses died by dozens.

"With regard to this war," writes Cardinal Massaja, "of which I will treat in its proper place, I will here offer my opinion. I do not enter into the question of its justice or injustice; but after all that has happened in Abyssinia, and principally amongst the British subjects, it had become so necessary that, had not the childish pride of that people been lowered, the honour and authority of not only England, but even of all Europe, would have passed away like smoke, and no stranger whatsoever would have been able to set his foot in those regions. Because it must be said that there no distinction is made between English, French, Italians, etc.; all Europeans are

considered as belonging to one stock and nationality—all, in fact, come under the denomination of *Frangi*. Therefore the British Government not only vindicated its honour, and made its name to be feared, but rendered such service to the other nations as to have deserved applause and gratitude. And because the various European governments could not prevent their subjects going to those strange countries, either by reason of commerce, or for scientific purposes, good sense in that instance demanded that, instead of raising the standard of jealousy, they should have hastened to help a generous nation, which with its blood and money avenged the honour of all, and opened a safe way for our traders and explorers.* And if England or the other European Powers, after that fortunate war, had taken more wise resolutions, the Ethiopian continent would not be always closed and hostile to strangers and to our civilization. At least two-thirds of the Abyssinians longed to be delivered from the tyrannical yoke of Theodore, and wished that their liberators would have stopped and established themselves in some part of the eastern frontier. Many of the people told me, in ten years that place would have become a great city; because the people, tired of reprisals, would have ran in mass to take refuge under the pacific protection of a civil and humane people to seek in their midst to live tranquilly and enjoy the fruit of their labours.”†

Great Britain effected the release of the captives, and considered her honour satisfied by the death of the despot and the destruction of his principal stronghold, Magdala. Not a moment was lost in returning to the coast, for the troops had to be withdrawn from the highlands before the rainy season set in.

Lord Napier, in his farewell order to his army, said: “You have traversed, often under a tropical sun, or amidst storms of rain and sleet, 400 miles of mountainous and rugged country. You have crossed ranges of mountains (many steep and precipitous) more than 10,000 feet in altitude, where your supplies could not keep pace with you. . . . Not a single complaint has been made against a soldier, of fields injured, or villagers wilfully molested, either in person or property. . . . The remembrance of your privations will pass away quickly; your gallant exploit will live in history.”

* The expedition to Abyssinia caused considerable irritation in France.

† Cardinal Guglielmo Massaja, “I miei trentacinque anni di Missione ne alta Etiopia,” vol. vii. p. 58.

In 1872 the Government added to the Gold Coast some possessions which they had purchased from the Dutch. The King of Ashantee, who had already a grievance, on account of some of his slaves who had taken refuge in British territory, claimed a tribute formerly allowed him by the Dutch, and refused to evacuate the territory acquired by Great Britain. The Ashantees attacked the Fantees, and a straggling war commenced. It then became obvious to the Government that it was necessary to drive the Ashantee forces out of the Protectorate, and in the autumn of 1873 a small force was sent to Cape Coast Castle, reinforced in the winter by three battalions of British infantry.

The expedition against King Coffee Calculi cannot claim to be a memorable military operation; nevertheless, it was *unique*, and remarkable from the nature of the country, the unhealthiness of the climate, and the difficulties of subsistence and transport.

The operations can be properly divided into three distinct periods, as the efforts made to check the Ashantee invasion of the Protectorate, to drive the enemy back beyond the frontier, and to transfer the war into his own country, were in each case carried out under essentially different conditions.

The first period commenced with the invasion of the Fantee territory, in which the Ashantees were resisted by the chiefs and tribes of the Protectorate. The second comprised Sir Garnet Wolseley's operations with the 2nd West India Regiment, native levies, and allies, and the men of the fleet from October, 1873, to the end of the year. The third and last was the invasion of the Ashantee kingdom and return of the British force to the coast.

From the shores of the ocean right up to Coomassie, the capital city of Ashantee, is a dense forest. In the words of H. M. Stanley, the great African traveller, who accompanied the expedition as a special correspondent, "It was all forest—forest here, forest there, forest monopolizing every fathom of land save the road." The few villages which stud the mainway from Cape Coast Castle to the interior are located on the very limit of this forest, and are not surrounded by smiling fields. The tribesmen cultivate no crops; they are satisfied to feed on plantains, various roots and snails, supplemented by a few pumpkins, the tendrils of which are allowed to creep over their miserable huts. There is not a head of cattle in the land, no sheep, no goats, not one

atom of food to which Europeans are accustomed. Roads in that forest can only be called so by courtesy; they are simply tracks which admit only of travelling in Indian file, and are frequently interrupted by unbridged streams and long stretches of marsh and swamp. There are no carts, no pack-animals, and all the carrying is performed by natives whose burden never exceeds fifty pounds in weight, the load being invariably carried on the head.

On its march towards the coast the Ashantee army had destroyed all the Fantee villages on or close to the mainway, and its chiefs had neglected to establish any dépôts of provisions on their line of communication. The Ashantees make their army principally subsist on the resources of the invaded country, but in a country so devoid of means of subsistence, some thousand men soon eat up the little there is to be obtained, and, not to die of starvation, must soon move to some other place. When, in the second period of the operations, they were driven from the neighbourhood of the sea, they were deprived of the means of subsistence they had obtained from the disaffected Elminas, and from the people of friendly villages on the coast. Famine and sickness, with small-pox and dysentery, brought about by the heavy rains and insufficient food, soon compelled them to turn their steps in the direction of their own country. In the absence of all other food, wild yams were sought for, and even unripe pawpaws were eagerly devoured. The sufferings of the slaves must, indeed, by the accounts of the prisoners, have been very severe, for the few articles of food they were able to obtain, at great personal risk, were always taken from them by their masters on their return to camp. Starvation and disease reduced their army by nearly one-half. Abundant were the indications of famine and distress on their line of retreat; in all the abandoned camps were found dead bodies, whilst the prisoners brought into our camps were living skeletons, and unanimously reported that want and sickness in the Ashantee army were very great.

On the British side, large quantities of Australian meat, salt provisions, biscuits, rice, flour, preserved potatoes, and vegetables, lime juice, and preserved provisions of all sorts were sent out from the victualling yards, and every measure was taken to provide the soldiers regularly with proper and nutritious food. The idea obtained that generous feeding was necessary to keep healthy

in such a malarious country. The following scale of rations was adopted :—

- 1½ lbs. of meat, salt or fresh.
- 1 lb. of canned meat.
- 1¼ lb. of biscuit.
- 4 ozs. of pressed vegetables.
- 2 ozs. of rice or 2 ozs. of preserved peas.
- 3 ozs. of sugar.
- ¾ oz. of tea.
- ½ oz. of salt.
- ⅓ oz. of pepper.

Everything was done which could preserve the health of the troops in such a proverbially dangerous climate, and a very large body of medical officers, with hospital orderlies, medical comforts, and hammocks for the conveyance of the sick and wounded, were landed at Cape Coast Castle, and gradually sent up to the front.

In this expedition not only had every particle of food, equipment, munitions, etc., to be brought up from the base, but the greatest trouble was experienced in overcoming the innate sluggishness of the people, and in persuading them to come forward as carriers. The Fantees are the most shiftless and indolent of the negro race; they are also absurdly superstitious. The inducement offered them in the way of pay was not sufficient, and some pressure had to be brought to bear on the chiefs of the various tribes. At one time carriers had become so scarce that the men of the 2nd West India Regiment, a large portion of one of the battalions raised locally, and the Kroomen of the men-of-war had to be employed as carriers. Even one of the line regiments, the Royal Highlanders, stepped forward and volunteered to undertake the carriage of provisions.

The great anxiety of the General Commanding was the transport; a great number of carriers was required to effect an accumulation of provisions for a given number of days, besides such as were needed to carry the sick and wounded, the camp equipment, and personal effects.

One carrier was allowed to each regimental officer, and one for the kit of every three European soldiers; six were allotted to each hospital hammock; the small seven-pounder guns were dismounted, the piece, slung on a stout bamboo, was carried by four

men, one carrier was allotted to each wheel and three to the gun-carriage; the ammunition was packed in small cases, each one being a load for one carrier. One carrier was detailed to the rocket-tube or trough, and one for each bundle of six rockets. The provisions were made into loads as near as possible of 50 lbs.

Towards the end of 1873, Lieutenant Colonel Colley joined the force. He had been professor of military administration at the staff college, and had devoted special attention to questions of army organization, including the vital sections of transport and supply. He resigned his appointment to see service, and was placed in charge of the transport.*

The arrangements for the supply of the troops contemplated the collection at Prahsu by the 15th of January of 30 days' supply for the following force:—

English infantry	1360
Bluejackets and marines	250
Royal Artillery	60
Royal Engineers	50
1st West India Regiment	500
2nd West India Regiment	400
Native Artillery	50
Staff and other officers	50
Wood's and Russell's regiments	800
Carriers and workmen	3000
Total				6520

The distance from Cape Coast Castle to Coomassie was 146½ miles. The Royal Engineers, with the assistance of native labour, made a good broad road for the first 71 miles, up to the river Prah; they bridged the streams, of which there were many, and corduroyed the swamps. So accustomed, however, were the natives to the narrow paths of the country, that, notwithstanding the broad road made, they adhered to the ordinary formation of marching in single file.

The Fantees, who had not the courage to fight their own battles, had a great dread of the Asbantees, and in the last marches, after the battle of Amcaful had been fought, it was

* Should the reader desire to learn the measures taken by Lieut.-Colonel Colley for working the transport, he will find them in detail in Brackenbury's "Narrative of the Ashantee War," vol. i. p. 369; vol. ii. p. 93.

deemed impracticable to bring up convoys of provisions from the rear. The least alarm might have caused a stampede amongst the carriers. The troops were therefore made to carry provisions for five days, and were induced to make them last longer. The Control only took to Coomassie a very small supply of food as a last reserve.*

It was with this slender stock of provisions that the final dash on Coomassie was made. After the battle of Amoaful, Lieut.-Colonel Colley retraced his steps in the direction of Fomanah, to ascertain if it were possible to push forward any provisions. He reached Fomanah on the 2nd of February, whilst the place was in process of being attacked by Essamanquatia; and, after the Ashantees had been driven back, arrived at the conclusion that nothing could be done in that direction, as the communications had become unsafe.

On the 4th of February, the Ordah having been bridged, the force moved forward towards Coomassie. The Ashantees attacked the British troops, but Colonel McLeod (now Sir John McLeod, G.C.B.), who up to that moment had commanded the native brigade, seeing that the enemy did not intend to push on the attack, requested to be given command of his regiment. This was granted, and, firing volleys to the right and to the left, without halting, the Black Watch were led by their gallant colonel into Coomassie.

The occupation of the city was very short. The king, always insincere, refused to come in and treat, or to send any person of sufficient rank to represent him, and, as there were signs that the rainy season was approaching, Sir Garnet Wolseley determined to fire the city and retire. During the retreat, at Detchiasu, on the 9th of February, he received ambassadors from the king, who had become alarmed by the approach of Captain Glover's force, and terms of peace were settled with them. On the 13th of February a treaty of peace was signed at Fomanah.

The peace with the Ashantees was not a lasting one. The terms accepted by King Coffee Calcali, Article 2, to pay 50,000 ounces of gold as war indemnity, and Article 8, to put an end to human sacrifices, were not complied with. This led to a second occupation of Coomassie in 1896. The former expedition had

* When in the month of January hundreds of carriers deserted from the coast and from the line of communications, the European troops offered to be satisfied with half rations if they were only allowed to go to the front.

rendered this a less difficult matter, for it had broken the power of the Ashantee confederation, and many of the minor kings held aloof, or came forward to propitiate the British by rendering assistance to their forces.

Some eight years after the conclusion of the war against the Ashantees, the very unsatisfactory state of affairs in Egypt began to attract the attention of the British Government. Matters came to a crisis, and a British force was eventually sent to that country to suppress the rebellion. After Arabi's army had been so easily defeated at Tel-el-Kebir, and order had been restored in the Delta, the British troops were on the point of being withdrawn from Cairo, when the insurrection blazed in the Sudan.

The British Government, mindful of General Gordon's able administration of that country, and relying on his supposed influence over its people, selected him for the difficult task of extricating the Egyptian officials and garrisons.* The latter, after the annihilation of Hicks Pasha's army at Kazghil, were no longer in a position to hold their own.

General Gordon, and his assistant, Colonel Stewart, quitted England on the 18th of January, 1884, and on the 18th of February reached Khartum, where they were not long in being besieged by the Mahdi's forces. The British Government were, by the general wish of the nation, urged to take steps for their rescue, and in the summer of 1884, very reluctantly, sanctioned preparations being made for a force to proceed to Khartum. The delay had been too long, and a portion of the relieving force had barely established itself near Metemmeh, on the banks of the Nile, when Khartum fell.

There are grounds for entertaining a somewhat different view from the common with regard to General Gordon's mission. He had been Governor-General of the Sudan, and as such the nobleness of his character, combined with his administrative talent, had won for him the respect of the various chiefs and tribes inhabiting that part of Africa. His rule was strictly just and conciliating; he exerted himself in the interest of the people,

* Sir Henry Gordon complained that his brother, at the moment of his departure for Khartum, "was to the great mass of his countrymen a person who was now heard of for the first time." General Gordon was well known to the English official world, but he never hesitated to speak his mind, he dearly loved having his own way, and could not quite agree with the men at the helm. If his name was not in everybody's mouth, it was because his services were mostly rendered to foreign powers, and his nature made him shun popularity.

so much as to gain their confidence, and, as far as it can be said when referring to a turbulent and Mussulman population, who are guided by ideas entirely different from our own, had gained a certain amount of influence over them.

In 1884, a religious revival had convulsed the ideas of the people, and events had shown them how they were better men than the soldiers who had long held them in subjection. Their apathy had been conquered by the dogma of Mohammed: "The sword is the key of heaven and of hell! A drop of blood shed in the cause of God, a night passed under arms, will be accounted more than two months of fasting and praying. Whosoever shall die in battle will obtain pardon for his sins." Just as these words had made the prophet's followers full of valour at the battle of Muta, so they turned timid men into fearless combatants, more than twelve centuries later, through the instrumentality of the Mahdi.

The many defeats the Egyptian forces had suffered at the hands of the Mahdists, had left no troops on which a bold chief might have counted for restoring order and peace. Khartum had been denuded of troops, for Hicks had taken away the best, and for the defence of about four miles of earthworks there remained some few thousand Egyptian soldiers, which Colonel Coetlogen described in one of his telegrams as "the refuse of the Egyptian Army." Several defeats and the total annihilation of General Hicks' force had altered the state of affairs in the Sudan. Mohammed Ahmed, the Mahdi, had gained immense prestige, and was believed through the land a greater prophet than Mohammed. His followers were well armed, for they had acquired possession of 20,920 Remington rifles and 19 pieces of ordnance, of which several were Krupps and Nordenfeldts.

Not a word in our argument must be taken as casting the slightest slur on the General's courage; that is a point established beyond all possible doubt. Where there has always been in our mind some uncertainty is whether he did not undertake what must have appeared a hopeless task, one beyond his power to compass, and whether he did not precipitate the catastrophe by disclosing too soon the ultimate intentions of his Government.

Of all extravagant enthusiasms that on religious subjects is the greatest, and of all religious fanaticisms that of the followers of the prophet has shown itself always the most intense. It is a form of madness; the people are stimulated into fury; in a

moment they fling aside all rational considerations, and even the fear of death; the men seize their weapons, and are transformed into daring and redoubtable fighting men. Now, the question naturally arises: did the Government or the General gauge accurately the strength of the Mahomedan revival? Was it ever realized by either how thoroughly the General's influence, or what stood for it, had passed away? It appears evident that when General Gordon left England for Khartum he had not taken sufficiently into account the great change which had come over the country, both through the religious influence exercised by the Mahdi and the destruction of Hicks' army.

In looking over the correspondence which was carried out about that time, it is clear that the programme settled between the ministers and Gordon was the complete evacuation of the Sudan, including the garrisons of Kassala and Sennar. But he was not a man to carry out another man's conceptions; for, like Nelson, Robert Craufurd, Henry Lawrence, and other remarkable men, he was impatient of control.* Reflection had made him alter his views on the question, and he had persuaded himself strongly that the correct course to pursue was not to abandon the Sudan. Soon after his arrival in Khartum, he telegraphed to Cairo that he found it impossible to withdraw the soldiers and Egyptian *employés* in consequence of the insurrection of the Arabs and the interruption of the communications. The Government, however, reposing full confidence in him, left to his discretion the time and manner in which the withdrawal should be carried into effect; it only stipulated that the abandonment of the country should be done with the least sacrifice of life and property.

In the last pages of Gordon's journals can be seen in what light he considered the evacuation. If it could be done with honour he was for it, but if it was to be simply a skedaddle he would have none of it.

We can thoroughly understand how contrary to Gordon's nature it was to deprive of the support of the troops the officials and those people of Khartum who had stood loyal, and who without it would have been sacrificed.† The conception to hold

* This he himself admits; for in one of his letters from Central Africa he writes: "I felt too independent to serve, with my views, at Malta or in the corps."

† In the beginning of 1884, the population of Khartum numbered 60,000 souls. This number was reduced by one-third, as many individuals were ordered to quit the city, being known or suspected adherents of the Mahdi. Of the remaining 40,000, a very large proportion cherished feelings of sympathy with the cause of the self-proclaimed prophet. The town was full of traitors.

the city was that of a bold man, but Gordon's courage did not avail him. It was not his individual presence which so greatly inspirited the citizens, but the natural supposition that he was backed by a body of British troops. The rejoicings of the people gave way to despondency when they saw none arriving.

On his way to Khartum, at Berber and at Metemmeh, Gordon had imprudently disclosed to Hussein Pasha Kalifa and to the Emir of Metemmeh that he had come to withdraw the Egyptian garrisons. A fatal error; for these chiefs, up to that moment undecided, now determined to cast their lot with the Mahdi—the individual who to all appearance was bound to be soon the ruler of the country.

In the middle of February 1884, when the General reached Khartum, the Khedive's flag still floated over Berber, and the communications with Egypt by way of Abu-Ahmed and Korosko, or through the Bayuda desert and Dongola, were open. The Ababdeh Arabs were friendly, and had assisted in passing through the Korosko desert, *en route* for Cairo, the most helpless portion of the garrison of Khartum under Colonel Coetlogen. Whilst the communications remained open—a period of about seven weeks—2500 men, *employés*, widows, and children were sent down the Nile to Korosko by way of the Nubian desert. There is the testimony of Father Ohrwalder that, had Gordon not been sent to Khartum, the evacuation as originally ordered could have been carried out without difficulty.

With a river communication, and with half a dozen steamers available, such points as Shendy, Berber, and Abu-Hamed might have been occupied, the troops gradually falling back, when the inhabitants of Khartum would have taken advantage of their movements to effect their withdrawal.

The fate of Khartum was intimately connected with that of Berber. Gordon suggested the occupation of that important post in the following words: "In face of storm likely to break on us, why not utilize Wood and his forces to move on Dongola, and thence to Berber? The route is safe, and camels plenty." Nubar Pasha warned the British representative in Cairo in time that the Mudir of Berber, Hussein Khalifa, might be thrown into the hands of the rebels, and asked that two Egyptian battalions and 500 Ababdeh Arabs might be sent as soon as possible to Berber. The military authorities in Cairo objected to sending only Egyptian troops, and the British Government

backed them by insisting that the Sirdar's force was organized for service in Egypt alone.

What was the Egyptian army about? Why did it not exert itself to go to the assistance of the two British officers in Khartum? Did it ever strike them that these brave men were engaged in saving a remnant of their own army; that it was their bounden duty to give them a helping hand? When Gordon was contending with immense difficulties, it is strange that there should have been no officer in Egypt strong enough to bring his influence to bear, and if necessary even to risk his own reputation to go to the rescue of a gallant comrade.

Berber had a miserable garrison of 600 men; Abu Hamed, the next post on the communications with Egypt, and the real gateway to the Sudan, had no garrison. The first was invested by the Mahdi's troops at the end of March, and fell in April. Khartum was then left to its fate, and a large tract of country north of the beleaguered city was yielded to the insurgents without a struggle!

There has been much dispute as to the wisdom of selecting the Nile route for the advance of the relief expedition, and rejecting the Suakin-Berber one. The Nile route was good, and General Gordon admitted it, though he states, "but it ought to have been undertaken in July with a rising Nile." We must bear in mind on this point that up to the 17th of September, 1884, the Government had not arrived at a decision with regard to sending any portion of Lord Wolseley's force to Dongola. "You are fully aware," said a telegram of that date, "of the views of Her Majesty's Government on this subject, and know how adverse they are to undertake any warlike expedition not called for by absolute necessity!"

Lord Wolseley was not answerable for the delay, for he began agitating for a relief expedition as early as the 8th of April. Some writers have taken great pains to run down the route he selected for the advance, but they should remember that it was only the demonstration of the success which attended the Red River expedition that moved the Government, and made them entertain the idea of a relief expedition at all. It was the Adjutant-General at the War Office, and not the military authorities in Egypt, who did most to aid General Gordon. It was he who urged the Government to take measures for his relief, and who studied the alternative schemes for getting him out of Khartum.

There were several ways of reaching that city. There were the Nile, the Suakin, the Korosko, and the Kassala routes. It is to no purpose now to review the advantages and disadvantages of each of them; it will be sufficient to state that in three the principal difficulty was the scarcity of water, which would have entailed a transport on a very large scale, and for which the country could provide no forage. The advantage of shortness which the Suakin route had was reduced by the opposition likely to be met with from the tribes living about it, the limited supply of water, oppressive heat, and the terminus of the route, Berber being in the hands of the Mahdists, who might have destroyed the wells in the last section of the road.* In the end, the advantages of the Nile route were admitted. There was the superiority of river over land transport, plenty of water for all purposes, and the fact that the route was open for a very long way in the direction of the Bayuda. The Korosko route, striking the Nile at Abu Hamed, with the tribes well disposed towards us, might have been preferable in point of time, but it had only one water-supply on its entire length, at the Murat wells. Water reservoirs might, however, have been established, working from both ends, once Abu Hamed had been taken by an advanced party; but nothing in this way was done.

We must regard as one of the reasons which led to the collapse of the Khartum relief expedition the dearth of natural resources in the Upper Nile provinces. These districts compare very badly with the rich and productive plains of the Delta. The cultivation in most places—the mudirieh of Dongola excepted—is simply limited to a very narrow strip of ground on each bank of the river, which can be easily irrigated by means of *sakias*. The difficulty of provisioning a relief expedition had been foreseen; arrangements had accordingly been made to fit the whaler boats, in which the troops were to ascend the Nile, with cases containing a store of provisions calculated to last the crew for three months. Later on a demand was made for a further supply of the same description of provisions.

* A correspondent, telegraphing from the Atbara camp, August 7, 1898, announces the arrival of the 5th Battalion of the Egyptian Army from Suakin. The battalion took eighteen days to march from Suakin to Berber. At one place, after a 30 miles' march, the wells were found dry, and the soldiers had to proceed another thirty miles before water could be obtained.

The ordinary field ration for the troops moving from Assiut in the direction of Khartum was fixed as follows:—

- 1½ lb. fresh, or 1 lb. preserved, meat.
- 1½ „ bread, or 1 lb. biscuit or flour.
- 1 „ fresh vegetables, or 1 oz. compressed vegetables, or 1 tin erbswurst.
- ½ oz. tea.
- ½ „ coffee.
- 2½ „ sugar.
- ½ „ salt.
- ⅓ „ pepper
- 120 gallon lime juice, with ¼ oz. sugar.

Dates were often issued in lieu of a vegetable ration, or given as an extra when sugar fell short. South of Abu Fatmeh no spirit ration was issued. Fresh meat was obtained by contract, but as the supply of cattle was not plentiful, Russian oxen had to be imported. The contractor's agents purchased cattle in the Dongola district.

The whaler-boat ration comprised articles of food which seldom form part of the soldier's field ration, and was arranged with the idea of providing variety in the diet. It was composed as follows:—

- Preserved corned meat, 1 lb. on four days out of six.
- Preserved fresh meat, 1 lb. on one day out of six.
- Ham or bacon, 1 lb. on one day out of six.
- Fresh meat, 1 lb. in substitution for 1 lb. of any of the foregoing whenever it could be procured.
- Cheese, ⅓ oz. daily.
- Biscuit, navy or cabin, 1 lb. five days out of six.
- Bread, 1½ lb. in substitution for 1 lb. biscuits, whenever procurable.
- Baking-powder, ½ oz. to 12 lbs. of flour.

DAILY.

- 1 oz. tea.
- 3 „ sugar.
- ¼ „ salt.
- ⅓ „ pepper.
- ½ „ rice.
- 1 „ preserved vegetables, or 12 ozs. fresh vegetables.

- 12¹/₈₀ gallon vinegar.
- 3¹/₂₀ „ lime juice.
- $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. oatmeal.
- $\frac{1}{3}$ „ pickles four days out of six.
- 1 $\frac{1}{3}$ „ jam or marmalade two days out of six.
- 1 tin erbswurst every three days.

When the troops ascending the Nile in boats passed through a station, they drew fresh bread and meat, and kept from consuming the whaler-boat provisions as much as possible.

The daily ration for the Egyptians was 1 lb. bread, rice, biscuit, or flour ; $\frac{1}{3}$ lb. fresh or preserved meat ; $\frac{1}{3}$ oz. coffee ; 2 ozs. sugar ; $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. salt.

For the Aden camel-drivers the daily issue of food was fixed as follows :—

- 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. biscuit or rice.
- 1 „ dates.
- 2 oz. ghee.
- 2 „ sugar.
- $\frac{1}{3}$ „ coffee.
- $\frac{1}{3}$ „ salt.
- 2 „ onions, when procurable, or 4 oz. dhal.

The daily allowance of forage was—

For English horses, 10 lbs. corn, 12 lbs. hay or chopped straw, 1 oz. salt.

For native horses and mules, 8 lbs. barley, 8 lbs. chopped straw, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. salt.

For camels, 10 lbs. beans, 15 lbs. chopped straw.

The provisions were of very good quality. With the many loadings and unloadings of the boats, as these had to be lightened previous to being towed up difficult places, the cases containing them underwent much rough usage, and notwithstanding that the packing was done with more than ordinary care, it was found on arrival at Korti that the water had damaged many of the articles.

The bulk of the food came from England, and there was no comparison between what was purchased locally and what was received from Alexandria. It was not so with the camel food ;

the crushed beans and chopped straw, the durrah and durrah stalks were all purchased locally.

Ascending the Nile from Cairo—the base of operations—the line of communications up to Korti measured 1144 miles, and this distance, with regard to provisions, can be divided into five sections, as follows :—

From	To	Miles	Provisions and forage
Cairo	Assouan	549	Abundant
Assouan	Wady Halfa	210	Limited
Wady Halfa	Abu-Fatmeh	210	Very limited
Abu-Fatmeh	Dongola	40	Plentiful
Dongola	Korti	135	Moderate

In the course of eight months the following amount of provisions and forage were purchased in the country between Wady Halfa and Dongola :—

144,319 lbs. of wheat.
 2,334,483 lbs. of forage.
 403 oxen.
 466 sheep.
 25,716 lbs. of vegetables.

From Korti—the fighting base—the combatants advanced by two different routes : one division moved by land across the Bayuda desert in the direction of the wells of Gakdul and Metemmeh, the other by water, up the Nile towards Abu-Hamed. For the first, provisions were carried by convoys of camels which either marched with the troops or were despatched after them from Korti. For the second, the boats principally carried what was required for the troops. Arrangements had also been made to come to the assistance of the river column by convoys of provisions which the friendly Ababdeh, who inhabit the Korosko desert, had engaged to convey to Abu-Hamed.

Notwithstanding the unusual length of the line of communications, and other difficulties, the troops were well fed throughout. Where the supply failed was in the matter of forage, and it was due to its scarcity, and nothing else, that a large portion of the camels belonging both to the camel regiments and to the regular transport became debilitated and died.

After the departure of the desert column, the Kababish tribe undertook most of the transport in the Bayuda desert between Korti and Gakdul. Though drivers by profession, and accustomed to move in a very barren country, the Kababish found that their camels suffered from constant work and insufficient grazing. They were very keen to secure the very high rate of hire fixed by the chief of the staff, nevertheless they were very soon reluctantly compelled to put many of their camels out of work.

The native caretakers of camels are so accustomed to having to face poor and insufficient grazing, that they never lose an opportunity of taking their animals out to pick up anything in the way of fodder to be found round the camp. Our people, on the other hand, spoilt by seeing good forage issued with great regularity, take no pains to help their animals by leading them out of the lines when there is no carrying work to be done. They are no herdsmen, and very often strangers to the habits and requirements of the transport animals in their charge.

Khartum fell, worn out by scarcity of food. "Many of the famished troops," wrote Colonel Kitchener, "left their posts on the fortifications in search of food in the town. Some of the troops were also too weak for want of nourishment to go to their posts. This state of things was known in the town, and caused some alarm. Many of the principal inhabitants armed themselves and their slaves, and went to the fortifications in place of the soldiers."

Of biscuit and dhurra much had been stolen; much more went to feed the wives and families of men who had deserted to the Mahdi, and were fighting against Gordon. The fatal error of allowing the communications to be severed bore fruit, and though the steamers still held their own on the waters of the Nile, it was not possible to turn them to account for provisioning the beleaguered city.

The gradual abatement of the religious enthusiasm, which Khalifa Abdullah has been unable to keep up, and the horrible tyranny exercised over the people of the Sudan, have much favoured the reconquest of the province of Dongola and the advance on Khartum. Without wishing in the least to detract from the excellence of the arrangements, from the ability of the direction, from the skilful strategy and organization of Lord Kitchener, and the admirable marching and cheerful endurance of the troops, there can be no question that the circumstances were latterly very favourable to the Anglo-Egyptian force.

In the late advance on Omdurman, the army numbered something like 23,000 men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, with 40 guns. These troops were in one body, and had besides an efficient flotilla to aid their advance by sweeping the banks of the Nile with the fire of artillery and machine guns, and a line of railway to facilitate the transport of materials and provisions. On the other hand, in 1885, Sir Herbert Stewart had at Abuklea only 1800 combatants of all ranks, and General Earle, with the river column, had 2966 officers and men drawing rations.* Both the British Government and their representative in Egypt, Lord Cromer, worked to aid the Sirdar, and the former had not to be urged and stimulated, as was the case in 1884, to give after many months an unwilling consent, which left everything to be done in the briefest space of time. This consent, which, with the best of luck, would have allowed nothing more than a discreet withdrawal, was given too late to rescue the gallant defender of Khartum.

Mr. G. W. Steevens, in describing the battle of Omdurman, wrote: "The honour of the fight must still go to the men who died. Our men were perfect, but the dervishes were superb—beyond perfection."

Bravery, whether displayed by the foremost soldiers of the world, or by Zulus, Hadendowas, or Baggaras, must always call forth the admiration and respect of all. Most noteworthy in the battle of Omdurman was the reckless valour and contempt of death shown by the dervish army. The fearful slaughter, the certainty of death that lay before them, had not the slightest effect in abating their determination. The dervishes may have been cruel and bloodthirsty, but they were brave. What redounds so much to Gordon's glory is that, with treachery all round him, and with the indifferent troops he had, he should have been able for many months to make head against such a redoubtable and fanatical foe, fighting under the eyes of their Sayid, the successor of the Prophet.

* "The bravery of the English in advancing on Khartum with such a small number of men is always a source of wonder to the Sudanese" (Father Joseph Ohrwalder, "Ten Years' Captivity in the Mahdi's Camp," chap. viii.).

CHAPTER XIV.

VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF PROVISIONING.

THE past chapters have shown what has occurred in some of the more recent wars ; the results speak for themselves, and demonstrate in a very clear manner why the measures pursued answered well in some instances and failed totally in others. We must here claim indulgence for having often departed from our subject. This has been done to render a dry subject more attractive to the reader, and also because it was often necessary to explain the effect the course of events had on the provisioning of the combatants.

Though he wrote in the sixteenth century, Macchiavelli makes some pertinent observations on the methods of subsisting armies. He recommends all princes and commanders to have their armies as free as possible from encumbrances, so that they may be at all times fit and ready to undertake any expedition or enterprise. He remarks that all the difficulties which have beset armies hitherto have come from either a want or an exuberance of provisions. It is the system of the ancients that finds favour in his eyes ; they fed their men with frugality, made them bake their own bread, and be satisfied with water. He condemns the system of modern armies, inasmuch as it is dependent on too many very burdensome and costly articles.

All officers who have undergone any training in athletics know that constant hard and sharp exercise is not sufficient to bring the body into condition to perform some feat of strength or endurance, and that this must be combined with rigid abstinence. A modern writer has defined this *training* to be the resolute performance of the three cardinal virtues—temperance, soberness, and chastity. The Roman soldier rightly regarded abstemiousness as a military virtue, to be practised as a useful training and preparation against the hardships of war. Except

on service, our troops are never in *condition*; the care taken in their lodging and in their feeding is very commendable, nevertheless it can be carried, and is carried, to excess.

There has been a great deal of nonsense written about the insufficiency of the British soldier's food; his ruddy and plump appearance is sufficient evidence to prove how well he is fed. Some years ago a zealous quartermaster imagined that he had discovered the way to make the soldier's meals more substantial. Without carefully investigating the peculiar circumstances of the battalion, the whole army was enjoined to copy the good example stated to have been set. The matter died a natural death; the discovery was a myth, the data were found misleading.

In war there must be suffering; often there is more than is necessary, and much of it is due to inexperience.

It is delusive to imagine that any fixed rules can ever guide the provisioning of an army in the field. Elasticity of measures, common sense, readiness of resource, and courage to incur responsibilities are at the bottom of an efficient supply service. There is no officer who has been on active service who does not know what a blessing it is to have to deal with a man who is not afraid of taking responsibility upon himself.

The principle which should animate all commissariat officers is to do their very utmost to furnish the troops, in whatsoever situation, with the food which has been sanctioned for them. To do this efficiently, they must be familiar with the peculiarities of the various systems of subsistence, without which knowledge, with the very best will in the world, it would be impossible for them to apply them to meet the circumstances of the moment.

In a very well-stocked country, with a friendly population, if the commissariat do their duty, our supplies are certain. Where the difficulty lies is when we step into the enemy's territory. There the system most practical under the great variety of conditions found in war is the one that should be adopted in each case.

There are not very many officers who picture to themselves with any approach to the truth all the embarrassments which arise from the daily movements of considerable masses of troops. Yet it has been said that he who would obtain a true idea of the soldier's life on service must mentally share the fatigues of the march and the monotony of the camp. To show how this constant moving reflects on the subject of their subsistence, let

us give a faint outline of what occurs on the line of march. Generally speaking, when an army corps forms part of an army, only one road can be assigned to it for its movements; those running laterally are required for the other corps. The sequence of batteries, battalions, etc., on the line of march is arranged principally in view to their coming into action, and on this we need not touch. It is, nevertheless, evident that when something like 35,000 men are ranged in column of route on a road not much more than from twenty-four to thirty feet broad, they will occupy a considerable length. Next after the combatants and their light baggage will come the various trains of the army corps; the provisions alone will require about 500 vehicles, and even this large number will seldom carry more than a four days' supply. The road will now be filled with animals and carriages; waggons drawn by four horses or mules, carts drawn by two, with requisitioned vehicles of all patterns and dimensions; Army Service Corps soldiers, some mounted, others on foot, leading or walking alongside their animals; other soldiers of all arms with pack animals and led horses; officers and non-commissioned officers moving about at a brisk pace—shouting, and urging the conductors to close up, and striving to make themselves understood by the drivers of the country. The noise of whips, the angry voices of men, will be heard everywhere along the road. Intermingled with the mass will be detachments of the administrative corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, Ordnance Store Corps, Army Service Corps, marching in small squads at the side of the dusty road, led by their officers. Here and there a herd of cattle shuffling and straggling along, raising greater clouds of dust still, and hurried forward by the drovers; last of all the Military Police with their prisoners. An endless thin stream of men, vehicles, and animals, in tedious processional movement, and, from that very reason—and from having had to wait for several hours before setting off—becoming more and more wearied and irritated as the duration of the march increases. The soldiers, tired, dusty, and dry, are made clamorous for a drink by the very sight of a public-house; they quit the ranks, and eagerly accept a draught of water from the dwellers along the high-road. Endless delays ensue at bad and steep places, or when a bad piece of water occurs, by reason either of the waggons being overloaded or of the draught animals being weak and out of condition. These halts, frequently repeated,

weary the horses, who have to stand harnessed for hours, and their drivers, whose attention is kept on the strain by having continuously to start and pull up. This immense convoy, moving onward slowly, and obstructing miles of road, is a constant source of annoyance; still it is one no army can do without.

From head to tail an army corps marching on one road, when keeping the prescribed distances between units—which never occurs—will occupy about twenty-one and a half miles. This, however, is far beyond the average of the day's march for large bodies of troops, which seldom exceeds twelve or thirteen miles; where the road is encumbered or the weather is bad they will not do nearly as much. In any case, when the first troops arrive in camp or bivouac, the largest portion of the train will not yet have got into motion, and not for many hours can what it conveys be of any use to the troops.

The normal state of an army in the field, as we have seen, is one of motion, and it is this constant state of movement which makes its being fed with regularity such an arduous task. If it is found stationary at intervals, beyond those occasions when a halt to rest the troops and animals is deemed imperative, it will generally be because it has outstripped its convoys, or because its commander does not dare to undertake a set of operations until he has accumulated provisions sufficient to last him for a given number of days.

The degree of rapidity in the march of the troops will have a decided influence on their provisioning. The subsistence becomes easy if the troops remain stationary for any time, but by remaining so they soon exhaust the local resources, and there is no other way of keeping them alive than in bringing up food from the rear. In a defensive war provisioning does not cause much difficulty, for a regular chain of dépôts can be established, from which issues are made to the retiring troops. In advancing, on the other hand, into a hostile country, as an army gets further and further from its base, the transport of provisions, and, consequently, the subsistence of the troops, becomes more difficult.

To provide this shifting mass of men and animals with food there are several methods. First, the army may obtain food through the soldiers being billeted on the inhabitants—food and quarters combined. Secondly, it may be fed from magazines. Thirdly, the whole of the provisions may be carried after the army by provision-trains. Fourthly, it may be fed on the

resources of the theatre of war, procured through requisitions or purchases.

It is necessary to understand under what circumstances each of these methods becomes applicable. Quarters large masses of troops on the inhabitants can be resorted to when there is no fear of coming into contact with the enemy, or when an army crosses a rich and well-populated country the resources of which have not yet been made to support other troops in any number. There is no trouble in this method connected with issues or with the preparation of meals, and the needs of the soldiers are attended to with very little loss of time. The adoption of this method also allows of a diminution in the transport.

The system, nevertheless, entails a certain dispersion of the combatants, and ceases to yield good results when there is a long halt, or when it becomes expedient to effect a considerable concentration of troops.

When this measure is adopted the arrangements for the march must be very complete, a number of columns advancing simultaneously on a broad front.

An army can be fed and lodged by the inhabitants when in consequence of one or more battles the adversary has been annihilated or rendered powerless. This was the method adopted by the Russians after they crossed the Niemen in 1813, and when they marched on Paris in 1815, after Waterloo had been fought. Quarters troops on the inhabitants, on the other hand, becomes very risky as long as the enemy is in a position to keep the field. Of this there is a good example in the campaign of 1814 in France.

The career of Count Saint-Priest had been distinguished by a series of brilliant and fortunate actions, which had justly gained him a fine military reputation. Called up from the blockade of Mayence to re-establish the communication between Prince Schwartzberg and Blücher, he captured Rheims on the 12th of March, 1814. He then decided that his troops should take up their cantonments in the neighbourhood of that city. Blücher's exaggerations of the victory of Laon had such an effect on Saint-Priest, that he thoroughly believed himself beyond all chance of surprise from the enemy. His ordinary prudence was cast aside, and he was resting tranquilly after his conquest, having distributed his troops amongst the villages around in the direction of Fismes and Soissons. At eleven o'clock the following morning

the report of artillery at the gates of Rheims raised the alarm, and a prisoner declared that Napoleon in person was before the city.

The French, advancing suddenly, had surrounded the allies in the villages they occupied, where they were resting peacefully, trusting to the protection of a few squadrons of cavalry. Saint-Priest at first could not be made to believe the statements of the fugitives. When the presence of the French was too evident, he hurried his dispositions, hurled his cavalry against them to gain time, and called up the infantry from the city. These measures were taken too late; the General was mortally wounded, and with his fall his troops became disheartened, and rushed in disorder towards the bridge on the Vesle. But for the gallant conduct of the regiment of Riazan, commanded by the brave Colonel Skobelev, and the murderous fire it opened on the pursuing cavalry, the entire army corps would have been destroyed, for the confusion at the bridge was beyond description.

Making the subsistence of the troops rest entirely on magazines is a method which is now considered obsolete. An army tied to its magazines is limited to the working powers of its transport; this system, when in vogue, acted as a drag on military operations, and made the general's plan dependent on the possibilities of the commissariat. It was a subversion of all military ideas, for the accessory was permitted to dominate the principal. That the subsistence of the troops has great influence on the operations of war, all admit; nevertheless, it should never be looked upon except as a means to an end. There may, however, be circumstances in the future in which the old system may again have to be brought into existence; when, for example, a given district has been depleted of its resources, or its population being small, provisions for the numbers to be fed cannot be obtained at any price. In any case, to depend entirely on magazines is a costly system, and one which requires good roads and plenty of transport.

The system of provision-trains, aided by what the soldier himself carries in the shape of an emergency ration, comes in useful in rapid movements in a closely concentrated formation. This is generally resorted to in unforeseen cases, when, from whatsoever reason, the fourth method cannot be resorted to. In a march to the front it is not always possible, nevertheless, to insure the feeding of the troops by means of administrative parks alone.

In Chapter XXIV. of his "Memoirs," General Sherman, treating of the military lessons of the Civil War, goes into the question of provision-trains. We borrow the General's words because they explain his ideas far more thoroughly than we could. They are as follows: "Our base of supply was Nashville, supplied by railway and the Cumberland River; thence by rail to Chattanooga, a 'secondary base,' and thenceforward a single track of railroad. The stores came forward daily, but I endeavoured to have on hand a full supply for twenty days in advance. The stores were habitually in the waggon-trains, distributed to corps, divisions, and regiments, in charge of experienced quartermasters and commissaries, and became subject to the orders of the generals commanding these bodies. They were generally issued on provision returns, but these had to be closely scrutinized, for often the colonels would make requisitions for provisions for more men than they reported for battle. Of course, there are always a good many non-combatants with an army, but, after careful study, I limited their amount to twenty-five per cent. of the 'effective strength,' and that was found to be liberal. An ordinary army waggon, drawn by six mules, may be counted on to carry 3000 lbs. net, equal to the food of a full regiment for one day, but by driving along beef-cattle a commissary may safely count the contents of one waggon as sufficient for two days' food for a regiment of 1000 men; and as a corps should have food on hand for twenty days ready for detachment, it should have 300 such waggons as a provision-train; and for forage, ammunition, clothing, and other necessary stores, it was found necessary to have 300 more waggons, or 600 waggons in all for a *corps d'armée*."

In the following chapter the principal drawback of relying on cattle on the hoof will be shown; and what happened in the last Franco-German war is liable to repetition in any other war. General Sherman calculates the strength of a battalion (regiment) at 1000 men, but the casualties from battle and disease soon lower the establishment on paper; a commissary, therefore, shortly after the commencement of the operations, might well count on the contents of a waggon as likely to last for about two days. The allowance of waggons he fixes for an army corps evidently refers to the weak ones he commanded. According to General Easton, in the march from Atlanta, the 14th Corps numbered 15,680 men; the 15th, 18,000 men; the 17th,

11,000 men. The establishment fixed for our army corps is much higher ; each corps comprises 35,087 officers and men, with 1736 carriages.

With reference to the provision-columns the General writes : "These should be absolutely under the immediate control of the corps commander, who will, however, find it economical to distribute them in due proportion to his divisions, brigades, or even regiments. Each regiment ought usually to have at least one waggon for convenience to distribute stores, and each company two pack-mules, so that the regiment may always be certain of a meal on reaching camp without waiting for the larger trains."

The business of the commissariat is to establish magazines, and to push forward their resources in the direction of the troops ; but in those cases in which the troops move very fast the only safe way of keeping them in food is to have recourse to what can be found locally. As the army would outmarch the provision-trains, it must then live on the produce of the theatre of war. This is the system on which the provisioning of almost every army now mainly rests.

The right of war, which, reduced to its most simple meaning, is nothing more than the dictation of the strongest, renders an army, wherever it may be, absolute master of all the produce and other useful articles found in the theatre of operations, whether they may be destined for the use of the enemy or for other purposes. This hard law recognizes the right of subsisting the troops on the resources of the adversary's territory. The appropriation of all that belongs to the enemy is apparently sanctioned by the Holy Scripture. Deuteronomy xx. 13, 14 laid down the following command to the Hebrews : "And when the Lord thy God hath delivered it into thine hands, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword. But the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city, *even* all the spoil thereof, shalt thou take unto thyself ; and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine enemies, which the Lord thy God hath given thee."

A population attained by the scourge of invasion cannot escape the consequences known under the general name of "war requisitions."

The population is in a certain way a criterion of the amount of provisions to be found locally. Its density in most cases indicates the degree of richness of a country, for in proportion as

the population becomes thin the productive forces diminish ; this reduces the local sources of supply for an army ; they decline by degrees, and finish by disappearing altogether. If the population consists more of artisans than of agriculturists, if the soil is poor, if the land is uncultivated, if the country has already been overrun, then the resources to be found will be very limited.

Where the consumption is large, the provision to meet that consumption is likewise large ; a large population, therefore, as a rule, produces largely. Moreover, densely populated countries have the advantage that the roads and waterways are plentiful and kept in good repair, also that they are intersected by numerous railway lines.

It will be well, nevertheless, to bear in mind that the resources of a country cannot be thoroughly utilized by an army which marches rapidly across it ; much will be wasted and lost. It cannot be otherwise, for, as the troops move to attain a definite object, they cannot spread too far to the flanks ; the tract, therefore, laid under contribution will be a thin strip of country parallel to the line of march. Whilst some places will be utterly ruined, abundance will reign a few miles beyond. This point is borne out by Baron de Marbot's statement, which will be found in Chapter IX., where he asserts that there were resources to be found on both flanks of the French line of march during its retreat from Moscow. The advance had swept on too swiftly, and whilst it had cleared all that was left in the vicinity of the main road itself, it had not drained the lateral resources.

Napoleon, when he found time to infuse order and regularity in the administration of his armies, employed a compromise between the system of magazines and the system of requisitions, and borrowed from each what he found good. He did not reject either of the two systems, but employed them conjointly, giving the preference to one or the other as circumstances demanded.

It is only when there is a well-laid-down system, coupled with certain favourable conditions, that the local resources will be turned to the greatest account. The cavalry covering the army, whose movements would be impeded if accompanied by slowly moving provision-trains, must of necessity live on immediate requisitions. It can, besides, be the medium employed for making larger demands, which can be complied with in time to meet the wants of the troops which follow. This presupposes that the local resources have not been touched.

To feed the masses of combatants that can be put in the field in these days entirely on the produce of the occupied country will very often be an impossibility, owing to the very concentrated state in which armies now move.

As, moreover, both contending parties resort to about the same system of provisioning, it may happen that an army in brisk pursuit of another may find the local resources exhausted or purposely destroyed, and may have to fall back on provision-columns and emergency rations, if it may not even have to retire and surrender the advantages gained by battle. The latter is an extreme case; still we have an example of this in the Napoleonic wars.

On the 1st of February, 1807, Napoleon's army, composed of the Imperial Guard, Soult's, Angereau's, Davout's, and Ney's corps, with Murat's cavalry, commenced marching against the Russians, who had retired towards Königsberg. "Such a body of troops," observes Marbot, "marching for the same point would soon exhaust the supplies which the country could furnish, and we suffered much from hunger; the Guard alone, having waggons, carried with it the means of providing rations. The other corps lived how they could; that is to say, they got scarcely anything.*

"On the 7th of February, Angereau's troops were quartered in the little hamlet of Zehen. We had hoped to find some supplies there; but the Russians had plundered everything in their retreat, and our unlucky regiments, who had received no rations for a week, found no better comfort than potatoes and water. The store-waggons of the staff having been left at Landsberg, our supper was even less satisfactory than that of the men, for we could not get any potatoes. At eight in the morning, just as we were about to mount and advance, a servant brought a loaf to the marshal, who, with his usual kindness, shared it with his aides-de-camp."†

Napoleon remained on the battle-field of Eylau for eight days, principally to impress his victory on Europe. After that, finding that the country did not yield any subsistence for men or horses, he retired thirty leagues.‡ In this campaign, more than in any

* "Memoirs of Baron de Marbot," vol. i. p. 253.

† Idem, p. 256.

‡ Baron Lejeune narrates how he saw a horse "with but three legs licking the face of his owner, who was standing gazing at his injured steed with an expression of the greatest consternation. He had but a morsel of bread for himself, but he gave it to his horse."

other, the Emperor paid great attention to the safety of his communications and the formation of dépôts.

The French army retired from the ghastly battle-field to establish its winter quarters on the left bank of the Passarge, and took up a position round the Castle of Finkenstein.* It was first intended to give it a rest for three days, but provisions flowed in in abundance from the plains of Poland, and here the army stayed. In this famous camp the French troops recovered their efficiency, which made it possible for Napoleon to capture Dantzg and to defeat the Russians in the field of Friedland.

In this last battle they were not better off for provisions than at Eylau; for, according to one eye-witness, "as the sun went down on the 14th of June, the French found themselves masters of Friedland, but were sorely tried by hunger and thirst, which they could not satisfy."

To draw provisions from the rear is a tedious and uncertain process; one, moreover, that demands communications safe and in a good state of repair, and a very large amount of transport. This transport needs a supply of forage in the same ratio, which is not always to be found. In any case, the system becomes inapplicable in a rapid march to the front; then only the utilization of the local produce can be of any efficient assistance.

To live on the resources of a country requires an uninterrupted move forward, a war carried out with energy. Whenever the continuity of the march cannot be maintained, and there occurs a check, the troops must fall back on the supply trains and the rations they themselves carry, or the commissariat must draw amply on the magazines and dépôts of provisions established in the rear of the army.

It may be found impolitic or dangerous to push too far the principle that war should feed war. This also has its limits. The French tax the Germans with having an absolute injunction for the troops to draw their subsistence from the occupied country. Nevertheless, though the Germans in 1870-71 campaigned in as fertile and rich a land as can well be found, by their own admission, they were compelled to draw two-thirds of their supplies from their own country. There can be no clearer proof that the system of requisitions failed to satisfy the larger portion of their wants.

* It was at Finkenstein that the Emperor received the ambassadors from Persia, with Mirza-Riza-Khan at their head, who came to congratulate him on his victories over their enemies the Russians.

De Gerlache remarks: "Notwithstanding the most careful consideration and foresight, requisitions must be made in every country where there is war. The *army must live*, and no consideration should stop the staff when this imperious law has to be obeyed; a town, a village, always contain food and supplies of different kinds for an army which is at hand: to find the means of extracting them, that is the problem."

The employment of this method, even when all the measures which humanity enjoins are attended to, is a scourge for the invaded. The ignorance of the population, the antipathy for the enemy with which they have been designingly inspired, and the very natural longing to protect their property, often lead to an obstinate resistance. The least ill-will shown to a needy army can, nevertheless, have no other result than to increase the evil.

Terrible may become the soldier if not fed. A writer alludes to the Old Guard in these words: "On arriving anywhere, the first care of the soldier was for his weapon. I speak here of the old soldier, because his musket was his life, his existence; he had only that for his defence, and very often nothing else to procure himself some bread."

Adherence to the two following principles will do much towards getting what is wanted. First, the appropriation of the provisions should be made as little displeasing to the people as possible; secondly, coercion should be resorted to only when persuasion and allurements have utterly failed. The requisitioning officer, as a rule, should be supported by a body under arms, a company, or a detachment of cavalry and infantry under one or more officers. Experience shows that the presence of troops has a very salutary effect in securing compliance with the demands. The detachment should be of moderate size; small detachments are more manageable, and do not frighten the people so much as large ones. They should always be accompanied by guides and interpreters. The duty of the officers is to protect the collection and loading of provisions and forage, to keep the men in hand, to prevent irregularities, and get the soldiers to confine themselves strictly to their work. Pillage must be repressed with a very strong hand, for it is always a source of indiscipline. Once it is tolerated it will to a certainty increase.

Lieut.-General Von Hanneken has gone into a simple calculation to show up to what number of days provisions can be obtained locally under favourable conditions. He writes: "If

the country in which one of our modern armies is called to operate is in condition to meet the nourishment of its inhabitants—that is, if their agriculture produces or their commerce imports what will satisfy the demand—it is after the harvest that the provisions are most considerable; it is before the harvest when they will be most limited. It is nevertheless always permissible to suppose that, even in this latter period, there is—as a warrant of security—a reserve of provisions to insure the nourishment of the inhabitants more or less for a month, let us say for thirty days. Now, if we admit that the territory occupied by the army is peopled by 150,000 souls on a surface of from thirty to thirty-five square miles—which is the average surface corresponding to the numbers of 150,000 souls in the regions which have been the theatre of war in 1870–71—one may count on finding 4,500,000 ordinary rations to be disposed of, those of women and children included. Given that 150,000 soldiers arrive, who consume at least two of such rations per day, there will remain provisions but for ten days, even admitting that everything is conducted with the most perfect order (because every day there are 450,000 rations consumed). Should the enemy have in this same region an army of equal strength, the want of food will begin to make itself felt on the sixth day; but on account of the losses and the waste which inevitably accompany all forced requisitions, on the fourth day probably the necessity will arise of having to bring up provisions by convoys.

“The regions which are crossed a second time will naturally furnish much less, and for however short a time the armies remain stationary, it becomes impossible for them to subsist even in the countries reputed the richest, if the subsistence of the troops is not assured, independently of the local resources, by means of regular convoys.”

We resort to requisitions for two essentially different objects: first, to meet the immediate requirements of the troops; secondly, to fill the magazine in their rear. In the latter case the call does not press so heavily on a locality, because there is more leisure, and the demands can cover a larger extent of country, which, as the army advances, is always increasing.

We will now pass to examine a system which has many advocates on the Continent, but which has not yet been thoroughly worked on a regular method. Competent authorities are of opinion that the only safe system in war is to purchase step by

step at remunerative prices such articles of diet and forage as the country can yield. This may be said to be only a modification of the system of requisitions, for though it is a purchase, it imposes an obligation on the people to part with their goods. This obligation is a *sine qua non*, for even when the inhabitant has sure confidence of reaping more than fair compensation for what he gives up, if it were simply a matter of option he might cause considerable embarrassment by refusing to comply with the demand.

Purchase at a highly remunerative price will make all the reserves of a country flow in the direction of the troops, for the producers and dealers are never blind to their personal interest.

In the preliminary marches, or when marching through one's own country or across the territory of an ally, notifications or officers can be sent in advance to the cities and towns on the line of march to have provisions and forage ready for the army. The very nature of war, however, generally hinders the commissariat when in presence of the enemy from preceding the troops with the object of collecting provisions, to be issued to them on their arrival in camp or bivouac. The most that can be done to improve matters is to attach expert commissariat officers to the cavalry which covers the army, for the purpose of demanding the provisions required for the troops which are coming up, but this is not considered sufficient. The provision-trains come up at a late hour, and the wants of the troops will not be satisfied for a long time after they have completed their march, to say nothing of the extra labour they will have to endure should they have to seek their provisions from some central depôt. All these drawbacks are well known, and the idea is now prevalent that in the same manner as the troops procure their own water and fuel they should requisition their daily subsistence. It will be seen what a very large breadth of country, equal to the front of the army, can thus be placed under contribution, how many purchasers can be employed at one and the same time, how the demands can be more fairly apportioned, and how much easier they can be complied with when the units to be provided for are small. Requisitions with the co-operation of the local authorities demand time; when time is wanting, what the troops get for themselves directly is got much quicker.

The system is applicable both to friendly and to hostile

countries, with this difference, that in the latter the districts or cities can be taxed with a contribution in money which will go a good way to cover what has been laid out in the purchases.

It may be objected that in this system there is the drawback of not knowing the language, which may make it difficult to enter into dealings or may lead to disputes. This difficulty always exists in war; still there are men who overcome it after a very brief intercourse with the people.

The French, who have done much since 1870–71 to set their army on an efficient footing, notwithstanding the faith they have in the courage and spirit of their soldiers, evidently entertain some doubt on the point of provisioning.*

Their *intendance*, despairing of being able to provision the troops in large movements with anything like regularity, has been reduced to engage each corps to look after its own subsistence. In time of war the French regulations appoint to each a provisioning officer—*un officier d'approvisionnement*. This officer has charge of the regimental transport, is expected to keep the regimental supply waggon always full, to make the issues, and even to purchase provisions direct. The *intendance* have found it impossible to come up in time at the end of the march and bring up bread; if in time of manœuvres whole regiments have been for entire days without distributions, what, they say, would it be in war? The responsibility is therefore transferred to the *officiers d'approvisionnement*.

As in war a very great abuse is made of requisitions, clear and precise instructions are needed. To start with, the regulations must clearly lay down who are the officers empowered to act. In the cavalry the unit should be the regiment, in the infantry the battalion, in the artillery a group of three or four batteries. There can be no question that the demand must be made by an officer appointed *ad hoc* by the commander of each of these units, and that he shall be required to deliver either a bond for what he obtains, or pay in ready money.

At the conclusion of the daily march, when the troops arrive in camp, this officer will proceed to the nearest village or farm; he summons the magistrate or owner, inquires into the resources, concludes a bargain, and carries to camp provisions for his men and forage for his horses. Naturally, a scale of prices will have

* A well-known writer asks: "*Mangera-t-on? L'intendance fera-t-elle son métier qui est de nourrir la troupe et non de la faire jeûner?*"

been previously fixed by the commissariat indicating the maximum for each article.

If towns are occupied, these can be partitioned into sections, each one being placed in charge of a local committee enjoined to have what food can be found in each house cooked and brought to some central place for distribution to the troops. When the cooking is left to the inhabitants, it will be done better and in less time than if the troops had to undertake it; the food will be ready sooner than it would be were a mass of provisions to be collected. A town of 3000 inhabitants should in this way supply food for double that number of men in a very short space of time.

This system offers great advantages, for, as the troops consume the articles on the spot, the transport and convoys are largely diminished; besides, many articles which the commissariat does not ordinarily turn to account, such as pigs, mutton, and even poultry, can be made to form part of the alimentation of the troops.

Such a system requires ready money and a certain measure of trust on the part of the War Department. It should not be difficult to constitute a committee in each regiment or battalion, composed of a captain and two subalterns, to keep the accounts and look after the details.

Even living on the resources of a country, in the ordinary manner, there must be some method. It would evidently be unwise to pounce down in too great numbers on certain towns, villages, and farmhouses; the most rational system to pursue is to distribute the demands in equal proportion, as far as is practicable, over all the ground in the neighbourhood of the combatants.

No army can keep the field without a large number of animals, and the consumption of forage in a campaign is on a huge scale. Forage is the most difficult article to procure from a distance; it must be obtained locally on account of its bulk and the size of the ration. Great efforts must be made to extract all that is absolutely needed to meet the requirements. The demand must embrace a large circumference of country, and be served on communities and not on individuals.

The quantity of forage needed augments with the size of the army trains; these are, generally speaking, large, and comprise a considerable number of quadrupeds. A calculation to start with should be made of the amount of forage which, in all probability,

will be found in the country which it is our intention to occupy. This demands an accurate knowledge of the fertility of the soil and of the proportions allotted to tillage of each description of grain. To do this it will be necessary to consult the statistics of several years running. A bad harvest in the theatre of war will affect the yield of forage, which of itself might produce very serious embarrassments during the progress of the campaign. Little will ever be found in districts where the pursuits of the people are confined to commerce and manufactures.

A leading principle of the art of feeding troops in war enjoins a search for the manner which is best adapted to satisfy the exigencies of the moment.

Most writers agree in this, that when moving rapidly an army must trust as much as possible to the local resources; when the troops are in a concentrated state, occupying a very limited space, they must fall back on the provision columns; and in cases of imperative necessity they must subsist on the reserves they carry with them. When armies are small and the population friendly, it is practicable to feed them largely on the produce of the country. Magazines are indispensable in a retreat.

The system of requisitions favours speed; it should be resorted to not only in rapid marches to the front, but when the lines of communication have been cut by the enemy, or when there exist no longer any lines of supply. The system of magazines has the advantage of order and of uniformity. The best method lies in a combination of the two. In a campaign are often found a combined employment of the different systems; at other times we remark a sudden transition from one to another, to meet some marked change in the circumstances.

Napoleon's campaign of 1809, as regards this variation of methods for securing the subsistence of his army, requires to be studied. In the campaign in question he found the local resources exhausted, as the country had already been cleared of most of its produce by the Austrian armies; consequently he made arrangements for provisions to be brought up from the rear, from his main depôts at Augsburg and at Donauwerth. Shortly after the commencement of the operations, the fortunate capture of the enemy's magazines at Eckmühl and at Ratisbonne helped the emperor in feeding his troops. Later on, when these were stationary in the neighbourhood of Vienna, everything was soon consumed, and had he not organized considerable depôts of

supplies in the island of Lobau after the battle of Essling, his 150,000 men would have died of starvation.*

The real talent of the administrator lies in taking advantage of any one of these methods as long as it will serve, casting it aside, and adopting another the moment the former is found inadequate to meet the requirements of the army.

The mission of the commissariat department in the field is to feed the army; their duty is to use every effort to procure and issue the necessary food and forage, and not to devote the greatest part of their time to keeping elaborately detailed accounts. This excessive amount of paper work, the outcome of long years of service in peace, is detrimental to the best interests of the army. The aim of all administrative officers in war should not be to justify themselves before the War Department at home, but to gain the gratitude of the troops in the field. There are sometimes men to be met with who appear to think it their duty to keep their stores full, and to raise all manner of objections to issue articles to such as are in want of them. There is a just medium in everything: too much routine, too much adhering to the letter of the law, too much fear of incurring responsibility, are contrary to the real spirit of war, and therefore are reprehensible.

Often it is not simply a question of getting the provisions, it is not where they are to be found in abundance, but where they can be purchased cheapest, for the officer has to husband the public money. The commissariat officer has thus a double duty to perform, the one towards the army, the other towards the State; he has to keep in view the just wants of the soldier and the interests of the public. On active service his path is bestrewn with difficulties, and, with the very best will possible, he cannot always act in accordance with the two. The important point is to feed the troops regularly and well, and to accord subordinate attention to matters of account and economy. Expense should not be held of much account in a war in which the honour or the destiny of the nation is at stake.

The commissariat should be trusted, and must have leave to spend money without the prospect of being blamed for it

* After the battle of Wagram there was no meat to make into soup for the wounded. Baron Larrey caused some horses belonging to himself and to other officers to be slaughtered, and thus obtained a substitute for the meat he required. As there were no kettles to prepare the soup, the cuirasses found on the battle-field were used for that purpose; gunpowder furnished the salt.

afterwards. The censure it often receives is unjust, for it is passed by officials who act by rule, who do not know the straits the troops are put to in war, and who, moreover, from not having been present, must have been quite ignorant of the urgent nature of the circumstances. In war very frequently there is no time to obtain sanction to measures which must be taken without a moment's hesitation.*

When about to undertake a war, the first thing to be done is to form a good plan of operations ; this is the duty of the special commander-in-chief and of his superior staff officers. At the same time the chief commissary or other officer of supply—call him what you will—must sketch out a plan of the measures which will have to be taken to insure the regular provisioning of the army. He will show how the commissariat will have to be administered, the number of officers he will need, what will be the probable requirements of the troops, what preparations must be set going to meet them, and the dispositions to be taken both in the event of success or of a reverse.

Much of this will have to be grounded on the statistical data which are collected by the general staff in time of peace. This is a work of great consequence, the object being to gauge, tabulate, and keep up to date the resources of all countries, and, above all, of such as are likely to become theatres of war.

The task of provisioning an army in the field is immense ; for the continuity of the movements, the rapidity of the marches the uncertainty of the events, the variety of chances, the imperfection of the means, the insufficiency of the resources, the lack of time, all cause innumerable embarrassments and perplexities.

The commissariat, having to provide the soldier with most of his material wants under whatever circumstances he may be placed, in garrison or in camp, on the march or in the field, stationary or in movement, is incontestably the most important of the administrative branches.

On an absurd question of sentiment this department was eliminated some few years ago from the British Army. It is questionable if the step was a judicious one ; however, setting this point aside, in our army, as in any other, there must be a

* "*A la guerre les instants sont comptés. Perdre quelques minutes avant d'agir est une faute ; demander des instructions, attendre des ordres pour ravitailler serait presque un crime.*" (Général Lewal.)

department of the service charged with the supply of provisions and forage for the troops, and educated specially with that object. Call it what you please, some branch must attend to what is understood under the heading of Commissariat Duties. To go back to very early times, Xenophon relates how Cyrus admitted the necessity for an organized commissariat, and how he found "that it was absolutely necessary for all men who were engaged in military service to have some stated person to take care of the tent, and to provide all things necessary for the soldiers."

The subsistence of an army in the field is a complicated and difficult question—one on which the results of a campaign will generally depend. Begin to despise it; let pride overcome the officers who have to attend to administrative matters; let them, in the "growing militarism of the times," hanker after greater rank and status, after more pompous or brilliant duties;—and the first step is taken towards a disaster.* Now that the difficulties of provisioning have largely increased, we are bound to pay special attention to this matter, and to proceed with greater method than ever. The best method rests on a full appreciation of the importance of the work to be performed, a just division of labour, and a proper delegation of duties in accordance with the capacity of each individual.

In their combinations, in their measures, the provisioning officers must seek to fulfil the following conditions: (a) To furnish the soldier with food daily, without any avoidable delay, and without increasing the fatigues which a state of active service imposes; (b) To keep within reach of the troops reserves of provisions, which will assure them complete freedom of movement; (c) To renew the store of provisions as they are being gradually consumed, either by resorting to local purchases or demands, or by drawing up from the stores accumulated in the rear; (d) To keep the general officers to whom they are attached fully

* All the non-combatant branches of the service, as being indispensable for the success of the rest, have a right to be treated with respect. No good officer will sneer at Medical, Ordnance Store, or Army Service Corps officers, as if they had not the pluck of fighting men. They all come from the same stock, "British gentlemen," and their courage is equal. For the efficiency of the public service, the commissariat officer requires a higher education. Whenever and wherever in the past a really good commissariat officer was met with, he was always treated with respect. In the Crimea, Messrs. Drake, Carpenter, and Young were esteemed by every one who knew them; so were in Ashantee Messrs. Irvine, O'Connor, and Ravenscroft. So it was in all other cases.

instructed on the measure of their resources.* What applies to provisions for men applies equally to forage, and possibly with more force, as it has been said of the cavalry of our army that it exhausts a district sooner than that of other armies.

To secure the necessary division of labour the *personnel* of the commissariat should be partitioned into three distinct sections, one section for home service and two for the field. The home section should foresee the necessities of the forces in the field, should attend to the purchases or state manufacture of all articles produced on the national territory, and provide for their timely despatch to the various large units of the army.† Of the field commissariat one branch—that of the second line—should commence to operate at the sea base of operations or at the collecting station of a railway, according to circumstances, passing up successively along the various stations as far as the advance dépôt the articles received from home or collected in the territory in rear of the combatants. The commissariat of the first line should look after the feeding of the troops by the utilization of the local resources through purchases or requisitions, by the employment of the articles contained in the provision-trains and other rolling magazines, and by supplies captured from the enemy. Though ordinarily this branch should bring up from the advanced dépôt the provisions and forage accumulated there, it should also detail active officers to proceed with the cavalry covering the army to impose requisitions for the troops coming up.‡

It is not conducive to the best results to ignore the special attainments of different officers, and to employ all alike in performing the same duties. In a large war, commissariat officers

* Archduke Charles, who commanded the Austrian armies in the wars with Napoleon, issued the following instructions to his generals:—

“The morning state must always show for how many more days there are provisions for the troops.

“A special column will be set apart for demands for conveyances, munitions, and other objects which the various corps may need, and for which it will be necessary to obtain the sanction of the commander-in-chief.

“Care must be taken to state if the soldier has always a reserve pair of shoes.

“Should an army corps have detached bodies, the fact must be mentioned in its morning state; the strength and locality where the detached bodies are must be indicated.

† In their wars beyond the seas the Romans entrusted the command of the troops to one of the consuls, while the other remained in Rome charged with the duty of providing provisions for the army in the field.

‡ In 1810, Wellington commanded an army of 50,000 men. His commissariat comprised 1 commissary-general, 6 deputy commissaries-general, 16 assistant commissaries-general, 19 deputy assistant commissaries-general, and 51 clerks, making a total of 93 officers.

cannot all be issuers and accountants, some must attend to the utilization of the resources of the country in conformity with a pre-established system. This duty cannot well be performed by officers who have to follow the troops, and who have to look after their immediate wants.

Sir John McNeil, in his "Report on Military Organization," stated: "It seems to be a defect in the system of the British Army that no one is specially responsible for the fitness of the diet supplied to the troops, or for the most advantageous adaptation of the resources of the countries in which military operations are carried on, to the requirements in this respect of the army. Supplies of the utmost value to health may thus be lying within reach without being made available, because they are not specified in the scale of rations, and because there is no one whose special duty is to find them out, and to suggest their employment."

The following extract will show how this point was remarked upon in connection with the expedition to Abyssinia: "Many excellent executive officers are not well qualified to search out the resources of the country; indeed, few officers combine a high order of executive and administrative powers of mind. In many of our operations beyond seas the commissariat have at first been at fault for want of the administrative element to develop the resources, leaving the commissariat officers to devote their whole time and attention to their executive duties." *

In the standing orders for the Light Division, Major-General Robert Craufurd commanded as follows: "Whenever the division is in settled quarters, commanding officers of regiments will investigate, in their several districts, the best method of supplying their regiments, and the prices which ought to be paid. If, after the investigation, it appears that the mode adopted by the commissary might be improved, they will immediately report it through the brigade-major to the officer commanding the brigade, suggesting such alterations in the mode of supply as they may think advisable."

Commissariat officers should be acquainted with the relation that exists between demand and supply, and should know where and when they can expect to find ample provisions. To draw out the resources of a country are needed officers of firm purpose and strong character, who will demand and obtain more than their

* "Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia," vol. i. p. 50.

gentler comrades. Agricultural districts offer the greatest facility in provisioning, and such as are devoted to cattle-breeding are generally rich in meat, forage, and transport. Much must depend on the time of the year; so it is well to remember, before tapping the resources of a district, that immediately after the harvest is the time when the produce of a country will be found in the greatest abundance, and that immediately before it is the moment when it is most limited.

As a rule, when the people are prosperous they are in no hurry to sell; they hold their produce, hoping for a rise in the market price. It is the smaller cultivator who sells as soon as the harvest operations are over. With regard to meat, if forage is plentiful, the farmers can keep and feed up many animals. When forage is scanty, to fatten them is too costly; the breeders, not being able to afford it, bring many head of cattle at one time to market, and prices consequently fall.

Though statistics are acknowledged to be the basis for supplying from the local resources, officers should strive to acquire the habit of learning those indications by which in every country nature proclaims beforehand abundance or scarcity. They should also seek information on the nature of past seasons, inasmuch as these may have had a good or bad influence on the harvest.

It would help officers (at all events, superior officers) if they could be supplied with maps on which the wealth of the different localities was indicated by means of conventional signs or tints. These maps would have to be prepared in time of peace on information extracted from the local statistical returns. In short, the commissariat officer can never know too much about the land in which the army is to campaign.

Self-interest is, almost universally speaking, the great mover of all human actions, and the shilling and the sovereign are powerful agents in unearthing provisions. It is well to reflect on this point that, though war is a very arbitrary proceeding, it is advantageous for the inhabitants of a country that men with arms in their hands should be furnished with what they might otherwise take from them. When the requisitioned articles are paid for, the yeoman or peasant should be well satisfied, for he can conceal the money, and get rid of goods on which, in the existing conditions of the country, he has a very uncertain hold.

Too much importance can never be attached to the observance of a conciliatory policy towards the unarmed citizens of an invaded

country. All acts of oppression, of violence towards those whose good will and friendliness may be of vital importance to the army, should be punished, and punished promptly, severely, and publicly.

To establish intercourse with the people, it is a great point to persuade them that it is not intended that the invading army shall live at their expense. It will conduce to this end to assemble the civil authorities, the most noted citizens, proprietors, merchants, clergymen—in fact, all who have some sort of position and influence in the district. This done, it should be clearly explained to them that *the army must be fed*, and that in the interest of their own people they should lend a hand to the work.* They should be requested to spread out in every direction, and to inform their dependents, their friends, and the people at large that the army is in need of bread, meat, vegetables, forage, and transport, and that everything will be paid for in ready money. Once the report gets about that every article has been promptly paid for, and, possibly, a little in excess of the current price, abundance will set in, and as the vendors increase, by means of competition prices can be kept down.

Money and transport are the great instruments of the provisioning service. There can be no question that the second is intimately connected with the subsistence of an army, for a mass of provisions without any means for moving them cannot but be a worthless commodity. Whilst admitting this connection between the two, we have always advocated their being directed as separate services, not only to secure a fairer distribution of this very essential aid—one of which *all services and departments alike are in need*—but for the following reasons. Transport, though anything but a brilliant service, is one of the most laborious; it can be looked upon in the light of manual labour, requiring principally for its best utilization great regularity and discipline. This being so, it can be efficiently worked by officers or warrant officers whose occupation has partaken of a routine and disciplinary nature. It would simply be a waste of power to employ in it officers who have acquired special attainments.

For the subsistence service, on the other hand, we are in need

* Marlborough established a *depôt* at Dixmunde, where bread and provisions were to be obtained by the Earl of Stair from the peasantry on payment. The peasant complained to the duke, but received no encouragement, for he wrote: "It is better that they should suffer than the army perish for want of bread."

of business men—of men who can enter into large dealings, prepare contracts, examine statistics, calculate the necessities of an army in all their details, and who can estimate when and where the provisions will be needed. The matter of issues can be considered as entirely secondary, and the distribution of provisions and forage is an operation which can be very well performed by the subordinate staff. The great point is to bring forth, to create almost, the provisions; and real talent and the greatest exertions are needed in doing so when the course of events has pushed an army forward beyond the possibility of deriving any assistance from the rear.

On reflection it will be seen what a heavy and fatiguing task is that which the provisioning officers will have to undertake in war; with a prospect that many of them will be taxed beyond their powers. To assign them a very laborious one in addition to this, viz. the detail working of a large mass of transport employed in a variety of ways throughout the theatre of war, would be to set aside that fair division of labour which is considered so essential for the success of large operations of any kind.

A board of French generals prepared in 1874 a report on army administration. In this, as one of the causes assigned for the misfortunes of the 1870–71 campaign, it is stated that the intendant took on his shoulders a crushing burden of functions and duties, and exhausted himself in useless efforts to accomplish what was beyond his powers. We ourselves failed on this point in the Peninsula.

The organized transport maintained in time of peace can be best worked as a branch of the subsistence department. This is only a very small fraction of the transport employed in war, and is not the most troublesome part of it.* Where the real trouble lies is with the general transport, which always assumes very large dimensions. To give it a kind of organization is only the first step; unceasing pains afterwards must be taken to maintain it in proper working order, and to prevent desertions. Besides this there will be endless labour in settling with the men; in getting additional carriage or in discharging what becomes superfluous; in seeing that the animals in every situation are

* This organized transport is not employed in peace, or even at the annual manœuvres, as it is in war. In the manœuvres, in view of economy, it does not, like the rest of the troops, get a thorough training for service in the field. Again, on mobilization a company is split up, and probably half of it is withdrawn from the constant supervision of its captain.

fed, watered, and stabled; in keeping a correct record of all expenditure; and in attending to a multitude of repairs.

We imagine a higher class of duties for the commissariat officer. His time is too valuable to be wasted for hours on the road, looking after a slowly moving line of waggons or pack animals. Whilst every one admits that the commissariat should have ample means of transport, all alike are keen to see that that department does not fare better than the others on this point. Valuing, as it is bound to do, the great importance of its services, it is open to the department to appropriate to itself the largest share of the transport to the detriment of other branches. These latter do not relish having, so to say, to beg for assistance in the matter of transport, and to have their wants judged by a department which has a great interest in looking first of all to the success of its own special operations.

In the Peninsular War the commissariat may have been intrusted with provisioning, transport, the raising of funds,* and even with the supply of fascines and palisades; but the administration of the services in rear of an army has undergone, since that time, considerable alteration.† There is now a special staff under a general officer to direct the whole of the services on the lines of communication, and all the departments are brought under the direction of a single head. Our regulations besides detail a special staff officer to control all transport, whether by rail, by water, or by ordinary carriage.‡

Let us quote the opinion of Major-General von Schellendorf on this point of the control of the transport in war. He writes in the duties of the general staff: "It would, however, be at the expense of the other troops and of the mass if the utilization of the means of transport were not regulated by a purely military and impartial hand, attentive in meeting the most varied needs in order of their importance and of their urgency."

Deputy Commissary-General E. B. de Fonblanque, when questioned by the Committee on Administration of Transport

* In this war it was found that the commissary-general, with a movable force, was not able to superintend exchange operations with advantage, and towards the end of the war he was freed from that duty.

† "During the Peninsular War the reserve stores of shoes, blankets, camp-kettles, tents, and what are usually called quarter-master-general stores, were received and issued by the commissariat" (Commissary-General Sir John Bisset, K.C.H.).

‡ The director of transport, the responsible officer, will be sure to see that what portion of the transport is made over to any department of the service is worked strictly in compliance with the orders issued by the officers of that department.

and Supply Departments, 1867, stated: "I think all transport should be placed under an officer who would be above suspicion of favouring one department at the expense of another. His only object would be to distribute the transport fairly among all the departments for the common good of the service, for which he should be responsible. A commissary-general might be suspected of wishing to favour his own department; but if you made the chief of administration an independent, and not a departmental officer, no such suspicion could exist."

Lord Napier of Magdala—an officer of most practical common sense, and who had great experience of service in the field—when appointed to take command of the Abyssinian expedition, desired, for good reasons, to have the land transport kept on an independent basis, subordinate to the quarter-master-general's department. We have seen in Chapter XI. how in this he was opposed by the Governor of Bombay. A civilian overruled the arguments of an experienced and practical officer of many years' standing. The working of the transport in January, 1868, was not found satisfactory, owing to imperfect organization; but so persuaded was Lord Napier that the success of the campaign depended on its efficiency, that, on the arrival of the Punjab mule-train in Abyssinia, he kept it distinct from the rest of the transport, organized, under his orders, by the assistant quarter-master-general, to work on the highlands and accompany the army to Magdala.

Looking at the great network of railways which now covers the civilized world, it might appear that railways had done away with the necessity for the employment of a large animal transport. The history of the most recent wars, however, shows that it is far from so. In Chapter XI. it has been seen what a very large proportion of the carriage in the last Franco-German war was done by animal transport, and so it will always be in a brisk campaign; for the head of the railway lines, notwithstanding the speediest possible repairs, will be two or three marches, at the very least, in rear of the combatants. This will represent something like forty miles of road, and this span can only be crossed by convoys moving between the temporary advanced dépôt and the army. Special destructions of tunnels, bridges, or viaducts may at any time be undertaken by the enemy, and all such will throw the army back for a longer or shorter time on the old methods of transport.

There must be a system of provisioning established on a sound practical basis, and able to work smoothly. To intrust the furnishing of provisions and of forage to contractors may relieve the commissariat of much anxiety, but in war it may, notwithstanding, place it in a serious predicament. There can be nothing more dangerous for the success of the most important military operations—on which the destiny of a country may possibly rest—than to have to depend on individuals who are not subject to military responsibility, and who can only be punished by the infliction of a heavy fine. No individual cares to take up a contract unless he can make large profits. Whether it is that the affair turns out to be on too large a scale, that the articles have become too costly, or that, on the whole, there is too little clear profit to be realized, the deliveries are liable to cease at a most critical moment—at a time, possibly, when a sudden and momentous movement has been determined. The real blot of the contract system lies in this, that there is no certainty, and that, should the contractor fail to comply regularly with his engagements, there is nothing to set up in its stead.*

It is dangerous, besides; for the contractor and his agents are acquainted with the numerical strength of the army, and, in consideration of a heavy bribe, may be induced to communicate this knowledge to the enemy, or let their contract fail at a critical moment.

Independent of this, of double payments, of short deliveries, there is the question of quality. In a large contract there must be sub-contractors and agents, men of questionable self-respect and honour, all more or less interested in passing off inferior articles. Whilst the soldier suffers from the inferiority of the articles supplied, their transport costs the same as if they were of good quality. Certain checks may be inserted in the contracts with the object of preventing fraud, but the officers must be at every moment on the alert, and vigilant to see that the terms of the agreement are strictly fulfilled. In the stir and excitement of active operations fraud is a thing that is easily overlooked.

It is true enough that the contract system has answered well in India in some of our most important wars; but, regardless of

* In 1711 Peter the Great was facing a Turkish army beyond the Pruth. Whilst the Turks largely outnumbered his forces and were well fed, his soldiers were dying of hunger, because the contractors carried over to his adversary's camp the provisions he had paid for. Only the ability and cunning of his mistress, and the sacrifice of her jewels, extricated him from his difficulties.

the fact that the Company had the reputation of being a good paymaster, in most of these the contractor or agent was a man of exceptional ability, of great influence and resources.* Lalla Jotee Pershad's father was himself a very rich and influential native, and it is a well-established idea that his son, who was a banker, did not look so much to deriving large profits out of his dealings with the Company as to the hope of receiving a title. We may, therefore, assume that his ambition kept him faithful to his engagements. The Company alone could give him what he so earnestly coveted.

According to the evidence of the officer in charge of the commissariat in the first Sikh War, all the other contractors failed entirely; Jotee Pershad alone did not fail in the performance of his promises.

With regard to the utter collapse in the arrangements which a break-down of the contract is very liable to bring about, we can give an example taken from what, fortunately, did not occur, but might possibly have done so, in the Sutlej and Punjab campaigns. In the first, after the battles of Ferozshahur and Moodkee, matters were in a very critical state, and Colonel Parsons, who was the deputy commissary-general, admits that had Lalla Jotee Pershad, under the influence of the general panic, sacrificed his security, and left the army, he could not himself have supplied the troops. The flight of the contractor would have placed the commissariat in an extremely difficult position. In the next campaign, Major Ramsay, the deputy commissary-general, has stated that, had Lalla Jotee Pershad left the camp just after the battle of Chillianwallah, it would have been fatal for the army, for it was reduced to one day's supply, and the communications with the depôt in rear, and with all the country around, were cut off. Everything depended on the contractor.

The inconvenience of the contract system revealed itself in the Afghan Campaign of 1878-80. In the report of the Bombay Government the failure of the meat contract for the South Afghanistan field force is thus referred to: "As long as everything ran smoothly, the contractor made large profits; but, when difficulties arose, he had to be supported by civil and military aid, and without any corresponding advantage."

To accept the lowest tender is not always for the good of the

* Native agency is largely employed by every European house of business throughout India.

soldier. The contractor must make his profit; to get his tender accepted he will set the prices low, but in the hope of making up for the loss by furnishing inferior articles. When on the staff of the Southern District a case came to our notice which shows what temptations men are at times placed in. The key of the box to receive the tenders was by regulation to be in the safe keeping of the senior commissariat officer. In this instance the key had been carelessly put away, and on opening the box to schedule the tenders, one was found in which all the prices had been brought to the lowest figure by erasing the original figures and substituting others. The thing was so clumsily done that it was impossible not to detect unfair play. The contractor and his conniver had not the sense to put in a fresh form.

The contract system does not lend itself to a prompt and efficient movement of troops; no dependence, particularly if the operations are sudden, can be placed on a contractor. In quick and rapid movements direct purchase is a more reliable system. To acquire experience, the officers of the Army Service Corps should be allowed to make their own purchases in peace as they would have to do on service; they should learn to find out the best dealers; they should become experts as to quality, enter into bargains, etc.

Our home markets hold provisions in large quantities, which, owing to brisk competition, can be secured at a reasonable price. However, for a war or for an expedition beyond the seas, such as ours usually are, rather than forward everything from home, it may often be found more economical and speedier to procure provisions, forage, and other articles from foreign countries, in the ports which lie near the base of operations. Contracts in such cases are not open to the same objection as those made to supply provisions in the actual theatre of operations. Acting in this manner there will be a considerable saving in the matter of transport. Some difficulty may be experienced on the point of packing, when pack transport is mainly used; but if the purchases are intrusted to careful officers, they will be able to have the packing done in the most practicable manner.

A theory on the art of provisioning large bodies of men in the field must be based on the lessons contained in the former chapters. The skill lies in copying all that was found good and practical, and in carefully avoiding a repetition of past errors.

CHAPTER XV.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RATIONS.

THE principal articles the soldier requires in the field, besides his arms, are ammunition and food.

To be to a certain extent independent of the transport, to lighten the difficulties of the commissariat, so that he may have at all moments the articles he needs for fighting, and for keeping healthy and strong, he must be made to carry a certain quantity of these about him.

To be able to fix the just amount of ammunition and food that may be issued to the soldier, it is necessary, first of all, to ascertain the average weight which a marching man should be able to carry without experiencing any serious discomfort. Secondly, we must study the best way to carry it, so that it may cause him the least possible distress in the trying marches which he will have to perform.

To make the soldier come in aid of the transport by carrying provisions for a given number of days is nothing new; in all ages the precaution of making him bear a certain amount of provisions has been observed. According to Aristophanes and Thucydides, the Athenian soldier carried food for three days, and Vegetius tells us that the Roman legionary carried enough food to last him for four days.

It appears from all accounts that the Romans made every effort to diminish the impedimenta, and with that object made the soldier carry a heavy burden. Nevertheless, when we meet passages in Cicero, Cæsar, and Livy stating that the soldier carried rations for fifteen, twenty-two days, and even for a month, we may assume that this amount of food was to be found with the combatants, though it was not actually carried by them.

It is otherwise impossible to reconcile with these statements the wonderful marches made by the Romans, often in unfavourable seasons of the year, and moving over bad roads.

In the Seven Years' War the Prussian infantry carried an average weight of 56 lbs.; in 1812 the French Imperial Guard marching on Moscow carried as much as 70 lbs.; each soldier of Craufurd's brigade marching to Talavera carried from 50 to 60 lbs. weight upon his shoulders; in the Crimean War the French soldier, in heavy marching order, with his provisions, kit, and piece of tent, carried about 68 lbs. With the rapidity of movement demanded in these days all these averages are too great, and the fatigue of the march alone must lead to the break-down of many soldiers. To secure perfect efficiency we must study to reduce the weight to a minimum, taking for example the laws of the Romans, which cut off everything that was not absolutely necessary.

Sherman writes in his memoirs: "Each soldier should, if not actually sick or wounded, carry his musket and equipments, containing from forty to sixty rounds of ammunition, his shelter-tent, a blanket or overcoat, and an extra pair of pants, socks, and drawers, in the form of a scarf, worn from the left shoulder to the right side in lieu of knapsack, and in his haversack he should carry some bread, cooked meat, salt, and coffee. I do not believe a soldier should be loaded down too much, but, including his clothing, arms, and equipment, he can carry about fifty pounds without impairing his health and activity. A simple calculation will show that by such a distribution a corps will thus carry the equivalent of five hundred waggon loads—an immense relief to the trains."*

Much will depend on the sort of food the troops can work upon, and this differs in the several armies. Contentment being a good promoter of discipline, it is a sensible arrangement to furnish the troops liberally and with the most relishable food.

The ordinary field ration of the British Army is composed of $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of bread or 1 lb. of biscuit; 1 lb. of fresh, salt, or preserved meat; $\frac{1}{3}$ oz. of coffee; $\frac{1}{6}$ oz. of tea; 2 ozs. of sugar; $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. of salt; $\frac{1}{36}$ oz. of pepper. The weight of this ration amounts to a trifle over 2 lbs. 3 ozs. It may be, however, truly said that there is no fixed field ration in our army; for, called, as it is, to campaign in

* "Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman," vol. ii. p. 390.

many different countries, a special ration is generally adopted at the commencement of each campaign.

The weight carried by the British infantry, not over-good marchers as a rule, is 55 lbs. when the valise is worn, and 47 lbs. 7 ozs. when the valise is not worn. This is the average in fine weather; for, if it should rain, as the clothing becomes saturated, the weight is increased. The above of itself is a good deal for a marching man to carry, and little can be left out to make room for provisions.

In studying the question of military equipment it is expedient to profit by every measure which will tend to lighten the burden of the foot soldier and of the troop horse, and which will, consequently, reduce their fatigue on the line of march. This, when judiciously done, will prove beneficial to an army, for it will have up to a certain degree an influence on the length of the daily march.

The articles of change and cleanliness which he must have on hygienic grounds the soldier carries in his valise; the ammunition he carries in his pouches, with some reserve rounds in the valise; the food is distributed between his haversack, canteen, and valise. The main consideration is to make room for the ammunition and food by eliminating from the equipment every item which is not absolutely indispensable; with this object all articles which are solely intended to add to the appearance of the soldier should be cast aside on mobilization.

We must be careful to husband the small number of troops we have got, and not to overtask their strength. The tropical nature of the climate in most of our campaigns imposes a reduction in the kit carried by the infantry soldier, consequently the knapsack or valise is seldom carried. When contending against a second or third rate adversary, who has no initiative, this arrangement may have no serious consequence, but in a campaign conducted *secundum artem*, the troops must be able to make long marches, often outstripping the army trains. As they must be more independent of the convoys and more self-supporting, they must, as a rule, carry their packs or valises. The soldier will often grumble during the march at having to carry his pack, but let him be without this hold-all, and see how many little things he will miss.

Rations cannot be set down pound per pound; to avoid any risk of falling short the calculation should be made for two or

three times the amount strictly necessary. The estimate must comprise the total mouths to feed, for there will always be many men to be rationed besides the combatants.

With regard to rations, the Turks were the first who fixed the proportion of the daily issue. On this point the articles which are to constitute the ration, together with their quantity, are now established by direction of the War Minister. It is evident, nevertheless, that this ration can only be considered as the normal, for it is unreasonable to expect that the same amount of food will suffice for troops that are doing ordinary work, or, possibly, resting in camp, and for those that are subject to severe bodily and mental strain. The commander of an army, or the commander of a detached body, must therefore have the power—acting on the advice of his principal medical officer and chief commissariat officer—to alter the quantity and nature of the various articles. For troops subsisting mainly on the local resources there must be considerable latitude given to the commissariat, if their food is to be based on the principal production of the various districts, rejecting nothing in the way of eatables that may be useful.

The soldiers' food on active service is very simple; the principal articles consist of bread and meat. There is not that large assortment of eatables which are sought when feeding a large community. Besides these two, there are a few articles of grocery, which do not present any very serious difficulty in the matter of portability. With regard to bread and meat, some nations, in different proportions, eat more of one than of the other; still, the two together form the basis of the food required for the recovery of expended forces. The British soldier depends more on the meat portion of his ration than on bread.

Nothing will conduce to the health and strength of the fighting man as fresh bread and fresh meat. This is incontestable, nevertheless fresh provisions occupy a good deal of room, and are easily spoilt. Say that the soldier has been furnished with a supply for three days, the whole of his haversack will be nearly filled, causing him inconvenience. The meat portion, carried in a haversack with a number of other articles, soon gets tainted and loathsome. It turns equally bad if carried in a mess-tin. At the commencement of a march, the soldier will possibly strive to keep the rations in good condition, but little by little he will become careless; if it becomes very hot, if dust gets at the haversack,

the meat is spoilt: a great portion of it becomes unpalatable, and is cast away.

Meat is often said to be the only part of the soldier's food which carries itself; in other words, herds of cattle follow the march of the troops. How badly fitted the animals must be for food after a march of from twelve to fifteen miles a day, smothered by dust, without proper pasture and water, can be left to imagination. Under these disadvantages the cattle cannot but lose condition, and cattle much out of condition are liable to take and spread all manner of contagious diseases. Animals obtained locally on requisition or by purchase will be in a better condition for slaughter.

The rule with regard to live stock is that the vital energy of the animals which may have been to any extent impaired by excessive fatigue, or from any other cause, should have fully recovered before they are slaughtered. Then only the flesh can be considered of good quality. This condition is not fulfilled with cattle which have to conform to the movements of the troops. Their habits of life are totally changed; accustomed to wander leisurely on soft fields, on the march they tread on hard roads, urged at a pace to them extraordinary; they are pressed for many consecutive hours, are harassed and kept in a feverish condition. The animals will be saved much fatigue when transported part of the way by rail, nevertheless this will not spare them the hardships of the journey. They will be overcrowded, seriously frightened, and will suffer from exposure, hunger, and thirst.

To drive cattle on the hoof in rear of the combatants is by many practical men regarded as an error. As cattle march slower than the troops, they cause intervals in the length of the column; they are difficult to keep together on such roads as are not bound by fences, and come into camp long after the troops. There they are penned up, and seldom get an opportunity for picking up food in pasture fields. Under these conditions the animals soon get reduced to skin and bone, and the nutritive value of the ration is very considerably lowered. Should the animals show signs of having contracted any contagious disease, they will have to be destroyed without having rendered any service to the commissariat.

In India it was found that cattle brought in from the country and penned in small enclosures rapidly lost flesh. Ordinary feeding had but little effect on them for some time.

From the late arrival of the cattle in camp, the slaughtering, dressing, and distribution of the meat—the animals being killed in a central *abattoir*—it must take a considerable time before the issue is completed.

A ration of fresh meat, all expenses included, costs too dear when cattle follow the troops. If everything is taken into consideration—the loss on account of skin, bone, horns, hoofs, blood, stomach, and intestines; all the difficulties experienced in having to feed, water, and keep a large herd; the ravages caused by disease; the cost of forage; the maintenance and salary of the herdsman, etc.—it will be seen how preferable it is to provide meat for large armies in the field otherwise than by resorting to cattle on the hoof.

In 1870–71 the German armies marching through France always found fresh meat, and a supply of it for several days. They principally experienced difficulties in getting it when they sat down before Paris. In that war, as we have seen in Chapter XII., the cattle disease very soon developed itself in the herds brought over from Russia. Meat from infected animals is a source of danger to the troops. In 1813, there was a considerable amount of typhus in Dresden and throughout Germany, and the origin of this malady was traced by the doctors to diseased cattle drawn from Hungary by the Austrian army.

The need for driving cattle no longer exists now that preserved meat of good quality and at a reasonable price has become an article of commerce.

Preserved provisions of many kinds have now come to be of the greatest help to an army in the field. Both with regard to their transport and employment, they are very well adapted for use in a campaign. Preserved provisions rank as reserves; the principal conditions which these eatables should fulfil are good nutritive qualities, small volume, lightness, good keeping qualities, and speediness in the preparation of the meals.

Provisions of this kind occupy less space and weigh less than fresh victuals; they enable the soldier to live for a certain number of days on what he carries in his valise, if the country he is in affords no other resources, or the army has outstripped its provision-columns. When the local resources are insufficient to provide all that is needed, by adding preserved provisions to the little that is found the soldier can be adequately fed. The advantages of preserved meat and preserved vegetables have been so

fully recognized that in most European states, with a view to their employment in war, establishments have been provided for their manufacture.

What is much to be desired in many of the circumstances of a campaign is a description of catables which can be easily transported and have beyond doubt good keeping qualities. A reserve ration, small in bulk, very nourishing, and easy to transport, which, when substituted for the ordinary provisions, should give an invigorating meal. Certain rapid and continuous movements cannot be executed without something of this sort.

When employing railways as lines of supply, a very ordinary reflection will show how a certain number of trucks will be able to carry far more rations of preserved meat than their equivalent in live cattle. Indeed, all the many experiments which have been made with substitutes for fresh meat have had, amongst other principal objects, a tangible reduction in the matter of transport. In the field, however, it is held that their use should not be pushed too far, for a lengthy consumption of any single description of food tires and disgusts the stomach. Man, not satisfied with procuring food for his support, has endeavoured to add to it some seasoning which will gratify his palate. In the Franco-German war the German soldiers very frequently complained that they were tired of the same nourishment, that there was no variety, no account taken of their taste.

Canned meat has several advantages. It can be carried by the soldier for any time without undergoing deterioration; it nourishes him well, for a pound of it really represents a pound of food; it is more tender than freshly killed meat; it can be made into excellent soup or can be eaten cold. This last is a very valuable advantage when the soldier has no time to cook his meals on service, has no fuel, or is worn down by fatigue. He can then eat a piece of it cold with some bread or biscuit, and soon lie down to take his rest. Compare this with the use of fresh provisions, when to prepare a meal water and fuel have to be fetched, the fires lighted, and some hours must naturally be allowed to elapse before the food is cooked and fit to eat.

But, invaluable an article as canned meat is for troops in the field, it is devoid of fat, and soldiers quickly tire of it. The point which should engage our attention is to study how it can be made the basis of a really palatable meal. The chief point in this direction is to assimilate the nourishment to what

the soldier has been accustomed to in his home. With a little ingenuity several ways will be found of cooking canned meat, and when mixed with certain ordinary essences and condiments—extracts of onions, celery, carrots, parsley, etc.—some way may be discovered that will deprive it of its somewhat insipid taste.* Rice, lentils, pearl barley, or oatmeal added to it would have that effect. These articles keep well.

With regard to bread, there exists a good substitute for it in biscuit, which is very portable, and keeps well. It can be made more palatable by restoring to it its crispness by a moderate re-baking before use. It is not a very sound measure to remove men who are bakers by trade from their regiments with the object of allotting them to the commissariat to augment their *personnel*. Bread baked in the rear seldom comes up in good time, and when it does come up it is often not worth eating; whereas, if the bakers remain in the ranks, they can frequently find opportunities for baking bread for their comrades in the ovens of the country.

The French attach great importance to the rule that the bread should be baked by the soldiers themselves. It is a leading principle of their administration that an army should always be able to supply its own wants. Bread being almost the principal necessary of life, they take care that their soldiers shall never lose the habit of making it. They never issue biscuit when they have the time to bake a supply of bread.

In baking there are mechanical kneaders by using which labour is economized. These kneaders require no special skill, and their employment will reduce the number of hands required for manufacturing bread. The yeast can be prepared on the march, effecting a saving of eight hours in time. Bakers make good yeast by boiling one peck of malt with one pound of hops, and letting it ferment. When rolling bakeries are available, they should be brought up as close to the troops as possible, so that carts and waggons may not have to make long journeys to fetch bread and bring it up for delivery.

Whole-meal bread, when vegetables are scarce, is by some considered more wholesome than bread made of flour from which all the bran has been removed.

In India so much importance is attached to this important article of the soldier's food, that bread is the one exception to the general rule of obtaining all articles by contract.

* Onions are invaluable; they impart an agreeable flavour to the soup.

Bread and meat can well be regarded as the necessities for the preservation of life. There are, besides, articles necessary for the preservation of health, such as fresh vegetables, rice, potatoes, fruit, lime juice, pickles, spirits, beer, etc., the want of which the soldier who has been accustomed to partake of them would soon feel. Fresh vegetables and potatoes can be found in most places, and the produce of orchards can be put under requisition to furnish what is too bulky to be carried.

The French in the Crimea used tablets of dried preserved vegetables. The small cakes were first soaked in warm water, when the leaves imbibed the liquid in all their pores, expanded, and became themselves again. Afterwards they were cooked like any other vegetables. Though in that war vegetables were very scarce, the British soldier objected to the issue of pumpkins.

It is not reasonable to run away with the idea that all our difficulties have vanished with the great improvements in preserved provisions, for these are never likely to be found—at all events, in sufficiently large quantity—in every theatre of war alike. Hitherto the bulk of preserved, canned, and frozen meat has come from Australia and America. If the precaution is not taken to have special establishments set up for this purpose on mobilization, the preserved provisions will have to be procured from foreign countries and delivered at the base. For this reason animals for slaughter must, as far as it is possible, be procured on the spot, the preserved meat being issued with discernment. For supplying fortresses nothing could be better.

Coffee is now recognized as a very valuable portion of the soldier's ration. Some difficulty at times is found in grinding it; this can be overcome by grinding a sack or two in the ordinary flour mills. It cannot much matter if there be a little flour mixed with the coffee, it will not make any worse beverage for that.

Hunger is said not to agree with long waiting followed by a scanty meal. Troops which have to perform a series of fatiguing marches must be fed with regularity, and the great point to attain is to get them to partake of their chief meal as early as possible after their arrival in camp or bivouac. One of the main obstacles in the speedy preparation of the food lies in the difficulty very often experienced in bringing up betimes the camp-kettles and those provisions which follow in rear on the regimental transport vehicles.

Of the food, a certain amount is kept with the combatants knapsack reserve, and regimental transport. The knapsack reserve being given to the men to meet exceptional cases, cannot be touched without special authority, but in addition to it the soldier is made to carry a portion of his daily ration. The other portion, the meat, which, as we have said, is the most difficult part to carry, is borne by the regimental transport.

Besides what is carried by the soldier and by the regimental transport, there are other reserves of food kept handy to replenish what is gradually consumed. As these reserves are for the use of the division, the issues can only take place in a central point in rear of the troops, and the weariness of the soldiers would be augmented if they had to go too far from their headquarters to draw their provisions.

To meet this difficulty, the Germans, in their last war, made it a great point to have a little reserve of provisions always handy, which were based on two provision-carts attached to each battalion. These carts were intended to carry what had been obtained locally, or to go and replenish from the convoys in the rear. This measure is quite rational, for, however well organized the provision-columns may be, looking at the late hour of their setting off after the last of the combatants have stepped away, it is delusive to believe that they can bring up every day in good time the provisions which the soldier needs either in cantonment or in bivouac. As an essential corollary, the Germans held that it was necessary to give to the officers in charge of these carts a direct interest in rejoining their respective units, and that this could only be secured by taking them from each corps.

In the British service this point is recognized, and the regimental transport carries provisions for one day. Much, however, of the success of this measure will depend on the position allotted to these carts on the line of march. As it is generally considered desirable to abstain from introducing vehicles between the parts of a marching column, the regimental transport runs a risk of being relegated to the rear, thus defeating one of the principal advantages contemplated, viz. of ministering to the soldier's needs betimes. Looking at all the advantages that can be derived from feeding the troops speedily after their arrival in camp, an exception should be made in favour of the regimental provision-waggons, which, with the small-arm ammunition reserve, should

by regulation find their place in rear of their respective units on the line of march.

At any time when a battle is imminent, greater attention should be paid to the emergency ration, every care being taken to see that the soldier has the full allowance of it. This is a measure of precaution, for, as the battle goes on, furnishing food to the troops engaged is next to impossible, and it will be even more so if a pursuit of the enemy follows. For all rapid movements the conveyance of food—biscuit, canned meat, compressed soups, sausage, coffee—might be performed by small, handy one-horse carts, something similar to the carts used by bakers, butchers, etc., for distributing food in towns and in the country. Our military waggons are not well adapted for swift locomotion.

The best military authorities agree that the task of keeping troops adequately supplied with food in the numerous conditions which present themselves in war, is an extremely difficult one, and one which requires considerable experience. We have said that commissariat officers require, if possible, a higher education than other officers. This we maintain, because knowledge in their case must generally make up for experience. As our usual wars are not on such a large scale as those which have been waged by other military powers, we must be content to acquire an insight into all the difficulties and embarrassments of the provisioning service by a diligent study of past events. Jomini tells us that "history is the only school in which some good precepts are to be found." These precepts must be sought for, and, once found, must be engraved on our minds. It is on these that must be based the provisioning service, if we desire to see our armies full of healthy and vigorous men—a match for any adversary they may be called upon to encounter in the field.

Others have willingly laid down their lives for the country we are all so proud to belong to ; all we can do is to proffer to her our industry, hoping that our labours may bear fruit in the hour of her need.

In the following words the brilliant historian of the Peninsular War shows how unceasing this labour must be : "*But such an art is war ! So fearful is the consequence of error, so terrible the responsibility of a general. Strongly and wisely did Napoleon speak when he told Joseph he must give himself up entirely to the business, labouring day and night, thinking of nothing else.*"

INDEX.

A

- Aberdeen* (Lord), averse to a war with Russia, 163
Abyssinia, origin of the expedition of 1867-68, 232; Consul Cameron made prisoner, 233; Mr. Rassam's mission to the Negus, 233; preparations set on foot for the expedition, 234; difficulties in obtaining provisions, 234; distance of Magdala from the base, 234; Lord Roberts on the organization of the land transport, 234; provisions begin to run short, 239; troops insufficiently fed, 240; the medical officers complain, 241: the British forces quit the country, 242
Aireé recommends the Greek to retire by a different route, 143
Ashantee, cause of the war of, 1873-74, 243; description of the country, 243; provisions brought up from the coast, 245
Azimoolah Khan visits England and the Crimea, 174

B

- Bakers* to remain in the ranks, 296
Bassano (Duke of) neglects to organize depôts on the line of retreat from Moscow, 153
Bonaparte, result of the 13th Vendimiaire, An IV., 59; appointed to command the army of Italy, 60; his first proclamation to the troops, 60; imposes contributions and requisitions on the people of Italy, 61; exaggerates the number of his troops, 61; dangerous example set to his soldiers, 62; acts of pillage and violence, 62; outbreak at Pavia, 62; reorganizes the administrative services, 63; proclamation to the army of Egypt, 64;

- originator of the expedition to Egypt, 65; attention to all that related to the subsistence of the troops, 67; prepares for the campaign of 1800, 70; creates an army of reserve, 71; deceives the spies and general public by an inspection of conscripts at Dijon, 72; echelons, depôts of clothing, supplies, etc., in Switzerland, 72; purchases the assistance of the people of the Alps, 72; partition of the French forces, 73; sets the army in motion, 73; beats Melas on the field of Marengo, 73
Bourbons, weakness of their rule, 119; execute Marshal Ney, 147
Bourmont twice deserts Napoleon, 149
British officers have no liking for the study of military administration, 10; not encouraged to study the art of war, 11
Busnach and Bueri provide supplies for the French expedition to Egypt, 66

C

- Camp-kettles*, difficulty of bringing them into camp betimes, 297
Canning (Lord) intercepts the troops going to China, 176
Caulincourt endeavours to dissuade Napoleon from undertaking the campaign of 1812, 118
Cattle, marching herds not well fitted for slaughter, 293; facility with which the cattle disease spreads, 293; cost of fresh meat, 294
China, plenty of provisions found in the country in 1860, 232; Great Britain contributes a supply, 232
Colbert, his efforts excite the emulation of Louvois, 32
Coligny, what should be taken as a base when raising an army, 12

Commissariat, Indian, never failed during the Mutiny, 177; had gained experience in recent wars, 177; its punctuality in payments, 178; contrast between the Indian and the British, 184; abolition of the latter as a department, 277; desirable subdivision of its *personnel*, 279; some should be specially detailed to develop the local resources, 280; can never know too much about the theatre of war, 281

Crimæan War, people in England much in favour of it, 164; allied commanders ordered to take the troops across the Black Sea, 164; want of land transport, 164; indispensable necessity for a safe base, 165; utter collapse of all branches of administration, 166; no knowledge of the country, 166; the besieging troops cooped up in a corner of the peninsula, 170; sufferings of the Russians, 170; committee appointed to inquire into the condition of the British army, 171; appearance of the army in the second winter, 171; cost of the war and nullity of the results, 171; the last foreign legion, 172

Cuesta refuses to furnish food to the British troops at Talavera, 80

Curely, De Brack's opinion of his worth, 156; measures he took for feeding his soldiers in 1812, 157; how he procured provisions at Korleski, 158

D

Daru opposed to an advance beyond Witbesk, 132; believed that the French could be fed during the winter at Moscow, 140; suggests turning the city into an intrenched camp, and killing the horses for meat, 141

Darout, his birth and early career, 106; not endowed with conciliatory manners, 106; his harsh and despotic character questioned, 106; given to serious studies, 108; his conduct at Auerstadt, 109; importance of his victory, 109; it gives offence to Napoleon, 109; looks carefully after the men of the 1st Corps in the Russian campaign, 110; is in favour of that expedition, 111; his efforts misrepresented, 111; the 1st Corps an exception to the others, 112; retains its discipline and soldierly spirit, 112; details of the Marshal's arrangements, 112; Marbot's testimony, 114; drives Bagration's corps back upon Bobruisk, 115; suggests a plan of action before the

battle of Borodino, 115; favours the retreat by way of Medyn and Smolensk, 115; disdains to hurry the retreat, 115; much dispirited by the disasters of the army, 116; his corps reaches Thorn, 116; holds that Ney's actions during the hundred days were covered by the terms of the capitulation, 148

De la Grave explains the system of subsistence adopted by Massena's troops in Spain, 91

De Ponthon, reasons given to Napoleon against undertaking the campaign of 1812, 118

Desaix falls at Marengo, 74

Directory, by no means the originators of the Egyptian expedition, 65

E

Education of officers of an entirely offensive nature, 14

Empire, our obligation to maintain its integrity, 5

Europe under arms, 6

Exhibition of 1851, hopes it gave rise to, 161

Eylau, difficulty of feeding the French troops after the battle, 268

F

Foy, remarks on the French invasion of Portugal, 76; pleads in favour of Tillet, 149

Franco-German War (1870-71), the three armies in the field, 215; difficulties of provisioning at first starting, 215; measures taken at this period, 216; all Germany contributed supplies, 217; large stores captured from the French, 217; restrictions as to sending provisions by rail, 218; dearth of food after the battles of Vionville and Gravelotte, 218; measures for provisioning the troops detailed to blockade Metz, 219; the cattle-plague breaks out, 219; the 3rd Army changes direction to the right, 220; provisions captured from the enemy, 220; the 3rd Army fed by the inhabitants when marching on Paris, 220; subsistence of the troops at the commencement of the investment, 221; Versailles, Corbeil, and Chantilly magazines, 221; establishment of markets, 222; transport working between the terminal railway station and the troops, 222; railway communication with Germany, 222; railway lines available, 223; daily supply

required for the investing forces, 225; line of communications service suffers from an insufficiency of animal transport, 225; loss in animal transport, 226; subsistence of the 2nd Army on its march to the Loire, 226; want of wood and straw, 227; the frost hinders the march of the convoys, 227; subsistence of the 1st Army, 227; proportions of the German provision columns, hospital establishments, and military train, 228; sad state of the German troops at Le Mans, 229; the troops acting against Belfort experience a scarcity of bread and forage, 229

Frederick II. counsels meditation in time of peace, practice in time of war, 12; how hunger destroys discipline, 13; excelled more as a tactician than as a strategist, 45; his definition of an army, 45; his anxiety about bread, 46; establishment of magazines, 46; recommends the use of transport by water, 46; measures for the protection of convoys, 47; instructions to Prince Henry, 47; the five days' march system, 47; the magazine system reduces the number of combatants, 48; his rigid economy, 48; his solicitude about transport, 49; no rapidity of movement possible under the magazine system, 50; difficulties which arose in 1758, 51; did not neglect to make use of the resources of the enemy's country, 52; ideas on starving the enemy, 52; how to forage, 53; collecting dry forage, 54; the other armies copy his system, 55; difference between his system of subsistence and Napoleon's, 56; his troops always kept within bounds of discipline, 57; condemns winter campaigns, 139; opposed to wars distant from the natural frontiers, 139

G

Gladstone dislikes the idea of a war with Russia, 163

Goltz on the size of modern armies, 49

Grant, effect of his capture of Vicksburg, 194; importance of the victory of Chattanooga, 198; explains his plan to Butler, 203; his depôt at City Point, 211

Great Britain likely to be attacked by land, 7

Gustavus Adolphus sides with the protestants of Germany, 22; strength of his forces in 1630, 25; care of his troops, 26; enforces a strict discipline, 27; defeats Tilly at Breitenfeld and

on the Lech, 28; occupies Nürnberg 29; quits Nürnberg and falls at Lützen, 30

H

Health of troops a most weighty factor in war, 2; feeding troops will lessen the number of sick, 2

History lessons of the past must be turned to profit, 14; must turn to them to find principles, 20

Home (Colonel Robert), importance of the subject of provisioning, 2

I

Indian Mutiny, its causes, 174; revolt at Meerut, 176; the question of British supremacy decided at Delhi, 176

J

Jaffa, the French destroy everything in retreating from that town, 67

Jomini, his opinion of difficulty in subsisting armies in the field, 14; how Napoleon found provisions accumulated in rear by the enemy, 55

Junot invades Portugal, 75; tries to anticipate the British forces at Lisbon, 76; enters Lisbon at the head of a few soldiers, 77; fails to capture the Portuguese fleet, 78; his rashness and his neglect of his soldiers, 78; his inactivity at Valutina, 130

Kléber irritated by Bonaparte's sudden departure for France, 68; his complaints to the Directory, 68

Kutusoff waits for Napoleon at Borodino, 136; believes that winter alone will overthrow Napoleon, 145; refuses to stir when urged by Miloradowitch, 145

L

Lannes captures Melas's reserve magazine at Pavia, 74

Larrey, on the amount of provisions found at Moscow, 141; on the severity of the winter of 1812, 145; recrosses the bridge over the Berezina in quest of his instruments, 150; observations on the men who resisted the hardships of the retreat, 155; has the officers'

- horses killed after Wagram to give soup to the wounded, 276
- Lee*, unfurnished state of his army in 1862, 190; wishes to fight the Federals behind the North Anna, 191; advances into Pennsylvania to procure provisions, 195; sufferings of his troops in the winter of 1863-64, 199; tries to carry City Point and fails, 212; starving condition of his troops when he surrendered, 214
- Le Tellier* initiates his son in military administration, 32; retires from office, 33
- Line of march*, outline of the march of an army corps, 261; length of road occupied, 262
- Louvois*, his birth, 32; appointed to succeed his father in office, 32; excites in Louis XIV. a passion for military glory, 32; marries Anne de Souvré, 33; his endowments, 33; chafes at being chided by the king, 34; fathoms the defects of the French Army, 34; introduces promotion by seniority, 35; fixes the pay of the troops, 35; his efforts to secure their daily bread, 36; his special aptitude for preparations for war, 36; places the *Intendance* on a sound footing, 37; creates magazines, 37; their effect on the readiness of the French army, 38; his assistants, 38; purchases a large quantity of munitions from the Dutch, 39; his journeys along the frontier, 40; makes himself obnoxious to Turenne, 40; gives wrong advice to Louis XIV., 41; his ideas as to the best way of raising funds, 41; is adverse to wars conducted far from the frontier, 42; upholds the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 42; his ultimate unpopularity with the king, 43; monuments he left behind him, 43
- M
- McClellan*, his supply dépôt at White House in 1862, 188; White House abandoned, 188; reasons for not renewing the attack at Antietam, 189
- McMurdo* raises a land transport for the Crimean War, 171
- Magazines*, subsistence mainly drawn from them, 264
- Marbot* searches a road that turns the heights of Alcoba, 87; testifies to Davout's arrangements for the maintenance of the 1st Corps, 114; accuses the Poles of not having helped the French army in 1812, 118; charges Napoleon with having lowered the tone of the French army by mingling with it large masses of foreign troops, 120; losses in horses in the Russian campaign, 135; considers that provisions for six months were saved from the conflagration of Moscow, 140; describes the state of the Grande Armée, 150; the deserted bridges over the Beresina, 150; condition of the 23rd Chasseurs, 151; refutes charges of cannibalism, 154; losses of the French army in Russia, 156; losses in his own regiment, 156
- Martinet* selected by Louvois to superintend the discipline in the infantry, 35
- Massaja*, proud nature of the Negus Theodore, 233; observations on the British expedition to Abyssinia, 241
- Massena* besieged by Ott in Genoa, 70; selected to command the third invasion of Portugal, 82; his deserved reputation, 82; his difficulties in provisioning, 82; difference on this point between the British and the French armies, 83; objections to levying contributions, 86; advances unwillingly, 86; takes the roads by the mountains of Viseu, 87; refuses to believe it possible to turn the ridges of the Alcoba, 87; rejects Ney's and Reynier's advice to retire from Portugal, 88; marches to Boialva, 88; does not pursue the British forces, 88; comes in sight of the defences of Torres Vedras, 89; his generals opposed to an attack of the lines, 90; takes up a position at Santarem and Rio Mayor, 90; his troops establish a system of raids to procure provisions, 91; decides to send a portion of his army across the Tagus, 92; driven to tap the districts in his rear, 93; precarious state of the communications, 93; urged to retire into Spain, 94; commences his retreat, 94
- Miloradowitch* sends Wilson to summon Kutusoff to his aid, 145
- Miot de Melito* credits Monge with the first conception of the expedition to Egypt, 65
- Mohammed*, his dogma of fighting in the cause of God, 249
- Moltke* on the efficient alimentation of the German Army in the war of 1870-71, 215
- N
- Napoleon* considers nothing can replace health in war, 3; to concentrate

- to fight, to disperse for subsisting, 14; operates without magazines in 1805, 56; no cordiality amongst his marshals, 90; his estimate of Suchet's abilities, 96; motives for the campaign of 1812, 118; his knowledge of details, 119; his endless capacity for work, 120; the Grande Armée crosses the frontier, 120; difficulties in providing food for his army, 121; magazines formed at Dantzic and at Königsberg, 122; his arrangements for the land transport, 122; bad state of the roads, 123; the cavalry begins to experience lack of forage, 124; many of the resources collected abandoned after crossing the Niemen, 124; too great rapidity of movement, 125; a storm kills a number of horses, 125; the Russians retire, burning or carrying away everything, 126; plunder restricted to articles of food, 127; intended utilization of the water-ways, 127; hurries his troops to Wilna to overtake the Russians, 128; halts there to reorganize his transport and supplies, 128; hopes a victory will restore the efficiency of his army, 129; all villages and cities destroyed by the population, 129; the advantages of the actions of Bobruisk and Valutina lost, 130; irritated by Poniatowski's complaints, 130; halts at Witebsk, 131; his officers opposed to a further advance, 132; appears to contemplate spending the winter at Witebsk, 132; the army continues to advance, 132; battle of Krasnoe, 133; the army enters Smolensk, 133; heavy losses between August 18 and September 7, 135; proclamation before the battle of Borodino, 136; heavy losses in that battle, 137; hopes to conclude peace at Moscow, 140; decides to quit Moscow, 141; no proper preparations made for a retreat, 142; abandons the direction of Kalouga, and retires on Smolensk, 144; few supplies on that road, 144; the troops suffer, 144; serious storm overtakes the army after quitting Wiazma, 145; the number of victims becomes large, 145; the army loses its formation, 146; disorders of the French on reaching Smolensk, 146; disturbed by the non-appearance of Ney, 147; appearance of the French army after the crossing of the Beresina, 150; disorders at Wilna, 153; want of discipline amongst his troops, 154
- Napoleon III.* becomes Emperor of the French, 162
- Ney*, want of bread makes him urge a return of the army to Strain, 86; opposed to an attack of the position of Torres Vedras, 90; quits Smolensk and fights the Russians at Krasnoe, 147; retires beyond the Dnieper, 147; rejoins Napoleon at Orcha, 147; his heroism during the retreat from Moscow, 155
- Nicholas I.* proposes a division of the Ottoman Empire, 162; the Russian fleet destroys the Turkish at Synope, 162
- Nile expedition*, General Gordon sent to withdraw the garrisons of the Sudan, 248; power of Mohammed Ahmed (the Mahdi), 249; Gordon's influence on the people lost by the religious revival, 250; he does not take sufficient account of the great change in the country, 250; forms the idea of retaining the Sudan, 250; possibility of quitting Khartum, 251; the loss of Berber, 252; dispute as to the best route for reaching Khartum, 252; the alternative routes, 253; little resources in the Upper Nile districts, 253; the mass of the food sent from England, 255; line of communications, 256; how the troops advancing from Korti were supplied, 256
- O
- Officers*, special advancement needed to obtain young officers, 10; their education, 13
- Outram*, his forces return from Persia to India, 176
- Pack or valises* must be carried, 291
- Palmerston* (Lord) overcomes the scruples of his colleagues, and combines with the Emperor of the French, 163
- Peace party* in England denounces war, 161
- Peninsular War*, failure in provisioning the troops, 6
- Portuguese* suspected of provisioning Massena's troops, 92; do not comply with the order to carry off all provisions on the approach of the French, 93
- Portuguese Government* orders the destruction of all available resources, 85
- Preserved provisions*, principal conditions they should satisfy, 294; their advantages, 295; they aim at a reduction of the transport, 295; never found no

large quantities in the theatre of war, 297

Provisions carried by the Athenian and Roman soldier, 289

Provision-trains and emergency rations, 264

Prussian Army in 1854-55, 172; attention paid to all matters connected with their forces, 173

Purchase by the troops themselves, 271; ready money required to work this system properly, 274

Q

Quartering on the inhabitants, a risky measure to pursue when the enemy is still in a position to keep the field, 263

R

Raglan (Lord), appointed to command the British forces in the East, 163

Railways have not done away with the necessity for animal transport, 285

Rations scale to serve as a guide, 292; fresh rations easily spoilt, 292

Requisitions made to meet immediate wants or to fill magazines, 271; what officers should be permitted to make demands, 273

Resources of the theatre of war cannot be entirely utilized by an army marching rapidly through it, 267; impossibility of feeding numerous troops on the local produce alone, 268

Russell (Sir W. H.), shows the real state of affairs in the Crimea, 169

Saint-Jean d'Acre, the French troops arrive before it, 67; the siege raised, 67

Saint-Priest, attacked and killed at Rheims, 263

Saint-Simon remarks on Louvois's character, 31; praise of Vauban, 37; Louis XIV. irritated against Louvois, 43

Schellendorf, opinion on the difficulty of subsisting armies in the field, 14

Schérer pictures to the Directory the miserable state of the Army of Italy, 59

Schwartzenberg allows the army of Wallachia to pass, 152

Ségur describes how the French troops provided for their subsistence, 134;

reduction of the Russian corps through the intense cold, 160

Sherman captures Atlanta, 205; his march through Georgia to the sea, 206; marches to Goldsboro and devastates South Carolina, 209

Sick, their number reduced by, feeding the troops well, 2

Sobieski defeats the Turks in 1674, 4

Suchet, his birth and career, 95;

Napoleon's estimate of his ability, 96; solicitude for the subsistence of his troops, 96; appointed to command the 3rd Corps, 97; ordered to rely on the revenues of the country, 97; Aragon impoverished by the war, 97; he draws around him the influential people of the province, 98; its financial condition, 98; remits eight millions of francs to the public treasury at Madrid, 99; ordered to take possession of Tortosa, 99; succeeds in forming magazines and organizing a transport, 100; his administrative measures, 101; opposed to the system of contracts, 101; procures meat from France, 101; steps taken for the siege of Tarragona, 102; improves the communications with France, 102; state of the province of Valencia, 102; conciliates its inhabitants, 103; financial results of his administration, 103; French armies badly provided with funds, 104; sieges he conducted in a period of six years, 105; the 3rd Corps curtailed to supply troops for the Russian campaign, 105; trophies captured from the enemy, 106

Supply of food cannot be guided by fixed rules, 260; the state of daily motion makes the provisioning of an army difficult, 262; several methods for meeting the needs of the troops, 262; labour in bringing up provisions from the rear, 269; a combination of methods found in most campaigns, 275; campaign of 1809, 275; a sketch of the system of provisioning to be pursued to be made before the troops take the field, 277; effects of the harvest on abundance and scarcity, 281; conciliating the people in their own interest, 281; obtaining provisions from foreign markets, 288

T

Tchichagoff, want of unanimity between the Russian generals in 1812, 145; fifteen hundred of his vehicles captured by Castex's brigade, 151

Theodore (the Negus), his pride, 233; his system of warfare, 237; reduces his country to a state of misery, 238

Thiers refutes Kléber's accusations against Bonaparte, 69; losses of the French army in the Russian campaign, 156

Tilly defeated and mortally wounded, 28

Transport, indispensable to feed an army, 17; arguments for separating transport from supply, 282

Treviso (Duke of) urges Napoleon to adopt a more methodical march, 131

V

Vauban on the art of provisioning, 3; how troops, being without bread, lived on plunder, 36

W

Wallenstein at Nürnberg, 29

Weight carried by the foot soldier, 291; how distributed, 291

Wellington (also Sir A. Wellesley), enters Spain in 1809, 79; receives no help from the Spanish juntas, 79; gives notice that he will withdraw his army, 79; his soldiers fight at Talavera in a starving condition, 80; their privations, 80; retires into Portugal, 81; his views on the necessity for a good system of supply, 81; attaches great importance to the transport, 81; battle of Busaco, 87; Sierra de Busaco turned, 88; orders the construction of the lines of Torres Vedras, 89; accused of having lost good opportunities for attacking the French, 94

Wilson (Sir Robert), the French fail in gaining the friendship of the population of Egypt, 69; exodus of the inhabitants of Moscow, 138; opinion as to the amount of provisions saved from the burning of Moscow, 141; irritated by Kutnssoff's inactivity, 145; estimate of the Russian losses in pursuing the French, 159

Wolseley, his endeavours to send a relief expedition to Khartum, 252



